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#### Will pass, PC key – Obama Pushing

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[Dan ,CNN, Obama pushes expedited timetable on immigration reform in meeting with faith leaders, 3/8/13, <http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/08/obama-pushes-expedited-timetable-on-immigration-reform-in-meeting-with-faith-leaders/>]

President Barack Obama emphasized the need to get immigration reform accomplished this year in a meeting with a diverse group of faith leaders at the White House on Friday. Religious leaders that attended the meeting said the president spent more than an hour with them, and after making a few remarks at the top of the meeting he let each group discuss their priorities and problems with comprehensive immigration reform. During the discussion, these faith leaders said, Obama made it clear that he wanted to see a bill on immigration reform in the next 60 days. “I really sensed that this is a high priority for him,” Jim Wallis, president of Sojourners, a Christian social justice group, told CNN. “We are all looking at something being introduced this month and then the bill passing in May or June. We are all hoping that kind of time frame could work.” Since winning reelection in 2012, the Obama administration has made it clear that immigration reform is a top priority for the president’s second term – and something they want to see quick action on. According to people who attended the meeting, in attendance, the president reiterated that support and laid out a timetable for the religious leaders. Wallis, who has spearheaded a group of evangelical leaders on immigration reform, said that Obama particularly mentioned the importance of faith leaders in the immigration debate. “He said that while every issue has politics, but on this question, it really was am moral issue to him and he sees the faith community as lifting that up,” Wallis said. “He was really fervent about the role of faith in this debate.” “This was the broadest, most well-rounded group of folks that I have ever met with on this issue,” said Stephan Bauman, the president of World Relief. “And pretty much everyone in the room had a chance to share their opinion on the issue.” In addition to Wallis and Bauman, both evangelical leaders, representatives from the Jewish, Muslim, Mormon and Catholic faiths were in attendance. Bauman and Wallis said this was not only a religiously diverse group, but also politically diverse. The Christian leaders said that politically, the group represented both liberal and conservative political traditions. “This was not a bunch of left-leaning religious groups,” Wallis said. A source who attended the meeting provided the full list of attendees to CNN: Leith Anderson, National Association of Evangelicals Stephan Bauman, President and CEO, World Relief Bishop Minerva Carcaño, United Methodist Church Rev. Luis Cortés, President, Esperanza Barrett Duke, Southern Baptist Convention Bishop Orlando Findlayter, Senior Pastor, New Hope Christian Fellowship Archbishop José Horacio Gomez, Archdiocese of Los Angeles Mark Hetfield, President and CEO, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Rev. Kathryn Lohre, National Council of Churches Imam Mohamed Magid, President, Islamic Society of North America Rev. Samuel Rodriguez, President, National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference Rev. Gabriel Salguero, President, National Latino Evangelical Coalition Dieter Uchtdorf, Second Counselor, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Jim Wallis, President and CEO, Sojourners Cecilia Muñoz, Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council In a statement about the meeting, the White House thanked the religious leaders for their attendance and said the group talked about how they could work to "swiftly pass... a commonsense immigration reform bill." "The President and the leaders discussed the pillars the President has put forward for reform, including that any bill must include a pathway to earned citizenship, as well as measures to crack down on employers who game the system and exploit both American and immigrant workers, continuing to strengthen our border security, and strengthening the legal immigration system for families, employers, and workers," the statement said. At the end of the meeting, the group offered a prayer, according to the White House. Some faith leaders have long called for comprehensive immigration reform, but demand for reform has increased in the last few months. “I think we have a window of opportunity in these first months of 2013,” Richard Land, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, told CNN in January. “I think there is a real, new conversation on immigration reform.”

#### OCS drilling drains capital

Orth 11 (Derek Orth, J.D. expected May 2012, Rutgers School of Law (Newark, N.J.); Managing Articles Editor for the Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal, 2011 University of Oregon, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 26 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 509, Lexis, 2011)

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The Deepwater Horizon was constructed in 2001 and was "capable of operating in water up to 8,000 feet deep and able to drill down to 30,000 feet." n6 The disaster occurred while Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (Halliburton) was mounting production casing and [\*512] cement on a 5,000 feet deep exploratory well in the Macondo Prospect. Ironically, integrity tests were due to be performed on the Macondo well at the time the explosion occurred, after which the well would have been capped until BP was prepared to begin extraction operations. n7¶ Tragically, the fiery explosion that occurred onboard the Deepwater Horizon threw BP's plans into disarray, resulting in eleven deaths, n8 millions of barrels of spewing oil, n9 and immense damage to the Gulf Coast. n10 The subsequent proliferation of monetary claims, lawsuits, and legislation n11 has raised numerous issues that stand to forever alter the regulatory structure of the offshore oil industry n12 as well as the liability schemes of international oil companies operating in the United States' coastal waters. n13¶ A bill's passage through Congress is fraught with danger at every turn. In general, most bills are submitted by individual members of Congress, examined and voted upon by specialized committees, presented to both the House and Senate for approval, and, finally, submitted to the President for his signature. Thus, a well-meaning and complex bill can often only gain approval through an expenditure of serious political capital by at least one party or the occurrence of an event that exerts public pressure on both political parties to react expediently and deal with the crisis. n14

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations and economic growth in China and India.

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war.

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

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#### Offshore renewables are competitive – plan locks us in to fossil fuels

Conathan 13 (Michael, Director of Ocean Policy – Center for American Progress, “Filling the Sails of Offshore Wind Energy,” Center for American Progress, 1-31, [http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2013/01/31/ 51280/filling-the-sails-of-offshore-wind-energy/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2013/01/31/%2051280/filling-the-sails-of-offshore-wind-energy/))

But our potential is so much greater. “Drill now, drill everywhere” is a closed-minded strategy of the past. And with every day that goes by as we continue to focus on fossil fuels for energy, we fall further behind the rest of the world in the quest to diversify our offshore energy portfolio. By continuing to prioritize yesterday’s technologies, we are locking ourselves into an energy future that dooms our climate, harms our environment, and sacrifices human health. The costs of coal, oil, and natural gas have all been kept artificially cheap by government subsidies and by our failure to make polluters pay for the negative effects of their emissions. Artificially lowering the price of these commodities slants the playing field, making it harder for new clean energy sources to compete in the marketplace. As America has stood on the sidelines, other countries such as Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, and even China have leapt ahead of us in developing one particularly strong—and commercially viable—renewable resource, which the United States also happens to have in abundance: **offshore wind**. As of June 2012 the rest of the world boasted 4,619 megawatts of total installed offshore wind energy capacity. Meanwhile, we have not even begun construction of our first offshore turbine. Lack of a clear regulatory structure, inconsistent messages from other ocean stakeholders, congressional budget battles, opposition to specific project siting, and instability in financial markets have all played a role in preventing domestic offshore wind from becoming a reality. Much of this has **changed under President Barack Obama’s leadership**. In February 2011 the Departments of Energy and the Interior announced the intention to develop 54 gigawatts of offshore wind capacity by 2030, and the United States is closing the gap between our domestic offshore wind industry and those of the rest of the world. In 2012 alone the administration and Congress made major strides toward encouraging renewable energy development on the Outer Continental Shelf: In November 2012 the Department Of the Interior announced the first-ever competitive sales on the outer continental shelf for offshore wind energy. This allows potential developers to bid on 277,550 acres in two wind energy areas—one off the coast of Virginia and another off the coasts of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. These areas are expected to be able to support more than 4,000 megawatts of wind generation—enough electricity to power an estimated 1.4 million homes. In October 2012 the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management signed its first lease under the “Smart from the Start” program with developer NRG Bluewater Wind, giving them rights to build a wind farm off the coast of Delaware. In May and August the bureau issued Determinations of No Competitive Interest for two cable routes to transmit power—one for the Atlantic Wind Connection off the mid-Atlantic seaboard and another for the Deepwater Wind Block Island project off Rhode Island. And in December 2012, the bureau began leasing and approving site assessment/characterization environmental assessments off the coast of Georgia and North Carolina. In December 2012 the Department Of Energy announced that it will fund seven offshore wind technology demonstration projects, including Fishermen’s Atlantic City Windfarm in New Jersey; technology projects in California, the Great Lakes, Connecticut, and Maine; and two turbines off the coast of Virginia. The recipients are eligible for up to $4 million each in project-development grants. The U.S. offshore wind industry is beginning to emerge from the political doldrums that clouded its early days, and it is finding champions in Congress, as well as in the Obama administration. Sen. Tom Carper (D-DE) led legislation to ensure that offshore wind is covered by key tax provisions that had previously only applied to onshore wind. Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) championed funding for offshore wind development, including a deepwater pilot project in her home state of Maine. Governors such as Martin O’Malley (D-MD) and Deval Patrick (D-MA) have prioritized offshore wind development as well. They view it as a political victory on multiple fronts—creating sorely needed jobs in construction, operation, and maintenance, and contributing to a diverse energy portfolio while moving us closer to renewable energy targets and away from polluting fossil fuels. As political opposition falls away from offshore wind projects, opponents are turning more toward economic arguments against further development of this technology, suggesting it will increase electricity rates and ultimately cost jobs. As with any new product or technology, the first U.S. offshore wind farm will undoubtedly face steeper costs of construction and development than its successors. But as the industry grows, experience, technological developments, and economies of scale will cause those costs to decline. Multiple studies of the offshore wind industry in Europe have shown that the “learning rate”—the rate at which the overall cost of offshore wind energy development declines over time—can be as high as 10 percent per year. The question is not, therefore, whether the cost of offshore wind energy will come down, **but rather how quickly**. Cost-reduction rates will depend heavily on the amount of upfront investment the industry receives, including investment from the federal government. The billions of dollars in subsidies spent on mature industries such as oil and gas would go further in growing the nascent renewable energy technologies, which can in turn keep us competitive in the global market and create high-quality green jobs that reduce our dependence on foreign oil and help forge a new energy future. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to truly level the playing field for offshore wind or any renewable energy technology, we must incorporate the cost externalities currently being ignored for oil, gas, and coal-fired power generation—most prominently the societal cost of pollution it generates, including the greenhouse gas emissions. Those who suggest Americans can’t afford to spend more for energy in the middle of an economic recovery are ignoring the fact that we are already spending more for our energy than the amount we see on our monthly utility bills or at the gas pump. We’re paying through Congress when we subsidize Big Oil. We’re paying at grocery stores when food prices increase as a result of an epic Midwestern drought. And we’re paying at hospitals as more of our children suffer from asthma and other maladies caused by unclean air. One of the catchphrases tossed around cavalierly in Washington by both parties is the need for an “all of the above” energy strategy. Conservatives say the president is failing to achieve this when he makes any decision not endorsed by the American Petroleum Institute. But the reality is no true “all of the above” strategy can be complete if it leaves out a commercially viable, renewable, and domestic resource that has the potential to make major contributions to our country’s energy needs and our economy without perpetuating the negative and uncounted effects of our fossil-fuel dependence. While no single energy source can turn back the tide of climate change that is already raising sea levels, acidifying our oceans, and contributing to extreme weather events, as President Obama said in his second Inaugural Address, a failure to respond to climate change “would betray our children and future generations.” Affordable domestic offshore wind can and must be a part of the response.

#### Key to US-EU relations

Abolotins, 11 [Energy policy analyst, Centre for public policy PROVIDUS Project director, Baltic Communication Partners Lt Director, Social Integration Department, Secretariat for the Special assignments Minister for Social Integration Baltic International Academy, European Studies Programme, author and lecturer of the course “International Human Rights, Contemporary Issues”. Riga Stradins University, Faculty of European Studies, author and lecturer of the course “International Human Rights and International Relations B.A. in Political Science, University of Latvia, Faculty of Philosophy and History, Department of Political Science Freedom House fellowship, Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations E.MA. in Human Rights and Democratisation, University of Padova and Raoul Wallenberg Human Rights Institute at the University of Lund USIA and US state Department visiting fellowship “Managing Cultural Diversity on Federal and state Level” (Washington D.C., Memphis, San Diego, Chicago)Chapter Six¶ The Future of Renewable Energy¶ Reinis Aboltins, signatransatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/publications/books/Transatlantic\_Energy\_Futures/ch06-Aboltins.pdf]

Signals for Energy and Energy Technology Markets¶ **long-term policy measures provide** clear signals to a number of segments in the energy sector: technology production, primary energy¶ production, as well as industrial and household consumption and¶ everything related to this. All of these industries adjust their strategies¶ and plans to such policy trends and decisions. If the policy emphasis is¶ on improving energy efficiency, then technology producers are going¶ to invest in improving the efficiency of technological processes of¶ energy producing systems. If the policy emphasis is on developing¶ wind power capacity, then producers can forecast the demand for new¶ and more effective wind turbines and wind park management systems.¶ Going green demands investment, clear market stimulus and longterm¶ policy vision. Even having all of the afore-mentioned does not¶ guarantee an overnight switchover from fossil to renewable energy.¶ There is no doubt that renewables will increase their market share of¶ total energy consumption over the coming years, but they are not¶ likely to displace the use of fossil fuels any time soon. This is because¶ of much higher supply costs and requirement for vast tracts of land¶ and water surfaces. Just to give an example: between 1990 and 2004,¶ the contribution of renewables in meeting the total primary energy¶ requirements of EU countries rose from 4.5% to 6.5%, from 12.0%¶ to 14.5% for electricity generation, including hydro, and from 0.8%¶ to 5.0% for electricity generation, excluding hydro. The corresponding¶ numbers for North America show a decrease from 6.5% to 5.9%¶ per cent for total primary energy, 18.6% to 15.3% for electricity generation,¶ including hydro, and from 3.0% to 2.4% for electricity generation,¶ excluding hydro.15¶ Infrastructure is one of the great challenges for the energy sector in¶ terms of the scale of necessary action stemming from policies; the¶ investment required to develop new infrastructure and renovate or¶ replace the existing infrastructure (energy production, transmission¶ and distribution/upstream and downstream); and the ever closer cooperation¶ and synergies between a multitude of sectors of economy that¶ are in one or another way related to energy, including energy consumption¶ for industrial production.¶ Funding and Institutional Support¶ Both the EU and the U.S. have support measures in place for various¶ energy types. Similarly both markets provide huge amounts of¶ financing for research and development (U.S. Department of Energy¶ (DoE) programs and EU Seventh Framework Programme (FP7)).¶ In the U.S. the renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (rE&EE)¶ Advisory Committee was established by Secretary of Commerce Gary¶ locke in November 2010 as part of the renewable Energy and¶ Energy Efficiency Export Initiative, which has set a goal of doubling¶ renewable energy exports in the next five years, targeting $10 billion¶ or more in annual export benefits. In September 2011 rE&EE Advi- sory Committee presented 11 recommendations to promote U.S.¶ exports of renewable and efficiency technologies to federal officials.16¶ The recommendations are the first set of actions the Committee was¶ able to recommend to ensure robust growth in the renewable energy¶ and energy efficiency exports by U.S. companies.17¶ In 2012 the total proposed budget for the U.S. DoE, which is the¶ lead financial supporter of energy r&D in the United States, is $29.5¶ billion18, with $3.2 billion going to the Office of Energy Efficiency¶ and renewable Energy (EErE) and $550 million to the Advanced¶ research Projects Agency–Energy (ArPA-E). This would represent¶ an 11.8% increase over 2010. Critics point out, however, that compared¶ to global investment in renewable energy research and development¶ in 2010, when governments invested in renewable r&D alone¶ more than $5 billion, the United States invested the same amount for¶ all energy r&D during the same period.19 Additional energy r&D and early commercialization funding is¶ also provided through tax benefits, grants, loans and contracts created¶ by the American recovery and reinvestment Act (ArrA) of 2009.¶ This stimulus legislation created $260 billion in energy tax credits for¶ companies and consumers with the goal of improving the market penetration¶ and share of efficient and clean energy technologies.¶ The EU’s funding for research is channeled through its Framework¶ Programme 7 (FP7), the total budget of which is approximately €50¶ billion from 2007 until 2013. Funding for energy research in 2011 was¶ €216.9 million and will reach EUr €314 million in 2012 and an additional¶ EUr €413 million during the last year of the current FP7. The¶ total volume for energy research over the complete course of FP7 will¶ amount to EUr €2.197 billion. More than 30 states in the U.S. have financial incentives that subsidize¶ the installation of renewable energy equipment. Net metering¶ programs are in place in over 40 states allowing to pay for the net¶ amount of electricity consumed, thus facilitating installation of microgenerating¶ equipment for private use. Feed-in tariffs are widely used¶ in the EU and also in a number of states in the U.S. specifically to¶ support development and installation of certain types of renewable¶ energy technologies. Most of EU member states have legislation that sets framework and¶ specific conditions for energy production from renewable sources¶ along with energy efficiency measures. Priority issues in the EU are¶ quite definitively related to the set 20-20-20 targets: energy efficiency,¶ decrease of GHG emissions and a significant increase of renewable¶ energy share in energy consumption. A very recent initiative of the¶ European Commission foresees introduction of a new energy efficiency¶ and savings directive. It has been put on the table because the¶ Commission thinks that the current legislation does not provide the¶ desired results and more stringent and compulsory measures have to¶ be introduced to be able to achieve 20% higher energy efficiency by¶ the target date. The new legislation, when adopted, would set binding¶ energy efficiency measures for state and municipal institutions and¶ large energy consumers. State and municipal institutions would be¶ obliged to renovate 3% of their building stock annually and industrial¶ consumers would have to undergo energy efficiency audits every three¶ years. The Commission believes that these and other binding measures¶ would help achieve the 20% energy efficiency and CO2 emission¶ reduction targets for 2020. Climate and Economic Growth Dichotomy¶ Climate change and economic growth are two notions that are¶ often interrelated in public rhetoric. Typically there are two schools¶ with opposite views on the relationship between the two issues: one¶ says that green energy imposes too much of a socio-economic burden¶ (because green energy has to be subsidized in one or another way, but¶ often through tariffs) and hampers economic growth (because green¶ technologies cost more, demand higher investment and pay back over¶ a longer time than fossil energy technologies); the other view propa- gates climate-friendly development of energy industry, the essence of¶ which can be summarized under the green growth slogan. The EU¶ pursues the rhetoric of climate change with generally higher enthusiasm¶ than the U.S., where the “change” and “no change” dichotomy is¶ more pronounced and controversial. However, regardless of ideologically¶ motivated positions or the interests of industrial lobby groups on¶ climate change, there is a general consensus that the least that can be¶ done is being more effective in energy use. There are energy industry sectors that do not exactly represent¶ renewable energy as we understand it, but are very much in favor of¶ achieving climate targets. The nuclear power industry is often mentioned¶ as one potential solution to climate change processes. It is¶ indeed true that nuclear power does not produce CO2 emissions and¶ thus can contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions. However,¶ nuclear is not renewable, at least in traditional terms and it also has¶ issues that do not have a solution currently— nuclear waste has to be¶ buried somewhere and there is no guarantee that the depositories will¶ remain intact for thousands of years to come. Finally, renewable¶ energy is definitely a priority choice for the reduction of GHG and¶ mitigation of the impact of energy production on climate. Keywords: Competition and Cooperation¶ Global economic processes have contributed to both competition¶ and cooperation between the EU and the U.S. Close economic and¶ financial ties produce both opportunities and risks. This is true also¶ about the EU– U.S. energy relations: competition and cooperation,¶ opportunities and risks go hand in hand. On the one hand there has¶ not been much discussion of European energy security in the United¶ States, and thus the energy security debate centers around the possibility¶ that the U.S. could be more self-sufficient in terms of energy¶ supplies. On the other hand the recent eurozone crisis, with its risk of¶ contagion to the United States, exposes the level of linkage between¶ the two economies. For example, if a large-scale gas crisis were to¶ occur in Europe partially shutting down production in Europe, then¶ the U.S. also would be vulnerable to economic instability. Increasing¶ transatlantic cooperation and ensuring European energy security¶ would help to minimize the economic impact that such an adverse event would have on the U.S. Thus, in order to ensure its own economic¶ security, the United States needs to bolster these efforts by¶ strengthening energy cooperation with the European Union.¶ Both the EU and the U.S. invest heavily in energy-related research¶ and development. The reason is quite clear: investment today in the¶ development of better ways to handle extraction of energy resources,¶ energy production or energy use is almost certain to lead to mid- and¶ long-term gains. As commercially available fossil resources become¶ scarce and renewables are growing in terms of sources and means of¶ application, the efficient use of technologies used and organization of¶ energy systems become not only more complex but more clearly¶ geared to being sustainable. Some EU countries are keen to develop¶ the ideology and principles of green growth, in essence emphasizing¶ that economic growth does not have to come with depletion and or¶ inefficient use of resources and or environmental pollution, e.g. greenhouse¶ gas emissions, degradation of biodiversity, etc. Energy security provides a dominating context for any further¶ energy policy debate on both sides of the Atlantic. A good deal of discussion¶ is centered around decreasing the dependence on imported¶ fossil energy resources as well as more efficient use of energy¶ resources. Nevertheless, it is clear that renewable energy will stay high¶ on the policy agenda as an important means to increase energy independence¶ from foreign supplies in a world of energy price volatility,¶ particularly with regard to fossil resources.¶ The remaining question on the agenda is which renewables have¶ the best effect on energy production in particular circumstances and¶ how effective different kind of renewables can be. Natural gas is still¶ better than biomass in terms of effectiveness and environmental¶ impact.20 In the U.S. the effectiveness of natural gas has facilitated use¶ of shale gas in energy production, leaving questions only about the technology of extraction. On paper biomass has no CO2 emissions,¶ but in reality natural gas is 3-5 times more effective and produces 3¶ times less CO2 emissions than biomass.21 On the other hand, biomass¶ is a resource that can be produced locally and is renewable: there is¶ abundance of biomass available from a number of sectors like forestry¶ and agriculture, to name but a few; and biomass CHPs can contribute¶ to local economy through distributed power generation.¶ Expansion of the renewable segment goes hand in hand with¶ improvement in production management systems and transmission of¶ electricity. This is where modern power management comes into play¶ in the form of deployment of smart grids, smart metering and good¶ interconnections that are essential for managing an energy system¶ with a multitude of various energy sources feeding energy into the¶ grid. Distributed power generation and also microgeneration add to¶ the complexity of tackling unstable wind power capacity and¶ hydropower, which depend on the hydrological situation in their natural¶ or artificial water reservoirs.¶ Further development of rES also depends on continued support,¶ starting with r&D in the field of renewable energy and ending with¶ managing grids with big renewable capacities connected. It is quite¶ clear that deployment of smart grids in big and complex energy systems¶ will take a lot of time and the existing power management and¶ transmission systems need a lot of investment for being up-to-date¶ anyway. With an increasing number of rES energy producing units¶ connected to the grids, both the U.S. and EU member states are going¶ to need massive investment in national transmission systems just to¶ keep them up-to-date and able to handle varying power capacity.¶ Technology producers in the EU and the U.S. have opportunities for¶ competition and also for cooperation in this regard. renewable energy technologies similarly to some of the fossil technologies¶ need relatively high upfront investment, therefore predictable¶ and clear financial incentives have to be in place to make renewable energy attractive to the investors. In addition to contributing¶ to diversification of energy mix and tackling the climate issues,¶ investments in rES have to produce payout. Furthermore, newer rES¶ technologies have to become commercially available and viable. For¶ example, estimates by the U.S. Department of Energy state that wind¶ power has the potential to cover at least 20% of electricity production¶ in the U.S. by year 2030, reaching 300GW.22 Concentrated solar¶ power, as well as photovoltaic electricity production, also has a very¶ good potential to become an essential part of the national electricity¶ production mix already by 2020 both in the U.S. and the European¶ Union. Most renewable sources that are currently commercially available¶ also contribute to reducing climate change stemming from¶ energy production from fossil resources. At the same time, energy efficiency¶ has to become a household phrase, because it makes little sense¶ to produce energy from renewables if such energy is simply wasted.¶ renewables are very much seen as part of the solution of energy¶ security risks, along with clean coal and nuclear power. Oil and natural¶ gas are certainly not to disappear from the energy menu, but might¶ gradually give up part of their share. The U.S. and the EU are far¶ from switching over from oil to renewable petrol in the transport sector,¶ however, the share of biofuels is growing because of both marketdriven¶ choices and legislation requirements demanding an increase in¶ biofuels in transport fuel mix. The role of electricity in transport is¶ growing, also thus giving way to energy produced from renewable¶ sources, be those wind, solar or hydro. Better commercial availability¶ of microgeneration technologies combined with net metering and¶ smart grids may well do the trick of more widespread use of electricity-¶ powered vehicles. Given the amount of funding for energy r&D and specifically¶ renewable energy r&D on both sides of the Atlantic optimistic forecasts¶ can be made about the potential for both competition and cooperation.¶ While more competition can be expected on the commercial¶ side, the regulatory and legislative framework set by decision makers can contribute to ever closer cooperation between the two key players¶ on the global energy stage.

#### Extinction

Stivachtis 10 – Director of International Studies Program @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Dr. Yannis. A. Stivachtis (Professor of Poli Sci @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute & Ph.D. in Politics & International Relations from Lancaster University), THE IMPERATIVE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION,” The Research Institute for European and American Studies, 2010, pg. <http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/78.html>]

There is no doubt that US-European relations are in a period of transition, and that the stresses and strains of globalization are increasing both the number and the seriousness of the challenges that confront transatlantic relations. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War have added significantly to these stresses and strains. At the same time, international terrorism, the nuclearization of North Korea and especially Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transformation of Russia into a stable and cooperative member of the international community, the growing power of China, the political and economic transformation and integration of the Caucasian and Central Asian states, the integration andstabilization of the Balkan countries, the promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, poverty, climate change, AIDS and other emergent problems and situations require further cooperation among countries at the regional, global and institutional levels. Therefore, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is more imperative than ever to deal effectively with these problems. It is fair to say that the challenges of crafting a new relationship between the U.S. and the EU as well as between the U.S. and NATO are more regional than global, but the implications of success or failure will be global. The transatlantic relationship is still in crisis, despite efforts to improve it since the Iraq War. This is not to say that differences between the two sides of the Atlantic did not exist before the war. Actually, post-1945 relations between Europe and the U.S. were fraught with disagreements and never free of crisis since the Suez crisis of 1956. Moreover, despite trans-Atlantic proclamations of solidarity in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. and Europe parted ways on issues from global warming and biotechnology to peacekeeping and national missile defense. Questions such as, the future role of NATO and its relationship to the common European Security and Defense policy (ESDP), or what constitutes terrorism and what the rights of captured suspected terrorists are, have been added to the list of US-European disagreements. There are two reasons for concern regarding the transatlantic rift. First, if European leaders conclude that Europe must become counterweight to the U.S., rather than a partner, it will be difficult to engage in the kind of open search for a common ground than an elective partnership requires. Second, there is a risk that public opinion in both the U.S. and Europe will make it difficult even for leaders who want to forge a new relationship to make the necessary accommodations. If both sides would actively work to heal the breach, a new opportunity could be created. A vibrant transatlantic partnership remains a real possibility, but only if both sides make the necessary political commitment. There are strong reasons to believe that the security challenges facing the U.S. and Europe are more shared than divergent. The most dramatic case is terrorism. Closely related is the common interest in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the nuclearization of Iran and North Korea. This commonality of threats is clearly perceived by publics on both sides of the Atlantic.

Actually, Americans and Europeans see eye to eye on more issues than one would expect from reading newspapers and magazines. But while elites on both sides of the Atlantic bemoan a largely illusory gap over the use of military force, biotechnology, and global warming, surveys of American and European public opinion highlight sharp differences over global leadership, defense spending, and the Middle East that threaten the future of the last century’s most successful alliance. There are other important, shared interests as well. The transformation of Russia into a stable cooperative member of the international community is a priority both for the U.S. and Europe. They also have an interest in promoting a stable regime inUkraine. It is necessary for the U.S. and EU to form a united front to meet these challenges because first, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to WMD will fall into the wrong hands; and second, the spread of conflict along those countries’ periphery could destabilize neighboring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminal organizations. Likewise, in the Caucasus and Central Asia both sides share a stake in promoting political and economic transformation and integrating these states into larger communities such as the OSCE. This would also minimize the risk of instability spreading and prevent those countries of becoming havens for international terrorists and criminals. Similarly, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkans politically and economically. Dealing with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as other political issues in the Middle East are also of a great concern for both sides although the U.S. plays a dominant role in the region. Finally, US-European cooperation will be more effective in dealing with the rising power of China through engagement but also containment. The post Iraq War realities have shown that it is no longer simply a question of adapting transatlantic institutions to new realities. The changing structure of relations between the U.S. and Europe implies that a new basis for the relationship must be found if transatlantic cooperation and partnership is to continue. The future course of relations will be determined above all by U.S. policy towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of the evolving world together. But a policy that takes Europe for granted and routinely ignores or even belittles European concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits. There is no doubt that the U.S. and Europe have considerable potential to pursue common security interests. Several key steps must be taken to make this potential a reality. First, it is critical to avoid the trap of ‘division of labor’ in the security realm, which could be devastating for the prospects of future cooperation. Second, and closely related to avoiding division of labor as a matter of policy, is the crucial necessity for Europe to develop at least some ‘high-end’ military capabilities to allow European forces to operate effectively with the U.S. Third, is the need for both the U.S. and Europe to enhance their ability to contribute to peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Fourth, is the importance of preserving consensus at the heart of alliance decision-making. Some have argued that with the expansion of NATO, the time has come to reconsider the consensus role. One way to increase efficiency without destroying consensus would be to strengthen the role of the Secretary General in managing the internal and administrative affairs of the alliance, while reserving policy for the member states. Fifth is the need to make further progress on linking and de-conflicting NATO and EU capabilities. Sixth is the need for enhanced transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. Seventh, one future pillar for transatlantic cooperation is to strengthen US-European coordination in building the infrastructure of global governance through strengthening institutions such as the UN and its specialized agencies, the World Bank, the IFM, G-8, OECD and regional development banks. Finally, cooperation can also be achieved in strengthening the global economic infrastructure, sustaining the global ecosystem, and combating terrorism and international crime. To translate the potential of the transatlantic relationship into a more positive reality will require two kinds of development. First, the EU itself must take further steps to institutionalize its own capacity to act in these areas. Foreign policy and especially defense policy remain the areas where the future of a ‘European’ voice is most uncertain. Second, the U.S. and Europe need to establish more formal, effective mechanisms for consultation and even decision-making. The restoration of transatlantic relations requires policies and actions that governments on both sides of the Atlantic should simultaneously adopt and not only a unilateral change of course. Developing a new, sustainable transatlantic relationship requires a series of deliberate decisions from both the U.S. and EU if a partnership of choice and not necessity is to be established. For the U.S., this means avoiding the temptation, offered by unprecedented strength, to go it alone in pursuit of narrowly defined national interests. For the EU, the new partnership requires a willingness to accept that the EU plays a uniquely valuable role as a leader in a world where power still matters, and that a commitment to a rule-based international order does not obviate the need to act decisively against those who do not share that vision.

### 3

#### **The Aff’s acquisition of offshore resources for security causes serial policy failure and extinction**

Martens 11 (Emily, MA in Geography and Regional Studies – University of Miami, “The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida,” Open Access Theses, 5-10, http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa\_theses)

Amid growing concerns over access to reliable and cheap energy resources, on March 31, 2010 the Obama Administration announced the opening of additional exploratory and drilling sites for oil within the United States’ Outer Continental Shelf. The announcement of an Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy for 2012-2017 came only three weeks before the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, an event that marked an unprecedented economic and environmental disaster, spilling an estimated 5 million barrels (172 million gallons) of oil into the Gulf of Mexico over the course of 86 days. This oil disaster renewed concerns over the environmental impacts of offshore drilling – many of which remain unknown; offshore oil drilling, however, has been a concern of environmental activists and domestic energy policy makers for decades. Since the oil crises of 1970s the political rhetoric regarding access to energy resources has focused on the creation of domestic supplies that can reduce heavy dependence on imports from volatile or hostile foreign producers. Yet, the rhetoric of energy security emanating from policy making circles has been, since its beginning, internally constrained by a rhetoric of environmental protection, because of an oil spill in January 29, 1969 resulting from a blowout on a Union Oil Co. drilling platform six miles off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. Thus the opening of new spaces for the purpose of oil exploration and drilling under the rubric of domestic energy security, ranging from removing protected place status from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska to new offshore spaces along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, including the historically oil-rig free waters surrounding the state of Florida, has since been debated heavily in the public forum. 2 The impetus to open additional offshore spaces to oil drilling and selling more leases in offshore territory has been sustained by a dominant discourse of energy security that has called to expand the domestic oil supply in order to establish national energy independence and ensure access to cheap and “safe” energy supplies. More recently, this discourse has been lent urgency by geopolitical rearrangements that rendered US oil imports as an indirect means of funding terrorism and states hostile to the interests of the US. This discourse of energy security, however, is opposed to, and by an alternative expression of energy security emanating from the environmental movement — an environmental discourse of energy security that shares the goal of reducing the dependence of the US on foreign oil not by expanding domestic oil production but by reducing the dependence of the US on oil itself and therefore the development of alternative fuels. The fusion of energy security and environmental protection concerns has since the energy and environmental crises of the 1970s forged a policy aimed at creating environmentally safe extraction and production processes. The emphasis on cheap energy resources, however, has **come into contradiction** with requirements of costly regulation and oversight practices that are thought to better ensure environmental security. The attempt to reconcile offshore drilling with concerns about environmental protection during the Nixon and Carter years was torn asunder by the hostility to regulation during the Reagan and Clinton years. As a result, a heated debate developed between proponents of offshore oil drilling who argue that (unregulated) offshore oil drilling — and expanded domestic oil production in general — ensures energy security by making the United States energy independent and opponents of offshore oil drilling who do not 3 contest the goal of energy independence but who argue that this should not be at the expense of the protection of marine ecosystems and coastal economies from the destructive effects of offshore drilling, regulated or not. The debate, in other words, developed into a debate between a dominant discourse of energy security and a counter discourse of environmental security — at the core of it were questions of regulation as well as competing commercial interests. Though there are various actors and interests within each of these discourses, the primary tension between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling tends to reproduce the tensions embodied in the larger discourses of energy security and environmental security at different geographical scales. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the credence given to either one of these two security discourses at any given time is the result of broader socio-political forces and the changing ideologies within which they operate. Underlying both seemingly opposed discourses, however, is a common logic that informs the path they take and the language they use to establish legitimacy — the logic of the commodity — an abstract representation of space that supports this logic. This space, as Lefebvre (2007: 53) points out, “includes the ‘world of commodities’, its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state”. As will be shown in the following chapters, each of these competing discourses has organized its arguments around the logics of capitalism to gain public support and federal and local state protections. This is not an arbitrary association but rather the result of specific political developments in the US that have shaped environmental concerns, and the environment, according to free market principles. 4 Prior to the injection of neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization into the environment and discourses on the environment under the Reagan Administration, the Nixon and Carter Administrations were caught between an environmental movement, which attempted to create a new perspective from which human activity could be viewed in light of its often negative impacts on the environment – especially offshore oil drilling as a result of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill – and the volatility of the international oil market which threatened oil imports. The Nixon and Carter strategies attempted to balance the two agendas through the expansion of domestic oil production in tandem with regulations and oversight that would monitor the offshore oil industry’s compliance with environmental standards. This was thought and presented as a temporary measure. Ultimately the aim was to create alternative fuels in the not too distant future to replace oil, in light of evidence and concern that both the production and consumption of oil were proving to be detrimental to the environment which humans depended on for their own survival. Neoliberal restructuring under the Reagan Administration, however, promoted a market-based discourse of energy security above, or more precisely against the discourse of environmental security, advocating reduction of state oversights and reliance on market signals instead as the more efficient means to regulate offshore drilling. Environmental security, in the form of government oversight, became a threat to the accumulation of wealth — a source of insecurity. Instead, environmental security could be entrusted to the multiple interests operating in the free market. The argument rested on the neoliberal mantra that the government was not as efficient as private owners and the market in managing and protecting the environment. As a result, offshore oil drilling 5 activity has since enjoyed lax regulatory oversight, while day-to-day oil pollution continues to disrupt various ecological and economic activities that share ocean space. The fact that the question of environmental protection and regulation concerns productive activity in ocean space lends it additional complexity deriving both from the nature of ocean space itself, and how it has been historically perceived and constructed, and from the peculiar political system in the US that divides sovereignty between the federal government an the individual states. This shared sovereignty over ocean space has shaped the interaction of policy-makers at the state and Federal level in their attempt to promote policy reconciling economic imperatives and environmental concerns that differed across scale. This scalar tension finds its origin in the Submerged Lands Act that President Eisenhower signed in 1945, which gave coastal states sovereign rights over coastal territory extending three miles from the shore. In the case of Florida and Texas, where a rather extensive continental shelf exists on their gulf coasts, they were granted 10.3 miles of territory into the Gulf of Mexico, which was to acknowledge historical use claims. Complementary ocean laws between the state and federal government appear to acknowledge the uncontainable nature of the ocean environment which can carry pollutants horizontally across space, which exacerbates not only the tension between states and the federal government but also the varying interests of different coastal states with different economies and ecologies. Where the government of Florida, a state heavily dependent on revenues from tourism, has found it commercially necessary to keep the ocean territory free of oil pollutants, at least for now, the Federal government has implemented a moratorium that extends what can only be seen as a buffer surrounding the state of Florida in order to reduce the risk of oil pollutants washing ashore. In Texas 6 and Louisiana, on the other hand, whose economies are dependent on revenues from and employment in offshore oil drilling (despite some tourism, and fishing and shrimping interests in the latter), the coastal territory has developed into a site of extensive drilling and production, with an extensive network of pipelines strewn over the ocean floor. Florida’s coast, in contrast, is a protected area at both the state and Federal levels, with policy-makers at both levels acknowledging sensitive environments, such as the Everglades and a few marine sanctuaries that would be threatened by pollution from offshore oil activities and potential oil spills. But ocean space does not recognize political borders, and the shores of Florida are as susceptible to that ever present threat of a large oil spill as the spill from the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig might come to prove I found Florida to be a significant case for studying the interaction between the discourses of energy and environmental security and their perceived utility for ocean space because it allows for significant insight into the interaction between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling as well as how the logic of commodity comes to be expressed as a vital component in creating policies that protect commercially viable interests harnessed within the security discourses. Though a similar study could be done on California, I find the unique positioning of Florida in relation to the other Gulf States extremely intriguing, particularly due to Florida being the only state situated along the Gulf of Mexico to ban offshore oil drilling. Furthermore, the Gulf of Mexico is considered to be partially landlocked, which means that there is only one side that connects to the open ocean, where the rest is encapsulated by land. This means that pollution from offshore oil drilling would have to maneuver its way through the gulf, 7 possibly traveling around the Florida Peninsula on the Loop Current, before it would reach the open ocean. This situation is very unlike that of California, as there is no offshore oil production nearby to threaten its coasts. Though it would be an interesting point of departure to compare Florida’s offshore oil drilling policy and the reasons behind it with those of the other Gulf States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas, my primary concern in this thesis is to understand the interaction between the discourses of energy and environmental security which compete to define the utility of ocean space and its relationship to society. The case study of Florida is significant, as it allows an analysis of how the security debate in crosses between the federal and state levels, and is not simply reiterated but is also localized, made pertinent to specifically local concerns. Secondly, the case of Florida allows a look into a state that has managed to successfully commodify a clean environment and create policy that protects that commodity from the threat posed by offshore oil drilling; and this in the Gulf of Mexico where offshore oil drilling is widespread. The ban on offshore drilling in Florida and the uncertainty about potential, largely unexplored, offshore oil reserves lend the debate over offshore oil drilling in Florida more significance. With advancements in exploration and drilling technology it has been argued that larger oil deposits may lie in or around what were once commercially unproductive oil wells off the Florida coast. As a result, there has been a push at both the Federal and state levels to lift the ban on offshore oil drilling off Florida’s coasts. The push to open offshore oil drilling around Florida has been met with objections from both environmentalist groups and industries dependent on maintaining a clean marine 8 environment, such as tourism and fishing. As a state dependent on beach tourism, with roughly $37 billion generated in revenue annually, the cost of offshore drilling in Florida depends more heavily on the creation of unsightly oil rigs and the potential for spills that can spoil beaches and thereby the local economy. Florida remains the only gulf state that does not allow drilling in either its coastal waters, or in the Federal waters within 100 miles from its coast, though some drilling did take place along Florida’s coast before it was banned in 1990. Operating on the notion that offshore oil drilling within and near state waters will threaten the “pristine” marine environment and damage the local, tourism-dependent industries, environmental activism within the state, in conjunction with the local tourism industry, has played a key role in keeping oil rigs out of Floridian waters since 1990. Prior to the BP oil spill in April 2010, however, a debate was underway within the Florida state legislature to allow offshore exploration and production within state waters. Though state waters – which extend some three miles into the Atlantic Ocean and ten miles into the Gulf of Mexico – ultimately remained closed to offshore oil drilling, President Obama announced a plan in March 2010 to open the Federal waters along Florida’s northeast coast, as well as an area in the eastern Gulf of Mexico to offshore oil leasing. The policy generated a backlash by drilling opponents, even though the drilling would take place more than 100 miles from the Florida coasts. The sense of victory this created for offshore oil proponents did not last long, as the Obama administration reversed its decision to allow oil drilling off the Florida coast – in the eastern Gulf of Mexico and along the Atlantic coast – until 2017 as a result of the BP oil spill. The environmental devastation caused by the BP oil spill, along with the economic turmoil 9 suffered by the tourism and fishing industries along the Gulf coast, managed to table the discussion on offshore oil drilling along the Florida coast until a full investigation could be conducted as to the cause of the spill and the effects it had on the environment. The intention of this thesis is to analyze the Florida offshore oil debate within the contexts of the energy security and environmental security discourses, in order to gain insight into the values and beliefs that lead to the implementation of policies regarding offshore oil drilling within the United States, and more particularly the state of Florida. Using a discursive analysis, I look at how arguments for and against offshore oil drilling are framed, justified and how they are incorporated into the policy-making process. Furthermore, I aim to understand why and when certain arguments come to dominate the discussion by looking at current events and socio-economic structures which inform how a discourse comes to be articulated to gain credence and policy support. I begin by looking at how **ocean space is constructed as a result of perceptions about its utility to society**. Social constructions of the ocean’s position in relation to the social sphere, as well as its perceived utility, serve as a prominent point of departure for the security discourses analyzed later on. The dominant energy security discourse seeks to maintain the ocean as a source of resources and wealth accumulation external and resistant to socialization, while simultaneously promoting a sense of national security through attempts to reduce dependence on oil imports by increasing domestic production. On the other hand, offshore oil drilling opponents, who have adopted an environmental security discourse, have a negative reaction to expanded offshore oil drilling as it signifies a threat to the long-term environmental sustainability and commercial interests that depend on an ocean free of dangerous pollutants. The opposition attempts to 10 reconstruct the ocean as a pristine environment, an essential element in the Earth’s ecosystem as well as coastal tourism and fishing industries, while simultaneously promoting a counter-hegemonic energy security by advocating for alternative fuels. The discussion regarding the construction of the ocean in Chapter 2 uses a historical optic through which one can view the evolution of ocean space in its relationship with human society. More importantly it looks at how perceptions and representations of ocean space inform how policy is made and how States, as the sources of legitimate territorial jurisdiction, manage to acquire and secure ocean territory in order to utilize it for exclusive resource exploitation. Chapter 3 and 4 look at the historical evolution of energy security and environmental security in relation to offshore oil drilling first at the level of the federal state (chapter 3) and then at the level of the state of Florida (chapter 4), with the aim of deconstructing the discourses in the historical contexts from which they emanate. The 1970s mark a key turning point for, if not the initial emergence in the United States of concerns about environmental sustainability as well as concerns about the foreign oil supplies. The analysis focuses on the articulation of concerns about oil dependence and environmental protection in the speeches of United States Presidents **as a representation of hegemonic policy discourse**. This is important beyond the discursive level, at the level of policy making, because US presidents have the power to directly appoint key decisionmakers, such as the Secretary of the Interior – the department which then appoints the head of the Minerals Management Service which is in charge of leasing, overseeing and collecting revenues from the oil industry – the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of the Environmental Protection Agency. These appointed officials are in charge of the 11 agencies that implement policy and oversee compliance with regulations in the area of offshore oil drilling. Therefore, the sentiments towards offshore oil drilling that are held by the president tend to reflect those held by these appointed leaders and dictate regulations and how strictly they will be enforced. The discourses of US presidents on energy and environmental security are what Wolford (2010: 8) calls “strategic essentialisms”, “intentional simplifications of an otherwise complex subject for the purposes of democratic engagement.” Engagement in what? Thus, the primary question behind the discursive analysis I exercise in chapters 3 and 4 is: in the discourse on energy and environmental security, what is it that needs to be made secure, why does it need to be secured, and what are the potential threats to its security? Chapter 2 - The Construction and Securitization of Ocean Space To look upon the ocean is to place it within a particular social context according to a perceived utility. For the Florida beachgoer, the ocean is a pristine environment, where the horizon seems to extend infinitely as it meets the sky. For the oil entrepreneur, it holds great mineral wealth, which, at some point in time, must be exploited to fuel the economy and expand the industry. For the ecologist the ocean contains essential biophysical processes that are not only necessary for marine life, but part of the larger, global ecosystem that sustains all life forms on the planet. For the fisherman, the ocean is a space where both income and sustenance may be obtained. The ocean has been used for transportation, commercial and military activities for several thousand years, but only recently has much credence been given to its location within the global ecosystem. Today, these divergent interests find themselves competing over ocean space in order to define its utility as well as the international and State legislation required to secure these interests against potential threats. In the case of offshore oil drilling, ocean space is the physical arena upon which the security discourses, such as energy and environmental, create knowledge, portraying counter-realities of the ocean and its value for society. Though the security discourses discussed in depth in chapters 3 and 4 attach new images and values to ocean space through the perpetuation of their associated knowledges, the ocean has, throughout history, been the subject of social representations and value constructions that persist within these discourses. In particular, marine or ocean space, most notably in terms of its relationship to terrestrial space, has often held the position as the spatial ‘other’ in respect to human processes. As Steinberg (2001) points out, the ocean has held many positions in its relationship with society, namely as a space for transportation, resource extraction, and, more recently, an intricate part of the biophysical processes that sustain human life. Regardless of the attempts of the latter imagination to integrate ocean spaces into a complex argument about the long-term sustainability of life on earth, the more traditional notion that the ocean is “merely a distance and not a place” where social rules do not apply, persists in contemporary discourses, managing to distance ocean spaces from social controls and oversight (Steinberg 2001: 49; Zalik 2009). During the centuries before widespread seafaring, the ocean was a ‘resource provider’, furnishing littoral communities with food and the occasional luxury items (i.e. pearls). With God, Glory and Gold in mind, **the Imperial quest to map and mine the world** sent many explorers across the oceans, but with little interest given to the content of the oceans themselves. This has resulted, especially under the auspices of capitalism and neoliberalism, which emphasize material and financial accumulation in tandem with deregulation and privatization, in policies that often **ignore or belittle social and environmental consequences** to the very social processes transpiring within ocean space. Due to the anthropocentric nature of exploration and resource extraction, the oceans have tended to play merely a service role, as they are viewed simply as the matter lying between the more easily inhabitable terrestrial formations. Social constructions or representations of the ocean, attempt to provide a static image of this space in order to define the parameters of its usefulness to society. In the processes of resource extraction, multi-use preservation, and environmental sustainability, the often competing representations of ocean space have seen little compromise, with regulatory policies constantly being implemented, lifted, or ignored in view of competing interests, and their associated ocean-space imaginations. This chapter seeks to highlight the evolution of social constructions and securitization of the ocean, namely in the United States, by deconstructing and analyzing a few of the dominant perspectives regarding ocean space throughout history. I hope to show that despite an increase in scientific inquiry aimed at increasing an understanding of ocean spaces and reconfiguring the spatial imagination, the ocean as a resource provider and the ‘other’ to terrestrial spaces remains a prominent vision that serves to inform human actions within that space. As a result of the ocean’s seemingly fixed construction as the ‘other’, limited authority is placed on any knowledge that conceptualizes ocean space as a vital element within the Earth’s ecosystem, and the subsequent need for protections and regulations to ensure its sustainability. In fact, where protections of ocean space exist it is most frequently in light of efforts to maintain the ocean as a multiple use space for commercial enterprises, and not as a result of an incorporation of a new knowledge that seeks to protect ocean space for the purpose of environmental sustainability or ecosystem protection. In the case of energy and environmental security, the conceptualization of the ocean provides the frame of reference from which each discourse imagines the ocean’s relationship and utility to society. For instance, under the discourse of energy security the ocean is constructed as the frontier for oil resources, that would be produced and used domestically in order to secure the American oil supply from the volatile foreign oil market and oil-funded terrorism. In the case of environmental security, the ocean is perceived as [1] a vital element in the larger ecosystem on which humans rely upon for long-term survival; and [2] is the site where the commodification of the pristine, unspoiled by dirty offshore drilling activities and rigs, is able to generate thousands of jobs and billions in annual income for coastal tourism.

#### Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought

Neoclous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debatesand discussionsthat animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 4

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### The plan changes how energy is produced, rather than restricting how much is produced-voting issue- ruins limits- infinite types of extraction makes it impossible to debate – kills fairness

### 5

#### The United States Department of Interior should impose escalating surcharges on land in the United States that gas companies are leasing but not using and prohibit companies from obtaining additional leases unless they demonstrate that they are producing or diligently developing leases they already hold.

#### Idle leases contain a vast amount of natural gas- solves the aff and avoids the NB

Weiss, 12 -- Center for American Progress Action Fund senior fellow

[Daniel, “The American Energy Initiative,” congressional testimony, 9-13-12, www.americanprogressaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WeissTestimony.pdf]

Despite their demand to open **fragile**, previously protected places for oil and gas production, oil and gas companies are not developing many of the leases that they already hold. A **huge portion** of leases held for public lands and waters lack exploration or development plans according to Department of Interior data. The department found that 56 percent of the leased acres onshore in the lower 48 states are not in production or exploration. The percentage is even larger offshore, where **72 percent** of leased acres are dormant. 87 This simply means that big oil companies currently hold the keys to **vast amounts** of publicly owned resources but have chosen not to develop them right now. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, there were more than 38 million onshore acres under lease, but the industry was only actively producing on just more than 12 million acres. 88 The story holds true down the line, given that as of the end of fiscal year 2011, the industry was holding more than 7,000 authorized permits to drill with parcels that were unexplored or undeveloped. 89 Idle leases in the Gulf of Mexico contain large amounts of oil. The tracts that are not producing oil or subject to pending or approved exploration and development plans are estimated to contain 17.9 billion barrels of “undiscovered technically recoverable resources” oil and 49.7 trillion cubic feet of UTRR natural gas. 90 According to the same report from the Department of Interior, “More than 70 percent of the tens of millions of offshore acres under lease are inactive.” This includes almost 24 million acres that do not have “approved exploration or development plans” in the Gulf of Mexico. This area has an estimated 11.6 billion barrels of oil and **50 trillion** cubic feet of natural gas. 91

#### Counterplan solves and avoids politics

**Mufson, 12** – Washington Post chief economic policy writer

[Steven, staff writer covering energy and other financial news, "Study: 20 million acres of federal oil, gas leases in Gulf of Mexico idle," Washington Post, 10-22-12, articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-22/business/35501614\_1\_gas-leases-oil-companies-massive-oil-spil]

Oil and natural gas companies are not exploring, developing or producing on more than **20 million acres** of federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico, 40 percent of them owned by the five biggest private oil giants, according to a study by the office of Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), the ranking member of the House Natural Resources Committee. The study is the latest salvo in a politicized election year battle over whether the Obama administration should be blamed for what Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney has called a slow pace of leasing or whether the oil industry owns more drilling leases than it can handle. The study found that 131 oil and gas companies hold about 3,700 leases in the Gulf of Mexico that are not undergoing exploration, development or production. BP has 2.5 million acres of idle leases in the Gulf of Mexico, the report said. BP is followed by Chevron, Exxon Mobil and Shell, each of which own 1.4 million to 1.5 million acres of idle leases. Markey’s study added that about half of the leases have been idle for at least five years and that 80 percent of the idle leases were purchased for less than $300 an acre. Many Democratic lawmakers have pressed in recent years for “use it or lose it” legislation to compel oil companies to exploit their federal leases. But major oil companies have argued that the current system, which already uses a “use it or lose it” structure, works fine. Oil companies bid for federal leases and generally have 10 years to explore a lease or let the acreage revert to the federal government, which can then put the leases up for auction again. The companies, especially those exploring deep-water offshore leases, say they need time to carry out surveys and contract for a rig. Recently, BP has been the company most actively drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. It would not comment on the study. Some members of Congress, including Markey, want to push companies harder to develop their leases by imposing a system of escalating surcharges as idle leases get older.

### 6

#### Naval readiness is strong- now is key to deter conflict

Katz, 13 -- retired vice admiral, former commander of the Fifth Fleet

[Doublas, "A Strong Navy," The Hill, 1-3-13, thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/275395-a-strong-navy, accessed 1-24-13]

On the other hand, even with the increasingly austere fiscal climate unfolding, the nation seems to be entering **a new naval era** that emphasizes the renewed importance of U.S. sea power. Add to that the ever turbulent Middle East and Southeast Asian regions demanding rapid response capabilities, **it is now more imperative than ever** that civilian decision makers wisely plan for an adequate future size and composition of the our Fleet. In times of conflict, our Navy is called upon to control the seas, deny their use to the enemy, and to protect and sustain power ashore, indispensible in successful military operations. A strong Navy is a recognized United States commitment to the world. Our Navy is unique among all others in that the Fleet is not garrisoned in U.S. home ports but is spread across the globe. In fact, we presently have approximately 110 of those 287 ships deployed at any one time **with every expectation** that **that number will rise** as our naval commitments increase. Such recognized presence is a key element of the U.S. global defense posture. That presence is there to cooperate and defend partners and allies. It signals our national intent, prevents and **deters aggression**, promotes regional security and responds quickly to crises, to include humanitarian, no matter where they flare up.

#### Expanded gas drilling destroys naval readiness- current leases don’t trigger

Weiss, 12 -- Center for American Progress Action Fund senior fellow

[Daniel, "The American Energy Initiative," Congressional Documents and Publications, 9-13-12, l/n, accessed 1-31-13]

There have been recent proposals to open areas off the Atlantic coast for oil and gas production. Such proposals, however, could impair national security because a large portion part of this area is criticalfor a wide array of military training, including explosives, submarine exercises and Navy SEAL training. The Department of Defense wants to prohibit offshore drilling in a vast majority of the 2.9 million acre zone under consideration for oil production off Virginia. n65 About 20 percent, or 630,000 acres, would be open to drilling. n66 Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar reiterated that Defense Department needs will take precedence over the energy industry. n67 Similarly, proposals to open the Gulf coast of Florida to expanded oil and gas production would also interfere **with D**epartment **o**f **D**efense **training**. Tom Neubauer, president of the Bay Defense Alliance, raised concerns about conflict with the Navy during an April 2012 public hearing on the expansion of drilling. He warned: The Gulf test range, which is essentially everything east of the military mission line, which comes down from Pensacola into the Gulf of Mexico, is really essential to nine bases in Northwest Florida. Most of those bases do testing and training, research and development in the Gulf of Mexico. ... Drilling in those areas would impair those missions. n68 One of the benefits of energy independence would be enhanced national security. It makes little sense to strive for that goal by drilling in places that would interfere with our security. Drilling in these two places important to our military is even less sensible because "about 70 percent of undiscovered oil and gas resources are on federal lands that are available for leasing under current laws and administrative policies" according to recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office. n69

#### Strong navy de-escalates all conflict and deters great power war

Roughead, 7 -- Admiral, US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations

[Gary, James Conway, General, US Marine Corps, and Thad Allen, Admiral, US Coast Guard, "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," Oct 2007, www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf, accessed 1-24-13]

This strategy reaffirms the use of seapower to influence actions and activities at sea and ashore. The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the U.S. the **asymmetric advantage** of enlarging or contracting its military footprint in areas where access is denied or limited. Permanent or prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended economic, social or political repercussions. The sea is a vast maneuver space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions dictate to enable **flexible approaches** to escalation, **de-escalation** **and deterrence of conflicts**. The speed, flexibility, agility and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of options for responding to crises. Additionally, integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or more informal arrangements (such as the Global Maritime Partnership initiative), send powerful messages to would-be aggressors that we will act with others to ensure collective security and prosperity. United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. As our security and prosperity are inextricably linked with those of others, U.S. maritime forces will be deployed to protect and sustain the peaceful global system comprised of interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance. We will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. seapower to accomplish six key tasks, or strategic imperatives. Where tensions are high or where we wish to demonstrate to our friends and allies our commitment to security and stability, U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign. In addition, persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises. Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors. This combat power can be selectively and **rapidly repositioned to meet contingencies** that may arise elsewhere. These forces will be sized and postured to fulfill the following strategic imperatives: Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power. Today regional conflict has ramifications far beyond the area of conflict. Humanitarian crises, violence spreading across borders, pandemics, and the interruption of vital resources are all possible when regional crises erupt. While this strategy advocates a wide dispersal of networked maritime forces, we cannot be everywhere, and we cannot act to mitigate all regional conflict. Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises. Whether over the horizon or powerfully arrayed in plain sight, maritime forces can deter the ambitions of regional aggressors, assure friends and allies, gain and maintain access, and protect our citizens while working to sustain the global order. **Critical to this** notion **is the maintenance of a powerful fleet**—ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based fleet activities—capable of selectively controlling the seas, projecting power ashore, and protecting friendly forces and civilian populations from attack. Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a **key component** of **deterring** major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.

### Solvency

**Takes years to solve**

**Levi 12** (Michael A., Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Case for Natural Gas Exports,” 8-15-12, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/opinion/the-case-for-natural-gas-exports.html?_r=2&ref=opinion>)

But the critics are right to point out that exporting natural gas could **increase environmental risks** to communities where natural gas is extracted. Even so, a recent report from the International Energy Agency makes clear that inexpensive steps could substantially mitigate those dangers. **It will take years** before any export terminals are up and running — in the meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen safeguards so that gas is extracted safely.

#### **Squo solves – central gulf**

Alford 12-17 (Jeremy, Capitol Correspondent – Houma Today, “Gulf Oil Leasing Plan Faces Court Challenge,” Houma Today, 2012, http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20121217/ARTICLES/121219663?p=1&tc=pg)

The most recent lease sales include 35 leases in waters deeper than what BP's Deepwater Horizon was operating in when it exploded, he said. “Instead, the Obama administration is rushing headlong into a program that will put our shores and oceans at risk and do nothing for America's energy security,” Talberth said. Obama's plan calls for 15 new leasing areas in the Gulf and Alaska that could produce up to 8 billion barrels of oil and 35 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It also restricts activities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The plan includes 12 individual lease sales for the Gulf, with the next scheduled for March 20 covering the central Gulf, which encompasses Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. About 38 million acres will be made available for investors. It will be held in New Orleans and “could lead to the production of up to nearly a billion barrels of oil and nearly 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,” said Interior Secretary Ken Salazar. At the latest Gulf sale for the western Gulf, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management offered up more than 20 million acres and attracted $133 million in high bids for 116 tracts covering 652,522 acres.

#### Current energy boom is sufficient to solve your advantage

Mills, Their Author, 10-30

Mark, Senior fellow of the Manhattan Institute, and founder and CEO of the Digital Power Group, a tech-centric capital advisory group. He was formerly the co-founder and chief tech strategist for Digital Power Capital, a boutique venture fund. He co-founded and served as Chairman and CTO of ICx Technologies helping take it public in a 2007 IPO. Mark is a member of the Advisory Council of the McCormick School of Engineering and Applied Science at Northwestern University, and serves on the Board of Directors of the Marshall Institute.

http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mills.htm

There are good reasons for this shift. The nation is in desperate need of jobs. And technology has unleashed a surprising increase in domestic oil and gas output.[1] The U.S. now has a glut of natural gas, such that applications have backed up to convert facilities originally intended for imports into export terminals. At the same time, the 40-year decline in domestic oil production has been reversed. Add to this the rush to export abundant high-quality coal to soaring world demand and not only are lower prices now in play, but energy independence is in sight for the first time. Policies that would take advantage of this hydrocarbon abundance could spark widespread employment growth at time when unemployment is a central concern for many citizens, and can be a critical issue in political "swing" states. About 10 million Americans are already employed directly and indirectly in businesses associated with oil, natural gas, and coal production.[2] These jobs are widely distributed across the nation: 16 states have more than 150,000 people employed in hydrocarbon-related activities. As for the future, accelerating domestic hydrocarbon energy production will create at least three to four million jobs in the immediate future.[4] Five electoral "swing states" are among the 12 states that stand to gain the most from policies that would promote the boom. Over a half-million jobs would be generated in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Michigan, and Colorado.[5] The employment opportunities reach far beyond those directly associated with drilling and digging in the field. Hydrocarbon jobs ripple throughout the economy. For every direct hydrocarbon job, about six jobs are added in sectors from manufacturing to information services.[6] New employment from hydrocarbons could amount to one-fifth to three-fourths of the jobs needed by people in over 20 states counted as unemployed or underemployed, including Wisconsin, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.[7] While hydrocarbon jobs can't be the only answer to the country's staggering jobs deficit, they represent the largest single opportunity for near-term jobs, and one that requires no federal spending.[8] The broad economic benefits that come from privately-financed expansions in domestic production would generate at least $2 trillion for the country.[9] Put another way, each hydrocarbon job created brings an average societal benefit of $500,000 per job.[10] It bears noting that half of all existing hydrocarbon jobs and the major share of the recent increase in domestic production of oil and natural gas come from 18,000 small and mid-sized companies. And the expansion has occurred on private and state lands, without federal stimulus and despite regulatory headwinds.[11] It should be unsurprising that there are a lot of jobs associated with hydrocarbon industries. Over 80 percent of the U.S. and world's energy needs are met with hydrocarbons.[12] Meanwhile, today barely 2 percent of total energy consumption comes from the popularly discussed alternatives of solar, wind and biofuels.[13] For the coming two decades, oil, gas, and coal are forecast to supply 60 to 80 percent of world growth according to all major forecasts, including the U.S. Department of Energy.[14] America lost over 8.4 million jobs from February 2008 to 2010. Since then, through August 2012, only 4.4 million jobs were added. America needs more jobs, and needs them soon—and the hydrocarbon sector alone could add over 4 million more jobs. Over the long term, innovation and new technologies across all sectors of our economy will surely revitalize the economy and create a new cycle of job growth, and doubtless in some unexpected ways.[15] It is critical to have policies that ensure this great cycle is encouraged. But the depth and magnitude of job destruction from the Great Recession means that creating jobs in the near-term is vital.

#### Gas-only leasing fails – forced to abandon investment

MarEx 8 (Maritime Executive, “Gas-Only Drilling in Offshore Moratorium Areas Suggested,” 4-2, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2005-10-20gas-only-drilling-in-offshore-moratori/)

Oil and gas industry groups are criticizing a provision in House offshore drilling legislation that would allow the government to offer "natural gas-only" leases in areas that are currently off-limits to new production. The criticism is included in wider comments by petroleum producers to the Minerals Management Service (MMS), which has begun collecting public comments as it begins preparing an outer continental shelf leasing plan for 2007-2012. MMS asked for comment on the gas-only concept. Gas-only leasing was included in a bill by House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo (R-CA.) that allows states to "opt-out" of offshore leasing bans. States exercising the option could allow gas-only leasing, or oil and gas leasing. Senate legislation by Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN.) -- and supported by chemical companies and other industries that rely on the costly fuel -- also accepts the idea. However, the American Petroleum Institute (API), in comments this week to MMS, says gas-only and gas-preference leasing would offer the "false promise" of future supplies. The group says the concept would create uncertainties that could dampen investment, since it is impossible to predict with certainty what types of resources will be in an area. "A company might spend up to $80 million to buy a lease, conduct seismic testing, obtain the necessary permits, and drill a well(s) to determine whether any resources are present in amounts that make the prospect economic," the group says. "A company is unlikely to know if it had met the gas only or gas preference requirement until the capital investment had been made. Companies will be reluctant to spend tens of millions of dollars to explore for and develop a prospect, only to be forced to abandon the resource, stranding substantial investments."

#### No effect until after 2020 and it’s a tiny amount then – most is available already

Newell ’11 (Richard Newell, the Gendell Associate Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics at the Nicholas School at Duke and the head of the U.S Energy Information Administration, 3-17-11, “STATEMENT OF RICHARD NEWELL ADMINISTRATOR ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY before the COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,” <http://www.eia.gov/neic/speeches/newell_03172011.pdf#page=7>)

Access to offshore federal resources. As of January 2009, the mean estimate of technically ¶ recoverable crude oil resources located in Federal offshore areas of the lower-48 states is 64.1 ¶ billion barrels. Of this amount, 3.7 billion barrels are estimated to exist in the Eastern/Central ¶ Gulf of Mexico region that is still under a Federal leasing moratorium.¶ 1¶ In addition, the mean ¶ estimate of technically recoverable resources of crude oil located in the Alaska OCS area is 26.6¶ billion barrels. Note that these and other technically recoverable resource estimates provided ¶ here tend to be higher than resource estimates from the USGS because the USGS estimates only ¶ include undiscovered resources, where as the EIA estimates used for modeling purposes also ¶ include proved reserves, inferred reserves, and undiscovered resources in areas not yet assessed ¶ by the USGS. In addition, the resource estimates provided here do not reflect recent downward ¶ revisions by USGS to resource estimates for the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska.¶ 2¶ From the above, it is evident that the Eastern/Central Gulf oil resources now subject to a formal ¶ leasing moratorium represent only a small part of the Federal OCS. Even if the moratorium that ¶ restricts leasing in this region were to be lifted, lags associated with the awarding of new Federal ¶ offshore leases and with the exploration and development of such leases suggest that production ¶ would be unlikely to occur until after 2020.¶ Given that OCS areas not under any leasing moratorium are estimated to account for over 95 ¶ percent of the total mean estimate of technically recoverable OCS resources, perhaps the most ¶ significant Federal OCS development issues relate to those areas that are already open to Federal ¶ oil and gas leasing. One such issue revolves around when newly available offshore areas, ¶ particularly in the Pacific and Atlantic, will be made available to oil and gas producers in future ¶ Federal lease sales. Areas where OCS leasing has been available for many years—including the ¶ Western Gulf, most of the Central Gulf, and Alaska—hold the vast majority of estimated ¶ technically recoverable OCS oil resources. The AEO2011 generally assumes that both leasing ¶ and regulatory approvals in areas where OCS leasing has been available for many years will ¶ proceed in a manner that supports their continued major contribution to overall U.S. oil ¶ production. Were leasing and/or regulatory processes to slow or speed up significantly, ¶ projected OCS production could be reduced or increased from the level of 1.5 to 2 million ¶ barrels per day that is projected in the 2014 though 2035 period in the AEO2011 Reference case.

#### No drilling equipment

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

7. There isn’t enough drilling equipment. Due to the high price of oil, existing drilling ships are “booked solid for the next five years,” and demand for deepwater rigs has driven up the price of such ships. Oil companies just don’t have the resources to explore oil fields in the OCS.

#### Alt cause- infrastructure

**Hertzog, 10-1** -- Energy Collective consultant

(Christine, "Natural Gas – Is It Stunting Innovative Thinking?" Energy Collective, 10-1-12, theenergycollective.com/christine-hertzog/119036/natural-gas-it-stunting-innovative-thinking)

Let’s admit it, infrastructure is a boring word. There’s nothing sexy about it. It implies disruptions to our lives as we deal with delays and detours for construction and repair projects. Yet it is absolutely necessary, and infrastructure is what needs to be upgraded in our water, gas, and electric grids.

My previous articles discussed investments that are ongoing or needed in the electrical grid to modernize generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption. However, the same issues exist for gas and water too. In some aspects, the needs are even more striking. But how we build our infrastructure and what we build for our infrastructure also says a great deal about how innovative is our thinking. And unfortunately, right now that thinking is “like for like”, and merely replicates existing energy models with known weaknesses in reliability and resiliency instead of building infrastructure based on new models.

Natural gas is seen by some in the energy business as a panacea to all energy concerns. It’s domestic. It’s cleaner than coal. However, it requires significant infrastructure investments. No matter how much innovation you put into the extraction technologies for fossil fuels (which by the way had HUGE federal government assistance), the supply chains still require buildouts of pipelines to transport it to refineries and on to points of consumption. We simply don’t have sufficient pipeline capacity to transport it to all the places that want it in the USA. It’s an infrastructure play that has a number of challenges.

The natural gas that is extracted must be processed, just like oil must be refined, or electricity must be generated. These industrial operations expend lots of energy in processing gas into what is considered pure gas for end use consumption. The transport of processed natural gas in pipelines requires more energy to compress it and move it in pipelines, and compressor stations, like electricity substations, are placed along major transmission corridors to boost pressure. This map shows the interstate natural gas pipelines that transmit highly compressed natural gas. Pipelines have physical constraints – there is only so much space available for gas, and they require electricity to compress the gas in the pipelines. Therefore, when there is a significant electricity outage in a region, it can also impact the transmission and distribution of natural gas.

### Warming

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

**Plan doesn’t solve warming**

**A. Coal-shift doesn’t solve**

**NCAR 11** (The National Center for Atmospheric Research, The University Corporation for Atmospheric Research manages the National Center for Atmospheric Research under sponsorship by the National Science Foundation,

“Switching From Coal To Natural Gas Would Do Little For Global Climate, Study Indicates,” 9-8-11,

<https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/news/5292/switching-coal-natural-gas-would-do-little-global-climate-study-indicates>)

A SMALL IMPACT ON TEMPERATURES The burning of coal releases more carbon dioxide than other fossil fuels, as well as comparatively high levels of other pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and particles such as ash. Since natural gas emits lower levels of these pollutants, some energy experts have proposed greater reliance on that fuel source as a way to slow down global warming and reduce the impacts of energy use on the environment. But the effects of natural gas on climate change have been difficult to calculate. Recent studies have come to conflicting conclusions about whether a shift to natural gas would significantly slow the rate of climate change, in part because of uncertainty about the extent of methane leaks. Wigley’s new study attempts to take a **more comprehensive look** at the issue by incorporating the cooling effects of sulfur particles associated with coal burning and by analyzing the complex climatic influences of methane, which affects other atmospheric gases such as ozone and water vapor. By running a series of computer simulations, Wigley found that a 50 percent reduction in coal and a corresponding increase in natural gas use would lead to a **slight increase** in worldwide warming for the next **40 years** of about 0.1 degree Fahrenheit (less than 0.1 degree Celsius). The reliance on natural gas could then gradually reduce the rate of global warming, but temperatures would drop by only a small amount compared to the 5.4 degrees F (3 degrees C) of warming projected by 2100 under current energy trends. If the rate of methane leaks from natural gas could be held to around 2 percent, for example, the study indicates that warming would be reduced by less than 0.2 degrees F (about 0.1 degree C) by 2100. The reduction in warming would be more pronounced in a hypothetical scenario of zero leaks, which would result in a reduction of warming by 2100 of about 0.2-0.3 degrees F (0.1-0.2 degrees C). But in a high leakage rate scenario of 10 percent, global warming would not be reduced until 2140. “Whatever the methane leakage rate, you can’t get away from the additional warming that will occur initially because, by not burning coal, you’re not having **the cooling effect of sulfates** and other particles,” Wigley says. “This particle effect is a double-edged sword because reducing them is a good thing in terms of lessening air pollution and acid rain. But the paradox is when we clean up these particles, it slows down efforts to reduce global warming.”

**B. Emits Carbon**

**Hansen 11** (Lena, Rocky Mountain Institute, “How should the U.S. recalibrate itself to take advantage of natural gas reserves?,” 12-12-11, <http://blog.rmi.org/how_should_the_US_recalibrate_itself_to_take_advantage_of_natural_gas_reserves>)

As the economic, security and environmental cost of our oil and coal reliance becomes increasingly problematic, the U.S. is shifting its focus towards natural gas for good reasons. New sources of domestic supply are being developed, natural gas prices are low (at least for now) and natural gas’ carbon emissions are half that of coal. But, in spite of these benefits, rushing straight to natural gas as the principal solution to our energy problems is imprudent—as it distracts from **more flexible options**. New domestic supplies from shale gas have potentially damaging environmental and health consequences and don’t currently merit or enjoy public trust. Whether or not such issues like fracking turn out well or badly will determine whether shale gas is a huge or a modest resource, cheap or fairly costly, and tolerable or not in a given locality. Moreover, steeply declining production rates from shale gas wells could still bring **unpleasant surprises.** Some analysts claim that per-well reserves from major U.S. shale gas plays are less than half of what operators have claimed. We won’t really know one way or the other until we have longer production experience from plays largely developed just in the last five years. As has been the case historically, currently low natural gas prices will eventually rise again, and will likely remain volatile. And, at the end of the day, meeting long-term climate goals requires **reducing natural gas consumption**, too—not just coal and oil.

**Plan causes warming:**

**A. Exports cause methane**

**Romm 11** (Joe, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, “Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100,” 9-9-11 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/09/09/315845/natural-gas-switching-from-coal-to-gas-increases-warming-for-decades/>)

A key finding of the NCAR study is: In summary, our results show that the substitution of gas for coal as an energy source results **in increased** rather than decreased **global warming** for many decades — out to the mid 22nd century for the 10% leakage case. This is in accord with Hayhoe et al. (2002) and with the less well established claims of Howarth et al. (2011) who base their analysis on Global Warming Potentials rather than direct modeling of the climate…. The most important result, however, in accord with the above authors, is that, unless leakage rates for new methane can be kept below 2%, substituting gas for coal is not an effective means for reducing the magnitude of future climate change. What is the leakage rate for methane? Well, as I’ve written, we don’t know exactly because the gas companies won’t release all of their data. We do know that total life-cycle leakage and fugitive emissions from extraction, production, transport, and consumption is higher for shale gas than conventional gas. The controversial — but peer-reviewed — paper by Cornell’s Robert Howarth, which I wrote about here, seeks to quantify the impact of the leakage from the **best available data**. It **concluded**: Natural gas is composed largely of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas production escapes to the atmosphere in venting and leaks over the life-time of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at the time wells are hydraulically fractured — as methane escapes from flow-back return fluids — and during drill out following the fracturing. Methane is a **powerful greenhouse gas**, with a global warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following emission.

**B. Crowds out renewables**

**Romm 11** (Joe, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, “IEA’s ‘Golden Age of Gas Scenario’ Leads to More Than 6°F Warming and Out-of-Control Climate Change,” 6-7-11, <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/06/07/238578/iea-golden-age-of-natural-gas-scenario-warming-climate-change/>)

The International Energy Agency has just issued a special report titled, “Are We Entering a Golden Age of Gas?” The answer to that question is “yes” only if you are a natural gas producer who doesn’t care much about humanity. For the rest of us, the report makes clear **natural gas** by itself **does nothing** to avert catastrophic climate change. Quite the reverse. The UK Guardian‘s story put it well: Natural gas is not the “panacea” to solve climate change that fossil fuel industry lobbyists have been claiming, according to new research from the International Energy Agency. Reliance on gas would lead the world to a **3.5C temperature rise**, according to the IEA. At such a level, global **warming could run out of control**, deserts would take over in southern Africa, Australia and the western US, and sea level rises could engulf small island states. Not exactly a champagne moment. UPDATE: I’ve added a featured comment (and link) by Tyler Hamilton, business columnist at The Toronto Star. Ironically, the IEA report is built around what it calls “The Golden Age of Gas Scenario (GAS Scenario)” — except, of course, the acronym for “Golden Age of Gas Scenario” should be GAG Scenario not GAS Scenario. And GAG is exactly what the planet would do if the dash to gas becomes our primary energy policy, rather than a high and rising price for CO2. The reason is clear. Absent a high CO2 price, gas displaces as much **low-carbon electricity** as it does high-carbon coal. That was precisely the point made by Nobuo Tanaka, executive director of the IEA, at a London press conference: “While natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel, it is still a fossil fuel. Its increased use could **muscle out low-carbon fuels** such as renewables and nuclear, particularly in the wake of Fukushima. An expansion of gas use alone is no panacea for climate change.” The Guardian notes, “The IEA also warned that gas could push out renewables, if governments come under pressure to reduce renewables subsidies and opt for gas instead, as gas companies have been urging. The report itself makes clear that in the GAG scenario: Natural gas displaces coal and to a lesser extent oil, driving down emissions, but it also displaces some nuclear power, pushing up emissions…. This puts emissions on a long-term trajectory consistent with stabilising the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at around 650 ppm, suggesting a long-term temperature rise of over 3.5°C.

#### Offshore drilling collapses biodiversity – extinction

DW No Date (Debate Wise, <http://debatewise.org/debates/2213-oil-companies-should-not-be-allowed-to-drill-offshore/>)

Offshore drilling poses environmental risks The environmental risk taken by offshore drilling is very topical, made evident by oil spills such as the recent BP oil spill and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 off the coast of Alaska. In the case of the Exxon Valdez spill up to 250,000 sea birds died, over 2,800 sea otters and thousands of other animals, (figures from the BP oil spill are not yet complete), having had a massive impact on the local wildlife and leading to a ban on all offshore drilling in America, until George Bush overturned it in 2008 - the recent oil spill suggests this repeal was a mistake. In this way, offshore drilling destroys ecosystems and fish stocks. These resources are vital for humanity to feed its population, and wasteland like much of the coast of southern USA is of no use until cleaned. There is also a long term effect because the remaining species will have a lower heterozygosity index (the amount of allele variation within a species). This is important because if there is a change in selection pressure, such as a new disease, this could leave the remainder of the species vulnerable as they are less likely to survive because they are less likely to have a dormant allele that becomes advantageous. The potential environmental risk is massive and thus offshore drilling should not be allowed because it can have such an effect on the environment, both in the short term and long term. Offshore drilling could lead to the extinction of various species, and a ban would be a sure way to help preserve biodiversity.

### China

**China expanding domestic reserves – no import need**

**Yang 12** (Catherine T. Yang, National Geographic News, “China Drills Into Shale Gas, Targeting Huge Reserves Amid Challenges,” 8-8-12, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/08/120808-china-shale-gas/>)

Now a new chapter in Chongqing's history is being written, as hydraulic fracturing rigs assembled this summer in this undulating landscape to drill into one of China's first shale gas exploration sites. (Related Pictures: "A Rare Look Inside China's Energy Machine") Technology to force natural gas from its underground source rock, shale, has transformed the energy picture of the United States in the past six years, and China—sitting on reserves some 50 percent larger than those of the U.S.—has taken note. Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a made-in-the-U.S.A. process that China aims to import. (Related Interactive: "Breaking Fuel From the Rock") On June 9, state-owned oil giant Sinopec started drilling the first of nine planned shale gas wells in Chongqing, expecting by year's end to produce 11 billion to 18 billion cubic feet (300 to 500 million cubic meters) of natural gas—about the amount China consumes in a single day. It's a small start, but China's **ambitions are large**; by 2020, the nation's goal is for shale gas to provide 6 percent of its massive energy needs. (Related Quiz: "What You Don't Know About Natural Gas") Because natural gas generates electricity with half the carbon dioxide emissions of coal, China's primary power source, the hope is that shale development, if it is done in an environmentally sound manner, will help pave the way to a cleaner energy future for the world's number one greenhouse gas producer. "Clean, rapid shale gas development in China would reduce global emissions," says Julio Friedmann, chief energy technologist at the U.S. Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, which has been working with the Chinese on environmentally sound fracking practices. But challenges lie ahead in China's effort to replicate the U.S. shale gas revolution. Early indications are that China's shale geology is different. And above ground, China lacks the extensive pipeline network that has enabled the United States to so quickly bring its new natural gas bounty to market. A daunting issue is whether water-intensive energy development can flourish in China given the strains the nation already faces on water and irrigation-dependent agriculture. Even though there are more questions at this point than answers, China is determined to move ahead. "China now realizes it has incredible opportunity to find another major fuel source other than coal," says Albert Lin, chief executive of EmberClear, an Alberta, Canada-based energy project developer that is a partner of China's largest power producer, China Huaneng Group.

**Canada will be able to underprice the US for gas to Asia**

**Hulbert 12** (Matthew, Senior Researcher at the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) in The Hague, The Netherlands, B.A. in history and politics from Durham University and an Mphil in international relations from Cambridge University, Forbes Contributor, “Why America Can Make or Break A New Global Gas World,” 8-5-12,

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/05/why-america-can-make-or-break-a-new-global-gas-world/>)

It sounds complex stuff, but between this Qatari-Russia intrigue, rests the same debate: can producers continue to sell gas at oil indexed prices, or do they have to shift towards gas prices based on gas fundamentals? Even if Russia and Qatar conspire to pull the European and Asia strings for now, of the 330bcm of LNG gas globally shipped, 25% of it is now done so on a genuinely spot basis. With another prospective 250mt/y of LNG potentially coming to market over the next decade from every point on the compass – Nigeria, Angola, Israel, PNG, Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, you name it – LNG growth should continue to erode old market rules towards and structures. That proposition becomes even more compelling when you consider that North America promises to be one of the largest **export markets** of all. Unsurprisingly American players all have one market in mind at this stage: Asia. That categorically **applies to Canada**, where Shell, PetroChina, Kogas and Mitsubishi are lining up 12mt/y exports from **British Colombia** for Asian markets. That follows export licenses already agreed for BG Group, and Apache through Kitimat LNG as well as the Alaskan North Slope plumping for LNG to monetise its 35tcf of proven reserves. As the latest Nexen deal between Toronto and Beijing attests, Canada has zero doubt that selling 30mt/y of stranded gas to Asia is the **only option** it has on the table to 2020; it is not like it can place LNG into its neighbouring but saturated US market.

**India already has natural gas contracts with US companies**

**WSJ 9-27** [“Gail India Makes First Shale Gas Asset Buy With U.S. Deal”, September 27th, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576599982561160822.html, Chetan] \*\* GAIL = Gas Authority of India Ltd

NEW DELHI - **GAIL (India) Ltd**. said Thursday it **has bought a 20% stake in a U.S. shale gas asset**, its first such purchase, as the state-run utility seeks to gain expertise of an increasingly important fuel source ahead of India's plans to auction shale gas blocks. India's largest gas transmission company by volume follows private-sector explorer Reliance Industries Ltd., which last year acquired stakes in Marcellus and Eagle shale assets in the U.S. **A** **wave of multibillion-dollar deals has swept the North American shale oil-and-gas sector in the past few years as energy companies seek to boost their hydrocarbon reserves.** The GAIL transaction comes at a time when India is striving to acquire energy assets abroad while also looking to tap unconventional fuel sources at home. India plans to launch its first auction round for shale gas exploration blocks by end-December, the upstream regulator said in March. **GAIL said it will pay $95 million for** the stake in **Houston-based Carrizo Oil & Gas Inc**.'s CRZO +0.16% Eagle Shale Ford acreage via wholly owned unit GAIL Global (USA) Inc. The amount comprises an upfront cash payment of $63.7 million and $31.3 million **linked to Carrizo's future drilling and development costs**. The company will also invest about $300 million in the asset over five years, it said, adding that the unit will fund a major part of the investments from its earnings. "This transaction represents a major step in GAIL's efforts to establish its presence in North America," GAIL chairman B.C. Tripathi said. "As the next logical step, GAIL Global will consider expanding its business portfolio in the North American market by pursuing various upstream and midstream opportunities, including liquefied natural gas export to India." A decline in production of gas in India is driving demand for imported LNG, boosting earnings of companies such as Petronet LNG Ltd. and GAIL, which import the super-cooled fuel. GAIL plans to establish a trading desk in Singapore as east Asia emerges as a big LNG market. **GAIL said its joint venture with Carrizo will drill an additional 139 wells in the shale acreage**, which is producing 2,350 barrels of oil equivalent a day. **GAIL will get 470 barrels of oil equivalent a day as its share**. "GAIL and Carrizo shall also work together in exploring shale gas opportunities in India and other countries outside of the U.S.," Tripathi said.

**Russia solves**

**ZeeNews 10-1** [“GAIL signs 20-year deal to buy LNG from Russia’s Gazprom”, October 1st, 2012, http://zeenews.india.com/business/news/companies/gail-signs-gas-purchase-pact-with-russia-s-gazprom\_61467.html, Chetan]

New Delhi: **GAIL India, the nation's biggest natural gas distributor, said** on Monday that **it has signed a 20- year deal to buy 2.5 million tonnes a year of** liquefied natural gas (**LNG) from** the Singapore unit of Russian gas giant **Gazprom** OAO. GAIL, the first Asian company to buy liquefied natural gas from the US, said the supplies will start in 2018-19. The LNG (natural gas that has been converted to liquid form for ease of transportation) will come from Gazprom's Shtokman production facilities and will be priced with an oil-indexed formula and delivered to Dahej, Dabhol and Kochi terminals, the state-owned firm said in a statement. In December 2011, GAIL had signed an agreement to buy 3.5 million tonnes of LNG a year for 20 years from Houston-based Cheniere Energy Partners LP's Sabine Pass terminal in western Cameron Parish, Louisiana. This year in August, it signed an agreement with GDF Suez to buy 12 cargoes of LNG or about 0.8 million tonnes of the fuel from 2013 to 2014. **GAIL "has signed a legally binding** 20-year liquefied natural gas (**LNG) sales and purchase agreement** (SPA) with Gazprom Marketing and Trading Singapore (GM&TS), a 100 percent wholly-owned subsidiary of Gazprom Marketing & Trading," the company said in a press statement Monday. Under the terms of the agreement, **GAIL will receive 2.5 million tonnes of LNG per annum** (equivalent to about 130 million British thermal unit or 3.5 billion cubic metres or 122 billion cubic feet per annum) over a period of 20 years beginning 2018-19. LNG will come from Gazprom's Shtokman production facilities which has 130 trillion cubic feet of inplace reserves. This would be "optimised and supplemented by GM&T's global trading portfolio and capabilities," it said. Commenting on the development, GAIL Chairman and Managing Director B C Tripathi, "This long-term LNG supply agreement with Gazprom, which holds the world's largest gas reserves, is another milestone in Indian-Russian Energy cooperation." "**The deal with Gazprom reinforces GAIL's commitment to** facilitate the development of **the Indian market** for which USD 6 billion investments are being made by GAIL in creating natural gas infrastructure," he said. Speaking on the partnership, Gazprom Marketing & Trading CEO Vitaly Vasiliev said, "We are delighted to have signed this agreement with GAIL, during a period of rising demand for LNG in India. We are looking forward to working together with GAIL **to help meet India’s expanding gas demand whilst securing a long-term market for Russian gas."**

**Chinese leadership transition doesn’t cause aggression – minimal PLA influence over the CCP**

**Forbes 10** [“Overhaul Coming To China's Leadership”, September 20th, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2010/09/20/overhaul-coming-to-chinas-leadership/7/, Chetan]

The rising current of military power in the Chinese system could manifest in any number of ways. Sources tell STRATFOR that military officers who retire sooner than civilian leaders may start to take up civilian positions in the ministries or elsewhere in the state bureaucracy. Nevertheless, **the overall arc of recent Chinese history has reinforced the model of civilian leadership over the military. The Communist Party retains control of** the CMC, the **central and provincial bureaucracies, the state-owned corporations and banks, mass organizations and most of the media.** Moreover, **there does not appear to be a single military strongman who could lead a significant challenge to** **civilian leadership. So while the military’s sway is undoubtedly rising**, and the upcoming civilian leadership could get caught in stalemate over policy, **the military is not in a position to seize power**. Rather, it is maneuvering to gain more influence within the system, adding another element of intrigue to the already tense bargaining structure that defines elite politics in China. But despite possible military-civilian frictions, the PLA will seek to preserve the regime, and to manage or suppress internal or external forces that could jeopardize that goal.

#### Econ collapse doesn’t cause war

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Economy is resilient

Behravesh 06 (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

#### Chinese resource grabs will be peaceful

Dannreuther 11 -- Professor and Head of Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster (Roland, 11/1/11, "China and global oil: vulnerability and opportunity," Int'l Affairs 87(6), EBSCO)

The picture that emerges is a mixed and complex one. On the one hand, there is evidence that China’s energy-related diplomacy and engagement have become increasingly supportive of the efficient operation of international energy markets. As a consequence, China has become more willing to recognize the international public goods provided by the West in supplying security and military protection for these markets. There has been a notable shift, as argued above, in China’s strategy away from a neo-mercantilist approach which seeks to avoid reliance on markets and to ensure supplies through physical control of foreign sources of energy. This growing confidence in the role of markets has been combined with an implicit recognition by the Beijing government that China, as a major oil-importing state, has a number of congruent interests with other oil-importing states, such as the US, the EU and Japan. China’s intense economic interdependence with the West, most notably with the US, means that there is also considerable caution in Beijing about supporting the anti-western policies of many energy-rich revisionist states. The public pronouncements and statements issued by the Chinese leadership seek to reassure all external actors, including those in the West, that its energy-directed diplomacy is driven by economic rather than political necessity and seeks cooperation rather than confrontation.

**Conflict inevitable – Vietnamese contract with India lasts another 2 years**

**NGA 12** [Natural Gas Asia, “Vietnam Offers to Extend India's Contract for Gas Block in South China Sea”, July 17th, 2012, http://www.naturalgasasia.com/vietnam-offers-to-extend-indias-contract-for-gas-block-in-south-china-sea, Chetan] \*\* OVL = ONGC Videsh Limited (Indian NG Company)

**Vietnam has offered to extend India's contract for a gas block in the South China Sea for two more years**, raising the prospect of India getting embroiled in the territorial disputes of that region with China, Times of India has reported. The said Block 128 falls within the overlapping claims of China and Vietnam. Beijing has recently heightened tension by getting its energy major, CNOOC, to give out several blocks for exploration in the same. Times of India report said that India's OVL had decided to get out of Block 128 in June after their surveys showed that there was little prospect of gas in that area. However, with Vietnam running into political problems with China over sovereignty, **Hanoi decided to extend India's presence in the area as a hedging tactic.** Now, **OVL has two years to scout for gas in a place, where competing territorial claims between China and Vietnam might complicate issues for India**, despite India's long-standing presence in the region, the report said.

**No South China Sea conflict – countries will work together**

**Gupta 11** [Rukmani Gupta is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “South China Sea Conflict? No Way”, October 23rd, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/1/, Chetan]

These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. **Despite the rhetoric**, **conflict in the South China Sea may** well **not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement**. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and **China agreed upon** the Guidelines on the Implementation of **the Declaration on the Conduct** of Parties **in the South China Sea** at the Bali Summit **in July 2010.** And **recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct**. This isn’t to suggest that **territorial claims** and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they **can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s** a **common interest in making the disputes more manageable**, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, **the parties** to the dispute **recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade** through the South China Sea **would entail economic losses** – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ **The prospect of threats** to SLOCS thus **seems somewhat exaggerated.**

**No solvency - No market share**

**Das 11** (D.K., MBA degree from the University of Chicago and an MS in engineering from the University of British Columbia in Canada, “Prospects of LNG Exports From the United States to Japan,” 5-13-11, <http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/7707/Prospects-of-LNG-Exports-From-the-United-States-to-Japan>)

Fifth, risk to potential US export of LNG may arise from concerns over the **environmental impact** of frac jobs, over-supply of LNG, potential carbon tax imposition, wide-scale **shale gas discovery** in China (and Europe) and de-linkage from JCC indexation. The US Environmental Protection Agency has proposed a new study to investigate the frac job process and determine whether drilling techniques pose a risk to drinking and underground water. A preliminary report is scheduled for release by the end of 2012, with a complete report to be published in 2014. The fast ramp-up in LNG production in **Qatar and Australia** has the potential to create a **LNG glut** in global markets. Within the next five years Australian exports are planned to exceed 50 million tpa from current levels of less than 20 million tpa, ranking it just behind Qatar. Risks to US gas exports may also arise due to the incentives being offered to the drillers by the Chinese government [18]. In case China becomes self-sufficient in unconventional gas, it would **reduce imports** of LNG. De-linkage of LNG prices from JCC may be detrimental to US gas export. In this regard, CERA energy executives (2011) have predicted that despite increasing influence of Western spot prices in short- to mid-term LNG contracts, longterm LNG contracts will continue to be **linked to oil prices**, perhaps with adjustments in the face of any ongoing gas glut. **Permitting delays** and any postponement in constructing the liquefaction facilities on the Gulf coast may also lead to **US losing out the LNG race** to Australia, Qatar and Malaysia.

## 2NC

## Not K

### Ext – Idle Leases

#### Only 1/3rd of leases are being filled

Alford 12-17 (Jeremy, Capitol Correspondent – Houma Today, “Gulf Oil Leasing Plan Faces Court Challenge,” Houma Today, 2012, http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20121217/ARTICLES/121219663?p=1&tc=pg)

Thirteen offshore energy companies submitted 131 bids for the leases located off the shore of Texas. Vitter said the numbers were “well behind previously projected revenue levels” and was only the third since the 2010 drilling moratorium, issued and later lifted by Obama following the BP oil spill. Landrieu added the leasing brought in only a third of the total high bids expected, and it **involved about 400,000 acres less than the last lease sale in the western Gulf**.

### 2NC Multi-Condo Good

**Condo’s good**

**1. Neg flex – can’t use kritiks and counterplans and test the aff from different angles**

**2. Information processing – multiple choices make for more tactile and harder debate – fosters 2ac tech skills**

**3. Real-world – policy-makers aren’t forced to stick to their opinions if they realize a flaw**

**[4. Research – sides have to learn a broader variety of issues instead of relying on generics**

**5. Checks new affs – neg needs to be able to test multiple options on the fly]**

**Counter-interpretation – we get** [INSERT] **– it’s a logical fixed limit that mitigates their offense**

**Not a voter –**

**[If going for] just a reason to stick us with the CP – solves 1AR allocation**

**[If not going for] just a reason conditional worlds should be banned – solves 1AR allocation**

**AT: Strat Skew**

**No reason we skewed you any more than disads, T, or impact turns would – our advocacies aren’t contradictory**

**AT: In-depth education**

**2NR checks – still gain education but are forced to think about time allocation too – eventually will come down to the best option**

**AT: Neg Bias**

**Aff has first and last speech, gets to pick the focus of the debate, and can go for a single dropped arg in the 2ar – this topic proves there is no predictable neg ground**

**AT: C/I – One Condo**

**Can’t solve either teams offense – means we can’t test new options on the fly and leads to staler debate**

**Arbitrary and self-serving – like saying you can cheat just not in the specific way you cheated in this debate – if theory is entirely offense/defense, then all of our offense is a linear disad**

**AT C/I – Dispo**

**Arbitrary and not real-world – forces us into random rules to stick us with advocacies, let’s the aff frame the debate**

### Status Quo Solves – 2NC

#### Lots of drilling now

Conathan 12 (Michael Conathan is the Director of Ocean Policy at American Progress. His work focuses on driving progressive solutions to the multitude of problems facing the world’s oceans. Prior to joining American Progress, Mike spent five years staffing the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation’s Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard—initially serving a one-year appointment as a Dean John Knauss Marine Policy Fellow before joining the committee full-time as a professional staff member in 2007. In that capacity Mike worked primarily for Subcommittee Ranking Member Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME), as well as the Ranking Members of the full committee, Sen. Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX). He oversaw enactment of multiple key pieces of ocean legislation, including the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act, the Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observing Act, the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act, and the Shark Conservation Act. A native Cape Codder, Mike received a master’s degree in marine affairs from the University of Rhode Island in 2005 and also holds a Bachelor of Arts in English literature from Georgetown University., 2/29/2012, "More Drilling Won’t Lower Gas Prices", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/29/11091/more-drilling-wont-lower-gas-prices/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2012/02/29/11091/more-drilling-wont-lower-gas-prices/))

It hasn’t worked yet. There are currently more oil rigs operating on U.S. lands and waters than in the rest of the world combined, production is at an eight-year high, and the most recent “Short-Term Energy Outlook” from the Energy Information Administration projects production to continue growing at least through 2013 based on current activity. By the end of President Obama’s recently issued five-year drilling plan, fully 75 percent of our undiscovered, technically recoverable offshore reserves will be open to drilling. All that additional activity hasn’t stemmed the recent gas price spike. If oil companies wanted to increase production, they could. In March 2011 the Department of the Interior released a report revealing two-thirds of oil-and-gas companies’ offshore leases and more than half of their onshore leases are not being produced. Pumping oil takes time. Opening new offshore areas will take seven years to produce any new oil, and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge will take 10 years to produce a single drop of oil. Even if more production would lower prices, it wouldn’t happen tomorrow. And the Energy Information Administration finds that even if we wave the green flag for our entire exclusive economic zone, it will do nothing more than reduce the cost of gasoline by two cents, and not until 2030.

#### Existing leases solve

Department of the Interior, 3-29-11, “Review shows that more than two-thirds of offshore and half of onshore leases lie idle,” <http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/DOI-Releases-Report-on-Unused-Oil-and-Gas-Leases.cfm>

WASHINGTON - A report requested by President Obama and released today by the Department of the Interior shows that more than two-thirds of offshore leases in the Gulf of Mexico and more than half of onshore leases on federal lands remain idle, neither producing nor under active exploration and development by companies who hold those leases. ¶ “We continue to support safe and responsible domestic energy production, and as this report shows millions of acres that have already been leased to industry for oil and gas productions sit idle,” Department of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said. “These are resources that belong to the American people, and they expect those supplies to be developed in a timely and responsible manner and with a fair return to taxpayers. As we continue to offer new areas onshore and offshore for leasing, as we have done over the last two years, we will also be exploring ways to provide incentives to companies to bring production online quickly and safely.”¶ According to the report, more than 70 percent of the tens of millions of offshore acres under lease are inactive, neither producing nor currently subject to approved or pending exploration or development plans. This includes almost 24 million inactive leased acres in the Gulf of Mexico, which potentially could hold more than 11 billion barrels of oil and 50 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¶ For onshore leases, the review found that approximately 45 percent of all leases and approximately 57 percent of all leased acres are inactive. That means that out of a total of over 38 million leased onshore acres, almost 22 million leased onshore acres that are not being used. The Department is currently exploring policy options to provide companies with additional incentives for more rapid development of oil and gas resources from existing and future leases.

#### 70% undiscovered gas is unrestricted now- best CBO estimates

Nisen, ‘12

(Max, Business insider 9-12, <http://www.businessinsider.com/united-states-drilling-2012-8>)

Opening all Federal lands to oil and gas leasing has long been a point of political contention. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office put out a report, at the request of Chairman of the House Budget Committee Paul Ryan, that looks at the budgetary effects of immediately opening all federal lands to drilling.¶ According to the report, that would include two primary areas:¶ Lands where leasing is now statutorily prohibited, notably, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) and¶ Onshore and offshore areas that are unavailable for leasing under current administrative policies, including sections of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—generally, the submerged lands between 3 miles and 200 miles from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coastlines—and certain onshore areas in which oil and gas leasing is either restricted or temporarily prohibited.¶ The CBO expects the United States to collect approximately $150 billion in gross proceeds from federal oil and gas leases over the next 10 years. Opening all public lands would add an estimated $7 billion to that total over the same time period. ¶ $5 billion of that would come from ANWR, and if the deal with Alaska is similar to past legislation, 50 to 90 percent of it would go to the state. ¶ In the long run, the government could expect an estimated $2-4 billion extra in royalties from ANWR from 2023-2025, which would be split with Alaska in the same way. ¶ Ignoring environmental arguments for the moment, the issue is that there just isn't that much oil that would be freed up in such a proposal. The CBO estimates that 70 percent of undiscovered oil and gas on federal lands is already accessible under current law.

#### Most contracts are idle – the plan is non-sensical

**CBO 12** (Congressional Budget Office, August 2012, "Potential Budgetary Effects of Immediately Opening Most Federal Lands to Oil and Gas Leasing", [www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12\_Oil-and-Gas\_Leasing.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/08-09-12_Oil-and-Gas_Leasing.pdf))

Leasing Offshore Federal Lands The geographic scope of leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf has changed often over the past few decades.3 CBO anticipates that, under current law, DOI will offer leases for most of the acreage in the OCS over the next several decades. Until the early 1980s, DOI offered leases in all of the OCS, including the areas off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Florida coasts. In 1990, after the Congress imposed a series of temporary restrictions, President George H.W. Bush withdrew large portions of the OCS in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the eastern Gulf of Mexico from the leasing program. Those restricted areas were subsequently expanded by President Clinton. Then, in 2008, President George W. Bush narrowed the restrictions to include only areas that had been designated as National Marine Sanctuaries. In 2010, President Obama removed Alaska’s Bristol Bay area from the leasing program until the end of June 2017. Since 2008, policies on leasing in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS have varied, reflecting differences between the two most recent Administrations. In January 2009, DOI issued a proposed five-year plan that included lease sales in the Atlantic and Pacific OCS for the 2010–2015 period. The program proposed in June 2012 does not include an option for sales in those areas between 2012 and 2017. Neither plan involved the areas in the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the Florida coast in which leasing is now prohibited until the end of June 2022.4 Other than the temporary ban on leasing in the eastern Gulf of Mexico, there currently are no statutory restrictions on OCS leasing. Decisions about leasing are made administratively—in consultation with industry and the states—for five-year periods. Leases cannot be offered for areas that are not included in a five-year plan, but the available regions may change whenever a new plan is adopted. The next plan is expected to go into effect in August 2012 and will extend for five years unless a future Administration chooses to restart the process before that plan expires. Historical experience suggests that only a fraction of the leases awarded in the OCS will eventually be brought into production. Almost 60 percent of the OCS leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico through 2007 either expired or were relinquished without producing any oil or natural gas.5 CBO estimates that almost 90 percent of the 2011 OCS production was from leases issued before 2001, reflecting the long lead times associated with exploring and developing oil and gas fields. 6

#### Squo solves and restrictions irrelevant- prices too low to incentivize drilling

**Harder, 12** -- National Journal energy correspondent

(Amy, "The Price Isn't Right," National Journal Daily AM, 1-31-12, General OneFile)

For the United States to really capitalize on all the natural gas President Obama is boasting about, the price of it has to go up so that companies have an incentive to drill. Calling for high energy prices doesn't make political sense. But Obama is implicitly trying to do that by pushing incentives for natural-gas-powered trucks and cars that could boost demand for the energy source--and therefore prices. Obama traveled to the battleground states of Nevada and Colorado last week to tout such a proposal in the wake of his State of the Union address. Legislation incentivizing natural-gas-powered trucks is politically popular and has Republican support in Congress. Such a measure would have the potential to create jobs, bolster energy independence--and raise natural-gas prices. The administration is quietly taking two other politically controversial steps that could also boost natural-gas demand: implementing environmental regulations that are prompting utilities to shift from coal to the relatively cleaner-burning natural gas, and processing applications from companies to export natural gas. With the nation's natural-gas prices under $3 per million British thermal units (a worldwide low, and down from nearly $14 per million Btu in 2008), oil and gas companies are shifting investments from America's recently discovered vast shale gas reserves to resources that fetch higher prices--such as oil. Energy analysts say that this trend will continue for at least the next few years until prices reach a level where it becomes more profitable to produce gas. "There are a lot of benefits to our economy to having a relatively low price of natural gas," said Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman , D-N.M. "We have the reverse circumstance right now that natural-gas producers are shutting wells because of the very low price of natural gas."

#### Status quo solves – tons of unused federal lands

Rahall, ‘8

Rahall, Nick, US Rep, Report of House Committee on Natural Resources Majority Staff, 6-08, http://alternativeenergy.procon.org/sourcefiles/truth\_about\_americas\_energy.pdf

In a Nutshell¶ \_ On the Outer Continental Shelf, 82%of federal natural gas and 79% of ¶ federal oil is located in areas that are currently open for leasing. ¶ \_ Onshore, 62% of oil and 84% of natural gas resources are either fully ¶ accessible under standard lease stipulations designed to protect lands ¶ and wildlife, or will be accessible pending the completion of land-use ¶ planning or environmental reviews. ¶ \_ Between 1999 and 2007, drilling permits for oil and gas development on ¶ public lands increased more than 361%.¶ \_ Since 2004, the Bureau of Land Management has issued 28,776 permits ¶ to drill on public land; in that same time, only 18,954 wells were actually ¶ drilled. ¶ \_ Oil and gas companies have stockpiled nearly 10,000 extra permits to ¶ drill that they are not using to increase domestic production. ¶ \_ Onshore, of the 47.5 million acres of federal lands leased by oil and ¶ gas companies, only about 13 million acres are actually producing oil ¶ and gas. ¶ \_ Offshore, only 10.5 million of the 44 million leased acres are currently ¶ producing oil or gas. ¶ \_ Combined, oil and gas companies hold leases to nearly 68 million acres ¶ of federal land that are not producing oil and gas. ¶ \_ The 68 million acres of leased, inactive federal land could produce an ¶ additional 4.8 million barrels of oil and 44.7 billion cubic feet of natural ¶ gas each day. ¶ \_ That would nearly double total U.S. oil production, and increase natural ¶ gas production by 75%. ¶ \_ 4.8 million barrels of oil equals more than six times the estimated peak ¶ production from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. ¶ \_ Development of and production from the 68 million acres currently ¶ under lease but not in production would cut US imports of oil by one-third.

### Solvency – Long Timeframe 2NC

#### Decades until production

#### Murawski 12 [John, "Opening Atlantic Ocean to offshore drilling likely," 10-2, http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/10/02/2384560/opening-atlantic-ocean-to-offshore.html#storylink=cpy]

But even if the Atlantic Ocean is opened to energy companies, oil and gas production would likely not get underway for at least a decade. The energy exploration cycle is heavily regulated and requires seismic testing, environmental assessments, oceanographic mapping, military reviews and other regulatory hurdles before any oil and gas can start flowing. “There’s no way to speed this up,” said Athan Manuel, director of the Sierra Club’s lands protection program. The latest federal estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management for the entire Atlantic coast is between 11 trillion cubic feet and 54 trillion cubic feet of natural gas – well below the 84.2 trillion cubic feet found in the Marcellus Shale that spans New York and Pennsylvania. The amount of oil is likely between 1.3 billion barrels and 5.58 billion barrels, less than a year’s supply. With the market price of gas hovering near all-time lows, the Energy Information Administration, a division within the U.S. Department of Energy, has estimated that no oil or gas will be produced in the Atlantic or outer continental shelf before 2035. Drilling offshore could begin 3 miles beyond the coast, the point at which federal waters begin, extending as far as 200 miles in the ocean. Each mile away from land increases the cost of pipelines, land-to-rig travel and drilling in ever-deeper waters. $66M to $400M a year Beyond the engineering and technical challenges, offshore drilling would mobilize state governments to press Congress to change federal law to allow states to collect royalties on the lease fees, as is done for Gulf Coast states. North Carolina could collect $66 million to $400 million a year for the life of the reserves, according to a 145-page report issued September 2011 by a scientific advisory panel created by Gov. Perdue. The revenue amount, at the top end, could approach 2 percent of the state’s $20.2 billion annual budget. “You could scatter that money around all over state government,” said Weatherspoon of the N.C. Petroleum Council. He said the money could bolster programs such as environmental regulation, mental health services, community colleges and others that have been hard-hit by budget cuts. Weatherspoon said that offshore exploration would pit neighboring states against each other to host shore bases that would supply and support the offshore rigs. Such bases could involve hundreds of jobs in metallurgy, food preparation, transportation and related work. A 2009 report from the Southeast Energy Alliance, an industry trade group, estimated that offshore drilling could create 6,700 new jobs in North Carolina. Bill Holman, director of the State Policy Program at Duke University’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, said chances are slim that North Carolina could compete with larger ports in South Carolina and Virginia. Holman based his assessment on his tenure as a member of another offshore study panel, the Legislative Research Commission’s Advisory Subcommittee on Offshore Energy Exploration, which prepared a report in 2010. He said little research has been done on offshore resources, and noted that projected natural gas prices suggest that little will change in this regard in the near future. “We’re at the same state of knowledge on these issues as we were 20 years ago,” Holman said. “Until the price of natural gas goes way up, I’d be surprised if there would be very much interest, given the cost of developing those offshore resources versus the cost of developing the known resources.”

#### They can't solve lease certainty

#### Bluey 12 [Rob, journalist and blogger who leads The Heritage Foundation's investigative reporting unit, “Production of Oil, Gas and Coal on Federal Lands Sinks to Nine-Year Low,” 3-19, <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/03/19/production-of-oil-gas-and-coal-on-federal-lands-sinks-to-nine-year-low/>]

The administration, meanwhile, has also taken several steps to limit production. Heritage’s Nick Loris noted these four steps taken by the Obama administration: [Withdrew](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=134670) areas offered for 77 oil and gas leases in Utah that could cost American taxpayers millions in lost lease bids, production royalties, new jobs and the energy needed to offset rising imports of oil and natural gas. [Cancelled](http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/05/president-obama-to-cancel-offshore-drilling-projects/) lease sales in the Western Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic coast and delayed exploration off the coast of Alaska and kept other [resource-rich areas off-limits](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=179299). [Finalized](http://naturalresources.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=186056) rules, first announced by Secretary Salazar on January 6, 2010, to establish more government hurdles to onshore oil and natural gas production on federal lands. [Withdrew](http://billingsgazette.com/news/opinion/editorial/gazette-opinion/article_bb25685e-33df-11df-ae5a-001cc4c002e0.html) 61 oil and natural gas leases in Montana as part of a lawsuit settlement over climate change. “The big picture is clear that government policies undertaken by the Obama administration have produced a significant decline in offshore oil production on federal lands in fiscal year 2011,” the [Institute for Energy Research](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/03/15/fossil-fuel-production-on-federal-lands-at-9-year-low/) said in response to last week’s updated EIA analysis. “That is certainly not a way to increase domestic production of oil and keep oil and thus gasoline prices in check.”

#### Aff doesn’t solve---takes 5 years to boost production

CFAP 8 (Center for American Progress, 9/15/2008, "Ten Reasons Not to Expand Offshore Drilling", [www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2008/09/15/4894/ten-reasons-not-to-expand-offshore-drilling/))

6. Production would be expensive, would not start for a long time, and would have no short-term effect on oil prices. The average oil field size in the OCS is smaller than the average in the Gulf of Mexico, which is already being developed. As a result, much of the oil in the OCS would be expensive to extract, and is only becoming attractive now as a result of high oil prices. According the Energy Information Administration, it would take at least five years for oil production to begin. EIA predicted that there would be no significant effect on oil production or price until nearly 20 years after leasing begins.

### Solvency – Gas-Only Fails – 2NC

#### Gas-only deters investors

Humphries 8 (Marc, Analyst in Energy Policy – Congressional Research Service, “Outer Continental Shelf: Debate over Oil and Gas Leasing and Revenue Sharing,” CRS, 1-22, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33493.pdf>)

Under current law, all OCS lease sales include both oil and gas, and a lessee is required to develop the gas or the oil once it is discovered. Natural gas-only leases have been met with much skepticism by many experts in geology, who note that most of these offshore fields are likely to contain both oil and gas. Further, industry might be reluctant to bid on leases that did not transfer ownership of all discovered resources. Proponents argue that production of natural gas only would lessen states’ concerns.

#### Gas-only leases are too expensive and any hint of oil ends the project

CR 6 (Congressional Record, 5-18, p. Google Books)

First, the industry already has access to the vast majority of natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf. Indeed, according to the Bush administration, about 80 percent of the known reserves are located in areas where drilling is already allowed. Furthermore, the oil and gas industry already owns drilling rights to more than 4,000 untapped leases in the Gulf of Mexico alone. Second, there really is no such thing as gas-only drilling. Drilling for natural gas means drilling for oil. Even the Bush administration and energy industry honchos have dismissed the so-called gas-only drilling as unworkable. This is the president of the American Petroleum Institute on gas-only drilling: "We are somewhat concerned about some gas-only leasing proposals that have been embraced by people who don't know how the industry works." And this is the head of MMS: "Natural gas seldom comes totally by itself. Do you want to drill a well offshore that will cost anywhere between $20 million and $80 million? And then, if you find oil with it, what will you do? I don't know how successful it will be."

## K

### 2NC Overview

#### K outweighs the case

#### -- Magnitude -- logic of security created the most destructive features of the international system -- war, oppression, and ecological destruction are all inevitable when particular decisions become necessities. Specifically with the aff – the ocean represents the imperial other which we must dominate to obtain resources. Try or die -- voting aff makes their impacts inevitable.

#### -- Turns case -- your neoliberal commitment to drilling thwarts environmental sustainability -- the ocean is intricate and sustains us -- they destroy it in the name of national security.

#### -- Independent impact -- extraction becomes unsustainable as we create an imperial quest to mine the world -- means we can't solve warming or become independent.

#### -- Alt' solves case -- rejecting dominant political discourse challenges the root cause of violent identity construction, undermining the solar reason for war. We can use the ocean but not open up every part to every one. It's a prerequisite to better policy-making and a matter of sequencing -- good theory now causes better action later.

### AT Mobilization

#### No mobilization – empirically proven. Extinction rhetoric causes short-termism that fails

**Hodder 9** (Patrick, PhD candidate at the Bega Education Centre of the University of Wollongong and Brian Martin, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, “Climate crisis? The politics of emergency framing,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 36, 5 September 2009, pp. 53-60.)

The similarities between the issues of nuclear war and climate change suggest that campaigners should try to learn lessons from previous movements (Overy 1982; Young 1984). In particular, the trajectory of the international movements against nuclear war offers several lessons for climate change campaigners. Firstly, the anti-nuclear-weapons movements expanded dramatically yet collapsed just a few years later, even though the underlying problem - the risk of major catastrophe from nuclear war - remained much the same. This suggests that movements should aim to become sustainable, building structures or approaches that can maintain popular involvement over the long term. Secondly, crisis framing was insufficient to create the huge mobilisation necessary to bring about fundamental change in the nuclear system. Indeed, campaigners using thinking like that of Jonathan Schell and Carl Sagan, who argued that nuclear war was the ultimate catastrophe, failed to impart their sense of crisis to government decision-makers. Thirdly, crisis framing appeared to put an emphasis on short-term solutions implemented by governments - an orientation to reformism (Roberts 1979). This sort of framing neglected the development of long-term activism to bring about changes in the structure of state system that underlies the nuclear threat (Barnet 1972; Kovel 1983; Martin 1984).

#### Extinction rhetoric de-mobilizes action and causes numbing

Keller 96 (Catherine, Professor of Constructive Theology at the Theological School of Drew University, Apocalypse Now and Then, p. 13-14)

So if the term "apocalypse" indulges in the ensuing text a certain looseness of self-reference, it means to connote always both an interpretive and a material set of collective habits, always some tense coupling of hope and despair—always an end of some world and a corollary vision. But context, proportion, rhetoric, and effects will vary bewilderingly. And, I hope, revealingly. We will trace effects of the apocalypse myth rippling through our history, revolutionary as well as reactionary, political as well as religious, the myth itself perhaps even prejudicing our attempts to dispel its more sinister effects. But it will not be enough merely to observe how the moral dualism "revealed" in Revelation has underwritten Western civilization, or how it ramifies in our social movements, how it pulses in motions of thought and feeling in what Jacques Derrida has delicately named "an apocalyptic toner '9 Such deconstruction of a pattern that habituates itself readily into metanarrative—into any form of grand, telic history—will itself serve apocalyptic ends if all it does is yield more academic distance: paralyzed by irony, deactivated, we collude with the cruder endtime scenarios of our period. Whatever arcane tales and veiled hermeneutics we may enjoy, the point is after all to struggle against the more obtuse apocalypses—the massive, monstrous, self' literalizing ones like the annihilation of peoples and species. These are processes of relentless termination, bringing down no New Jerusalem. Yet warnings of social, economic, ecological, or nuclear disaster have become so numbingly normal that they do not have the desired effect on most of us, who retreat all the more frantically into private pursuits. Apocalyptic discourse, even or especially in the form of various "anti-apocalypses," has been coming at us, and we flee inside ourselves. I want therefore to poke openings into the apocalypse pattern, to enter attentively into the gravitational pull of apocalypse. I want to invite the reader inside with me. Or, more accurately, to consider together how we might find ourselves already inside of it. What might keep us awake to the dimensions of the danger—so gruesomely literal, so massively material, that it can hardly be addressed without recourse to the phantasmagoric? How can we sustain resistance to destruction without expecting to triumph? That is, how can we acknowledge the apocalyptic dimensions of the late-modern situation in which we find ourselves entrenched without either clinging to some millennial hope of steady progress or then flipping, disappointed, back to pessimism? For within the U.S. context, there is a traditional tendency to get active, to get enraged, and then to give up, surrendering to the lull of the comforts and conveniences extracted from the tribulations of the rest of the planet. I do this too. We see ourselves (or perhaps others) as innocent victims, and hope for ultimate vindication, and are soon disillusioned with the prospects. We think that we must "save the earth.” Who can carry this? In other words, to the extent that we get uncritically hooked on apocalypse—not merely the situation but the habit—we contribute to it. We wish for messianic solutions and end up doing nothing, for we get locked into a particularly apocalyptic either/or logic—if we can't save the world, then to hell with it. Either salvation or damnation.

#### Swamps your offense – numbing means extinction discourse loses its productive potential

Quinby 94 (Lee, Distinguished Lecturer at the Macaulay Honors College of the City University of New York City, Anti-Apocalypse, p. xx-xxi)

Today within the United States and in its representations abroad, the signifier "America" promises both millennial peace and harmony and military prowess and destructive force. In other words, contemporary U.S. apocalyptic discourse indeed differs from earlier versions, but it is no less real for that. Like the apocalypse of the first and second centuries and the apocalypse of Puritan colonization, the Revolutionary War, and the Civil War, twentieth-century apocalypse is a system of logic that understands mundane and momentous events in relation to the belief that the end of time is near. Unlike these earlier versions of apocalyptic expression, there is one key characteristic of twentieth-century apocalypse that was simply unthinkable in earlier eras: humanity's capacity to end the world. Although pre-twentieth-century forms of apocalypse have had any number of internal differences, they have all held the belief that God was the source of both revelation and destruction. Twentieth-century apocalyptic expression includes this concept of divine design but also includes the possibility of an accidental end brought on by technological prowess, which might occur in a flicker of time by a nuclear blast or by the gradual deadening of global warming. In the twentieth century, belief in a technological disaster of irrevocable proportions on the horizon has fostered a double movement of anxiety and denial, characterized by an ironic stance in regard to human self-annihilation. Henry Adams was one of the first U.S. intellectuals to have coupled a sense of imminent apocalyptic man-made catastrophe with irony. (I use "man-made" here in the specific sense that Adams did; as Adams indicates, the burden of such dangers thus far resides with men. )19 As Western calenders guide us toward the end of a millennium, postmodern cultural productions even more forcefully exploit this sense of ironic apocalypse. Director David Lynch, in films such as Blue Velvet and Wild at Heart, for example, boldly incorporates such irony into both utopian and distopian forms of apocalyptic cinema. On one hand, this kind of artistic experimentation helps dislodge apocalypse's insistence on its own uniqueness. Doomsday anxieties simply become banal. On the other hand, this insistence on the prevailing banality of everything, including fears about the end of time or the destruction of the environment, numbs people into inaction through its paralyzing sense of futility. This sense of futility is every bit as dangerous to individual liberty as is the righteousness that accompanies divine and technological apocalypse. Apocalyptic suppressions of freedom (of thought, economic opportunity, sexual and affective relations, political action, and so on) are informed by two differing attitudes about the end of time. One attitude disposes people to join forces as righteous agents of a predetermined end. This leads to active suppression of conduct that does not fit with apocalyptic truth, as exemplified by the outlawing of homosexuality, or vandalizing and bombing abortion clinics. This sense of righteousness has been succinctly asserted by Randall Terry, founder of the antiabortion movement called Operation Rescue. As he put it in a 1992 television interview, "God put me on this earth for this hour, for this purpose." A slogan appearing on a U.S. flag in the fundamentalist meeting room where the interview was conducted neatly summed up his mission in terms of American apocalypse: `America shall be saved."'° The second attitude, deriving from the irony found in twentieth-century apocalypse, inclines people toward a world-weary passivity. Although this stance doesn't lead to direct action against others, it too should be understood as a suppression of freedom. Operating through the stimulation of malaise and apathy, it renders people less inclined to political activity, despite their explicit acknowledgment of the need for social change. Whether it is located on the right, the left, or in the center of the political spectrum, the apocalyptic self stands on a threshold positioned between an imminent end and uncertainty about the exact moment and means of that end. Agents of active apocalyptic suppression are spurred on by a sense of righteousness, whether they perceive themselves as acting on behalf of divine or of human justice. For them, the end of history as we know it is near, it will be accompanied by dreadful but deserved events, and the righteous will be saved. As the elect, they are to help bring the end about. In contrast, ironic apocalypse supplants agency with apathy. For those who hold this view, the end is near, it is probably unavoidable, it is not deserved by all but it will be suffered by all. Those who hold this knowledge are not the elect; they are merely among the unfortunate ones who will be here for the end.

### AT Extinction Outweighs

#### Evaluate probability first – “any risk” logic makes decisionmaking impossible

Meskill 9 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)

Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.

#### Extinction won’t happen – false narratives of staving off apocalypse have continuously resulted in genocide and oppression.

Quinby 99 (Lee, Distinguished Lecturer at the Macaulay Honors College of the City University of New York City, Millennial Seduction, p. 2-5)

Promoting ways of thinking and living unhampered by fear of earth-shattering catastrophe and extricated from the kindred conviction that a perfect world is on the horizon is admittedly an uphill task. Endism has long run deep in the United States, ranging from a literal acceptance of the divine apocalypse predicted in the Book of Revelation to a more nebulous sense of impending doom, whether from asteroids, viruses, or technology.3 Believing that the end of the world looms means living in the shadow of fear. Some believers report suffering intensely whereas others disclose a more general anxiety or routine agitation. What makes living with apocalyptic belief tolerable for so many is its accompanying millennial dream, the current of hope that promises the fullness of Truth unveiled and visions of perfection for the elect. The elect are the chosen ones, whether they be divinely ordained, technologically proficient, or just plain lucky, the ones tapped to survive destruction and reign supreme in the millennium. Not that such hope is the antidote to fear—at least not the kind that is framed in apocalyptic zeal. Apocalyptic fear and millennialist hope fit hand in glove, with the glove of augmented desire needing the hand of inordinate fear to fill out its shape. I call this sense of millennial hope electism, not only to highlight its relation to endism, but also to make clear the inherent divisiveness of apocalypse. Even when electism takes a benign, generous and nebulous form, division and hierarchy prevail. For example, although the spiritual progress of New Age belief is supposed to envelop the whole world and for some the universe, the concept of the elect remains. It is simply extended to all in a promised transformation toward higher consciousness; the partition between the chosen and the doomed becomes temporal, dividing between the former and new ages.4 More often, however, electism is cast overtly in oppositional terms in keeping with the fierce battle between the forces of good and evil envisioned in Revelation. The rub, of course, is that it is impossible to disprove apocalyptic prophecy once and for all. But it can't be proven either; even the most ardent believers concede that faith is necessary. In the meantime, it should be possible to shift focus to the historical record of apocalyptic and millennialist belief. First, the end of the world has not arrived as predicted. This seems obvious, but given the recurrent insistence that the end is near, it needs to be stated bluntly. The failure rate of this prediction over the course of 2000 years is pretty astounding. If more than two millennia have passed since apocalyptic writings emerged in Jewish and then Christian society, there is no good evidence to accept them as applicable to the present. Even though natural calamities and technological disasters do happen, there is no historical or scientific evidence to link such occurrences to supernatural agency. And although there are well-known stories that tell of world-ending calamities—the biblical flood, for example—such disasters are more likely to be exaggerations of earthquakes, volcanoes, and mudslides that may have destroyed whole societies, but not the earth. Whatever the cause of the flood that Noah survived, it is obviously clear that—despite numerous predictionsworld-destructive disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, asteroids, and so on, have not happened. So my first point is what hasn't happened. My second point is what has happened as a result of the rise and spread of apocalypticism and millennialism as systems of belief. Apocalypticism claims that a supernatural or exceedingly powerful force, like nuclear disaster, for example, will bring world destruction, but that an elect number will be granted a new, transformed earth. This powerful conviction that time and the world as we know it are ending has brought both terror and fervor to multitudes over the centuries. As many scholars have pointed out, such a belief is far more likely to accompany poverty and persecution than privilege. Heartfelt expression for suffering to come to an end has a history of spurring struggle. This struggle includes holy wars against earthly forces believed to be under the sway of Satan as well as personal vendettas against forces of technology, by the unabomber, for example. Like apocalyptic endism, millennialist electism also stems most notably from the Book of Revelation, specifically Chapter 20, Verse 4,\* which proclaims that the martyred faithful will be returned to enjoy a thousand-year reign with the son of God while Satan is bound away in a lake of fire. From the Crusades to the colonization of the Americas to the Cold War, millennialism has spurred desire to be one of the elect, desire bolstered by apocalyptic demands to fight against forces of evil. The sense of being chosen to survive the days of doom easily conflates with believing one has been called to enact them, thereby bringing about the New Era. The twentieth century alone provides ample evidence of this, including one of its most atrocious brands of apocalyptic millennialism, the Third Reich, as well as its current white-supremacist and militia offshoots. Evoking Nazism is not meant to be alarmist. While I do want to insist that millennialist belief has been a powerful moving force for social domination, I also want to acknowledge, as Stephen Jay Gould has put it, that there probably will be more party than terror this time around.5 Nevertheless, it is important not to dismiss the detrimental effects of apocalypticism and millennialism, not only in U.S. culture, which is the focus of this book, but also around the world.° What this book stresses is that apocalyptic and millennialist principles and practices interfere with the goals of democratic societies. My view runs contrary to scholars who regard apocalyptic zeal as necessary to democratic social transformation, as indeed essential to the establishment of the United States as a democracy and to the achievements of the civil rights movement in the sixties and of second-wave feminism.7 This stance emerged out of Norman Cohn's highly influential work The Pursuit of the Millennium, which details a number of links between apocalyptic belief and egalitarian movements.8 But it is a reductive reading of Cohn's complex account, which situates what he calls "revolutionary millenarianism" in relation to other social movements in Europe between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries. He points out that both peasant revolts and urban insurrections were "very common and moreover often successful," contrasting them to apocalyptic groups which came together from an "unorganized, atomized population, rural or urban or both." Banding together around a charismatic prophet, often an intellectual, including former priests, rather than one of the poor, the millenarian groups typically had leaders who were obsessed with the end-time. Unlike the populist social movements, these fringe groups embodied a kind of radical desperation. Stances linking apocalypse to democracy tend to overlook the ways in which strident apocalyptic conviction propels such marginalized groups toward martyrdom or genocidal massacre because of their willingness to defy their enemies.9 When these designated enemies are as powerful as the U.S. government, incidents like Waco can occur. Similarly, many other groups run the danger of confusing unconditional defiance with radical social change in the name of democratic practice.

### Risk Calc

#### Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios.

Eliezer **Yudkowsky**, 8/31/**2006**. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, **adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable**. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." **Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security**, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, **people tend to overestimate the probability that**, e.g., **seven events of 90% probability will all occur**. Conversely, **people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur**. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### Security necessitates calculation – causes instrumentalization of beings – that outweighs

**Burke 2007** lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, “What security makes possible,” Working Paper 2007 p.11-12

Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’:

### 2NC OCS

#### **Dirty energy production for national security creates a political impulse to secure –makes resource wars inevitable**

Martens 11 (Emily, MA in Geography and Regional Studies – University of Miami, “The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida,” Open Access Theses, 5-10, <http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa_theses>)

The term energy security has become an engrained and seemingly unquestioned term within the contemporary political arena since earlier articulation under President Carter. The definition of the term seems to change according to shifting agendas and the socio-political zeitgeist, as evidenced in the previous historical narrative. In the United States energy security has encompassed a plethora of meanings that are the result of divergent understandings of the functioning of political and economic structures, as well as the social or ‘national’ significance of key energy resources, such as oil (Barton et al. 2004). From the consumer standpoint, oil (or in its refined form as gasoline), particularly cheap oil, is not simply the fuel for transportation and production, but also a signifier of the “American Way of Life”, a symbol of American exceptionalism and status within the global community (Huber 2009; Moran and Russell 2009). Traditionally, security has been conceptualized in terms of border protection, as well as the protection and promotion of ideologies and values both domestically and abroad. In reference to Foucault, Dalby alleges that there is a “political impulse to secure” through the invocation of “effective discourses of danger… contained within widely shared geopolitical imaginaries”, which serve to unify identities and justify State action (Dalby 2002: 146). Here it is a national identity contained within the discourse of energy security, and the popular rhetoric of “drill, baby, drill” that manages to **thwart environmental sustainability efforts**, thereby increasing incentives to expand domestic drilling sites. Resources have, historically, been at the heart of many quarrels, whereby certain types of natural resources available only in specific areas, **become essential ingredients for the productive process**. An adequate supply of these resources must be assured, and so the commercial tentacles of the productive unit must expand, until in some instances it draws upon supplies extracted from every corner of the planet. Inasmuch as every productive unit becomes dependent upon its sources of raw materials, every actual or potential denial of access to them represents a threat to the maintenance of that unit and to the well-being of its beneficiaries (Leiss 1994:156-157). Therefore, state security begins to encompass the productive process to ensure access to those resources which have become embedded within the daily functioning of the State’s commercial, social and political activities. The State security apparatus, therefore, must step in to protect and ensure sufficient access to oil as a means of ensuring its own survival and economic wellbeing (Barton et al. 2004; Muller-Kraener 2008; Ciuta 2010). The term security, therefore, “does not refer to an external, objective reality, but establishes a security situation by itself. It is the enunciation of the signifier which constitutes an (in)security condition…organiz[ing] social relations into security relations” for the purpose of protecting State interests (Dalby 2002: 12). The discourse of US energy security operates under the pretense of national security interests to ensure the protection and sufficient flow of key resources. Now whether an actually supply problem or political motives dictate the decision to create another offshore well is often difficult to determine. However, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the nationalistic, “Buy American” political sentiment increased drastically, with some gas stations claiming to sell only domestic, or “terrorist-free”, oil, thus creating an incentive to increase domestic 55 production in one of the few remaining spaces for extraction and production: the outer continental shelf (Huber 2009). In a senatorial hearing for the US Committee on Foreign Relations conducted in May 2009, Senator John Kerry concluded that the current US energy schema, which is heavily dependent upon oil, is unsustainable. The main complications include [1] the ‘transfer of American wealth to oil-exporting nations’, as a result of limited domestic supply; [2] a vulnerability to oil price shocks; [3] increased federal expenses created by an obligation of ‘our military to defend our energy supply in volatile regions around the world’; [4] the recent implications of ‘global terror, funded directly by our expenditures on oil; and [5] global climate change which is perpetuated by the burning of fossil fuels (Kerry 2009, May 12). Energy independence, accordingly, is supposed to secure the US from the aforementioned threats by creating a domestic energy supply capable of maintaining the infrastructure dependent upon a constant and cheap supply of energy resources. In addition the perceived threats under Carter’s initial articulation of energy security, Kerry adds the threats of oil-funded terrorism – as a reaction to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, where the known terrorists were citizens of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer in the world – and the environmental threat of global climate change. The addition of terrorist free oil to the energy security agenda brings energy security discourse into the present, by identifying a new and tangible threat. Since there had not been a significant energy crisis since the 1970s there seemed to be less urgency surrounding an energy security discourse that promoted energy independence. The establishment of the International Energy Agency by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), managed to insulate member countries from 56 such a crisis by way of stockpiling oil resources to be used in an emergency and establishing procedures to follow in case there was a shortage in the oil supply. Due to a decrease in the threat posed by a major oil crisis such as that experienced in the 1970s, the position that oil imports constrained and threatened political and economic independence appears to have lost a bit of weight. Following the events of 9/11, however, the impetus to once again protect the nation from the threats posed by imported oil, which now include oil-funded terrorism, was on the table, and energy independence, which includes an expansion of offshore oil drilling, had a new reference point to play on fear and gain consent.

#### Tying security discourse to offshore drilling militarizes ocean policy and makes it a commodity – turns the whole case and makes war inevitable

Martens 11 (Emily, MA in Geography and Regional Studies – University of Miami, “The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida,” Open Access Theses, 5-10, <http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa_theses>)

Though ocean space is constructed as the other to terrestrial space, offshore oil drilling offers a perspective from which this land-ocean dichotomy collapses, at least provisionally. It is within the context of the potential for offshore oil drilling that the Truman Proclamation declared national jurisdiction over the continental shelf by claiming that the shelf was simply an extension of the land base as part of a process to secure territory and resources deemed useful for States’ and their associated commercial operations. The ocean was, for the first time, seen to have land space amenable to the same type of enclosure policy exercised over traditional, habitable, land space, but was excluded beyond the 12 mile mark from sovereign jurisdiction. Offshore oil drilling, however, does not merely connect land-based societies, to underwater land, but includes all of the vertical space above the surface down to the subsoil wellhead. Drilling operations, and the effects of drilling accidents, impact the entire marine environment from the vertical space of subsoil to surface, to the horizontal space across which pollutants travel and often collide with onshore territories. The aspect of commercial use becomes significant in the case of Florida that will be discussed in chapter 4. The above analysis shows how the overall national security 29 interest of the nation **relied heavily on the production and acquisition of oil resources** for its own perceived success. Similarly, oil has relied on its connectivity to the military for access to foreign oil, and in its momentum to sway policy towards acquiring exclusive economic rights in the outer continental shelf, thereby legalizing offshore oil activity through the extension of land rights on the continental shelf. **This interplay between the military and oil becomes quite pronounced**, especially when viewing **contemporary war efforts** that reside in places such as the Middle East. This is where environmental concern over oil pollution in the ocean becomes manifest, and perceives additional threats to environmental security with the expansion of offshore oil drilling. The rise of environmentalism in the 1970s (to be discussed in more detail in the following chapters) created a new perspective upon which to view ocean space. Emerging from this discourse was a perspective that saw social and biological consequences of activities taking place upon and within oceans. The 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill served as a call to action for those concerned with the multiple uses of the ocean, due to its negative impact on commercial fishing and tourism, as well as those who envisage the ocean as an element in the larger ecosystem, upon which society depends on for its survival. However, environmental concern is often seen to impede the dominate energy security discourse that promotes offshore oil drilling and positions itself as an essential element in national security efforts centered around military needs, thereby relegating it to a secondary position in the broader security schema. In an age of intense financial authority, it is difficult to put a price on the quality components that impact social space. As we will see in the following chapters, there is an attempt by many concerned with the environmental and social dangers involved with 30 offshore oil drilling as well as the overall consumption of oil (rising CO² emissions), to draw attention to the commercial interests that are harmed by drilling accidents and its day-to-day pollution. Opponents of offshore oil drilling employ a financial discourse in hopes of engaging an audience that views growth and profitability as the paramount objective. This economic argument supplements the environmentalist’s perspective, which holds relatively little weight next to profitability and industrial growth. A sustainable environment yields relatively small returns in a world where power and security endeavors are tightly bound to prospective investments in commodities and their ability to generate financial returns to investors. The commodification to securitization argument will become more apparent in the following chapters as I delve deeper into the discourses on energy and environmental security, particularly after the institution of the neoliberal political agenda established under the Reagan administration. Space, and in this case ocean space, becomes the object of an ideology, specifically the State’s ideology, which projects an image and creates a knowledge pertaining to the dominant perceptions of that space’s utility. The State defines the utility of ocean space via the optics of a socio-political ‘logic’, such as accumulation under capitalism. Through visual (i.e. maps where the ocean remains a two dimensional space) and verbal discourse the ocean, becomes a space of an accumulation strategy, a supplier and transporter in “the world of commodities”, whose value is constructed using the “power of money” (Lefebvre 2007: 53). As a reaction to this, counter-ideologies envisage ocean space using both the logics of capitalism, as well as a separate logic that recognizes quality components that are irreducible to the emphasis on quantity necessitated by accumulation strategy, and unattractive to the powerful forces of financial investment. 31 Ocean space, therefore, is the object of an intense ideological dispute, upon which divergent perceptions about its social and economic utility, or its position in relation to society, compete to engage policy and protections to secure their objectives from potential threats.

### Mary Wash MM OCS

**Warming apocalypticism –**

**You have staff writers making catastrophe and extinction claims**

**Bryce -- "The United States – the country that is routinely vilified by the Green/Left for refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol or impose carbon taxes or institute a cap-and-trade system – is dramatically cutting its production of carbon dioxide"**

#### Their framing of climate change causes a distraction for more pressing environmental movements that solve extinction

**Crist 7** – Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)

The diminishment of life's richness began with the exodus of hunters and gatherers from Africa thousands of years ago, and deepened with the [end page 36] invention of agriculture and cities, the development of warfare, and the advent of the European voyages.24 But **biodepletion accelerated enormously after the emergence of industrial civilization, and particularly since the mid-twentieth century, with billions of people not only doubling every few decades, but inclining**—by force, choice, or delusion—**toward a consumer culture founded on overproduction and global trade. Overproduction and global trade, in turn, require the ceaseless conversion of living beings and natural systems into dead objects, "resources," and humanized landscapes and seascapes**.25 **The significance of human-driven extinction can never be overstated, because it means not only the death of species but the end of their evolutionary destinies as well**—of the life-forms they would or might have eventually originated. Present-day extinction is not about species blinking out sporadically; it is a global and escalating spasm of en masse losses that, the geological record reveals, is an infrequent event in Earth's natural history. Notwithstanding circulating shallow sophistry that proclaims extinction to be "natural" or "normal," anthropogenic extinction is neither natural (for countless species are disappearing from targeted onslaught or pressures far exceeding their capacity to adapt) nor normal (for this level of losses occurs rarely as a consequence of a catastrophic event). Yet, as tragic as extinction is, species are also being devastated without being annihilated: losses of distinct populations and plunges in population numbers are a blow to the vigor, ecological contributions and connectedness, and evolutionary potential of species. Today, drops of 70, 80, 90 percent, or more, of wild plants and animals, on land and in oceans, are common. Such declines mean that species hang on as relics, with shortened lifespans or committed to extinction, no longer able to play significant ecological and evolutionary roles. **The nosedive of wild-animal and plant abundance foregrounds** yet [end page 37] another facet of biodepletion: **the simplification of ecosystems**. From a landscape perspective, the decline of numbers and geographic races of wild organisms signifies constrictions of their former ranges. **As populations blink out from diverse places, their place-bound contributions are lost; the losses cascade through the communities of organisms to which the extinguished populations belonged, leaving behind degraded ecosystems. While the simplification of ecosystems is often dramatically visible, it can also unfold as an incremental, barely noticeable process. And it is not that ecosystems, here and there, are occasionally suffering simplification by losing constituent locals. The biosphere is experiencing gross decline or elimination of areas that are, in certain cases, centers of diversification**—most notably, tropical forests, wetlands, mangrove forests, and coral reefs everywhere. The whittling down of ecological complexity has been a global trend proceeding from the conversion of ecosystems for intensive human uses, the aforementioned population depletions, and the invasion of nonnative species. Nonnative species are the generalists hitching rides in the bustle of globalization—from the climate-change-favored fungus that is killing frogs, to millions of domestic cats preying on birds, to innumerable more.26 Human-facilitated invasions, coupled with the disappearance of natives, lead to places losing the constellation of life-forms that once uniquely constituted them. The inevitable outcome of extinction, plummeting populations, lost and simplified ecosystems, and a bio-homogenized world is not only the global demolition of wild nature, but also the halting of speciation of much complex life. The conditions for the birth of new species within a wide band of life, especially of large-bodied species that reproduce slowly, are being suspended.27 [end page 38] **All these interconnected dimensions constitute** what conservation biologists call **the biodiversity crisis**—a term that to the postmodernist rings of rhetoric, while to the broad public (insofar as it has heard anything about it) involves a largely illiterate and vague understanding of "extinction."28 Academic frivolity and public ignorance aside, **the biodiversity crisis heralds a biospheric impoverishment that will be the condition and experience of all future human generations: it requires 5 to 10 million years for biodiversity to recover after a mass extinction of the current scope**. In light of this fact, I submit that **unless global warming unleashes appalling penalties—in which case, the climate crisis and biodepletion will merge into one devastating event for virtually all life**29**—the implications of humanity's impact on biodiversity are so far-reaching that they may, in reality, dwarf the repercussions of climate change**. And yet, **the current framing of climate change as the urgent issue encourages regarding the unwinding of biodiversity as a less critical matter than the forthcoming repercussions of global warming.** Attention to the long-standing ruination of biodiversity underway is subverted in two ways in climate-change discourse: either it gets elided through a focus on anthropocentric anxieties about how climate change will specifically affect people and nations; or biodepletion is presented as a corollary of climate change in writings that closely consider how global warming will cause biodiversity losses. **Climate change is undoubtedly speeding up the unraveling of life's interconnectedness and variety. But if global warming has such potential to afflict the natural world, it is because the latter's "immunity" has been severely compromised. It is on an already profoundly wounded natural world that global warming is delivering its blow. Focusing on the added blow of climate change is important, but this focus should not come at the expense of erasing from view the prior, ongoing, and climate-change-independent wounding of life on Earth**.

**Riley -- "There is little recognition by either side that current policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions are inadequate for dealing with the threat that they pose"**

**Roberts -- "handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade."**

#### We control uniqueness – apocalyptic warming rhetoric disabling effective approaches to warming now

Barrett & Gilles 12 -- \*nonprofit director and consultant for over a decade, her writing has appeared in newspapers, magazines, and blogs nationwide AND \*\*consulted for numerous political campaigns, advocacy organizations, and global NGOs, and has been profiled in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, and Fast Company (Mel and Metthew Barrett, 4/23/12, "How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action," http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/)

To understand why fewer people believe in climate change even as evidence mounts, we must look beyond the industry-funded movement to deny the reality and effects of climate change. Perhaps equally important -- if not quite equally culpable -- has been the extent to which both the proponents and opponents of human-made climate change have led us down a cul-de-sac of conversation by exploiting the apocalyptic metaphor to make their case. Whether by design or by accident, the initial warnings of environmentalists -- of oceans rising to engulf our most beloved metropolises, of amber waves of grain scorched into a desert landscape -- activated the apocalyptic impulse. The focus on disastrous repercussions for our behavior at some point in the future echoed the warnings of the Israelite priests to wayward Jews in Babylon or, later, to those who submitted too willingly to Alexander's process of Hellenization. It was a familiar story: change, and change radically, or face hell on earth. Perhaps there was no other way to sound the alarm about the devastating threat presented by global climate change, but that echo of apocalyptic warning was quickly seized upon by the naysayers to dismiss the evidence out of hand. We've heard this story before, the deniers insisted, and throughout history those who have declared the end of the world was near have always been proven wrong. As early as 1989, the industry front man Patrick Michaels, a climatologist and global warming skeptic, was warning in the op-ed pages of the Washington Post of this new brand of "apocalyptic environmentalism," which represented "the most popular new religion to come along since Marxism." That the solutions to global warming (a less carbon-intensive economy, a more localized trade system, a greater respect for nature's power) parallel so perfectly the dream of environmentalists, and that the causes of global warming (an unrestrained industrial capitalism reliant on the continued and accelerating consumption of fossil fuels) parallel the economic dream of conservatives, has simply exacerbated the fact that global warming has now become just another front in the culture wars. By seizing upon and mocking the apocalyptic imagery and rhetoric of those sounding the alarm, the industry front groups succeeded in framing the debate about global warming into a question about what one believes. Thus, entangled with the myth of apocalypse -- and its attendant hold on our own sense of belief and self-identity -- the debate about anthropogenic climate change has reached an impasse. You believe in the Rapture; I believe in global warming -- and so the conversation stops. But global climate change is not an apocalyptic event that will take place in the future; it is a human-caused trend that is occurring now. And as we expend more time either fearfully imagining or vehemently denying whether that trend will bring about a future apocalypse, scientists tell us that the trend is accelerating. Talking about climate change or peak oil through the rhetoric of apocalypse may make for good television and attention-grabbing editorials, but such apocalyptic framing hasn't mobilized the world into action. Most of us are familiar with the platitude "When the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, our over-reliance on the apocalyptic storyline stands between us and our ability to properly assess the problems before us. Some see the looming crises of global warming and resource and energy depletion and conclude that inaction will bring about the end of civilization: only through a radical shift toward clean energy and conservation, those on the Left argue, can we continue the way of life that we have known. Those on the Right dismiss the apocalyptic threats altogether, because the proposed solutions to peak oil, global warming, and overpopulation conflict with core conservative beliefs about deregulation and the free-market economy, or with a religious worldview that believes humanity is not powerful enough to alter something as large as our climate. Still others dismiss the catalog of doom and gloom as mere apocalypticism itself. Surely, we convince ourselves, all the dire warnings about the effects of global warming aren't that different from the world-ending expectations of the Rapturists? The result is that the energy we could expend addressing the problems before us is instead consumed by our efforts to either dismiss the threat of apocalypse or to prove it real. Ultimately, the question becomes not what to do about the threats before us but whether you believe in the threats before us. By allowing the challenges of the 21st century to be hijacked by the apocalyptic storyline, we find ourselves awaiting a moment of clarity when the problems we must confront will become apparent to all -- or when those challenges will magically disappear, like other failed prophecies about the end of the world. Yet the real challenges we must face are not future events that we imagine or dismiss through apocalyptic scenarios of collapse -- they are existing trends. The evidence suggests that much of what we fear in the future -- the collapse of the economy, the arrival of peak oil and global warming and resource wars -- has already begun. We can wait forever, while the world unravels before our very eyes, for an apocalypse that won't come. The apocalyptic storyline becomes a form of daydreaming escape: the threat of global warming becomes a fantasy to one day live off the grid, or buy a farm, or grow our own food; economic collapse becomes like a prison break from the drudgery of meaningless and increasingly underpaid work in a soul-crushing cubicle; peak oil promises the chance to finally form a community with the neighbors to whom you've never spoken. Yet despite the fantasia peddled by Hollywood and numerous writers, a world battered by natural disasters and global warming, facing declining natural resources and civic unrest, without adequate water or energy or food, with gross inequalities between the rich and the poor, is not a setting for a picaresque adventure, nor is it the ideal place to start living in accord with your dreams. The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

**Yellow peril --**

**Clement -- "China’s “string of pearls” strategy refers to attempts to negotiate basing rights" – proves coop possible but we make problematic assumptions**

#### **Threats of Chinese escalation in the SCS justify US intervention which prevents peaceful resolution**

Chen 12 -- Senior Professor, Law School, Xiamen University, People’s Republic of China; Chairman, Chinese Society of International Economic Law, 1993–2011; International Arbitrator, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the Washington Convention, since 1993 (An, 2012, "On the Source, Essence of “Yellow Peril” Doctrine and Its Latest Hegemony “Variant” – the “China Threat” Doctrine: From the Perspective of Historical Mainstream of Sino-Foreign Economic Interactions and Their Inherent Jurisprudential Principles," http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/docserver/22119000/13/1/22119000\_013\_01\_S01\_text.pdf?expires=1359819574&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F52EBADF2C41BB3C4ABD9774E2A182EA)

These questions have been quarreled for over at least 140 years. They are not only historical issues, but also important reality problems. One recent relating example is as follows: for the past few years, the dispute between China and various South Asian countries as Vietnam and Philippine on the matter of territorial entitlement of numerous islands in China’s South Sea has been gradually heating up. On the one hand, Chinese Government emphasizes that huge amount of historical recordings demonstrate the irrefutable fact that such disputed islands as Xisha (Paracel Islands) and Nansha (Spratly Islands) are entitled to China from ancient times to the present; and it is one of the core interests of China to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other hand, China also insists on a peaceful and good-neighborly policy, proposing to “shelve disputes and seek joint development”; and it is endeavoring to resolve the disputes separately through bilateral consultation between disputing parties on an equal footing. 1 However, in order to maintain and expand its vested hegemonic interests in Asia, the U.S., although lying as far as across the Pacific Ocean, spares no effort in the interference into above disputes. It drives a wedge in-between China and its contending parties as Vietnam and Philippine by instigating and supporting the latter to act as its “cat’s paws” and adopt various extreme unilateral measures vis-à-vis China’s peaceful and reasonable proposals, so that it could gain profits therefrom. In fact, the conducts of America have posed a severe threat to the regional stability of Southeastern Asia, as well as to a possible friendly cooperation among the countries therein. Yet again and again, the U.S. plays the trick of a thief crying “Stop thief!” by wantonly preaching “China Threat Doctrine”. Recently, many high-ranking American officials and various American Medias made an issue on the trial voyage of China’s first aircraft carrier, claiming that: Chinaʼs aircraft carrier has posed not only a political and military threat to its neighboring countries, but also a long-term potential threat to the interests of America in Asia-Pacific region. Chinaʼs aircraft carrier could and might be used to threaten its neighboring countries, as well as allies and friends of America. Together with China’s other military facilities, the Carrier could be used to endanger interests of America in Asia-Pacific region. 2

**Martin -- "Energy is clearly what’s driving a lot of Chinese behavior"**

**Klare -- "The Chinese clearly have little intention of backing down" – assumes we can know the Chinese and understand their intentions**

#### Reject their Chinese threat doctrine – relies on a false epistemology that ignores history and justifies US aggression

Chen 12 -- Senior Professor, Law School, Xiamen University, People’s Republic of China; Chairman, Chinese Society of International Economic Law, 1993–2011; International Arbitrator, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the Washington Convention, since 1993 (An, 2012, "On the Source, Essence of “Yellow Peril” Doctrine and Its Latest Hegemony “Variant” – the “China Threat” Doctrine: From the Perspective of Historical Mainstream of Sino-Foreign Economic Interactions and Their Inherent Jurisprudential Principles," http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/docserver/22119000/13/1/22119000\_013\_01\_S01\_text.pdf?expires=1359819574&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F52EBADF2C41BB3C4ABD9774E2A182EA)

To its close succession, China’s State Council released a volume of white book as lengthy as 13,000 words, entitled The Peaceful Development of China. This book has made comprehensive elaborations on the inevitability and steadiness of China’s pursuing the path of peaceful development, as well as comprehensive refutation against the absurdness of “China Threat Doctrine”. 7 The merit of above-mentioned recent advocacy of “China Threat Doctrine” by certain Americans is of course a very serious reality problem. However, it would be difficult to clearly understand the origin and development of this reality problem, if one merely stays at the level of talking about reality. Without profound knowledge of the source and essence of this reality problem, one’s understanding could not avoid being superficial and partial. On the contrary, in order to know from points to facets, from outward appearance to inner essence, thus to keep a sober mind and to deal with it calmly, one should carry out synthetic research by tracing to the very root of the matter and closely com­ bining the reality problem to its historical sources. Moreover, one should further carry out synthetic dissection by returning from the history to the reality prob­ lem. This Article is trying, through such approach, to carry out synthetic discussion and comprehensive dissection on the past and present, the points and facets, as well as the appearance and essence of “China Threat Doctrine.” As is known to all, from late 20 th century to early 21 st century, confronting the reality of China’s gradual and peaceful rising, certain American politicians, army-men and scholars have been vigorously and repeatedly preaching “China Threat Doctrine” under various occasions and in various forms. Such preaches are due to their habitual hegemonic practice and inopportune Cold War mentality; or for meeting certain special demands and pursuing some ugly interests; or out of their ignorance to the world and Chinese history. This Doctrine, with its seeming “certainty” and “innovation”, is not hard to be seen through as vaguely similar as historical “Yellow Peril Doctrine” [8](http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/docserver/22119000/13/1/22119000_013_01_S01_text.html?expires=1360274077&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=06369B613B7BDEB8E3D05F1B8E9770E6#fn9) preached by Russian Tsar and German Emperor, which once caused a temporary clamor in the 19 th century. In other words, the contemporary version of “China Threat Doctrine” by American Hegemonism is in essence no more than the newest recension and “variant” of the “Yellow Peril Doctrine” by Russian Tsar and German Emperor. Their DNAs come down in one continuous line in distorting the mainstream history of Sino-foreign interactions for the past thousands of years, as well as in conducting the political legerdemain with exaggerated and fabricated statements in order to create a sensation and seduce the people, who would be thus spiritually mobilized and publicly prepared for invasive activities and aggressions against China.

**Economic security --**

**Lind -- "economic stagnation will help the nationalist and populist right" – statistical and theoretical support for our root cause claim – they recreate the rally around the flag effect**

#### Attempting to save the global economy from disaster is a liberal order-building method of security

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy, Brunel University, 08 (“Critique of Security”, McGill-Queen’s University, pp. 94-97, Published 2008)

But 'social security' was clearly an inadequate term for this, associated as it now was with 'soft' domestic policy issues such as old-age insurance. 'Collective security' would not do, associated as it was with the dull internationalism of Wilson on the one hand and still very much connected to the institutions of social security on the other." Only one term would do: national security. This not to imply that 'national security' was simply adopted and adapted from 'social security'. Rather, what we are dealing with here is another ideological circuit, this time between 'national security' and 'social security', in which the policies 'insuring' the security of the population are a means of securing the body politic, and vice versa;" a circuit in which, to paraphrase David Peace in the epigraph to this chapter, one can have one's teeth kicked out in the name of national security and put back in through social security. Social security and national security were woven together: the social and the national were the warp and the weft of the security fabric. The warp and the welt, that is, of a broader vision of economic security. Robert Pollard has suggested that 'the concept of "economic security'- the idea that American interests would be best sewed by an open and integrated economic system, as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment - was firmly established during the wartime period'. 71 In fact, the concept of 'economic security' became a concept of international politics in this period, but the concept itself had a longer history as the underlying idea behind social security in the 1930s, as we have seen. Economic security, in this sense, provides the important link between social and national security, becoming liberalism's strategic weapon of choice and the main policy instrument from 1945. As one State Department memo of February 1944 put it, 'the development of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security. But it would also continue to be used to think about the political administration of internal order. Hence Roosevelt's comment that 'we must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security [and so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won't come back again'.' On security grounds, inside and outside were constantly folding into one another, the domestic and the foreign never quite On the fabrication of economic order properly distinguishable. The reason why lay in the kind of economic order to be secured: both domestically and internationally, 'economic security' is coda for capitalist order. Giving a lecture at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall recalled the disruption to the European economy during the war and Europe's continuing inability to feed itself, and suggested that if the US did not help there would be serious economic, social and political deterioration which would in turn have a knock-on effect on US capital. The outcome was a joint plan submitted to the US from European states at the end of August, after much wrangling with the Soviet Union, requesting $28 billion over a four-year period (the figure was reduced when finally agreed by Congress). The European Recovery Program (ERE known as the Marshall Plan) which emerged has gone down as an economic panacea, 'saving' Europe from economic disaster. But as the first of many such 'Plans', all the way down to the recent 'reconstruction' of Iraq, it does not take much to read the original Marshall Plan through the lens of security and liberal order-building. Alan Milward has suggested that the conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the picture of post-war Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and economic discontent, such that it needed to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse. There were no bank crashes, very few bankruptcies and the evidence of a slow down in industrial production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general deterioration in the standard of living. By late-1946 production had roughly equalled pre-war levels in all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward argues that the Marshall Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new, expansionary economic and social policies in Western European countries which were in fact already in full-bloom conditions. In other words, the Marshall Plan was predominantly designed for political objectives - hence conceived and rushed through by the Department of State itself." Milward's figures are compelling, and complicate the conventional picture of the Marshall Plan as simply a form of economic aid. But to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which, in terms of security, the economic and the political are entwined. This is why the Marshall Plan is so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine's offer of military aid and intervention beyond us borders, a new global commitment at the heart of which was the possibility of intervention in the affairs of other countries. As Joyce and Gabriel Kolko have argued the important dimension of the Truman Doctrine is revealed in the various drafts of Truman's speech before it was finally delivered on 12 March, and the private memos of the period. Members of the cabinet and other top officials understood very clearly that the united States was now defining a strategy and budget appropriate to its new global commitments, and that a far greater involvement in other countries was now pending especially on the economic level. Hence the plethora of references to 'a world-wide trend away from the system of free enterprise's which the state Department's speech-writers thought a 'grave threat' to American interests. Truman's actual speech to Congress is therefore more interesting for what it implied than what it stated explicitly. And what it implied was the politics behind the Marshall Plan: economic security as a means of maintaining political order against the threat of communism. The point then, is not just that the Marshall Plan was 'political' how could any attempt to reshape global capital be anything but political? It is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional, and to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which the economic, political and military are entwined The point is that it was very much a project driven by the ideology of security. The referent object of 'security here is 'economic order'. The government and the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the communist threat as economic rather than military. As Latham notes, at first glance the idea of military security within a broad context of economic containment merely appears to be one more dimension of strength within the liberal order. But in another respect the project of economic security might itself be viewed as the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the priority given to economic security was the driving force behind the us commitment to underwrite milita ry security for Western Europe." The protection and expansion of capital came to be seen as the path to security, and vice versa. This created the grounds for a re-ordering of global capital involving a constellation of class and corporate forces as well as state power, undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this period, stated that the 'overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish'." In this sense we can also read the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the Brussels Pact of March 1948 and the nascent movement towards 'European Union' as part and parcel of the security project being mapped out." The key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked a particular vision of order with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing 'security' political, social and economic - from the communist threat.

### 2NC Alt Solvency

#### The alternative reject's the affirmative's security discourse – think of the alternative as a broader process rather thean a finished product – only way to eschew security logic is to stop the reiteration of threats that marginalize political decision-making – fighting for an alternative political language requires tolerating uncertainty -- tha's Neoclous

#### Even if there are obstacles to the alt’, our thought excercise is more productive than their stable production of the present – the alternative enables a different conception of security that can overcome inevitable conflict

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many **appear like enduring political facts**, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they **condition politics** as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very **possibility of the present**. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination **has conceived and thought security**, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the wa**r** on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

#### Critical intellectualism creates change – answers all of their “alt fails” args

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Professor of International Relations – Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 155-163)

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party – a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination – for example, in the case of gender – to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks” – members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role – a significant one at that – in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing – even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures – can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays – in all senses – to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

### AT Reps Irrelevant

#### Not just a question of representation – the alternative rejects the aff’s security discourse – this encompasses reps as well as the epistemological and ontological focus behind the aff – means we still get all of our impacts

#### **Representations must precede policy discussion – it determines what is politically thinkable**

Neta Crawford ,PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21

**Coherent arguments** are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- **must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place.** Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are **particularly rare in politics** though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. **More common** are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and **whether a particular argument applies** to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through **exaggeration**, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation **do not re-produce accurately** so much as they **creatively re-present** situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized **or completely ignored** as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus **becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge**.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it **may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not**. **Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import** of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. **Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument** because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### Broader studies are intimately tied to national policy – they establish, support and foreclose policy decisions

Morrissey 2011 (John, Director of the MA in Environment, Society and Development at NUI Galway and Acting Head of Geography, PhD (University of Exeter), "Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security," Antipode, Vol 43, No. 2)

In the power–knowledge symmetry of the academic–military world, strategic studies discourses do vital geopolitical work: they prioritize, disguise, legitimize and characterize entire conflicts; they reduce political and cultural geographical knowledges of distant places; and they erase the signature of, and accountability for, “our” violence. In a world of euphemisms and neologisms, well paid mercenary soldiers become “contractors” or “security employees”; ungovernable spaces of abject violence andmisery become areas currently experiencing “a slight uptick in violence”; and waterboarding becomes “simulated drowning”, not actual drowning interrupted or torture. As David Bromwich (2008) succinctly puts it, the “‘global war on terrorism’ promotes a mood of comprehension in the absence of perceived particulars, and that is a mood in which euphemisms may comfortably take shelter”. He points out that critical accounts of US foreign policy and its consequences and accountability are limited to popular academic works such as Chalmers Johnson’s *Blowback* or Robert Pape’s *Dying toWin* (Johnson 2000; Pape 2005).23 The reductive “imaginative geographies” of the military–strategic studies complex not only support the operations of US geopolitical and geoeconomic calculation in the Middle East; they also contribute to a pervasive and predominant cultural discourse on the region that has all the hallmarks of Orientalism (Gregory 2004; Little 2002; Said 2003; Shapiro 1997). National security “specialist” commentaries have long enunciated the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and linked it to the feared potential of new political and economic orders emerging in the region (Lewis 1995; Roberts 1995). Since the war on terrorism began, such sentiment has been relentlessly championed in broader popular media circles; a development that has had grave consequences. As Stephen Graham (2005:6, 8) notes, the result of the “combined vitriol of a whole legion of US military “commentators” who enjoy huge coverage, exposure, and influence in the US media” is a world in which whole populations are positioned as unworthy of any “political or human rights”: 24 In the construction of people as inhuman “terrorist” barbarians understanding little but force, and urban places as animalistic labyrinths or “nests” demanding massive military assault, Islamic cities, and their inhabitants, are, in turn, cast out beyond any philosophical, legal, or humanitarian definitions of humankind or “civilisation”. Russell Smith (2003b) was in the minority in lamenting the standard and integrity of US reporting during the early stages of the Iraq War: “North American reporting, and in particular on the US television stations, has been cravenly submissive to the Pentagon and the White House”. As Smith dolefully observes, both the embedded and studio reporting of Fox, CNN and others “dutifully” used the “language chosen by people in charge of ‘media relations’ at the Pentagon”— describing, for example, the exploding of Iraqi soldiers in their bunkers as “softening up”, or referring to slaughtered Iraqi units as “degraded”. Reifying military sentiment rather than critical journalism resulted in the production and circulation of prioritized strategic and geopolitical discourses that worked to foster a reductive public understanding of the conflict (Pred 2007). In such a simplified discursive world, a closeup photograph of a battle-weary, frontline American infantry soldier— Marine Lance Corporal James Blake Miller—during the second Fallujah offensive in Iraq in November 2004 became the “Face of Fallujah” on CBS News, and on the front page of the *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Post* and more than 150 other American newspapers (Sinco 2007a). From the rubble and carnage of Fallujah, it was Miller’s image that became “iconic”; not, as Naomi Klein (2004) points out, an altogether different and proportionately more relevant image—that of “a dead child lying in the street, clutching the headless body of an adult”. The photograph of Lance Corporal Miller was ultimately mobilized into a well established scripting of US national security strategy in which young American men and women each play a heroic part in the defense of freedom overseas for all those who enjoy it at home.25 The recent work of Simon Dalby, Stephen Graham, Derek Gregory and others is both insightful and urgent in illuminating the “huge discursive efforts” in the US-led war on terror in “constructing and reconstructing” key spaces of the Middle East “as little more than receiving points for US military ordnance” (Graham 2005:6; cf Dalby 2007b; Gregory 2004). As outlined earlier, there is of course a long history of the US military, and its strategic studies advisors, mobilizing abstract geostrategic discourses of the Middle East (Klein 1994). The lead-up to the Gulf War in 1991, for example, was a particularly fertile period for airing reductive military visions (Sidaway 1998); and there is a continuum of essentialist scriptings of the Middle East that extend back to at least the late 1970s when the military–strategic studies complex began to assiduously assert US geopolitical and geoeconomic designs for the region in the name of national security (Morrissey 2008). These strategic studies scriptings have collectively served to establish a register of ageographical spaces, have long spoken of terrains and not worlds, and have been typically indifferent to the lives of “Others” (Epstein 1987; Record 1981a; Ullman et al 1996). Critical to our reading of the military–strategic studies complex, moreover, is the recognition that it does not operate outside of the political, decision-making process; as shown above in relation to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Upon taking up office in 1981, the Reagan administration actively consulted with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in planning an effective US geopolitical strategy for the Middle East, and promptly followed its recommendations (and those of its chief specialist, Jeffrey Record) in initiating, and budgeting for, US Central Command as a military necessity to defend US national interests in the Gulf (Record 1981a). The long-standing influence on US foreign policy of American pro-Israel lobby groups and think tanks has been recently demonstrated by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006). Others have shown the influence of the Project for the New American Century on the current Bush administration’s particular brand of aggressive foreign policy (Dalby 2006). And one of the architects of that policy, Donald Rumsfeld, as Secretary of Defense, was not averse to sitting down for panel discussions to review the findings of, for example, Brookings Institution surveys (US Department of Defense 2003). It is important to remember too that many of the leading Pentagon and Congressional advisors on the Middle East, such as Kenneth Katzman, for instance, are typically also research analysts in strategic studies institutes (Katzman is an external researcher for the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College); thus enabling the “government–strategic studies” loop (Katzman 2006). Thomas Barnett, too, who worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation at the DoD from the end of 2001 to mid 2003 simultaneously held a professorship in strategic studies at the WarfareAnalysis and Research Department at theUSNavalWar College in Newport, Rhode Island. His combined DoD and strategic studies work culminated in the publication of his influential and commercially successful *The Pentagon’s New Map*s in 2004, in which he envisages a new grand strategy for the USA in a post-Cold War and post-9/11 age: closing the gaps of neoliberal economic order across the globe (Barnett 2004; cf Dalby 2007a). Such “academic” strategic scriptings of US national security have long proved a supporting and legitimating intellectual cache for military action; they have been instrumental in the advancement of what Bradley Klein calls a “cultural hegemony of organized state violence” (1988a:136). A recent case in point was provided by the current Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, General David Petraeus. Writing in 2006, the much-heralded military saviour for the Iraq War did not just see an infantry surge as the key to success. He recognized too the importance of what has become a buzz word in US military circles in recent years, “culture”: Knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, the knowledge of the geographical terrain. This observation acknowledges that people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain, and that we must study that terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographical terrain (2006:51). A subsequent publication of a Professor of East Asian Studies at Oberlin College in Ohio, entitled *On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge*, variously echoed and held up Petraeus’ sentiments. In it, Dr Sheila Jager (2007:1) sets the tone for her appraisal of the importance of “culture” for the Iraq War thus: Faced with a brutal war and insurgency in Iraq, the many complex political and social issues confronted by U.S. military commanders on the ground have given rise to a new awareness that a cultural understanding of an adversary society is imperative if counterinsurgency is to succeed. Dr Jager was writing from, and for, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, where she was then a Visiting Fellow in National Security Studies. She concluded her analysis of the “uses of cultural knowledge” for the US military by suggesting that “perhaps it not too late [sic.] for culture to also rescue the United States from the *strategic* failures of the Bush Doctrine” (2007:24; emphasis added).26 As Derek Gregory (2008a:8) correctly notes, the recent development of “culture-centric warfare” did not emanate from “academics, military theorists or think-tanks”; it emerged largely from the “improvised tactics developed and shared by responsive commanders in the field”. However, themilitary’s “cultural turn”was quickly supported, expedited and legitimized by strategic studies. For both Jager and Petraeus, the cultural terrain of the military landscape now needs to be increasingly studied—strategically. Moreover, as Gregory has also shown, the US military’s cultural turn “does not dispense with killing” but rather is “a prerequisite for its refinement” (2008a:10). That the US military has reached a dangerously clinical appreciation of culture, and why knowledge of it matters in wartime, should shock us but it should not surprise us. What is even more troubling is that uncritical elements of the intellectual academy—from East Asian studies to geography, from international relations to psychology—are being increasinglymobilized in the service, support and sustenance of the military; developments that are of course entirely consistent with the increased neoliberalization of war and use of private contractors.

### 2NC Reps Key

#### Representation of the ocean and offshore drilling shape policy

Martens 11 (Emily, MA in Geography and Regional Studies – University of Miami, “The Discourses of Energy and Environmental Security in the Debate Over Offshore Oil Drilling Policy in Florida,” Open Access Theses, 5-10, <http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa_theses>)

In the following analysis of the energy and environmental security discourses pertaining to offshore oil drilling within the United States, I attempt to break down the general assumptions and portrayals of truth contained within each, with the purpose of detaching them from their banal existence, and uncovering the power relations concealed within them. In looking at the history of their development, we find that these two discourses found powerful voices in tandem (in the 1970s), and that, initially, political leaders sought to reconcile them. However, new security threats contained within these discourses were identified, namely that of profit or financial security, necessitating a change in the ideology of one or both discourses and the policy measures necessary to meet those ends. The struggle over offshore oil drilling serves as a prominent battleground upon which these discourses are developed and interact, competing with and reacting to one another in order to influence policy and public sentiment with regard to the overall utility of ocean space.

### AT O’Tuathail

#### 1. Our evidence subsumes- O’Tuathail just says a focus on representations without discussion of political institutions is flawed but does not counter the sequencing argument of our framework

#### 2. They misread Otuathail. He concedes representations come first and that your logic of geopolitical domination enables further violence

Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Department of Geography, Virginia Tech, 9/96

“At the end of geopolitics: reflections on a plural problematic at the century’s end” http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/website/publish/papers/End.htm

With their powerful systems of image capture, global media machines have tremendous police power over how we see and understand "real (i.e. virtual) geography" in international politics. Together with other megamachinic assemblages, they help zone and format post-Cold War global space into sectors like "rogue states," (a war machine zone), "failed states" (a paragovernmental zone) and "emerging markets" (a global financial machine zone). Beyond the mass media but still part of the technological enframing of global space, commercial and quasi-state enterprises, like Sovinformsputnik and Prioda from Russia, Israeli Aircraft Industries and the private California based Core Software Technology, Space Imaging (lead by Lockheed Martin), E-Systems (a Raytheon and Mitsubishi Corp joint venture), EarthWatch (backed by Ball Aerospace, WorldView Imaging and Hitachi) and Orbital Sciences, are all in competition to sell high-quality satellite images of any spot on the exposed face on the earth. The postmodern geopolitics of these satellite image companies is particularly interesting for they mark the privatization of previously state monopolized intelligence operations. A sub-division of Orbital Sciences, Orbital Imaging's satellite OrbView is scheduled for launch in mid-1997 and offers exclusive territorial agreements for clients. Buy the images of a certain terrain or region and no one else will get access. In the future, states may be forced to buy up images of their own territory to prevent spying. The Israeli government has already objected to a Saudi Arabian investment in Orbital Science, resulting in an agreement to alter the satellite's software to block imaging of the Israeli state. The French state, whose Helios 1A high-resolution optical spy satellite joined those of Russia and the United States in orbit in early 1996, understands the global view afforded by their system as a geo-power which helps, literally and figuratively, to define the nation. More than simply seeing actual high-definition images of France from space, it re-confirms France's mythical identity as a great power. As a Chirac aid put it: "Over-the-horizon information is a new source of geopolitical power, like nuclear weapons." Other machinic systems producing techno-geopolitical views include the U.S. run global positioning system (GPS) and military intelligence platforms and systems whose ongoing efforts to police the planetary spectrum are driven by technoscientific and militaristic fantasies of pure global (war machine) vision. A complex postmodern geopolitics entwining territory, media and machines was evident in the U.S. cruise missile attacks against Iraq in September 1996. The latest version of the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile used in these attacks (made by the GM owned Hughes Aircraft Company at an estimated cost of $1 million apiece) employed not only a supposedly improved terrain "scene-matching" computer but also a complementary guidance system that used satellites to continually update the missile's location and target. (Many of the missiles still missed!). The unusual geopolitics of these attacks -- the use of drone weapons launched by warships in international waters and by B-52's based in Guam, a 20 hour flight away -- was necessitated both by territorial limits in the region, diplomatic restrictions on the use of airbases in Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and televisual limits at home, the Clinton administration's fear of the spectacle of U.S. military casualties in the run-up to a presidential election. The geopolitics of vision, in this case, was triangulated by technology, territory and television. A second cluster of postmodern geopolitics is that emerging from the efforts of intellectuals and institutions of statecraft to re-map the global strategic landscape after the Cold War. While the crude Manichean world of the Cold War may be gone for now, the preoccupation of the national security establishment with "rogue states and nuclear outlaws" is indicative of a persistent territorial conceptualization of danger in international security studies. Underwriting these territorializing specifications of danger are, of course, old-fashioned essentialist identities -- totalitarian states, Islamic fundamentalists, die-hard Communists, terrorists, criminals and devils (like Saddam Hussein) -- and a longstanding strategic commitment on the part of the Western security apparatus to pro-Western states like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The effort of NATO to extend this zone of strategic commitment and protection in Central Europe is evidence that a state-centric territorial geopolitics does persist, but increasingly it is also non-territorial "postmodern terrorist" threats in a speeding hybrid world that preoccupy the defense planners in the Pentagon, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and elsewhere. Threats from contraband flows and proliferations -- the spread of nuclear weapons, plutonium, terrorists, drugs, illegal migrants, infectious diseases, money laundering, sensitive high-tech assets, biological and chemical agents, etc. -- and threats to vital official flows and ports -- oil pipelines, subways, world trading centers, airports, teleports, secret data archives, fiber-optic lines, international financial networks, and global sporting spectacles -- have brought into being a postmodern geopolitics of security where the geographies are in fluid flowmations not fixed formations. Ostensibly preoccupied by a geography of territorial fixities during the Cold War, security discourse has exspanded to encompass the protection of fundamental spaces of flows from material attack or the immaterial terrorism of computer hackers and software viruses. The creation of a Belfast-style "ring of steel" and CCTV system around the City of London -- a strategic space of financial flows -- and the militarization of U.S. airports in response to recent spectacular bombings disclose a geopolitics that mixes traditional forms of containment and detainment with new panoptic surveillance and scanning technologies. Again, media vectors are also implicated in the creation of these landscapes, one of their "strategic" functions being the simulation of security and the containment of media borne viruses of panic and hysteria. Even within the much remarked upon emergence of "environmental security" and the sacred visions of green governmentalists like Al Gore, geography is post-territorial in-flowmations of ozone gases, acid rain, industrial pollution, topsoil erosion, smog emissions, rainforest depletions and toxic spills. Yet, the discourse of unveiled and primordial geographical regions persists also. In the place of Mackinder's natural seats of power, Gore presents the "great genetic treasure map" of the globe, twelve areas around the globe that "hold the greatest concentration of germplasm important to modern agriculture and world food production." Robert Kaplan's unsentimental journey to the "ends of the earth" where cartographic geographies are unravelling and fading has him disclosing a "real world" of themeless violence and chaos, a world where "[w]e are not in control." The specter of a second Cold War -- "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population pressure, environmental degradation, disease and cultural conflict" -- haunt his thoughts. This equivocal environmentalization of strategic discourse (and visa versa) -- and the environmental strategic think tanks like the World Watch Institute which promote it -- deserve problematization as clusters of postmodern geopolitics, in this case congealments of geographical knowledge and green governmentality designed to re-charge the American polity with a circumscribed global environmental mission to save planet earth from destruction. Thirdly, the deterritorialization of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and inherited identity by the transnational flowmations of economic, financial and cultural globalization has already provoked a postmodern geopolitical rhetoric of acceleration and pace, on the one hand, and resistance and place, on the other hand, within U.S. political culture. On the one side, one has dromo-celebrants like Jack Kemp and Newt Gingrich for whom "accelerating the transition" from Second Wave industrial capitalism to Third Wave informational capitalism has become a mantra. America needs to dismantle its obsolete and old-fashioned regulatory "barriers" and speed itself out onto Microsoft's "road ahead" and into a futuristic "opportunity society" of friction-free (b)orderless capitalism. On the other hand, one has self-styled rebels, fundamentalists, and cultural warriors, like Patrick Buchanan, Ross Perot and Pat Choate, who campaign against the swamping of American identity by illegal immigration and multiculturalism, the erosion of American sovereignty by international agencies and corporations, and the dissipation of American patriotism induced by permissive individualism and radical social minorities. Buchanan's call for the construction of a vast wall along the Rio Grande seemed to symbolize his whole campaign for president, his metaphors of barriers, walls and resistance symptomatic of a profound desire to resolidify and reterritorialize America around imaginary notions of place, country and kin. In a postmodern time where, Zygmunt Bauman notes, "formlessness is the fittest of forms," Buchananism represented a desire to return to a time when forms were enduring fixities, the durable structures of family, faith and America first that made the United States the fittest of all the nations. Yet Buchanan, an electronic populist -- a product of the very screens of power he condemns -- can only offer teletraditionalist solutions to deterritorialization, the simulation of sovereignty in a world where the real thing is gone forever. Briefly summarized here are only some of the many decentered clusters in the postmodern geopolitics constellation now free-forming around us. As should be evident, the condition of postmodernity is saturated with geographical politics of many different kinds. To glibly assert that geopolitics is coming to an end is to ignore the ongoing struggle over global space at the end of the twentieth century. The imperial visions of Halford Mackinder and Cold War geopoliticians may be obsolete but new technoscientific visions of space have taken their place and strive to enframe our world. Geopolitics is not over; the struggle to envision and enframe global space in imperial constellations of geography/power/ knowledge continues. So also do struggles of resistance.

## 1NR

## Warming

### 2NC No XTC

#### Adaptation solves catastrophic impacts to warming

Goklany 11 -- PhD, author and researcher associated with IPCC, expert reviewer and U.S. delegate to that organization (Dr. Indur M., 12/11, "Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming," http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf)

So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more. The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. 39 The Stern Review’s time horizon extends to 2100– 2200 and beyond. 40 Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators. 41 Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, 42 and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100. 43 It should be noted that some of the newer impacts assessments have begun to account for changes in adaptive capacity. For example, the CIESIN study of 2006, in an exercise exploring the vulnerability to climate change under various climate change scenarios, allowed adaptive capacity to increase between the present and 2050 and 2100. 44 However, the researchers arbitrarily limited any increase in adaptive capacity to “either the current global mean or to a value that is 25% higher than the current value—whichever is higher.” 45 Such a limitation would, for example, have missed most of the increase in U.S. adaptive capacity during the twentieth century that virtually eliminated death and disease from climate-sensitive water-borne vector diseases. More recently, another study analyzed the sensitivity of deaths from malaria, diarrhea, schistosomiasis and dengue fever to warming, economic development and other determinants of adaptive capacity through the year 2100. 46 The results indicate, unsurprisingly, that economic development alone could reduce mortality substantially. For malaria, for instance, deaths would be eliminated before 2100 in a number of the more affluent sub-Saharan countries. 47

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

#### Warming will be slow, there’s no impact, and adaptation solves

William Yeatman 9, Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, February 3, 2009, “Global Warming 101: Science,” online: <http://www.globalwarming.org/2009/02/03/global-warming-101-science/>

A “planetary emergency—a crisis that threatens the survival of our civilization and the habitability of the Earth”—that is how former Vice President Al Gore describes global warming. Most environmental groups preach the same message. So do many journalists. So do some scientists.

In fact, at the 2008 annual meeting of Nobel Prize winners in Lindau, Germany, half the laureates on the climate change panel disputed the so-called consensus on global warming.

You have probably heard the dire warnings many times. Carbon dioxide (CO2) from mankind’s use of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas is building up in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas—it traps heat that would otherwise escape into outer space. Al Gore warns that global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions could increase sea levels by 20 feet, spin up deadly hurricanes. It could even plunge Europe into an ice age.

Science does not support these and other scary predictions, which Gore and his allies repeatedly tout as a “scientific consensus.” Global warming is real and carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to it, but it is not a crisis. Global warming in the 21 st century is likely to be modest, and the net impacts may well be beneficial in some places. Even in the worst case, humanity will be much better off in 2100 than it is today.

The following is a summary of key points:

Average Annual Heat-Related Mortality: People will not drop like flies from heat waves in a warming world. Heat-related mortality will continue to decline as the world warms.

Far more people die each year from excess cold than from excess heat.

Global warming will not make air pollution worse.

Global warming will not lead to malaria epidemics in Northern Hemisphere countries.

Contrary to Gore, no “strong, new scientific consensus is emerging” that global warming is making hurricanes stronger.

Global Death & Death Rates Due to Extreme Events, 1900-2004: Since the 1920s, death rates related to extreme weather declined by more than 98 percent globally. The impression conveyed by An Inconvenient Truth—that global warming is making the world a more dangerous place—is false.

Gore’s warning that global warming could shut down the Atlantic branch of the oceanic thermohaline circulation (THC) and plunge Europe into an ice age is science fiction.

Gore’s warning that sea levels could rise by 20 feet is science fiction. Sea level rise in the 21 st century is likely to be measured in inches, not in feet.

The world warmed at a rate of 0.17°C per decade since 1978, according to the temperature record compiled by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since most climate models predict that warming will occur at a constant—that is, non-accelerating—rate, it is reasonable to expect that global warming in the 21 st century will be close to the low end of the IPCC’s forecast range, of 1.4°C to 5.8°C.

The actual warming rate may be only half the 0.17°C per decade rate implied in the IPCC temperature record, because the IPCC has not adequately filtered out the warming biases from local factors like urbanization and improper management of monitoring equipment.

A warming near the low end of the IPCC range would produce both benefits—longer growing seasons, more rainfall, fewer cold deaths—and harms—more heat waves, more drought, some acceleration of sea level rise—but nothing resembling catastrophe.

Even in the IPCC high-end warming forecasts, human welfare would improve dramatically over the next 100 years. In the IPCC fossil-fuel-intensive development scenario, per capita GDP in developing countries increases from $875 per year in 1990 to $43,000 per year in 2100—even after taking into account an additional 110 years of global warming. Even in the IPCC worst-case scenario, global warming is not the civilization-ending catastrophe Al Gore purports it to be.

### 2NC Irreversible

#### 6 degree warming’s inevitable

AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

#### Low threshold—less than 2 degrees is sufficient to cause their impacts

Harvey 11 (Fiona, Environment Reporter – Guardian, 11/9, “World headed for irreversible climate change in five years, IEA warns,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Climate scientists estimate that global warming of 2C above pre-industrial levels marks the limit of safety, beyond which climate change becomes catastrophic and irreversible. Though such estimates are necessarily imprecise, warming of as little as 1.5C could cause dangerous rises in sea levels and a higher risk of extreme weather – the limit of 2C is now inscribed in international accords, including the partial agreement signed at Copenhagen in 2009, by which the biggest developed and developing countries for the first time agreed to curb their greenhouse gas output.

**Warming Link D: 2NC**

**Plan doesn’t solve warming –**

**1.) Coal shift – removes particles that offset the warming effects of coal, such as sulfates and aerosols. That’s NCAR.**

**2.) Emits carbon – natural gas consumption cannot eliminate greenhouse gases. That’s Hansen. We cannot solve warming absent a quick transition away from all fossil fuels.**

**3.) Balance of factors prove no benefit to natural gas use**

**NCAR 11** (The National Center for Atmospheric Research, The University Corporation for Atmospheric Research manages the National Center for Atmospheric Research under sponsorship by the National Science Foundation,

“Switching From Coal To Natural Gas Would Do Little For Global Climate, Study Indicates,” 9-8-11,

<https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/news/5292/switching-coal-natural-gas-would-do-little-global-climate-study-indicates>)

BOULDER—Although the burning of natural gas emits far less carbon dioxide than coal, a new study concludes that a greater reliance on natural gas would **fail to** significantly **slow down climate change**. The study by Tom Wigley, who is a senior research associate at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), underscores the complex and sometimes conflicting ways in which fossil fuel burning affects Earth’s climate. While coal use causes warming through emission of heat-trapping carbon dioxide, it also releases comparatively large amounts of **sulfates** and other particles that, although detrimental to the environment, **cool the planet** by blocking incoming sunlight. The situation is further complicated by uncertainty over the amount of methane that leaks from natural gas operations. Methane is an especially **potent greenhouse gas**. Wigley’s computer simulations indicate that a worldwide, partial shift from coal to natural gas would slightly **accelerate climate change** through at least 2050, even if no methane leaked from natural gas operations, and through as late as 2140 if there were substantial leaks. After that, the greater reliance on natural gas would begin to slow down the increase in global average temperature, but only by a few tenths of a degree. “Relying more on natural gas would reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, but it would **do little** to help solve the climate problem,” says Wigley, who is also an adjunct professor at the University of Adelaide in Australia. “It would be many decades before it would slow down global warming at all, and even then it would just be making a difference around the edges.”

**Warming Turn: 2NC**

**Plan Causes warming –**

**1.) Extraction**

**A. Releases Methane – natural gas drilling release large amounts of CH4, a powerful greenhouse gas. That’s Romm.**

**B. Accelerates warming**

**Wigley 11** (Tom M. L., National Center for Atmospheric Research, University of Adelaide, Australia, “Coal to gas: the influence of methane leakage,” *Climatic Change* (2011) 108:601–608)

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion may be reduced by using natural gas rather than coal to produce energy. Gas produces approximately half the amount of CO2 per unit of primary energy compared with coal. Here we consider a scenario where a fraction of coal usage is replaced by natural gas (i.e., methane, CH4) over a given time period, and where a percentage of the gas production is assumed to **leak into the atmosphere**. The additional CH4 from leakage adds to the **radiative forcing** of the climate system, offsetting the reduction in CO2 forcing that accompanies the transition from coal to gas. We also consider the effects of: methane leakage from coal mining; changes in radiative forcing due to changes in the emissions of sulfur dioxide and carbonaceous aerosols; and differences in the efficiency of electricity production between coal- and gas-fired power generation. On balance, these factors more than offset the reduction in warming due to reduced CO2 emissions. When gas replaces coal there is **additional warming** out to 2,050 with an assumed leakage rate of 0%, and out to 2,140 if the leakage rate is as high as 10%. The overall effects on global-mean temperature over the 21st century, however, are small.

**2.) Carbon Capture and Storage**

**A. Natural Gas destroys CCS**

**Inman 12** (Mason, reporter for National Geographic, specializes in reporting climate change and energy, “Shale Gas: A Boon That Could Stunt Alternatives, Study Says,” 1-7-12, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/01/120117-shale-gas-boom-impact-on-renewables/>)

Shale gas has transformed the U.S. energy landscape in the past several years—but it may **crowd out** renewable energy and other ways of cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, a new study warns. A team of researchers at **M**assachusetts **I**nstitute of **T**echnology used economic modeling to show that new abundant natural gas is likely to have a far more complex impact on the energy scene than is generally assumed. If climate policy continues to play out in the United States with a relatively weak set of measures to **control emissions**, the new gas source will lead to lower gas and electricity prices, and total energy use will be **higher** in 2050. Absent the shale supply, the United States could have expected to see GHG emissions 2 percent below 2005 levels by 2050 under this relatively weak policy. But the **lower gas prices** under the current shale gas outlook will stimulate economic growth, leading GHG emissions to increase by 13 percent over 2005. And the shale gas will retard the growth of **renewable energy**'s share of electricity, and push off the development of **carbon capture and storage** technology, needed to meet more ambitious policy targets, by as long as two decades. "Shale gas is a great advantage to the U.S. in the short term, for the next few decades," said MIT economist Henry Jacoby, lead author of the new study. "But it is so attractive that it threatens other energy sources we ultimately will need."

**B. CCS Key to solve warming**

**Guzman 9** (Doris de Guzman, ICIS – world’s largest petrochemical market information provider, “Capturing carbon's potential”, 1/15, <http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/01/15/9184929/chemicals-to-capture-ccs-potential.html>)

CARBON CAPTURE and sequestration (CCS) technology might still be at an experimental and development stage, but several companies, including those in the chemical industry, are lining up to take advantage of its opportunities. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which provides climate-change information, identified CCS as the most promising technology for the **rapid reduction** of global emissions. Carbon dioxide (CO2 ) is said to be capturable in significant quantities from five main pollution sources, namely ammonia production power generation from fossil fuels industrial production facilities, such as cement, coal-to-chemicals, and steel plants energy processing, such as coal and gas-to-liquids operations and well heads at gas fields. The IPCC estimated that CCS can reduce global emissions **by up to 55%** by 2100, according to Graeme Sweeney, executive vice president of future fuels and CO2 at Anglo-Dutch oil and chemical major Shell. "Major volumes of oil, gas and coal are still needed to meet rising global demand for energy in the coming decades. Left unmitigated, the cumulative global carbon footprint will be **dire for** people and **the planet**. Only CCS has the potential to cut the resulting CO2 emissions at the **speed and scale** required," says Sweeney. The Paris, France-based International Energy Agency (IEA) reported in its Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 report that CCS would need to contribute nearly one-fifth of the necessary emissions reductions to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2050 if its cost is reasonable. "CCS is therefore essential to the achievement of deep emission cuts," said Nobuo Tanaka, IEA director, in a recent statement. "If we do not successfully demonstrate CCS soon, it will raise costs significantly for other climate-mitigation options."

**A2 Methane < CO2: 2NC**

**Methane more important**

**Vergano 9** (Dan, senior science reporter at USA TODAY, “Methane's role in global warming underestimated,” <http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/environment/2009-10-29-methane-global-warming_N.htm>)

Greenhouse gas calculations blame carbon dioxide too much for global warming, and methane too little, suggest researchers Thursday. In the journal Science, a team led by Drew Shindell of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York finds that chemical interactions between greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide cause **more global warming** than previously estimated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other efforts. "The total amount of warming doesn't change, just the balance of gasses behind it," Shindell says. The world's climate warmed an average about 1.3 degrees Fahrenheit from 1906 to 2005, very likely due to industrial greenhouse gases, the IPCC concluded in 2007, adding that carbon dioxide is "most important" greenhouse gas. Methane is a greenhouse gas produced by lanfills, agriculture and some industries. In the study, Shindell and colleagues added chemical interactions between aerosols and greenhouse gases such as methane and carbon monoxide to a century-long model of climate change. They wanted to see the effects on each gas's "Global Warming Potential," or individual contribution to global warming. Methane played a bigger role than expected, suggesting that climate treaties such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol need to consider it more carefully, the study says. Greenhouse gases are transparent to sunlight, but retain heat in the atmosphere, raising global average temperatures. Burning fossil fuels, deforestation and other human activities have raised greenhouse gas levels to historic values in the last three centuries. "There is no way, other than aggressive geoengineering, to come close to meeting the world leaders’ goal of overall warming not exceeding (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial (levels) without focusing on BOTH carbon dioxide and non-carbon dioxide emissions," says Michael MacCracken of the Climate Institute, by email. "This is not an either-or choice — we must do both to have any chance at all." Because non-carbon dioxide gasses also cause air pollution, MacCracken and Shindell both suggest that politicians may embrace limiting those emissions in developing nations more quickly than carbon dioxide ones. China has about 750,000 air-quality-related deaths annually according to the World Health Organization, for example. In December, representatives of 192 nations head to Copenhagen to work on an international agreement to limit emissions. On the international front, "getting priorities right on the non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases has some real value," says MacCracken, a former Clinton-administration climate scientist. If negotiations keep stalling on carbon dioxide emissions debate, then "all of our efforts on the non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases won?t make much difference," he says. "There needs to be a deal and, in my view, cutting non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gases and soot can be a helpful bridge to getting an agreement." Current emissions of aerosols actually **cool the atmosphere** an average about 1.26 degrees Fahrenheit, notes aerosol expert Joyce Penner of the University of Michigan. "So changing aerosol concentrations through changing greenhouse gas emissions is certainly a factor that needs to be considered," Penner says." I think that what is needed here is a holistic approach to climate control that takes into account all the factors that influence climate change (including the present day "protection" by aerosol emissions)."

## DA

### Impact OV

**Causes extinction – kills resilience**

**Each instance increases the risk of exintction- evaluate linear risk of net benefit**

**Diner 94**

[“The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who’s Endangering Whom?” Major David N. Diner, U.S. Army, 94 Military Law Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, 1994, LEXIS]

By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

### Impact – Oceans 2NC

#### OCS WRECKS OCEANS AND THE WILDLIFE

DOW ‘12 (DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, "OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING", https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=vandq=cache:0hRYuUTRu6wJ:www.defenders.org/publications/impacts\_of\_outer\_continental\_shelf\_drilling.pdf+andhl=enandgl=usandpid=blandsrcid=ADGEESimvF33YzLvIENzYCceMo6rbZBgGL\_qq52L3lPQbQp9oCH-vySHbDLITJDlQ61o\_\_xCzITqYc56OWssn5OEjL5C7HATlZWYsBP4Ec9SoxALLnh9Rk0NY\_ANjAdUgfb3vh0C-e31andsig=AHIEtbSgOUGu\_Q4pEWJM2fsBDGMuNjtfvA

Ocean Floor. Drilling infrastructure permanently alters ocean floor habitats. Drill rig footprints, undersea pipelines, dredging ship channels, and dumped drill cuttings-- the rock material dug out of the oil or gas well-- are often contaminated with drilling fluid used to lubricate and regulate the pressure in drilling operations. The fluid contains petroleum products and heavy metals. Strewn on the ocean floor, contaminated sediments can be carried by currents over a mile from the rig, sharply reducing populations of small bottom dwelling creatures that are important to the rest of the food chain and biomagnifying toxic contaminants in fish we eat.

#### Collapse of ocean ecosystems ends life on Earth

**Craig 3** (Robin Kundis, Associate Prof Law, Indiana U School Law, Lexis)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human degradation of marine ecosystems **impairs the planet's ability to support life**. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems.Current evidence shows that, in general, an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: **if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves**, and we will take most of the biosphere with us.

#### Marine biodiversity is key to human survival

**Davidson 3** (Founder – Turtle House Foundation and Award-Winning Journalist, Fire in the Turtle House, p. 47-51)

But surely the Athenians had it backward; it’s the land that rests in the lap of the sea. Thalassa, not Gaia, is the guardian of life on the blue planet. A simple, albeit apocalyptic, experiment suggests Thalassa’s power. Destroy all life on land; the ocean creatures will survive just fine. Given time, they’ll even repopulate the land. But **wipe** **out the organisms that inhabit the oceans and all life on land is doomed**. “Dust to dust,” says the Bible, but “water to water” is more like it, for all life comes from and returns to the sea. Our ocean origins abid within us, our secret marine history. The chemical makeup of our blood is strikingly similar to seawater. Every carbon atom in our body has cycled through the ocean many times. Even the human embryo reveals our watery past. Tiny gill slits form and then fade during our development in the womb. The ocean is the cradle of life on our planet, and it remains the axis of existence, the locus of planetary biodiversity, and the engine of the chemical and hydrological cycles that create and maintain our atmosphere and climate. The astonishing biodiversity is most evident on coral reefs, often called the “rain forests of the sea.” Occupying less than one-quarter of 1 percent of the global ocean, coral reefs are home to nearly a third of all marine fish species and to as many as nine million species in all. But life exists in profusion in every corner of the ocean, right down to the hydrothermal vents on the seafloor (discovered only in 1977), where more than a hundred newly described species thrive around superheated plumes of sulfurous gasses. The abundance of organisms in the ocean isn’t surprising given that the sea was, as already mentioned, the crucible of life on Earth. It is the original ecosystem, the environment in which the “primordial soup” of nucleic acids (which can self-replicate, but are not alive) and other molecules made the inexplicable and miraculous leap into life, probably as simple bacteria, close to 3.9 billion years ago. A spectacular burst of new life forms called the Cambrian explosion took place in the oceans some 500 million years ago, an evolutionary experiment that produced countless body forms, the prototypes of virtually all organisms alive today. It wasn’t until 100 million years later that the first primitive plants took up residence on terra firma. Another 30 million years passed before the first amphibians climbed out of the ocean. After this head start, it’s not surprising that evolution on that newcomer-dry land-has never caught up with the diversity of the sea. Of the thirty-three higher-level groupings of animals (called phyla), thirty-two are found in the oceans and just twelve on land.

### Impact – Air Pollution 2NC

#### CAUSES AIR POLLUTION

DOW ‘12 (DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, "OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING", https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=vandq=cache:0hRYuUTRu6wJ:www.defenders.org/publications/impacts\_of\_outer\_continental\_shelf\_drilling.pdf+andhl=enandgl=usandpid=blandsrcid=ADGEESimvF33YzLvIENzYCceMo6rbZBgGL\_qq52L3lPQbQp9oCH-vySHbDLITJDlQ61o\_\_xCzITqYc56OWssn5OEjL5C7HATlZWYsBP4Ec9SoxALLnh9Rk0NY\_ANjAdUgfb3vh0C-e31andsig=AHIEtbSgOUGu\_Q4pEWJM2fsBDGMuNjtfvA

Air Pollution. A 2004 inventory of air pollution in the Gulf of Mexico found that OCS oil and gas activities account for the overwhelming majority of air pollutants: 89% of carbon monoxide, 77% of NOx emissions, 72% of volatile organic compounds emissions, 69% of particulate matter emissions, and 66% of sulfur dioxide.

#### Air pollution causes extinction

Driesen 3 (David, Associate Professor – Syracuse Univeristy Law, 10 Buff. Envt'l. L.J. 25, Fall/Spring, Lexis)

Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations. The Rio Declaration articulates six key principles that are relevant to air pollution. These principles can also be understood as goals, because they describe a state of affairs that is worth achieving. Agenda 21, in turn, states a program of action for realizing those goals. Between them, they aid understanding of sustainable development's meaning for air quality. The first principle is that "human beings. . . are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature", because they are "at the center of concerns for sustainable development." 3 While the Rio Declaration refers to human health, its reference to life "in harmony with nature" also reflects a concern about the natural environment. 4 Since air pollution damages both human health and the environment, air quality implicates both of these concerns. 5

### Link – General – A2: Safe Tech

#### The drilling tech still sucks

Savitz 12 (Jacqueline, Vice President – North American Oceans at Oceana, “Industry Won't Make Drilling Safe,” National Journal, 4-30, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/04/what-more-can-be-done-to-ensur.php?comments=expandall#comments)

The idea that offshore drilling safety and spill response have substantially improved is little more than a figment of some people’s imagination. In the question above, Michael Bromwich acknowledges that during the Deepwater Horizon disaster (DWH) safeguards were not effective, preparation was not adequate, and response tools were little better than they were 20 years ago. But what has really changed in the past two years? Sadly, not enough. Even the question itself, what the industry (private sector) can do to reduce risks, misses the point because it sidelines the needed government action to scale back drilling given the lack of sufficient safety and response options. Not to mention the lack of private sector solutions. Let’s look at the categories on the list: safeguards, preparations and response tools. Safeguards have barely changed. The last line of defense at the wellhead, the heavily relied upon blowout preventer (BOP), turns out to be flawed by design according to Det Norsk Veritas – not just the one on the Deepwater Horizon, but possibly the rest. Did the private sector fix that problem? Have BOPs been redesigned to be effective and replaced? No and no. So, there’s something the private sector could do, or rather should have done before resuming drilling. But it hasn’t been required and dangerous deep water drilling is already back in full swing. There are new testing and maintenance regulations for BOPs, but they don’t fix the underlying design flaw. So that means we need real improvements in the second category: preparations. Is industry more prepared now? Of course they are, just ask them. Their exploration plans brag about response times in days now, rather than the months that we are accustomed to. According to BP, if DWH happened again, it could plug a well in 2-3 weeks, much faster than the 3 months it took them last time. But what changed? Well, this time we are to assume the capping device will work -- except we really don’t know that. Just because it eventually worked on DWH doesn’t mean it will work next time on a different blowout with a differently oriented pipe or even a damaged wellhead. Maybe if the companies offered to pre-drill relief wells, then they could credibly promise a faster response. But the private sector isn’t offering that, and again, government hasn’t required it. So be ready for another 3-month ordeal. That takes us to response. It’s impossible to fully respond to a major spill. The DWH caused tremendous impacts on marine life and coastal economies. And the response tools are not much better now than they were 2 or even 20 years ago. We still rely on booms that don’t really work, and surface burns that may remove about 5% of the oil. And then there are always toxic dispersants that can be used to hide the problem, though they create new problems. As a result, the next spill will look like 2010 all over again. Response is little more than damage control.

#### Accident inevitable – even with safe tech

DOW ‘12 (DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, "OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF DRILLING", https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=vandq=cache:0hRYuUTRu6wJ:www.defenders.org/publications/impacts\_of\_outer\_continental\_shelf\_drilling.pdf+andhl=enandgl=usandpid=blandsrcid=ADGEESimvF33YzLvIENzYCceMo6rbZBgGL\_qq52L3lPQbQp9oCH-vySHbDLITJDlQ61o\_\_xCzITqYc56OWssn5OEjL5C7HATlZWYsBP4Ec9SoxALLnh9Rk0NY\_ANjAdUgfb3vh0C-e31andsig=AHIEtbSgOUGu\_Q4pEWJM2fsBDGMuNjtfvA

Spills, Leaks and Catastrophes. Even with safety protocols in place, leaks and spills are inevitable— each year U.S. drilling operations send an average of 880,000 gallons of oil into the ocean. Then there are the unanticipated catastrophes. In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed 113 of the oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and damaged 457 pipelines. Hurricane damage caused at least 124 different spills, totaling over 17,700 barrels (743,000 gallons) of petroleum products. Oil is toxic to the plants and microscopic animals that form the basis of the marine food chain. It also poisons birds, mammals and fish. Those not killed outright can suffer a slow death from debilitating illness and injury.

#### 2. Tech failure is inevitable—they will fracture in the Ocean floor.

Pravica 12—Professor of Physics and Astronomy @ [University of Nevada](http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Schools/University+of+Nevada), Las Vegas [Michael Pravica, “Letters: Science, not profit, must lead deep water drilling,” USA Today, Updated 4/24/2012 8:43 PM , pg. http://tinyurl.com/9g8x28q

There are a few critical points not mentioned in the USA TODAY editorial on the BP oil spill that should have been addressed ("[Editorial: 2 years after BP spill, lower risks](http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/story/2012-04-19/BP-Deepwater-oil-spill/54419466/1)"). First of all, deep water drilling represents a "brave new world" of oil exploration and novel technology as humans probe depths of water, oil and rock that sustain thousands of atmospheres of pressure. At these levels, the technology used to drill and extract oil can easily fail as we approach the yield strengths of many of the confining materials subjected to extreme conditions. There is also a high chance of significant fracture of the cean/sea floor in drilling and hole erosion from gushing, hot and high pressure oil (along with particulates and other mineral-rich fluids) that could make repair nearly impossible and could permanently poison our waters.

The greatest lesson from the BP oil spill is that politicians and businessmen cannot solve problems created by our advanced technology. Only scientists and engineers can. We must listen to them and adopt a more rational approach to drilling that places safety above profit.

#### 3. They incentivize mindless all-out exploitation that makes disaster inevitable.

Flournoy 11—Professor and Director of the Environmental and Land Use Law Program @ University of Florida Levin College of Law [Alyson C. Flournoy, “ARTICLE: THREE META-LESSONS GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY SHOULD LEARN FROM THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER AND WHY THEY WILL NOT,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 281

C. How to Learn from the Context of the Disaster: United States' Energy Policy

A third meta-lesson from the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster is that the drilling of that particular offshore well is the result not just of private choice, but of a broader national policy on energy. MMS's oil leasing and permitting decisions reflect executive branch decisions about the disposition of publicly owned oil and gas resources. [n115](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n115) BP's decisions about exploration in that area were not made in a vacuum, but in the context of a set of laws and appropriations that create a variety of incentives that affect industry's behavior. Thus, to understand why the disaster occurred, it would be wise to look at the policy context that has produced the increasing rush to develop oil resources in deepwater, and increasingly in ultra-deepwater--areas that increase the complexity, risks, and uncertainty of drilling operations and potential accidents. [n116](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n116) The most visible leadership on this issue comes from statements of the Oil Spill Commission and its Co-Chair Bob Graham, who has repeatedly noted that the lack of an energy policy is an important issue related to the work of the Oil Spill Commission and one that must be addressed by the legislative and executive branches. [n117](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n117)

 [\*301]  The current energy policy provides hefty subsidies for the highly profitable oil and gas industries to continue with their unwavering focus on producing more oil and gas. [n118](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n118) Although some say that the United States lacks an energy policy, it is more accurate to say that our leaders don't clearly articulate the operative energy policy. Perhaps this is because it is not a coherent one or because on close inspection it is difficult to justify in light of other stated priorities.

A primary and often overlooked component of energy policy is the national policy on the privatization of public natural resources. U.S. policy is to give away its natural resources at bargain prices presumably to promote exploitation and development. [n119](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n119) A 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office compared U.S. royalty rates to those of 103 other jurisdictions, and only eleven had royalty rates lower than those of the United States. [n120](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n120) Moreover, the Government Accountability Office has made repeated reports of problems with uncollected royalties and with MMS's royalty-in-kind program that has led to underestimation of the royalties owed. [n121](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n121)

Another significant component of the national energy policy is tax policy that directly affects investment in oil extraction. A 2005 Congressional Budget Office Report showed that many capital investments for oil extraction are taxed at a rate of nine percent, which ranks among  [\*302]  the lowest rates for any industry. [n122](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n122) Tax deductions and credits for the oil extraction industry amount to roughly $ 4 billion per year. [n123](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n123)

Looked at as a whole, the current energy policy strongly encourages all-out exploitation of remaining domestic fossil fuel resources, and deepwater oil reserves in particular. If the public and elected officials believe that the risks that produced the Macondo Well blowout are unacceptable, an energy policy that will move us towards a clean energy path is a logical response. This could include increased government support for lower carbon, lower-risk energy paths.

Despite the clear political opportunity provided by the Deepwater Horizon disaster for the President and Congress to focus attention on a broad clean energy policy, there have been few signs of any significant movement in that direction. [n124](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n124) The CLEAR Act included provisions that would eliminate some of the royalty relief for deepwater drilling, eliminate the disastrous royalty-in-kind program, and require BOEMRE to study global royalty payments to inform U.S. royalty policy. [n125](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n125) These are very positive steps that would reduce the mindless incentives for deepwater drilling and the unintended windfalls to oil companies. However, that Act has languished in the Senate. Moreover, even those proposed changes fail to address the broader question of whether policy should create incentives towards a cleaner energy path. In the wake of the November 2010 election, it seems highly unlikely that the Administration or Congress will have interest in this topic. [n126](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n126)

CONCLUSION

There is much that can be learned from the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. Unfortunately, even learning the most specific lessons has proved a contentious and uncertain process. This Article suggests first that both industry and government must fundamentally rethink their approaches to safety and develop a culture that encourages and facilitates learning from mistakes. Second, it identifies the phenomenon of  [\*303] hollow government, characterized by government lacking the resources and authority to protect the public interest and a policy process dominated by powerful economic interests, as a root cause of the BP disaster and a contributing factor to other recent national disasters, including the financial crisis. Hollow government also makes it unlikely that we will learn the third meta-lesson and address the longstanding need for a coherent energy policy. These lessons could help to avert future disasters and better enable government to protect public health, safety, and the environment. However, absent changes to address the underlying obstacles to learning, there seems little likelihood that the lessons will be learned.

#### 4. They weaken safety and environmental review—it green lights to the drillers to throw caution to the wind.

Goldstein 11—Director of Government Affairs @ Natural Resources Defense Council [Dr. David Goldstein (Former project director for the Bipartisan Policy Center), “Casting Oil Upon the Waters: The House Drilling Bills,” Switchboard, Posted May 2, 2011, pg. http://tinyurl.com/3syxpcl

This week, the House could vote on three bills to expand offshore oil and gas drilling.  It is remarkable enough that the House would take up such measures before Congress has done a thing to make drilling safer.  But what is truly astounding about these bills is that they would actually make the system that governs offshore drilling weaker than it was before the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.  This is legislation that should give pause even to the most ardent proponents of offshore drilling.

These bills are more than a Big Oil wish list; they are a sort of oil utopia—and they could make sense only in a utopian world in which oil spills could never ever happen, in which there are never conflicts between the oil industry and other economic interests like fishing and tourism, and in which oil companies always take environmental and safety concerns fully into account.  It’s as if Rep. Doc Hastings (R-WA), the bills’ sponsor, set out to prove how apt it is to talk about the U.S. “addiction” to oil.  Under these bills, the U.S. would truly be acting like an addict, willing to sell out any principle, dispense with any caution, endanger any asset to get its next fix.  Again, these bills ought to be seen as irresponsible even by supporters of increased drilling.

So what would the bills actually do?  Let’s start with the most egregious one of all, H.R. 1231.  The bill is designed to ensure that oil drilling occurs off the East Coast from Maine to North Carolina, off the coast of Southern California and in the Arctic Ocean and Bristol Bay.  That sweeping decision alone is breathtaking.  But the bill does this by mandating that at least half the unleased area in each of those regions be put up for lease sales each and every time the government puts outer continental shelf territory up for lease.  (Offshore territory available for lease is identified in five-year plans; the next one will cover 2012-2017.)

Now think about that.  The bill doesn’t simply reiterate that the government could make these areas available for oil drilling.  It doesn’t just say that the government has to figure out which parts of those coastal waters would be appropriate for oil drilling and open those.  It doesn’t even say that this administration has to open up a set amount of acreage for oil drilling, regardless of the specific concerns in any region.   It says that, in perpetuity, each time waters are opened to drilling, at least half of the available acreage in each area needs to be opened up to drilling—until, presumably, every bit of acreage is being drilled.

This is replacing oil policy with a kind of oil mania.  Under this bill, neither this administration nor any future one could ever decide to limit drilling off the coast of New England, the Mid-Atlantic states, Southern California or Alaska because of economic or environmental concerns.  No administration could decide to “take a breather” before opening up more leases to see how previously permitted activities were working out, or because there had been a spill, or because there was unexpected damage to the ecology or tourism, or because a state objected, or because there was no additional capacity to respond to an emergency, or because the agency overseeing drilling was too overwhelmed to properly review proposals.   At least half the remaining unleased territory would have to be put up for leasing each and every time no matter what had happened, no matter what could happen, no matter what concerns states or scientists or fishermen or federal officials might have.

The bill goes beyond earlier proposals to open up drilling, many of which had at least limited provisions for states to opt out of drilling off their states and which were not as prescriptive.

The bill is titled “Reversing President Obama’s Offshore Moratorium Act,” demonstrating that partisan animus is behind this bill as much as any interest in energy.  But the title is a misnomer in any event.  The bill ought to be called “A bill to prevent any president or other official or the public from ever deciding not to drill for oil everywhere, no matter what the facts on the ground are.”  Not so pithy, perhaps, but it’s what the bill actually does.

The other two bills, while less sweeping—it would be just about impossible to be more sweeping—are based on the same compulsion to remove any judgment, discretion and balance from drilling decisions.

H.R. 1230 mandates that the government conduct three lease sales in the next year—for oil and gas drilling in the central and western Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Virginia.  These are areas the administration decided not to lease after the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  But as with H.R. 1231, the problem is not just opening up areas to oil and gas drilling.  The bill short-circuits the environmental review for these sales.

Specifically, the bill blocks court review of the Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) prepared for the lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico.  It does this by having Congress deem that the EISs have met the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act.  This deeming, of course, is simply a political judgment, based on nothing more than the wish that it be so.  (The Virginia lease is treated differently, apparently because the military may have concerns with it.  For the sponsors, court reviews are only legitimate when someone they like is bringing a lawsuit.)

Shutting down the courts is particularly wrongheaded in this instance for two reasons.  First, the environmental review for these leases was done by the pre-Gulf disaster Minerals Management Service, an agency notorious for its close relationship to the oil industry.  Second, these environmental reviews did not take into account the damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon blowout (and therefore what could happen under these leases) because such a disaster was thought of as impossible at the time.

So under H.R. 1230, what is Congress’ reaction to the Gulf disaster?  It is mandating that the administration and the courts act as if it had never happened.  This ought to be a dictionary definition of irresponsibility.

H.R. 1229 is another effort to make the review of oil and gas drilling weaker than it was before the Gulf disaster.  The bill sets an arbitrary time limit of 30 days for reviewing drilling permit applications and grants automatic approvals if no action has been taken within 60 days.  Was the message of the Gulf spill to ensure that safety reviews be shorter and conducted “under the gun”?  In fact, the National Oil Spill Commission recommended that Congress extend another 30-day review limit—and that one didn’t even have an automatic approval provision.

H.R. 1229 also tries to make it harder to challenge any oil drilling decision related to the Gulf of Mexico by eliminating the ability of those who challenge the federal government successfully from having their legal fees reimbursed.  Current law does not encourage frivolous suits—the fees are only paid if the suit is successful—but it does enable citizen groups to challenge bad decisions.  And H.R. 1229 also has provisions to stack the decks against any plaintiff who still manages to sue.

So the first bills on drilling to come before the Republican-controlled House since the Gulf disaster try to wish away that catastrophic event.  They would open almost all the waters of the U.S. to oil drilling; prevent any judgments from being made about where and when and how to drill; tie the hands of this and future administrations and the courts; and weaken the system of safety and environmental review.  Quite a legacy.

As my colleagues have noted, additional drilling will have no impact on gasoline prices.  This is not a solution to our problems, it is a way to create new ones.  This is a bill written by people who are so hell-bent on drilling that they can’t even admit that there are consequences to be considered.  This is not policymaking; it’s a new kind of magical thinking.

#### 5. It will not be safe.

[**Beinecke**](http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/) 11—President of NRDC [[Frances Beinecke](http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/) “House Committee Promotes More Offshore Drilling with Less Oversight,” Switchboard, Posted April 14, 2011, pg. http://tinyurl.com/6jvt3j7

Despite the enormous toll that can come from drilling, Representative Doc Hasting (R-WA) and his colleagues want to make it easier for companies to drill more with less oversight.

I served on the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. After an exhaustive review of the evidence, we concluded that the root cause of the spill was systemic failure in industry management and government oversight.

Quick fixes in one company or one agency would not be enough to make offshore drilling safe. Instead, we laid out the comprehensive steps the oil industry, the government, and Congress would need to take to prevent another massive spill.

The three bills voted on yesterday disregard the commission’s safety recommendations. They would take us backward—making offshore drilling even more risky than it was before the Deepwater Horizon blowout.

Turning back the clock on offshore drilling will do little to relieve America’s oil addiction.

According to the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, drilling in America’s previously closed ocean areas “would not have a significant impact on domestic crude oil and natural gas production…before 2030.” Even then, “because oil prices are determined on the international market …any impact on average wellhead prices is expected to be insignificant.”

#### 6. Interior lacks the capacity to identify or respond to risks.

Geman 8/29/12 [Ben Geman, “Report: Interior has ‘limited’ ability to gauge offshore drilling risks,” The Hill, 08/29/12 05:37 PM ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/cmkjo9r

A [new report](http://gao.gov/products/GAO-12-423) by congressional auditors finds that the Interior Department still has “limited” ability to identify and evaluate risks from offshore drilling projects, despite overhauling and toughening oversight after the 2010 BP oil spill.  
“Interior continues to face challenges following its reorganization that may affect its ability to oversee oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico. Specifically, Interior’s capacity to identify and evaluate risk remains limited, raising questions about the effectiveness with which it allocates its oversight resources,” the Government Accountability Office report states.  
The July 30 report made public Wednesday arrives as Republicans, at their national convention in Tampa, Fla., are [vowing to greatly expand](http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/245863-gop-platform-block-carbon-regs-expand-drilling) offshore access for oil-and-gas companies if Mitt Romney wins the White House.

Interior, after the April 2010 spill began, announced it was dismantling its troubled Minerals Management Service and created what last year became separate agencies: The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement.  
The GAO report credits Interior with safety reforms but concludes, “the ultimate effectiveness of Interior’s reorganization and recent policy changes remains uncertain.”  
The report lists a number of areas of concern. For instance it alleges that environmental analyses of companies’ exploration and development plans have occurred “without the most current, potentially relevant information.”  
The report also lays out concerns with offshore regulators’ information management system and inspections program.  
“Interior’s inspections routinely identify violations, but Interior’s [Technical Information Management System] IT system is missing some data, such as the date that violations were found or corrected. As a result, Interior does not know on a real-time basis whether or when all violations were identified and corrected, potentially allowing unsafe conditions to continue for extended periods,” the report states.

#### 7. Weak regulatory regime will encourage the industry to take unnecessary risks.

Flournoy 11—Professor and Director of the Environmental and Land Use Law Program @ University of Florida Levin College of Law [Alyson C. Flournoy, “ARTICLE: THREE META-LESSONS GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY SHOULD LEARN FROM THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER AND WHY THEY WILL NOT,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 281

Although this Article's primary focus is on law and policy lessons, it is important to note that these highly visible and concrete failures will likely lead industry to respond voluntarily by adopting some practices and procedures to avoid similar failures. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n27) From a law and governance perspective, however, simply allowing industry to learn voluntarily and police itself is widely viewed as inadequate for several reasons. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n28) Indeed, the regulatory environment that existed at the time of the blowout relied  [\*286]  heavily on industry self-regulation. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095" \l "n29) Investigation in the wake of the blowout has revealed that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)--the law governing development of federally owned oil and gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf--included few standards to assure protection of health, safety, and the environment. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095#n30) Additionally, the Minerals Management Service's (MMS) approach to regulation under the OCSLA relied heavily on standards developed by and voluntarily agreed to by industry. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095#n31) Of course, even with this weak regulatory regime, the threat of tort liability should have provided industry with an incentive to take steps to avoid catastrophic risk. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095#n32) However, it seems clear from most accounts that BP and its contractors failed to accurately assess the severity of the risks they faced. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1347732562226&returnToKey=20_T15531026576&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.633384.4211442095#n33) Thus, relying on industry, market forces, and the tort liability system to deter similar conduct seems unwarranted and an abdication of government's role in protecting health, safety, and the environment.

### Link – General – Reviews

#### Plan causes quick approvals at the expense of environmental reviews

Polis 11 [Jared, US Representative from Colorado, “Putting the Gulf of Mexico Back to Work Act,” House Session Part 2, 5-10, <http://www.c-spanvideo.org/appearance/599956482>]

This is the exact wrong legislative response to the BP disaster. Rather than acting to make off-shore drilling safer and smarter, the underlying bill would make drilling faster and more reckless. Under this bill, we could actually have less rigorous oversight and review of offshore drilling than we had before the Deepwater Horizon disaster. By imposing an artificial and arbitrary deadline, the bill heavily biases the permitting process toward approval, placing undue burdens on reviewers to accelerate the process regardless of safety and environmental concerns. If the Secretary decides that the agency hasn't had enough time to approve the permit, then his only choice is to deny the permit undoubtedly leading to additional lawsuits from companies and the unrelenting onslaught of industry and Republican criticism. This bill is simply a catch 22 for the Department to either risk another disaster, or open up the Department even more to the vitriolic and false claims from industry and the Majority party of being anti-business or anti domestic energy--not that the facts have kept that misinformation from being spread in the past. Mr. Chair, this legislation doesn't get to the root of the problem. We all know through the numerous hearings last year that one of the fundamental causes of the BP spill was a lack of not only enough inspectors, but a lack of inspectors with high levels of expertise and engineering knowledge. Prior to the spill, the few inspectors the government did have simply had to take the oil companies' word that everything was in order. I'm sure we all remember when the big five oil companies were caught pointing the finger of blame squarely at BP in a hearing last year, only to have it disclosed moments later that every one of their spill response documents and other application material was not only identical, but included completely inaccurate information, listing for example walruses as a critical species for the Gulf of Mexico and citing as an emergency contact a professor from Florida Atlantic University, who had long since passed away. We shouldn't have to take a company's word for it when there is so much at stake. We should ensure that the watchdogs have the tools they need to verify that everything is done properly. This is what my amendment aims to do. Congress shouldn't set an arbitrary timeline if Congress doesn't give the Department enough resources they need to properly do their job within that timeline. In fact, the recommendations of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon spill contain an entire section on ``The Need for Adequate Funding for Safety Oversight and Environmental Review,'' which lists a number of policy options letting the oil companies, not the American people, foot the bill. Sadly, the underlying legislation includes none of them. Mr. Chair, you wouldn't referee a game by doing away with the rules because the referee didn't know them; you'd get a better referee. The fact is that the regulators been grossly underfunded and understaffed in the past. With the Continuing Resolution's partial step toward reversing the ``shameful'' and years-long underfunding of offshore oversight, it was only half of what's needed to do the job right. The Director of the agency that oversees permitting, Michael Bromwich, just last month said: ``That is less than we need, but it is a significant sum, especially in a constrained budget environment where the funding of most other agencies is being cut. We desperately need more environmental scientists and more personnel to do environmental analysis. We desperately need more personnel to help us with the permitting process and much more.'' If the Department isn't going to be given enough resources and expertise to do the job right, then the Department shouldn't be forced to do the job fast. Instead of creating unnecessary catch 22's for government, we should be working to make government more efficient and more effective. My amendment addresses the root of this issue by lifting the arbitrary timeline requirements if the Department isn't given the necessary resources it needs to properly process applications.

### Impact Framing – Systemic Risk

#### AND, the risk of drilling multiplies with each additional drillers—you must account for the systemic risk of ecosystem collapse.

Craig 11—Associate Dean for Environmental Programs @ Florida State University [Robin Kundis Craig, “Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell,” Brigham Young University Law Review, 2011, 2011 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1863

Systemic risk is as important as individual risk. Notwithstanding the National Environmental Policy Act's requirement that federal permitting agencies consider cumulative impacts to the environment, [n188](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348065909828&returnToKey=20_T15563238106&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.735297.7128077165" \l "n188) we currently evaluate the risks of offshore oil drilling primarily with respect to individual oil drilling operations in connection with individual permits and leases. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission recognized, however, the larger systemic context of such drilling is also important, and perhaps arguably more so. From a resilience perspective, a drilling operation that uses the only oil rig in a pristine marine environment is an inherently different risk problem than the Deepwater Horizon's situation of being one of thousands of similar rigs in a pervasively and multiply stressed Gulf. As Clark, Jones, and Holling have suggested, our trial-and-error experiments with Nature in our first-sense resilience  [\*1895] dependence mode "now threaten errors larger and more costly than society can afford." [n189](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348065909828&returnToKey=20_T15563238106&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.735297.7128077165" \l "n189) Resilience thinking should more forcibly insist on multilayered systemic awareness, promoting limits on how much exploitation should be occurring simultaneously and encouraging more gradual resource development over longer periods of time.

. Risk to the environment should be presumed, even when all actors follow all best practices. Our current first-sense resilience dependency produces laws that assume that ecosystems can be fixed—and, perhaps more importantly, as embodied in the OPA natural resource damages regulations, that natural processes will often be able to restore themselves without human effort. Resilience thinking, in contrast, effectively assumes that ecosystems could suddenly shift to a new regime at any time for any number of reasons that we do not understand and may not even be able to anticipate—the combined potential of the second and third conceptions of resilience. In the words of Clark, Jones, and Holling, "if a system has multiple regions of stability, then Nature can seem to play the practical joker rather than the forgiving benefactor." [n190](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348065909828&returnToKey=20_T15563238106&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.735297.7128077165" \l "n190) To exaggerate the differences in outlook just a bit, our current paradigm presumes that most ecosystems can cope with most human activities, while resilience thinking presumes that all changes to an ecosystem are at least potentially completely destabilizing—i.e., inherently risky, with the outer limits of that risk being potentially massive. To translate this change in presumption into legalese, full resilience thinking promotes a policy framework where most human activities in the environment could be—and perhaps should be—considered inherently dangerous activities.

 [\*1896]  As every first-year law student learns, engaging in inherently dangerous activities tends to subject the actor to strict and fairly absolute liability for the kinds of harm that made the activity inherently dangerous. [n191](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348065909828&returnToKey=20_T15563238106&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.735297.7128077165" \l "n191) Under resilience thinking, those kinds of harm would include all of the unpredictable and unexpected changes to the ecosystem that might occur as a result of a disaster like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, up to and including a substantial shift in ecosystem regime or ecosystem collapse.

While full implementation of an "inherently dangerous activity" legal regime for all marine activities is unlikely, the case is fairly strong for deep sea oil exploration and drilling. It is at least worth pondering what such a consequence of resilience thinking might mean for risk assessment and behavioral incentives in this context. If nothing else, one would predict under such a new view of potential liability that oil companies' insurers might begin charging premiums that more accurately reflect the potentially catastrophic liability that resilience-minded regulations and policies would make legally cognizant—and might insist on the much more precautionary and safety-minded approach to offshore oil drilling that a multitude of commentators and the Deepwater Horizon Commission have sought in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

V. Conclusion  
 The second and third senses of resilience, and the socio-ecological risks for humans that they underscore, should not be foreign concepts in the regulation of the marine environment, including (and perhaps especially) when it comes to regulating the offshore oil and gas exploration and drilling taking place at ever-increasing depths. Nor should the possibility that the cumulative stresses to the Gulf of Mexico have pushed its ecosystems to the brink of ecosystem thresholds be ignored in our regulatory regimes.

By acknowledging that ecosystems are dynamic and subject to sudden and fairly catastrophic (at least from a human perspective) changes, full resilience thinking provides a path away from the trap of first-sense resilience dependence. Specifically, full resilience thinking recognizes that exploitative activities that affect the Gulf—not just deep sea oil drilling but also fishing and farming up the Mississippi River—put all of the human beings who depend on the ecosystem services, as well as the ecosystems themselves, at collective risk of catastrophic ecosystem collapse. A liability regime based on these unavoidable and potentially massive environmental risks would likely protect the Gulf of Mexico better than our current regime of natural resource damages, especially when injury occurs in the Gulf's murky depths.

## China

### AT SCS Energy Conflicts

#### Public opinion and nationalism are the driving source of tension in the South China Sea – oil isn't key

Nehru 8/23/12 (Vikram, The National Interest, senior associate and Bakrie Chair in Southeast Asian Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Collision Course in the South China Sea," http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/collision-course-the-south-china-sea-7380?page=1)

Certainly, the potential costs of conflict for the region and the world far outweigh any potential economic benefits contained in the seabed of the South China Sea—much of which is unknown in any case. Rather than the availability of hydrocarbons and fisheries, the South China Sea dispute is now increasingly being driven by domestic public opinion in the countries concerned that is fueled by military lobbies and strong nationalist sentiments.

### 2NC No Econ War

#### Jervis

#### No more wars from economic collapse – we’re in a state of turboparalysis

Lind 12 -- co-founder of the New America Foundation, policy director of the Economic Growth Program, graduate of the University of Texas and Yale, taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, been an editor or staff writer for The New Yorker, Harper’s, The New Republic and The National Interest (Michael, 12/15, "The age of turboparalysis," <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8789631/the-age-of-turboparalysis/>)

More than half a decade has passed since the recession that triggered the financial panic and the Great Recession, but the condition of the world continues to be summed up by what I’ve called ‘turboparalysis’ — a prolonged condition of furious motion without movement in any particular direction, a situation in which the engine roars and the wheels spin but the vehicle refuses to move.¶ The greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression might have been expected to produce revolutions in politics and the world of ideas alike. Outside of the Arab world, however, revolutions are hard to find. Mass unemployment and austerity policies have caused riots in Greece and Spain, but most developed nations are remarkably sedate. Scandal and sputtering economic growth appear unlikely to prevent another peaceful transition of power within the Communist party of China. And in the US, the re-election of President Obama and the strengthening of his Democratic party in the US Senate reflect long-term demographic changes in an increasingly non-white and secular American electorate, not the endorsement of a bold agenda for the future by the Democrats. They don’t have one.¶ In the realm of ideas, turboparalysis is even more striking. On both sides of the Atlantic, political and economic debate proceed as though the bursting of the global bubble economy did not discredit any school of thought. Right, left and centre, the players are the same and so are their familiar moves. Public debate is dominated by the same three groups — market fundamentalists, centrist neoliberals, and mildly reformist social democrats — who have been debating one another since the 1980s. Someone who went to sleep like Rip Van Winkle in the 1980s when Reagan and Thatcher were in power and awoke today would find nothing new in the way of economic theories or political doctrines.¶ By now one might have expected the emergence of innovative and taboo-breaking schools of thought seeking to account for and respond to the global crisis. But to date there is no insurgent political and intellectual left, nor a new right, for that matter. In the US, the militant Tea Party right, many of whose candidates went down to defeat in this year’s elections, represents the last gasp of the Goldwater-Reagan coalition, not something fresh. The American centre-left under Obama is intellectually exhausted and politically feeble, reduced to rebranding as ‘progressive’ policies like the individual mandate system (‘Obamacare’) and tax cuts for the middle class which originated on the moderate right a generation ago. In Britain, the manifestos of various ‘colour revolutions’ — Blue Labour, Red Tory and so on — have the feel of PR brochures promoting rival cliques of ambitious apparatchiks rather than the epochal thinking the times require.¶ Why has a global calamity produced so little political change and, at the same time, so little rethinking? Part of the answer, I think, has to do with the collapse of the two-way transmission belt that linked the public to the political elite. Institutions such as mass political parties, trade unions, and local civic associations, which once connected elected leaders to constituents, have withered away in more individualistic and anonymous societies. One result is a perpetual crisis of legitimacy on the part of political elites, who owe their electoral successes increasingly to rich donors and skilful advertising consultants. New political movements are hard to found. At the same time, anachronistic movements can continue to raise funds or entertain audiences, even if, like America’s conservative movement, they lose election after election.¶ But there is a deeper, structural reason for the persistence of turboparalysis. And that has to do with the power and wealth that incumbent elites accumulated during the decades of the global bubble economy.¶ In essence, the bubble economy was a dysfunctional marriage of export-driven economies like China, Japan and Germany and debt-addicted nations like the US and many of Germany’s European neighbours. As international trade imbalances built up, from the 1980s to the 2000s, so did the wealth and power of elites who profited from the system, from Chinese Communist princelings with a stake in overbuilt export industries to the financiers of Wall Street and the City of London.¶ A global economic system that relied on excessive borrowing by consumers, particularly in the US, was bound to grind to a halt when fearful consumers switched from borrowing to saving. But the crash was only the first stage of the adjustment. The second stage is rebalancing. Countries like China and Germany must rely more on domestic consumption; countries like the US and UK must rely less on private consumer debt and shift resources from finance and housing to productive, traded industries.¶ But these reform agendas, from the downsizing of the overbuilt industrial sectors of mercantilist Asian nations to the pruning of finance in the Anglo-American world, threaten the very interests that profited from the preceding bubble and now glare defensively at a changing world, like Fafnir crouched upon his hoard. In the US, the wealth of the bubble-swollen financial sector has been transmuted into political power via campaign contributions. While Mitt Romney, the candidate of Wall Street, lost his bid for the presidency, the American financial industry overall has been successful in blocking reforms like the nationalising of failed banks (rather than government bailouts with few conditions) and the restructuring of private household mortgage debt. These reforms, along with a dose of moderate inflation and much more aggressive fiscal policies like massive investment in infrastructure, would have helped the economy recover more rapidly. But they would have imposed significant costs on economic elites who have wielded their power to thwart them.¶ For their part, the masses seldom unite against the classes in democracies because they are divided among themselves. When nations realise that they will be collectively poorer in the future than they had expected, the usual result is not solidarity but rather civil war, by means of ballots and sometimes bullets. Confronted by a crisis like the Great Recession, each section of society uses its political influence to try to maintain its share of the national wealth, while forcing the cost of economic adjustment to others. The rich try to shift adjustment costs to the middle class, who in turn try to pay for their own subsidies and entitlements by cutting the programmes of the poor.History is sobering, in this regard. The Great Recession, which continues despite a technical ‘recovery’, can be viewed as the third great economic collapse of the industrial era, following the ‘Long Depression’ of the 1870s-1890s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The earlier two episodes of global economic crisis witnessed setbacks for liberalism, democracy and free trade and the flourishing of illiberal nationalism, racism, imperialism and beggar-thy-neighbour economics. While slow growth combined with national rivalries have not yet engendered anything like the autarkic economics of the earlier two crises, it would be premature to predict the survival of present levels of financial and economic integration in a world that wobbles between feeble recoveries and renewed recessions.¶ Nowhere is there greater potential for conflict than in the relationship between the two poles of the now-collapsed bubble economy — the US, which specialised in exporting debt to China, and China, which specialised in exporting manufactured goods to the US. Since the Great Recession began, American attitudes toward China have grown strikingly more negative. The much-discussed ‘pivot’ in American strategy away from fighting jihadists in the Middle East and Central Asia towards unnamed great power rivals in East Asia is manifestly a shift toward greater military containment of China.¶ And in the recently concluded US elections, both candidates competed in promising to protect American producers from unfair Chinese competition. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which China is excluded, combines military and trade concerns in a single set of America-centred Asian alliances. Gone is the Clinton-era vision of China as a liberalising and democratising partner of the US in a world of great-power harmony.¶ The last global depression was brought to an end by the second world war. This time a ‘hot’ war is extremely unlikely and a cold war merely possible. Nevertheless, geopolitics may do what domestic politics has failed so far to do and free the world’s leading countries from ongoing turboparalysis.

#### AND - even if wars occur, they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states’ desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### 93 examples are on our side

Miller 2k [Morris Miller, Winter 2K. economist and adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration and former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25.4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Their chain of causation is backwards

Ferguson 6 (Niall, prof. of history, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### Countries can’t start wars when their economies decline—only growth triggers conflict.

Bennett and Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

Alternative relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator (1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the historical notion that leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full—in bad times, leaders may simply not be able to afford to go to conflict. Blainey’s argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory.

### 2NC SCS

#### No SCS conflict

Economist 12 (9/22, "Could Asia really go to war over these?" http://www.economist.com/node/21563316)

Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of political theatre—the product of elections in Japan and a leadership transition in China. The Senkakus row has boiled over now because the Japanese government is buying some of the islands from a private Japanese owner. The aim was to keep them out of the mischievous hands of Tokyo’s China-bashing governor, who wanted to buy them himself. China, though, was affronted. It strengthened its own claim and repeatedly sent patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. That bolstered the leadership’s image, just before Xi Jinping takes over. More generally, argue the optimists, Asia is too busy making money to have time for making war. China is now Japan’s biggest trading partner. Chinese tourists flock to Tokyo to snap up bags and designer dresses on display in the shop windows on Omotesando. China is not interested in territorial expansion. Anyway, the Chinese government has enough problems at home: why would it look for trouble abroad? Asia does indeed have reasons to keep relations good, and this latest squabble will probably die down, just as others have in the past. But each time an island row flares up, attitudes harden and trust erodes. Two years ago, when Japan arrested the skipper of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming a vessel just off the islands, it detected retaliation when China blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry.

#### No SCS escalation

Storey 12 -- Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, specializes in Asian security issues, with a focus on Southeast Asia (Ian, Interviewed by Ann Jung, 7/16/12, "ASEAN and the South China Sea: Deepening Divisions," http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=262)

The worst-case scenario for the United States, and indeed all stakeholders in the South China Sea, is a serious confrontation in which military force is employed. But frankly I think the chances of that happening are not very high. The best-case scenario is for China and ASEAN to agree on a credible and effective CoC that ameliorates tensions, leads to the implementation of confidence-building measures, and thereby creates an environment conducive to a peaceful resolution. I don’t think the chances of that outcome are very high either. So I think what we will see for the foreseeable future is a continuation of the status quo in the South China Sea: tensions will continue to ebb and flow, the claimants will protest each other’s moves, and ASEAN and China will keep the DoC/CoC process going if only to show that they are doing something. How long the status quo can continue is another matter. I think it has a limited shelf life, though what the post–status quo will look like is impossible to say at this point in time. But it could be very messy.

#### -- South China Seas are stable – China lacks capability and interdependence checks

Rosenberg 9 (David, Professor of Political Science – Middlebury College and Research Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies – Australian National University, “Dire Straits: Competing Security Priorities in the South China Sea”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 3-20, http://japanfocus.org/-David-Rosenberg/1773)

From the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca, security concerns are growing around the South China Sea. While the Bush Administration sees a resurgent Chinese military threat across the Taiwan Strait and a terrorist threat in the Strait of Malacca, many countries between the Straits are more concerned about security for their maritime resources from the threats of competitors, traffickers, poachers, and pirates. Security Concerns in the South China Sea Several recent statements and appointments highlight the current Bush administration view of China's threat to Taiwan. Porter Goss, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, warned that improved Chinese capabilities not only threaten Taiwan but also U.S. forces in the (western Pacific) region. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worried that the Chinese navy was building some amphibious landing ships for possible use across the Taiwan Strait. The appointment of combative neoconservative John Bolton as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations sends a clear and ominous signal: formerly a paid consultant to the Taiwanese government, Bolton has advocated Taiwan's independence and its full U.N. membership. Then, in February 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts announced a significant alteration in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance by identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective." Has there been any big shift in the balance of power around the Taiwan Strait that warrants this U.S. response? The Chinese defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of pursuing peaceful external relations initiatives through multilateral, cooperative approaches to promote domestic development. The most recent Defense White Paper, published in December of 2004, reiterates this priority. More important than statements of good intentions, however, China has taken significant steps to implement this goal. It was evident in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, negotiated in November 2002. That led to the agreement signed in November 2004 to implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010. Following the 10th Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in Vientiane, Laos in November 2004, Beijing held its own summit with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus One) and then joined Japan and the Republic of Korea in discussions with ASEAN leaders (ASEAN Plus Three, or APT). Beijing had earlier in November hosted the first Security Policy Conference of the ASEAN Regional Forum. It featured an anti-piracy drill and a workshop on countering terrorism. Regional Economic and Financial Agreements Regional economic agreements were the main achievements of these meetings. However, the ASEAN Plus Three sessions identified other areas for cooperation, including deeper cooperation in investment and finance, expanded security dialogue and cooperation, expanded cultural exchanges, and periodic progress reviews. Perhaps the most dramatic developments have occurred in regional financial cooperation. Finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries have launched an Asian Bond Markets Initiative and the regional central bankers group set up two Asian Bond Funds in early 2005. These are key steps in addressing one of the major weaknesses in the region's development as indicated by the currency and financial crisis that struck large parts of the region in 1997: the heavy reliance by firms on short-term bank loans for financing. As Jennifer Amyx notes, many countries in East Asia maintain high savings rates but, because of the absence of stable long-term debt markets, the savings deposited into local banks tended to be funneled out to international financial centers and then back into the region as short-term foreign currency loans. This situation creates a problem referred to as a "double mismatch" -- that is, a mismatch between debt maturities (short-term borrowing for long-term investments) and the denomination of this debt (in foreign rather than local currencies). [2] The ASEAN+3 finance ministers had earlier set up a network of bilateral currency swaps to permit a country beset by a speculative attack to draw on reserves of other nations. The program -- the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) -- went into effect at the end of 2003. Japan, with the largest reserves in the region, led negotiations over swap arrangements and will play the role of arbitrator for currency loans. China, another potential lender with substantial reserves in excess of potential needs, also lent its support to the CMI. Widespread participation by ASEAN Plus Three members in these initiatives encourages smooth financial liberalization processes and thereby bolsters regional stability. It also reinforces the efforts of various working groups to improve transparency and information dissemination and to strengthen settlement systems and regulatory reforms. China's shift to a more proactive position on regional financial cooperation has greatly facilitated these recent financial developments. As a result, interdependence between the Chinese economy and other economies in the region has deepened significantly in recent years. Today, trade by ASEAN member nations with China far exceeds trade conducted within the ASEAN grouping, while China is predicted to soon overtake the United States as Japan's top trading partner. Levels of investment in China by countries in the region are also extremely high. The worst case scenario is not Chinese domination but a Chinese meltdown, as many regional monetary authorities are quick to note.

#### South China Sea is no longer a concern

Bitzinger and Desker 08 Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Senior Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

(Richard and Barry, Why east asian war is unlikely [Survival](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919), Volume [50](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=t713659919%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=50#v50), Issue [6](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title%7Edb=all%7Econtent=g906414492) December 2008 , pages 105 – 128)

Nowhere, perhaps, is this new 'play-nice' strategy and good-neighbour approach more tangible than in China's recent handling of the Spratly Islands dispute. From its supposed flashpoint status during the 1990s, the Spratlys have calmed down considerably, and today the status of the islands is 'no longer discussed as a major security concern'.[20](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/section?content=a906256449&fulltext=713240928#EN0020) To its credit, China has made a concerted effort not to let the South China Sea issue become a major domestic political football (unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan), nor has it seized or occupied additional islands in the Spratlys since 1995. In particular, in 2002 Beijing and ASEAN agreed to a joint Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which affirmed the intention of the signatories to peacefully resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes, to exercise self-restraint in the South China Sea and to avoid actions that would 'complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability', including refraining from further construction on the presently uninhabited islands**.** In addition, in March 2005 Beijing also signed bilateral agreements with the Philippines and Vietnam for the joint exploration for oil in areas of overlapping sovereignty claims. (At the same time, estimates of likely oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea have been revised downward considerably, so there may be much less to fight over than originally believed.) This is not to say that the Spratly Islands dispute has been settled once and for all (fishing rights, for example, will continue to be important). It does stand a much better chance of being resolved peacefully, however, and without adding to tensions or hostility between China and Southeast Asia.

#### Existing agreements solve Chinese aggression

PDI 08 (3/13, "SPRATLYS DEAL NOTHING TO WORRY ABOUT FVR", L/N)

FORMER PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS Yesterday allayed fears over the governments joint oil exploration deal with China inthe Spratlys, saying bilateral and multilateral agreements have long been in place to ensure the peaceful resolution of border disputes. We should not panic... Because there is so much goodwill already built up among the claimants especially between China, who is the big power in this area, and the other claimants, Ramos said in an interview. After addressing an international forum on the Asean Charter, Ramos told reporters yesterday that the controversial Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) should not be a cause for concern since military superpower China would honor previous agreements made to ensure the non-violent resolution of lingering border questions on the Spratly islands.

#### China’s avoiding Spratlys conflict and any dispute won’t esclate

Teves 08 (Catherine J., 10/5, News.Balita, “Chinese aggression over Spratlys far-fetched: expert observer,” http://news.balita.ph/2008/10/05/chinese-aggression-over-spratlys-far-fetched-expert-observer/)

A Beijing-based Filipino journalist believes Chinese aggression over internationally disputed Spratly Islands is unlikely. ”China doesn’t want these Spratlys to be the bone of contention in Asia,” said ABC News Beijing Bureau chief producer Chito Sta. Romana at Kapihan sa Sulo forum, noting the Chinese prefer to maintain good relations with neighboring countries which are also their trading partners. He said China will likely handle the Spratly issue by continuing to use its ‘soft power’ approach consisting of investing in and aiding its neighbors instead. ”The Chinese want to avoid conflict as much as possible –- they’d rather negotiate and exert influence,” he said. Sta. Romana expressed this view as concern on possible Chinese aggression over the Spratlys re-emerged amidst Congress’ discussions on the baseline bill that’ll define the country’s territorial limits. Government is aiming to include several of the islands as part of Philippine territory. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, China and the Philippines are pushing for respective claims over the Spratlys, a group of islands in South China Sea. Studies indicating possible presence of oil and natural gas reserves in the area further heightened these countries’ claims. China, Asia’s former ‘Sleeping Dragon,’ has financial resources for investments and aid to other countries as Sta. Romana pointed out the economy there is growing, placing it fourth worldwide. He cited trade liberalization, tempered State control and the Chinese’s determination to achieve progress as the major factors that drive their country’s economy. ”That country’s already an economic super power, having the biggest foreign reserves amounting to some US$ 1.8 trillion,” he said. If China continues such growth, he said its economy by the mid-21st century will surpass that of the United States. Sta. Romana however noted China dislikes the super power tag. ”China doesn’t want to be a super power and that means it doesn’t want to have troops worldwide,” he said. Despite economic progress, Sta. Romana said China’s armed forces still lags behind US military power. (PNA)

#### -- No escalation

Bush and O’Hanlon 7 (Richard and Michael, Senior Fellows – Brookings Institution, “U.S. Grapples With China’s Rise, Taiwan”, The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 5-3, Lexis)

But most of the issues and frictions that accompany China's rise can be managed. The good news is that China and the United States, not to mention other key regional players like Japan, now have politicians and bureaucracies that are relatively good at preventing serious problems from becoming grounds for war. China will want to flex its military muscle more in the future, but it also wants economic prosperity for the political stability that comes with it. In addition, the United States and its regional partners know how to maintain open dialogue with Beijing while also sustaining vigorous defense alliances. China has enough reason to worry about nuclear weapons and global instability that it will not be totally oblivious to our concerns about proliferating countries such as Iran and North Korea. Conflict with the littoral nations of Japan, the Philippines or Vietnam over disputed seabed resources (like oil in the East China Sea or small islets in the South China Sea) is highly unlikely.

#### -- Many factors check South China Sea war

-- Geography -- ASEAN

-- Shipping Lanes -- Political Costs

Joyner 98 (Chris, Professor of International Relations – Georgetown University, New England Law Review, Spring, Lexis)

Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the Spratlys in the foreseeable future. For one, there is the geography: These islands are scattered over an immense area, nearly 200,000 square kilometers. Considerable room is available for naval patrols to maneuver and miss contact with one another. Relatedly, the Spratlys are more than 300 kilometers (185 miles) from [\*837] the Philippine and Vietnamese coasts, and more than 1000 kilometers (600 miles) from mainland China. This distance presents serious difficulties for any claimant government to patrol more than a small area of the Spratly archipelago at any one time, especially given these states’ relatively weak capabilities for projecting armed forces. No claimant state possesses sufficient logistical support capabilities to ensure effective occupation and maintain extended control over these islands, which underscores the importance of relative naval size. Even so, these conditions presumably should permit greater opportunities for confidence building measures to be considered as alternative strategies. 50 The Cold Wars passing has also fostered a sense of rapprochement throughout Asia, which makes the political costs of a large-scale military conflict in Spratlys less acceptable to the PRC or Taiwan. 51 The dynamic economic expansion of ASEAN counties, increasingly close links with the international community, and strategically significant shipping lanes through the South China Sea -- all converge to dissuade overt attempts by any state, including the PRC, to strive for regional military domination. That the economies of both the PRC and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent with those of Southeast Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.

# Rd. 4 vs. Wayne State JS (EPA Regs)

## 1NC

### 1

#### Will pass, PC key – Obama Pushing

Merica 3/8

[Dan ,CNN, Obama pushes expedited timetable on immigration reform in meeting with faith leaders, 3/8/13, <http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/08/obama-pushes-expedited-timetable-on-immigration-reform-in-meeting-with-faith-leaders/>]

President Barack Obama emphasized the need to get immigration reform accomplished this year in a meeting with a diverse group of faith leaders at the White House on Friday. Religious leaders that attended the meeting said the president spent more than an hour with them, and after making a few remarks at the top of the meeting he let each group discuss their priorities and problems with comprehensive immigration reform. During the discussion, these faith leaders said, Obama made it clear that he wanted to see a bill on immigration reform in the next 60 days. “I really sensed that this is a high priority for him,” Jim Wallis, president of Sojourners, a Christian social justice group, told CNN. “We are all looking at something being introduced this month and then the bill passing in May or June. We are all hoping that kind of time frame could work.” Since winning reelection in 2012, the Obama administration has made it clear that immigration reform is a top priority for the president’s second term – and something they want to see quick action on. According to people who attended the meeting, in attendance, the president reiterated that support and laid out a timetable for the religious leaders. Wallis, who has spearheaded a group of evangelical leaders on immigration reform, said that Obama particularly mentioned the importance of faith leaders in the immigration debate. “He said that while every issue has politics, but on this question, it really was am moral issue to him and he sees the faith community as lifting that up,” Wallis said. “He was really fervent about the role of faith in this debate.” “This was the broadest, most well-rounded group of folks that I have ever met with on this issue,” said Stephan Bauman, the president of World Relief. “And pretty much everyone in the room had a chance to share their opinion on the issue.” In addition to Wallis and Bauman, both evangelical leaders, representatives from the Jewish, Muslim, Mormon and Catholic faiths were in attendance. Bauman and Wallis said this was not only a religiously diverse group, but also politically diverse. The Christian leaders said that politically, the group represented both liberal and conservative political traditions. “This was not a bunch of left-leaning religious groups,” Wallis said. A source who attended the meeting provided the full list of attendees to CNN: Leith Anderson, National Association of Evangelicals Stephan Bauman, President and CEO, World Relief Bishop Minerva Carcaño, United Methodist Church Rev. Luis Cortés, President, Esperanza Barrett Duke, Southern Baptist Convention Bishop Orlando Findlayter, Senior Pastor, New Hope Christian Fellowship Archbishop José Horacio Gomez, Archdiocese of Los Angeles Mark Hetfield, President and CEO, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Rev. Kathryn Lohre, National Council of Churches Imam Mohamed Magid, President, Islamic Society of North America Rev. Samuel Rodriguez, President, National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference Rev. Gabriel Salguero, President, National Latino Evangelical Coalition Dieter Uchtdorf, Second Counselor, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Jim Wallis, President and CEO, Sojourners Cecilia Muñoz, Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council In a statement about the meeting, the White House thanked the religious leaders for their attendance and said the group talked about how they could work to "swiftly pass... a commonsense immigration reform bill." "The President and the leaders discussed the pillars the President has put forward for reform, including that any bill must include a pathway to earned citizenship, as well as measures to crack down on employers who game the system and exploit both American and immigrant workers, continuing to strengthen our border security, and strengthening the legal immigration system for families, employers, and workers," the statement said. At the end of the meeting, the group offered a prayer, according to the White House. Some faith leaders have long called for comprehensive immigration reform, but demand for reform has increased in the last few months. “I think we have a window of opportunity in these first months of 2013,” Richard Land, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, told CNN in January. “I think there is a real, new conversation on immigration reform.”

#### Plan costs capital – it’ll ignite fierce political debates

Travers, 11 (Andrew, “Natural gas industry drilling for people’s hearts and minds”, August 20, Aspen Daily News, http://www.aspendailynews.com/section/home/148663)

Schuller said the biggest remaining challenge is political, and in convincing people that drilling technologies and hydraulic fracturing — known commonly as “fracking” — in their communities is safe. “You can be a passionate environmentalist and a devoted humanist and like natural gas,” she said, “because I am one of those people.” She compared the widespread worries about fracking — well-known to residents of the gas-rich Western Slope — to the concerns that climate change is a hoax. “In the same way that the climate movement has to deal with this unimaginable conflict about people not believing in science, we have to do that in the conversation about hydraulic fracturing,” she said. “And the nature of the conversation is as important as the information ... The public must be willing to hear that it’s safe when it’s demonstrated.” Julander then did his best to make an attractive natural gas pitch to AREDay’s renewable energy-friendly crowd. “With natural gas, combined with renewables and efficiency, we win,” he argued. “We get sustainable, reasonably-priced energy throughout the world, we take away the colonialism of the oil industry, we create an economy that prospers throughout the world in an environmentally-friendly fashion and we beat climate change.” The challenge, he agreed, is to get government leaders to stand with COGA and the oil industry in support of natural gas. “We don’t need nuclear, we don’t need coal, we don’t need anything else,” he said. “We just need the political power.” Pickens interjected a story about meeting the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the U.S. in 2008, shortly after Pickens had announced his plan to use wind and natural gas to supplant imported oil for energy generation in America. He said he told the ambassador his goal was to get the U.S. entirely off of Saudi oil. Friday he told the AREDay crowd that natural gas could do that. “It’s gonna give the United States an opportunity to sit at the big table for energy,” Pickens said. “For the last 20 years we have had no seat at the big table. When OPEC met, they met and we sat in the hall ... Now you can sit at the table and say, ‘Look, we have a resource that can compete with your oil.” That said, Pickens characterized the domestic fight to change the energy consumption and delivery paradigm toward natural gas as “a battle royale.” Wirth said getting different factions of the energy world to collaborate would prove equally difficult. “The coalition has to be a natural gas, solar, wind, efficiency, renewable coalition,” he said. “This is going to be a brutal political battle.” Ritter added that his experience as governor from 2007 to this past January proved both the difficulty and necessity of politicking for natural gas. Ritter said during his time in office he had to balance updating drilling regulations for new technology with promoting clean energy. Hearing local environmental concerns about impacts on ecology and wildlife also is a must, he argued, reminiscent of the ongoing battle over natural gas drilling in the Thompson Divide, located outside of Carbondale. “You have to be engaged in the politics of this, because there are politics involved in waging the clean energy future and making natural gas a part of it,” he said.

#### **Key to heg**

Nye 12. [Joseph S., a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye]

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. **Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the** decline of American power**.**¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation**, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.**¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**, skilled immigrants can be important to** particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely **because the US attracts the best and brightest** from the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting **immigration reform** in his second term, he **will** have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US.

#### Heg prevents great power conflict --- that culminates in extinction.

**Barnett 11** – Thomas P.M. Barnett is Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, March 7th, 2011, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. ¶ As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

### 2

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### The plan changes how energy is produced, rather than restricting how much is produced-voting issue- ruins limits- infinite types of extraction makes it impossible to debate – kills fairness

### 3

#### Energy security militarizes energy – justifies intervention and causes serial policy failure

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Even casual observers will be familiar with the argument that energy is a security issue because it is either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict. Two different strands converge in this logic of energy security. The first strand focuses on energy as an instrument: energy is what states fight their current wars with. We can find here arguments regarding the use of the ‘energy weapon’ by supplier states (Belkin, 2007: 4; Lugar, 2006: 3; Winstone, Bolton & Gore, 2007: 1; Yergin, 2006a: 75); direct substitutions in which energy is viewed as the ‘equivalent of nuclear weapons’ (Morse & Richard, 2002: 2); and rhetorical associations that establish policy associations, as exemplified by the panel ‘Guns and Gas’ during the Transatlantic Conference of the Bucharest NATO Summit. The second strand comes from the literature on resource wars, defined as ‘hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources’ (Victor, 2007: 1). Energy is seen as a primary cause of greatpower conflicts over scarce energy resources (Hamon & Dupuy, 2008; Klare, 2001, 2008). Alternatively, energy is seen as a secondary cause of conflict; here, research has focused on the dynamics through which resource scarcity in general and energy scarcity in particular generate socio-economic, political and environmental conditions such as population movements, internal strife, secessionism and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate and intrastate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 2008; Solana, 2008; see also Dalby, 2004). As is immediately apparent, this logic draws on a classic formulation that states that ‘a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able . . . to maintain them by victory in such a war’ (Lippmann, 1943: 51). The underlying principle of this security logic is survival: not only surviving war, but also a generalized quasi-Darwinian logic of survival that produces wars over energy that are fought with ‘energy weapons’. At work in this framing of the energy domain is therefore a definition of security as ‘the absence of threat to acquired values’ (Wolfers, 1952: 485), more recently reformulated as ‘survival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 27). The defining parameters of this traditional security logic are therefore: (1) an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict (Walt, 1991: 212; Freedman, 1998: 48); and (2) a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security. In the war logic, energy security is derivative of patterns of international politics – often captured under the label ‘geopolitics’ (Aalto & Westphal, 2007: 3) – that lend their supposedly perennial attributes to the domain of energy (Barnes, Jaffe & Morse, 2004; Jaffe & Manning, 1998). The struggle for energy is thus subsumed under the ‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets (Leverett & Noël, 2007). A key effect of this logic is to ‘arrest’ issues usually not associated with war, and thus erase their distinctive characteristics. Even the significance of energy qua energy is abolished by the implacable grammar of conflict: energy becomes a resource like any other, which matters insofar as it affects the distribution of capabilities in the international system. As a result, a series of transpositions affect most of the issues ranked high on the energy security agenda. For example, in the European context, the problem is not necessarily energy (or, more precisely, gas, to avoid the typical reduction performed by such accounts). The problem lies in the ‘geopolitical interests’ of Russia and other supplier states, whose strength becomes inherently threatening (Burrows & Treverton, 2007; Horsley, 2006). Energy security policies become entirely euphemistic, as illustrated for example by statements that equate ‘avoiding energy isolation’ with ‘beating Russia’ (Baran, 2007). Such ‘geopolitical’ understanding of international politics also habituates a distinct vocabulary. Public documents, media reports and academic analyses of energy security are suffused with references to weapons, battles, attack, fear, ransom, blackmail, dominance, superpowers, victims and losers. It is therefore unsurprising that this logic is coterminous with the widely circulating narrative of the ‘new’ Cold War. This lexicon of conflict encourages modulations, reductions and transpositions in the meanings of both energy and security. This is evident at the most fundamental level, structuring encyclopaedic entries (Kohl, 2004) and key policy documents (White House, 2007), where energy security becomes oil security (security modulates energy into oil), which becomes oil geopolitics (oil modulates security into geopolitics). Once security is understood in the grammar of conflict, the complexity of energy is abolished and reduced to the possession of oilfields or gas pipelines. The effect of this modulation is to habituate the war logic of security, and also to create a hierarchy between the three constitutive dimensions of energy security (growth, sustenance and the environment). This hierarchy reflects and at the same time embeds the dominant effect of the war logic, which is the militarization of energy (Russell & Moran, 2008), an argument reminiscent of the debates surrounding the securitization of the environment (Deudney, 1990). It is of course debatable whether this is a new phenomenon. Talk of oil wars has been the subject of prestigious conferences and conspiracy theories alike, and makes the headlines of newspapers around the world. A significant literature has long focused on the relationship between US foreign policy, oil and war (Stokes, 2007; in contrast, see Nye, 1982). The pertinence of this argument cannot be evaluated in this short space, but it is worth noting that it too reduces energy to oil, and in/security to war. The key point is that this logic changes not only the vocabulary of energy security but also its political rationality. As Victor (2008: 9) puts it, this signals ‘the arrival of military planning to the problem of natural resources’ and inspires ‘a logic of hardening, securing and protecting’ in the entire domain of energy. There is, it must be underlined, some resistance to the pull of the logic of war, as attested for example by NATO’s insistence that its focus on energy security ‘will not trigger a classical military response’ (De Hoop Scheffer, 2008: 2). Yet, the same NATO official claims that ‘the global competition for energy and natural resources will re-define the relationship between security and economics’, which hints not only at the potential militarization of energy security policy but also at the hierarchies this will inevitably create. New geographies of insecurity will thus emerge if the relationship between the environment, sustenance and growth is structured by the militarized pursuit of energy (Campbell, 2005: 952; Christophe Paillard in Luft & Paillard, 2007).

#### Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought

Neoclous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debatesand discussionsthat animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 4

#### DOE will block natural gas exports – increased demand means exports hurt “public interest”

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

From the perspective of the U.S. federal government, the issue of implications is viewed in terms of “public interest.” Under existing legislation, exports of natural gas to countries with a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States are, by law, deemed to be in the public interest and authorization is required to be given without modification or delay. Projects looking for authorization to export LNG to countries without an FTA, which account for roughly 96 percent of current global LNG demand, are required to be approved by the Secretary of Energy unless, after public hearing, the Department of Energy finds that such exports are not in the public interest. 80 Although the legal definition of “public interest” is not explicitly given in existing legislation, according to public statements by officials from the Department of Energy, “public interest” includes:

• Adequate domestic natural gas supply;

• Domestic demand for natural gas proposed for export; Economic impacts of exports (on GDP, consumers, and industry); • U.S. energy security; • Job creation; • U.S. balance of trade; • International considerations; • Environmental considerations; • Consistency with DoE’s policy of promoting market competition through free negotiation of trade 81 The first two of these criteria were addressed in Part I. The remainder focus on the various domestic and international implications of U.S. LNG exports. domestic implications The domestic implications of U.S. LNG exports include their impact on natural gas prices, natural gas price volatility, jobs and competitiveness, and on overall energy security. Price of domestic natural Gas The domestic price impact of natural gas exports will be a significant factor in determining whether or not the United States should export LNG. While it is generally acknowledged that a domestic price increase will result from largescale LNG exports, the size of the price increase is the subject of debate, with a number of studies suggesting a range of possible outcomes. The important considerations when analyzing the results and conclusions of the various existing studies are the assumptions and models that are used when making price forecasts. Below are the results and methodologies of five major pricing studies done by the EIA and three consultancies: Deloitte, ICF International, and Navigant Consulting, which published two studies. 2012 Energy information Administration study In January 2012, the EIA published a study entitled “Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets.” 82 The study, conducted at the request of the Office of Fossil Energy of the Department of Energy, analyzed four different export scenarios across four different resource base or economic assumptions to project price responses to LNG exports. In addition to a “baseline” scenario, where no LNG is exported, the EIA model considered four different export scenarios: • A low export/slow growth scenario, where 6 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 1 bcf/day per year; • A low export/rapid growth scenario, where 6 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 3 bcf/day per year; • A high export/slow growth scenario, where 12 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 1 bcf/day per year; • A high export/rapid growth scenario, where 12 bcf/day of LNG is exported, phased in at a rate of 3 bcf/day per year Given the uncertainty over the actual size of the shale gas resource base and the future growth of the U.S. economy, each of these scenarios (both “baseline” and export) were applied to four alternate background cases: • A reference case, based on the EIA’s 2011 Annual Energy Outlook; • A low-shale estimated ultimate recovery (EUR) case, in which shale gas production from new, undrilled wells is 50 percent below the reference case scenario; • A high-shale EUR case, in which shale gas production from new, undrilled wells is 50 percent higher than the reference case; • A high economic growth case, in which U.S. GDP grows at 3.2 percent as opposed to the 2.7 percent assumed in the reference case. Given the range of assumptions, the range of results was unsurprisingly wide. The results range from a 9.6 percent increase (from $3.56 to $3.90/ mcf) in domestic natural gas prices in 2025 due to exports (in the case of high shale gas recovery, low export volumes and a slow rate of export growth) to a 32.5 percent increase (in the case of low shale gas recovery, high export volumes and a high rate of export growth). The percentage premium for domestic natural gas prices in 2025 for each scenario relative to the baseline scenario price estimate is detailed in table 3. In addition to the price premium for exporting natural gas that exists in each case, the EIA study projected a short-term spike in natural gas prices as a result of LNG exports. As figure 7 below illustrates, in 2015, the first year that LNG exports occur, domestic natural gas prices rise rapidly until total export capacity is reached. In the “lowrapid” scenario prices peak in 2016, after the 6 bcf/day of export capacity is built over 2 years; in the “high-slow” scenario, natural gas prices peak in 2026, after the 12 bcf/day of export capacity is built over 12 years. The immediate jump in price becomes more pronounced in the scenarios where LNG export capacity increases quickly. In the “low-rapid” scenario, the price of natural gas peaks at nearly 18 percent above the baseline case; in the “high-rapid” scenario, natural gas prices peak at 36 percent above the baseline case. This price impact is exacerbated in the Low Shale EUR and High Macroeconomic Growth cases, as LNG exports further tighten domestic natural gas markets. In the most extreme example, the high-rapid scenario for exports in a Low Shale EUR case, the price for natural gas peaks at more than 50 percent than the baseline case. 83 There are two factors that should be considered when interpreting the results of this price impact study. The first is the assumption regarding the rate at which LNG could be exported. The results of EIA’s analysis represent an extreme scenario for LNG exports. In the existing LNG market, it is particularly unlikely that either the “low-rapid” or the “high-rapid” scenarios would materialize. The former assumption stipulates that the United States would export 6 bcf/day of LNG by 2016. Given that, at the time of writing, only one facility has been approved to export 2.2 bcf/day to nonFTA countries starting in 2015, it is unlikely that another three plants would be approved and built in such a short time frame. 84 The latter scenario, that the United States would be exporting 12 bcf/ day of LNG by 2018, suggests that in the next several years, the United States would grow from exporting negligible volumes of LNG to having roughly one-third of the global LNG export capacity. Not only would this supply growth outpace growth in global LNG demand, but this capacity addition would also have to compete with roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian-origin LNG that is expected to hit the market around the same time. 85 The second issue is the model’s assumptions for incremental investment in natural gas production as a result of increased export capacity. The spike in price depicted in figure 7 occurs because investment from gas producers lags additional demand. In the model, producers respond to, rather than anticipate, additional demand. For this reason, prices peak once the export capacity is filled, before steadily decreasing. In reality, the expectation of future demand would likely induce gas producers to invest in additional production before incremental demand occurs. As a result, the increase in prices would likely begin earlier and peak at a lower level than suggested by the model. deloitte study An earlier study released in November 2011 from the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions highlighted the producer-response in its model. In addition to finding that LNG exports would produce a smaller increase in gas prices than the EIA report suggests, the Deloitte study points out that “producers can develop more reserves in anticipation of demand growth, such as LNG exports. There will be ample notice and time in advance of the exports to make supplies available.” 86 Using a dynamic model, in which production increased in anticipation of new demand, the Deloitte study found that 6 bcf/day of exports of LNG would result in, on average, a 1.7 percent increase (from $7.09 to $7.21/MMBtu) in the price of natural gas between 2016 and 2035. Further, the Deloitte study noted that there would be regional variations to the increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As most of the proposed liquefaction terminals are expected to be on the Gulf Coast, the price of Henry Hub gas, which is the key benchmark for natural gas from the Gulf Coast, will increase by $0.22/ MMBtu by 2035 as a result of U.S. LNG exports. This is more than double the price increase projected in regions further away from the LNG export terminals. In New York and Illinois, natural gas prices are projected to increase by less than $0.10/MMBtu. This is particularly important in the Northeast, which historically experiences some of the highest natural gas prices in the country, but will benefit from the development and consumption of natural gas from the nearby Marcellus shale play. other studies Three other studies of note have analyzed the price impacts of U.S. LNG exports. In August 2010, Navigant Consulting found that 2 bcf/day of LNG exports would cause a price increase of between 7 and 7.9 percent from 2015 to 2035 relative to a scenario with no gas exports. ICF International found in August 2011 that 6 bcf/day of exports would result in an 11 percent ($0.64/MMBtu) increase in natural gas prices over the same period. 87 More recently, Navigant released another study that analyzed the impact of two separate export scenarios. The first scenario modeled the impact of 3.6 bcf/day of LNG exports from three terminals in North America: Sabine Pass in Louisiana, Kitimat in British Columbia, and Coos Bay in Oregon. The second scenario modeled the impact of 6.6 bcf/day of LNG exports from the three aforementioned export projects and 2 bcf/day of added exports from the Gulf Coast and 1 bcf/day from Maryland. 88 This Navigant study found that 6.6 bcf/day of LNG exports would result in a 6 percent ($0.35/MMBtu) increase in natural gas prices from 2015 to 2035. As with the EIA and Deloitte studies, the results of both Navigant and ICF’s studies must be analyzed in the context of their respective methodologies and assumptions. Navigant’s first study uses a more static supply model, which, unlike dynamic supply models, does not fully take account of the effect that higher prices have on spurring additional production. As a result, it takes a conservative estimate of supply growth potential. The report acknowledges that the price outcomes modeled in its analysis “establish the upper range of impacts that exports […] might have on natural gas prices.” 89 This study also did not factor in the reemergence of the industrial sector as a major consumer of natural gas following the shale gas “revolution.” The study assumes that natural gas consumption by the industrial sector will decline by 0.3% per year to 2035. By contrast, the EIA model assumes that industrial sector demand will increase by roughly 1% per year over the same period. 90 The ICF study factors in various levels of production response from an increase in price. Under its 6 bcf/day export scenario, the price impact ranges from a $0.52/ MMBtu increase in a more responsive drilling activity scenario to a $0.75/MMBtu increase in a less responsive drilling activity scenario. which study is right? Given that these studies forecast natural gas prices two decades into the future, it is difficult to determine which study is most accurate. (table 4 shows a comparison of the price impact forecasts of the various models.) However, policymakers would benefit from having a better understanding of the results that are generated from each report. This includes choosing the most relevant results from each report. For instance, following the release of the EIA study, many commentators were quick to highlight that natural gas prices could increase by more than 50 percent as a result of LNG exports. However, this ignored the assumptions behind this number: it was based on the price of natural gas in one year under the most extreme assumptions of exports and domestic resource base. A more comprehensive analysis should include an assessment of the average price impact from 2015 to 2035. When distinguishing between the various studies, policymakers should identify which assumptions most resemble the existing natural gas market and its likely direction, and which models are most reflective of the complex nature of domestic and global natural gas trade. Assuming realistic volumes of natural gas exports as well as a reasonable supply response by natural gas producers are important considerations. It is important to note that the supply curves in the various studies reflect different interpretations of the economics of marginal production. The Power sector and industrial sector Part I indicated that the power-generation and industrial sectors would account for most of the demand for newly available natural gas resources. As shown above, LNG exports are likely to increase domestic prices of natural gas, suggesting negative consequences for these two competing sectors. In their analyses, both Deloitte and EIA found that the majority—63 percent, according to both studies—of the exported natural gas will come from new production as opposed to displaced consumption from other sectors. By contrast, between 17 and 38 percent of supply of natural gas for export would be met by reduced demand, as higher prices pushes some domestic consumers to use less gas. In the power generation and industrial sectors, the price impacts of LNG exports are likely to have modest impacts. In the power sector, natural gas has historically been used as a back up to coal and nuclear base-load generation. For such gas used at the margin, the increase in electricity prices as a result of LNG exports would be limited by its competitiveness relative to other fuels: as soon as it becomes more expensive than the alternative for back up generation, power producers will substitute away from gas. 91 According to ICF International, a $0.64/MMBtu increase in the price of natural gas would result in an electricity price increase of between $1.66 and $4.97/megawatt-hour (MWh), depending on how often gas is used as the marginal fuel for electricity. Deloitte estimates that the price increase of electricity would not be more than $1.65/MWh. 92 EIA estimates that electricity price impacts will be marginal as well (between $1.40/MWh and $2.90/MWh) except in the “highrapid” export scenario. 93 The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2011 estimates that, without exporting LNG, the average price of electricity (across all fuels) in 2035 will be $92/MWh. 94 In the longer term, natural gas is itself likely to be used for more base-load generation. The rapid increase in shale gas production, coupled with the retirements of as much as 50 gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired electricity due to plant age or inability to adhere to possibly forthcoming EPA regulations is likely to increase the demand for natural gas in the power sector. According to some analysts, the near-term demand caused by the retirements of the oldest and least efficient coal-fired power plants could result in an additional natural gas demand of 2 bcf/day. 95 Given the lack of environmentally and economically viable alternatives, a moderate increase in gas prices is unlikely to result in a large move away from natural gas, although increased costs will be transferred to customers. Natural gas consumption in the power sector has been considered economic at prices much higher than those resulting from LNG exports in even the highest price-impact projections. Even prior to the shale gas “revolution,” when natural gas prices were high, natural gas demand was increasing in the power sector. The EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005— published in a year when average well head prices were over $7/MMBTU—projected that natural gas demand in the electricity sector would increase by 70 percent between 2003 and 2015. 96 Unlike the power sector, which continued to build natural-gas fired generation during a period of increasing gas prices, the industrial sector was negatively affected by growing natural gas import dependence, high gas prices, and gas price volatility. Between 2000 and 2005, the price of natural gas increased by 99 percent and LNG imports more than doubled. 97 By 2005, the ratio of the price of oil to the price of natural gas was approximately 6:1, just below the 7:1 oil-to-gas price ratio at which U.S. petrochemical and plastics producers are globally competitive. 98 That same year Alan Greenspan, then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, noted that because of natural gas price increases “the North American gas-using industry [was] in a weakened competitive position.” 99 Since then the price of natural gas has collapsed. In 2011, the oil-to-natural gas price ratio was more than 24:1. In 2012 it has been even higher. The decline in natural gas prices has galvanized the industrial sector. A joint study by PwC and the National Association for Manufacturers, an industry trade group, found that the development of shale gas could save manufacturers as much as $11.6 billion per year in feedstock costs through 2025. 100 New investments in petrochemical and plastics producing facilities are occurring throughout the East and Southeast, largely predicated on the availability of inexpensive natural gas. Opponents of LNG exports contend that such investments would be deterred in the future as a result of increases in the price of natural gas. However, the evidence suggests that the competitive advantage of U.S. industrial producers relative to its competitors in Western Europe and Asia is not likely to be affected significantly by the projected increase in natural gas prices resulting from LNG exports. As European and many Asian petrochemical producers use oil-based products such as naphtha and fuel oil as feedstock, U.S. companies are more likely to enjoy a significant cost advantage over their overseas competitors. Even a one-third decline in the estimated price of crude oil in 2035 would result in an oil-to-gas ratio of 14:1. 101 There is also the potential for increased exports to help industrial consumers. Ethane, a liquid byproduct of natural gas production at several U.S. gas plays, is the primary feedstock of ethylene, a petrochemical product used to create a wide variety of products. According to a study by the American Chemistry Council, an industry trade body, a 25 percent increase in ethane production would yield a $32.8 billion increase in U.S. chemical production. By providing another market for cheap dry gas, LNG exports will encourage additional production of natural gas liquids (NGL) that are produced in association with dry gas. According to the EIA, ethane production increased by nearly 30 percent between 2009 and 2011 as natural gas production from shale started to grow substantially. Ethane production is now at an alltime high, with more than one million barrels per day of ethane being produced. 102 Increased gas production for exports results in increased production of such natural gas liquids, in which case exports can be seen as providing a benefit to the petrochemical industry. natural gas price volatility A major concern among domestic end users of natural gas is the possibility of an increase in natural gas price volatility resulting from an increase in U.S. LNG exports. As figure 8 demonstrates, the price volatility experienced during the 2000s was the highest the domestic gas market has experienced in the past three decades. The volatility of the natural gas market in the 2000s was largely caused by a tight supply-demand balance. Natural gas demand increased substantially as the U.S. economy grew and natural gas was viewed as environmentally preferable to coal for power generation. This increase in demand coincided with a reduction in domestic supply and an increased reliance on imports. The recent surge in U.S. natural gas production has resulted in less market volatility since 2010. According to EIA, the standard deviation of the price of natural gas (a general statistical indicator of volatility) between 2010 and 2011 was one-third what it was during the 2000s. 103 Potential exports of U.S. LNG concerns some domestic consumers for two principal reasons: greater volatility in domestic natural gas prices; and exposure of domestic natural gas prices to higher international prices resulting in a convergence between low U.S. prices and high international prices. There is an insufficient amount of data and quantitative research on the relationship between do mestic natural gas price volatility and LNG exports. However, certain characteristics of the LNG market are likely to limit volatility. LNG is bound by technical constraints: it must be liquefied and then transported on dedicated tankers before arriving at terminals where a regasification facility must be installed. Liquefaction facilities have capacity limits to how much gas they can turn into LNG. If they are operating at or close-to full capacity, such facilities will have a relatively constant demand for natural gas, therefore an international price or supply shock would have little impact on domestic gas prices. Moreover, unlike oil trading, in which an exporter—theoretically—sells each marginal barrel of production to the highest bidder in the global market, the capacity limit on LNG production and export means that LNG exporters have an infrastructure-limited demand for natural gas leaving the rest of the natural gas for domestic consumption. As most LNG infrastructure facilities are built on a project finance basis and underpinned by long-term contracts, this demand can be anticipated by the market years in advance, reducing the likelihood of volatility. The macroeconomy and jobs The macroeconomic and job implications of LNG exports depend on two principal factors: the gains from trade from exploiting pricing differentials and inefficiencies of the global market; and the employment implications of those gains, higher domestic natural gas prices, and greater domestic natural gas production. The Department of Energy has commissioned a study on both the macroeconomic and employment implications of U.S. LNG exports, which will be released later this year. This study will provide a qualitative assessment of the implications of LNG exports to the U.S. economy and employment. LNG exports are likely to be a net benefit to the U.S. economy, although probably not a significant contributor in terms of total U.S. GDP. Exports of U.S. natural gas will take advantage of the benefits of the existing producer’s surplus resulting from the pricing differentials between the natural gas markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Contractual terms will determine how this surplus is shared between U.S. sellers and foreign buyers. 104 The benefit of this trade will likely outweigh the cost to domestic consumers of the increase in the price of natural gas as most of the natural gas demanded by exports will come from new natural gas production as opposed to displacing existing production from domestic consumers. On the other hand, LNG exports from the United States are likely to put marginal upward pressure on the relative value of the U.S. dollar. In March 2012, Citigroup released a report on North American hydrocarbon production that included a model of the macroeconomic impact of U.S. oil and gas exports. The Citi analysis found that oil and gas exports would cause a nearly two percent decline in the current account deficit by 2020, but that the exchange rate implications would be modest. By 2020, the U.S. dollar would appreciate by between 1.6 and 5.4 percent. 105 The implications of LNG exports on job creation are similarly difficult to quantify. Other than temporary construction jobs created by the need to build liquefaction capacity, pipelines, and other ancillary infrastructure, the operation of the liquefaction facility will likely provide little permanent employment benefit. As outlined in the section on price impacts above, as much of the gas for export will come from new production, rather than the displacement of consumption in other sectors, the negative economic, and therefore jobrelated, effects on those sectors is likely to be limited. Beyond the labor required for additional gas production to satisfy LNG exports, the net impact of LNG exports is likely to be minimal. Further upstream, the job potential may be greater. By increasing domestic natural gas production, employment from additional oil and gas producers will increase, as will the demand for manufacturers of equipment for oil and gas production, gathering, and transportation. domestic energy security Aside from the price impact of potential U.S. LNG exports, a major concern among opponents is that such exports would diminish U.S. “energy security”; that exports would deny the United States of a strategically important resource. The extent to which such concerns are valid depends on several factors, including the size of the domestic resource base, and the liquidity and functionality of global trade. As Part I of this report notes, geological evidence suggests that the volumes of LNG export under consideration would not materially affect the availability of natural gas for the domestic market. Twenty years of LNG exports at the rate of 6 bcf/day, phased in over the course of 6 years, would increase demand by approximately 38 tcf. As presented in Part I, four existing estimates of total technically recoverable shale gas resources range from 687 tcf to 1,842 tcf; therefore, exporting 6 bcf/day of LNG over the course of twenty years would consume between 2 and 5.5 percent of total shale gas resources. While the estimates for shale gas reserves are uncertain, in a scenario where reserves are perceived to be lower than expected, domestic natural gas prices would increase and exports would almost immediately become uneconomic. In the long-term, it is possible that U.S. prices and international prices will converge to the point at which they settle at similar levels. In that case, the United States would have more than adequate import capacity (through bi-directional import/export facilities) to import gas when economic. A further gas-related consideration with regard to energy security is the effects of increased production of associated natural gas with the increasing volumes of U.S. unconventional oil. As the primary energy-security concern for the United States related to oil, the application of fracking and horizontal drilling in oil production is reducing U.S. oil import dependence, while simultaneously producing substantial volumes of natural gas, which, given the relative economics of oil and gas, is effectively delivered at zero (or, in the case of producers who have to invest in equipment to manage flaring and venting, negative) cost. To the extent that associated gas from unconventional oil production is used for LNG export, it can be seen as a consequence of—rather than a threat to—increased U.S. energy security. international implications The international implications of LNG exports from the United States can be divided into pricing, geopolitics, and environment. international Pricing As discussed in Part I, the global LNG market is informally separated into three markets: North America, the Atlantic Basin (mostly Europe), and the Pacific Basin (including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and India). These markets are separated because of important technical differences that impact the pricing structure for LNG in each market. The North American natural gas market is competitive and prices are traded in a transparent and open market. The Atlantic Basin is dominated by European LNG consumers such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Italy, and is a hybrid of a competitive U.K. market that was liberalized in the mid-1990s and a Continental European market that is dominated by oil-linked, take-or-pay contracts. In recent years, the U.K. hub, the National Balancing Point (NBP), has traded at a premium to the U.S. hub, the Henry Hub. The Pacific Basin is a more rigid market that depends heavily on oilindexed contracts that are more expensive than those used in the Atlantic Basin. While they have no central trading hub, the Pacific Basin consumers such as Japan and South Korea (which is implementing its recently-signed free-trade agreement with the United States) currently import LNG based on a pricing formula known informally as the Japan Crude Cocktail, the average price of custom-cleared oil imports into Tokyo. Many Pacific Basin contracts have a built-in price floor and price ceiling depending on the price of oil. 106 Without exporting any natural gas, the U.S. shale gas “revolution” has already had a positive impact on the liquidity of global LNG markets. Many LNG cargoes that were previously destined for gas-thirsty U.S. markets were diverted and served spot demand in both the Atlantic and Pacific Basins. The increased availability of LNG cargoes has helped create a looser LNG market for other consumers (see figure 9). This in turn has helped apply downward pressure to the terms of oillinked contracts resulting in the renegotiation of some contracts, particularly in Europe. Increased availability of LNG cargoes also accelerated a recent trend of increasing reliance of consumers on spot LNG markets. In 2010 short-term and spot contracts represented 19 percent of the total LNG market, up from only a fraction one decade earlier. 107 In this case, increasing demand for spot cargoes indicates that consumers are taking advantage of spot prices that are lower than oilindexed rates. LNG exports will help to sustain market liquidity in what looks to be an increasingly tight LNG market beyond 2015 (see figure 10). Should LNG exports from the United States continue to be permitted, they will add to roughly 10 bcf/day of LNG that is expected to emerge from Australia between 2015 and 2020. Nevertheless, given the projected growth in demand for natural gas in China and India and assuming that some of Japan’s nuclear capacity remains offline, demand for natural gas will outpace the incremental supply. This makes U.S. LNG even more valuable on the international market. Although it will be important to global LNG markets, it is unlikely that the emergence of the United States as an exporter of LNG will change the existing pricing structure overnight. Not only is the market still largely dependent on long-term contracts, the overwhelming majority of new liquefaction capacity emerging in the next decade (largely from Australia) has already been contracted for at oil-indexed rates. 108 The incremental LNG volumes supplied by the United States at floating Henry Hub rates will be small in comparison. But while U.S. LNG will not have a transformational impact, by establishing an alternate lower price for LNG derived through a different market mechanism, U.S. exports may be central in catalyzing future changes in LNG contract structure. As previously mentioned, this impact is already be ing felt in Europe. A number of German utilities have either renegotiated contracts or are seeking arbitration with natural gas suppliers in Norway and Russia. The Atlantic Basin will be a more immediate beneficiary of U.S. LNG exports than the Pacific Basin as many European contracts allow for periodic revisions to the oil-price linkage. 109 In the Pacific Basin this contractual arrangement is not as common and most consumers are tied to their respective oil-linkage formulae for the duration of the contract. 110 Despite the increasing demand following the Fukushima nuclear accident, however, Japanese LNG consumers are actively pursuing new arrangements for LNG contracts. 111 There are other limits to the extent of the impact that U.S. LNG will have on global markets. It is unlikely that many of the LNG export facilities under consideration will reach final investment decision. Instead, it is more probable that U.S. natural gas prices will have rebounded sufficiently to the point that exports are not commercially viable beyond a certain threshold. (figure 11 illustrates the estimated costs of delivering LNG to Japan in 2020.) This threshold, expected by many experts to be roughly 6 bcf/day by 2025, is modest in comparison to the roughly 11 bcf/day of Australian LNG export projects that have reached final investment decision and are expected to be online by 2020. Also, the impact of U.S. LNG exports could be limited by a number of external factors that will have a larger bearing on the future of global LNG prices. For instance, a decision by the Japanese government to phase-out nuclear power would significantly tighten global LNG markets and probably displace any benefit provided by U.S. LNG exports. Conversely, successful and rapid development of China’s shale gas reserves would limit the demand of one of the world’s fastest-growing natural gas consumers. However, to the extent that U.S. LNG exports can help bring about a more globalized pricing structure, they will have economic and geopolitical consequences. Geopolitics A large increase in U.S. LNG exports would have the potential to increase U.S. foreign policy interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific basins. Unlike oil, natural gas has traditionally been an infrastructure-constrained business, giving geographical proximity and political relations between producers and consumers a high level of importance. Issues of “pipeline politics” have been most directly visible in Europe, which relies on Russia for around a third of its gas. Previous disputes between Moscow and Ukraine over pricing have led to major gas shortages in several E.U. countries in the winters (when demand is highest) of both 2006 and 2009. Further disagreements between Moscow and Kiev over the terms of the existing bilateral gas deal have the potential to escalate again, with negative consequences for E.U. consumers. The risk of high reliance on Russian gas has been a principal driver of European energy policy in recent decades. Among central and eastern European states, particularly those formerly aligned with the Soviet Union such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the issue of reliance on imports of Russian gas is a primary energy security concern and has inspired energy policies aimed at diversification of fuel sources for power generation. From the U.S. perspective such Russian influence in the affairs of these democratic nations is an impediment to efforts at political and economic reform. The market power of Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, is evident in these countries. Although they are closer to Russia than other consumers of Russian gas in Western Europe, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe pay higher contract prices for their imports, as they are more reliant on Russian gas as a proportion of their energy mixes. In the larger economies of Western Europe, which consume most of Russia’s exports, there are efforts to diversify their supply of natural gas. The E.U. has formally acknowledged the need to put in place mechanisms to increase supply diversity. These include market liberalization approaches such as rules mandating third-party access to pipeline infrastructure (from which Gazprom is demanding exemption), and commitments to complete a single market for electricity and gas by 2014, and to ensure that no member country is isolated from electricity and gas grids by 2015. 112 Despite these formal efforts, there are several factors retarding the E.U.’s push for a unified effort to reduce dependence on Russian gas. National interest has been given a higher priority than collective, coordinated E.U. energy policy: the gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 probably contributed to the acceptance of the Nord Stream project, which carries gas from Russia into Germany. Germany’s decision to phase out its fleet of nuclear reactors by 2022 will result in far higher reliance on natural gas for the E.U.’s biggest economy. The environmental imperative to reduce carbon emissions—codified in the E.U.’s goal of essentially decarbonizing its power sector by the middle of century—mean that natural gas is being viewed by many as the short-to medium fuel of choice in power generation. Finally, the prospects for European countries to replicate the unconventional gas “revolution” that has resulted in a glut of natural gas in the United States look uncertain. Several countries, including France and the U.K., have encountered stiff public opposition to the techniques used in unconventional gas production, while those countries, such as Poland and Hungary, that have moved ahead with unconventional-gas exploration have generally seen disappointing early results. Collectively, these factors suggest that the prospects for reduced European reliance on Russian gas appear dim. The one factor that has been working to the advantage of advocates of greater European gas diversity has been the increased liquidity of the global LNG market, discussed above. Russia’s dominant position in the European gas market is being eroded by the increased availability of LNG. Qatar’s massive expansion in LNG production in 2008, coupled with the rise in unconventional gas production in the United States as well as a drop in global energy demand due to the global recession, produced a global LNG glut that saw many cargoes intended for the U.S. market diverted into Europe. As mentioned previously, with an abundant source of alternative supply, some European consumers, mainly Gazprom’s closest partners, were able to renegotiate their oil-linked, takeor-pay contracts with Gazprom. As figure 10 illustrates, however, in the wake of the Fukushima natural disaster and nuclear accident in Japan and a return to growth in most industrialized economies, the LNG market is projected to tighten considerably in the short-term, potentially returning market power to Russia. However, there is a second, structural change to the global gas market that may have more lasting effects to Russia’s market power in the European gas market. LNG is one of the fastest growing segments of the energy sector. The growth of the LNG market, both through long-term contract and spot-market sales, is likely to put increasing pressure on incumbent pipeline gas suppliers. A significant addition of U.S. LNG exports will accelerate this trend. In addition to adding to the size of the market, U.S. LNG contracts are likely to be determined on a “floating” basis, with sales terms tied to the price of a U.S. benchmark such as Henry Hub, eroding the power of providers of long-term oil linked contract suppliers such as Russia. While U.S. LNG will not be a direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—the destination of U.S. LNG will be determined according to the terms of individual contracts, the spot-price-determined demand, and the LNG traders that purchase such contracts—the addition of a large, market-based producer will indirectly serve to increase gas supply diversity in Europe, thereby providing European consumers with increased flexibility and market power. Increased LNG exports will provide similar assistance to strategic U.S. allies in the Pacific Basin. By adding supply volumes to the global LNG market, the U.S. will help Japan, Korea, India, and other import-dependent countries in South and East Asia to meet their energy needs. The desire on the part of Pacific Basin countries for the U.S. to become a gas supplier to the region has been underlined by the efforts of the Japanese government, which has attempted to secure a free-trade agreement waiver from the United States to allow exports. As with oil price-linked Russian gas contracts in Eu- rope, U.S. LNG exports linked to a floating Henry Hub benchmark, have the potential to weaken the market power of incumbent LNG providers to Asia, increasing the negotiating power of consumers and decreasing the price. As U.S. foreign policy undergoes a “pivot to Asia,” the ability of the U.S. to provide a degree of increased energy security and pricing relief to LNG importers in the region will be an important economic and strategic asset. Beyond the basin-specific considerations of U.S. LNG exports, they would provide a source of predictable natural gas supply that is relatively free from unexpected production or shipping disruption. With Qatar representing roughly one-third of the global LNG market, a blockade or military intervention in the Strait of Hormuz or a direct attack on Qatar’s liquefaction facilities by Iran would inflict chaos on world energy markets. While the United States government will be unable to physically divert LNG cargoes to specific markets or strategic allies that are most affected (gas allocation will be made by the market players), additional volumes of LNG on the world market will benefit all consumers. international Environmental implications Proposed LNG exports from the United States have encountered domestic opposition on environmental grounds. As outlined in Part I, natural gas production causes greenhouse gas emissions in the upstream production process through leakages, venting, and flaring. The greenhouse gas footprint of shale gas production has been the subject of vigorous debate, with some studies suggesting that methane from the production process leads to shale gas having a higher global warming impact than that of other hydrocarbons including coal. While the methodology underlying such studies has been widely criticized, there is no doubt that leakage and venting of natural gas is a serious negative environmental consequence of natural gas production and transportation: EPA has estimated that worldwide leakages and venting volumes were 3,353.5 bcf in 2010. 113 By contrast, some advocates of U.S. exports of LNG maintain that they have the potential to bring global environmental benefits if they are used to displace more carbon-intensive fuels. According to the IEA, natural gas in general has the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 740 million tonnes in 2035, nearly half of which could be achieved by the displacement of coal in China’s power-generation portfolio. Natural gas—in the form of LNG—also has the potential to displace more carbon-intensive fuels in other major energy users, including across the EU and in Japan, which is being forced to burn more coal and oil-based fuels to make up for the nuclear generation capacity lost in the wake of the Fukushima disaster. In addition to its relatively lower carbon-dioxide footprint, natural gas produces lower emissions of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide nitrogen oxide and other particulates than coal and oil. Natural gas—both in the form of LNG and compressed natural gas—is also being viewed as a potential replacement for oil in the vehicle transportation fleet, with large carbon dioxide abatement potential. 114 However, as discussed in Part I, even the United States with its low gas prices is unlikely to see any significant move toward natural gas vehicles in the absence of government policies; the prospects for such vehicles entering the European or Asian markets, where gas is several times as expensive, are remote. On the other hand, additional volumes of natural gas in the global power generation fleet may also have longer-term detrimental consequences for carbon emissions. According to the IEA, by backing out nuclear and renewable energy generation, natural gas could add 320Mt of carbon dioxide by 2035. 115 Whether U.S. LNG exports contribute to reduced carbon dioxide emissions through the displacement of coal fired power generation or to the crowding out of renewable and nuclear energy in the global energy mix is something of a moot point. According to the IEA, global power generation is projected to exceed 27,000 terawatt hours per year by 2020. 116 Even assuming U.S. exports of 6 bcf/day (on the upper end of the range of expectations), zero losses due to transportation, regasification, and transmission, and a high natural gas power plant efficiency level of 60 percent, such volumes would account for just over one percent of total global power generation. 117 Therefore, although the domestic environmental impacts associated with shale gas extraction may, pending the outcome of further study, prove to be a cause for concern with respect to greenhouse gas emissions, the potential for U.S. LNG exports to make a meaningful impact on global emissions through changes to the global power generation mix is negligible. T his paper has attempted to answer two questions: Are U.S. LNG exports feasible? If so, what are the implications of U.S. LNG exports? **For exports to be feasible, several demand and supply-related conditions need to be met**. On the supply side, adequate resources must be available and their production must be sustainable over the long-term. The regulatory and policy environment will need to accommodate natural gas production to ensure that the resources are developed. The capacity and infrastructure required to enable exports must also be in place. This includes the adequacy of the pipeline and storage network, the availability of shipping capacity, and the availability of equipment for production and qualified engineers. On the demand side, LNG exports will compete with two main other domestic end uses for natural gas: the power-generation sector, and the industrial and petrochemical sector. According to most projections, the U.S. electricity sector will see an increased demand for natural gas as it seeks to comply with policies and regulations aimed at reducing carbon-dioxide emissions and pollutants from the power-generation fleet. Cheaper natural gas in the industrial sector has the potential to lower the cost of petrochemical production and to improve the competitiveness of a range of refining and manufacturing operations. Advocates of natural gas usage in the transportation fleet – particularly in heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) – see it as a way to decrease the country’s dependence on oil, although absent major policy support, this sector is unlikely to represent a significant source of gas demand. For increased U.S. LNG exports to be feasible, they will also need to be competitive with supplies from other sources. The major demand centers that would import U.S. LNG would be Pacific Basin consumers (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and increasingly China and India), and Atlantic Basin consumers, mostly in Europe. The supply and demand balance in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins and, therefore the feasibility for natural gas exports from the United States, depend heavily on the uncertain outlook for international unconventional natural gas production. Recent assessments in countries such as China, India, Ukraine, and Poland indicate that each country has significant domestic shale gas reserves. If these reserves are developed effectively—which is likely to be difficult in the short-term due to a lack of infrastructure, physical capacity, and human capacity—many of these countries would dramatically decrease their import dependence, with negative implications for existing and newcomer LNG exporters. Detailed analysis of the foregoing factors suggests that the exportation of liquefied natural gas from the United States is logistically feasible. Based on current knowledge, the domestic U.S. natural gas resource base is large enough to accommodate the potential increased demand for natural gas from the electricity sector, the industrial sector, the residential and commercial sectors, the transportation sector, and exporters of LNG. Other obstacles to production, including infrastructure, investment, environmental concerns, and human capacity, are likely to be surmountable. Moreover, the current and projected supply and demand fundamentals of the international LNG market are conducive to competitive U.S.-sourced LNG. While LNG exports may be practically feasible, they will be subject to approval by policy makers if they are to happen. In making a determination on the advisability of exports, the federal government will focus on the likely implications of LNG exports: i.e. whether LNG exports are in the “public interest.” The extent of the domestic implications is largely dependent upon the price impact of exports on domestic natural gas prices. While it is clear that domestic natural gas prices will increase if natural gas is exported, most existing analyses indicate that the implications of this price increase are likely to be modest.

#### Currently, inadequate supply of natural gas causes domestic infighting over LNG exports – new, sustainable supply is key to export feasibility

Ebinger et al 12 (Charles, Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, Kevin Massy, Assistant Director of the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, and Govinda Avasarala, Senior Research Assistant in the Energy Security Initiative – Brookings, “Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas,” Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 12-01, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/02%20lng%20exports%20ebinger/0502\_lng\_exports\_ebinger.pdf)

For an increase in U.S. exports of LNG to be considered feasible, there has to be an adequate and sustainable domestic resource base to support it. Natural gas currently accounts for approximately 25 percent of the U.S. primary energy mix.3 While it currently provides only a minority of U.S. gas supply, shale gas production is increasing at a rapid rate: from 2000 to 2006, shale gas production increased by an average annual rate of 17 percent; from 2006 to 2010, production increased by an annual average rate of 48 percent (see Figure 2).4 According to the Energy Information Adminis- tration (EIA), shale gas production in the United States reached 4.87 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2010, or 23 percent of U.S. dry gas production. By 2035, it is estimated that shale gas production will account for 46 percent of total domestic natural gas production. Given the centrality of shale gas to the future of the U.S. gas sector, much of the discussion over potential exports hinges on the prospects for its sustained availability and development. For exports to be feasible, gas from shale and other unconventional sources needs to both offset declines in conventional production and compete with new and incumbent domestic end uses. There have been a number of reports and studies that attempt to identify the total amount of technically recoverable shale gas resources—the volumes of gas retrievable using current technology irrespective of cost—available in the United States. These estimates vary from just under 700 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of shale gas to over 1,800 tcf (see table 1). To put these numbers in context, the United States consumed just over 24 tcf of gas in 2010, suggesting that the estimates for the shale gas resource alone would be enough to satisfy between 25 and 80 years of U.S. domestic demand. The estimates for recoverable shale gas resources also compare with an estimate for total U.S. gas resources (onshore and offshore, including Alaska) of 2,543 tcf. Based on the range of estimates below, shale gas could therefore account for between 29 percent and 52 percent of the total technically recoverable natural gas resource in the United States. In addition to the size of the economically recoverable resources, two other major factors will have an impact on the sustainability of shale gas production: the productivity of shale gas wells; and the demand for the equipment used for shale gas production. The productivity of shale gas wells has been a subject of much recent debate, with some industry observers suggesting that undeveloped wells may prove to be less productive than those developed to date. However, a prominent view among independent experts is that sustainability of shale gas production is not a cause for serious concern, owing to the continued rapid improvement in technologies and production processes.

#### Natural gas demand is closely monitored – perception of the plan triggers the link

Burnes et al 12-7 (John, Lisa Epifani, Curt Moffatt, Janna Chesno, Partner – VanNess Feldman, “DOE Releases LNG Export Study and Requests Public Comment,” VanNess Feldman, 2012, http://www.vnf.com/news-alerts-778.html)

Exports of natural gas, including LNG, must be authorized by DOE’s Office of Fossil Energy. By statute, exports of LNG to FTA nations must be approved “without modification or delay”. By contrast, before approving an application to export LNG to non-FTA nations, DOE must determine that the export is and will remain in the “public interest”. DOE’s primary focus is upon the domestic need for the gas to be exported. In May 2011, DOE conditionally authorized Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC (Sabine Pass) to export LNG to non-FTA nations. The authorization was finalized in August 2012. This remains the only long-term DOE authorization to export LNG from the lower 48 states to non-FTA nations. In the Sabine Pass order, DOE determined that it had a continuing duty to protect the public interest, and announced that it would monitor gas supply/demand conditions in the United States and the world to ensure that the cumulative impacts of the exports authorized in the order and in future orders would not lead to a reduction in the supply of natural gas needed to meet essential domestic needs. DOE also provided notice that it would take any action in the future, including amending or even revoking export authorizations, as appropriate or necessary to protect the public interest.

#### That kills Russia’s influence

Mead 12

Walter Russell Mead, April 25, 2012 (Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest magazine), , The American Interest, North American Shale Gas Gives Russia Serious Headache, <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/04/25/north-american-shale-gas-gives-russia-serious-headache/>

North America’s shale gas boom is chipping away at the market for gas producers like Russia. What’s more, if the United States becomes a gas exporter, Russia’s customers (especially in Europe) could decide to cancel expensive contracts with Gazprom in favor of cheaper American natural gas. “If the US starts exporting LNG to Europe and Asia, it gives [customers there] an argument to renegotiate their prices with Gazprom and Qatar, and they will do it,” says Jean Abiteboul, head of Cheniere supply & marketing. Gazprom supplied 27 percent of Europe’s natural gas in 2011. While American gas is trading below $2 per MMBTU (million British thermal units), Gazprom’s prices are tied to crude oil markets, and its long-term contracts charge customers roughly $13 per MMBTU, says the *FT*. European customers would love to reduce their dependence on Gazprom and start to import American gas. Already Gazprom has had to make concessions to its three biggest customers, and others are increasingly dissatisfied with their contracts. Worse, from Russia’s point of view: evidence that western and central Europe contain substantial shale gas reserves of their own. Fracking is unpopular in thickly populated, eco-friendly Europe, but so are high gas prices. All this ought to give Russia serious heartburn. Eroding Gazprom’s dominance of the European energy market would be a major check on Russian economic growth and political influence.

#### Outweighs Oil

Jack Sharples (Ph.D. Candidate specializing in EU-Russia natural gas relations at the University of Glaslow) 2012 “Russia-EU gas relations: the Russian perspective” http://glasgow.academia.edu/JackSharples/Papers/1596861/Russia-EU\_Gas\_Relations\_The\_Russian\_Perspective

The EU as a strategic market for Gazprom and Russia Gas sales to the EU enable Gazprom to subsidise domestic gas prices Domestic gas sales accounted for 56 percent of Gazprom’s sales by volume, but just 29 percent of total sales by revenue in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011b), meaning that the domestic market was under-represented in Gazprom’s sales revenues. Conversely, gas sales to EU-27accounted for 26 percent of sales by volume, but 44.2 percent of Gazprom’s total sales by revenue in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011b), meaning that the EU is over-represented in Gazprom’s sales revenues. The reason for this imbalance is the difference in price between the destinations of Gazprom’s exports. Gazprom’s official figures divide the destinations of Gazprom’s gas sales into three groups: domestic (i.e. Russian); the Former Soviet Union (FSU); and the ‘far abroad’ (countries beyond the FSU – in this case EU-27 minus the three Baltic states, plus Turkey and Former Yugoslavia). In 2010 Gazprom earned just over 1099.2bn Roubles selling148.1bcm of gas to the ‘far abroad’ at an average price of 9166 Roubles per million cubic metres (mcm). This figure also includes 2.5bcm of LNG exports, mainly to the Far East. Using the ‘far abroad’ average price, gas sales of 130.2bcm to the EU in 2010 would have generated 966bn Roubles for Gazprom. Sales to the Former Soviet Union (including the three Baltic states) amounted to 70.2bcm and earned Gazprom approximately 450.1bn Roubles at an average price of 7039 Roubles per mcm. Finally, Gazprom earned 636.8bn Roubles selling277.3bcm of gas to the domestic Russian market at an average price of 2296.8 Roubles per mcm (Gazprom, 2011b). Thus, the price of gas sold by Gazprom on the domestic Russian market in 2010 was a quarter of that sold to the ‘far abroad’ and a third of that sold to the countries of the Former Soviet Union. The result is that gas sales to the EU are crucial for Gazprom’s ability to sell gas at low prices domestically, and for Gazprom’s ability to invest in new gas production. As Dusseault puts it, Gazprom needs export profits to recoup the losses they make on the Russian market (Dusseault, 2010). Therefore, Gazprom’s gas sales to the EU are crucial not only for Russia’s external energy security, but also for Russia’s internal energy security. The role of energy in Russia’s broader economic and political relations with the EU The EU does not only represent a key market for Russian gas exports. The EU is also Russia’s most important economic and political partner on the international stage. According to the European Commission, the EU-27 accounted for 43 percent of Russian imports and 49 percent of Russian exports in 2010 (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade,2011a, pg. 4), and it is estimated that 75 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Russia comes from EU Member States (European Commission, 2011). For comparison, China is Russia’s second-largest import and export partner, accounting for 18.1 percent of Russia’s imports and 5.3 percent of Russia’s exports (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2011a, pg.6) The extent to which energy forms the basis of this relationship is seen in the fact that, according to EU statistics, ‘mineral fuels’ accounted for around 75 percent of Russia’s exports to the EU in 2010. Of these mineral fuel exports, petroleum and petroleum products accounted for 85 percent and gas 11 percent (Ottens, 2011, pg. 3). In 2010 Russia had a positive trade balance of 68.1bn Euro, based on exports worth 138.6bn Euro, with the EU. Of these exports, oil and petroleum products accounted for 100.5bn Euro, while gas, electricity and coal combined accounted for 19.4bn Euro (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2011a, pg. 10). However, these figures seem to slightly underestimate Russia’s revenues from gas sales in 2010 – Using an exchange rate of 37 to 43 Roubles per Euro (XE,2012), the figure of 966bn Roubles used above should have given Gazprom revenues of 22.5-26.1bn Euro for EU gas sales in 2010. Whilst gas sales are significant in that they represent around a third of Russia’s positive trade balance with the EU, it would clearly be impossible for Russia to maintain a positive trade balance with the EU without oil exports. However, while oil may be more important economically, gas is arguably more important politically. In the context of a more regional market still largely based upon a fixed pipeline network, Russian state control over Gazprom, which has both a monopoly on Russian gas exports and a significant role in EU gas imports, means that gas exports to the EU bring far greater influence and political value to Russia than oil exports

#### EU Dominance key to Russian growth and Stability

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Europe is an unavoidable partner. The European market consumes 90% of Russia's total gas exports and 60% of its crude oil, which make up only 25 and 15% of Europe's total demand, respectively. Russia presently does not have any viable alternative markets remotely equal in size to Europe. Dependence is a two-Way phenomenon. "40% of Russian public money” comes from the sale of oil and gas to Europe, and at least 75% of Russian export revenues are linked to the EU's energy market in general. Without any extant alternative markets to exploit in the near-term, Moscow requires European gas revenues to preserve its own financial solubility.

Energy overshadows other concerns. Paillard believes that while the energy trade has, in the past, been "part of a game of blackmail, lies and fear" between Europe and Russia, its new status as a "**question of life or death for Russian revitalization**" and its importance to Europe's economic growth mean that neither side can afford to use gas supplies as leverage in other international concerns. In Paillard's estimation, Brussels and Moscow both regard issues such as human rights or the Chechen conflict as not being worth risking the energy trade over. Therefore, Russian and the European Union are inextricably bound to one another by their mutual dependence on the energy trade. Russia cannot absorb the financial consequences of interrupting the EU revenue stream, while the European Union cannot do without Russian gas supplies. Europe has few alternative suppliers, and cannot develop alternative energy sources in the near term. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to be able to diversify its economy or target new markets any better than it has in the past.

#### Plan makes Russia a hostile challenger

**Allison and Blackwill, 11** – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI\_final-web.pdf)

Americans often tend to focus on either Russia’s strengths or its weaknesses without seeking an integrated understanding of the real Russia. This is problematic, because it leads to dangerous assumptions about Russia’s motives and conduct. For example, those who focus on Moscow’s strengths frequently see an assertive and dangerous rival without recognizing Russia’s profound insecurity. Conversely, those who concentrate on Russia’s shortcomings see a defeated power ill-prepared to resist American pressure or preferences. While these descriptions are clearly caricatures, views like those described above can produce damaging misjudgments.

Russia is grappling with the contradictions between imperial nostalgia, on the one hand, and the dramatic decline in its power after the Soviet collapse, on the other. The Russian government’s failure to present a credible plan to reverse Russia’s decline or to develop a successful foreign policy strategy that strengthens the country’s international role makes this only more difficult and contributes to a sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, the United States has the opportunity to manage its relations with an evolving Russia in a manner that advances America’s vital national interests. The stakes are high. Russia is more than sufficiently powerful to create a host of costly—and even devastating—problems for the United States if Russian leaders believe that Washington has a hostile, or casual, disregard for Russian national interests and priorities. This is true even though most in Russia’s elite recognize that today’s Russia is not sufficiently strong to challenge American global leadership without the support of other major powers.

#### Causes global war

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Conversely, a Russia relatively weaker to the United States would have less capability to challenge the United States but can provide less assistance for realizing common U.S.-Russian goals. A weaker Russia may also find it harder to control its WMD assets and become vulnerable to external predators not friendly to the United States (e. g.. China and Iran). But in all probability Russia will still have sufficiently strong nuclear forces to ward off external threats. Most worrisome, a Russian leadership that perceived Russia on a slope toward protracted decline might feel compelled to take drastic measures, internally and externally, to reverse its descent. The German Empire, Imperial Japan, and other great powers in the 20th century attempted to reverse their feared decline in ways that helped precipitate disastrous global wars.

**5**

**The United States Federal Government should implement a 15-year tax of $15 per ton of carbon dioxide emissions on electricity generation in the United States.**

**-- Solves the case**

**WG 11** (Wilkinson Group, “Natural Gas Big Winner From Carbon Tax – Reputex Research Report,” 9-11-11, <http://www.wilkinson-group.com.au/featured-news/natural-gas-big-winner-from-carbon-tax-reputex-research-report/>)

MELBOURNE, 27th September, 2011 – RepuTex, a leading carbon analytics firm, today released research into the impact of the proposed **carbon tax** on the Australian power industry from 2011 to 2020. The research found that natural gas generators will be the **big winners** with generation projected to increase by 40% by 2020. Over the same period, RepuTex predict that Australian power industry emissions will drop by 9% (equal to a 5% reduction from 2000 levels) and generation from brown and black coal is expected to reduce by 40% and 20% respectively by 2020. A comprehensive research report of RepuTex’s findings will be made available in a forthcoming research report with Standard & Poor’s. Initial findings were made available today at the Powering Australia conference in Melbourne. According to RepuTex Global Director of Research, John Metzler, the carbon price mechanism will make natural gas pricing more competitive and will increase power generation from cleaner fuels. “Domestic coal prices will gradually fall into line with international pricing, pushing up the long run marginal cost (LRMC) of brown and black coal, and making **gas more attractive**. RepuTex projects that gas output will grow from 14% at current levels, to 43% of total NEM generation by 2020.

**-- Only the CP keeps renewables competitive**

**OEP 12** (Our Energy Policy, “Can We Get It Right on Gas?,” 8-5-12,

http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/can-we-get-it-right-on-gas/)

“A sustained [natural] gas glut could **undermine new investments** in wind, solar, nuclear and energy efficiency systems – which have zero emissions – and thus keep us addicted to fossil fuels for decades,” Friedman writes. He suggests that such a scenario would reduce natural gas’ societal value because the economic and energy security benefits of domestic natural gas come with significant environmental trade-offs, such as climate impact and hydraulic fracturing. To maximize natural gas’ value to society, Friedman argues for “nationally accepted standards for controlling methane leakage, for controlling water used in fracking — where you get it, how you treat the polluted water that comes out from the fracking process and how you protect aquifers — and for ensuring that communities have the right to say no to drilling.” He goes on to say that a carbon tax, which would **raise the price** of natural gas, could raise enough revenue to help pay down the national debt, lower income and corporate taxes, and help make renewables cost-competitive with natural gas.

**-- Stops extinction from resource wars, great power competition, and warming**

**Klarevas 9** (Louis, Professor at the Center for Global Affairs – New York University, “[Securing American Primacy While Tackling Climate Change: Toward a National Strategy of Greengemony](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy_b_393223.html)”, Huffington Post, 12-15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/louis-klarevas/securing-american-primacy\_b\_393223.html)

By not addressing climate change more aggressively and creatively, the United States is squandering an opportunity to secure its global primacy for the next few generations to come. To do this, though, the U.S. must rely on **innovation** to help the world escape the coming **environmental meltdown**. Developing the key technologies that will **save the planet** from global warming will allow the U.S. to outmaneuver potential great power rivals seeking to replace it as the international system's hegemon. But the greening of American strategy must occur soon. The U.S., however, seems to be stuck in time, unable to move beyond oil-centric geo-politics in any meaningful way. Often, the gridlock is portrayed as a partisan difference, with Republicans resisting action and Democrats pleading for action. This, though, is an unfair characterization as there are numerous proactive Republicans and quite a few reticent Democrats. The real divide is instead one between realists and liberals. Students of realpolitik, which still heavily guides American foreign policy, largely discount environmental issues as they are not seen as advancing national interests in a way that generates relative power advantages vis-à-vis the other major powers in the system: Russia, China, Japan, India, and the European Union. Liberals, on the other hand, have recognized that global warming might very well become the greatest challenge ever faced by mankind. As such, their thinking often eschews narrowly defined national interests for the greater global good. This, though, ruffles elected officials whose sworn obligation is, above all, to protect and promote American national interests. What both sides need to understand is that by becoming a lean, mean, green fighting machine, the U.S. can actually bring together liberals and realists to advance a collective interest which benefits every nation, while at the same time, securing America's global primacy well into the future. To do so, the U.S. must re-invent itself as not just your traditional hegemon, but as history's first ever green hegemon. Hegemons are countries that dominate the international system - bailing out other countries in times of global crisis, establishing and maintaining the most important international institutions, and covering the costs that result from free-riding and cheating global obligations. Since 1945, that role has been the purview of the United States. Immediately after World War II, Europe and Asia laid in ruin, the global economy required resuscitation, the countries of the free world needed security guarantees, and the entire system longed for a multilateral forum where global concerns could be addressed. The U.S., emerging the least scathed by the systemic crisis of fascism's rise, stepped up to the challenge and established the postwar (and current) liberal order. But don't let the world "liberal" fool you. While many nations benefited from America's new-found hegemony, the U.S. was driven largely by "realist" selfish national interests. The liberal order first and foremost benefited the U.S. With the U.S. becoming bogged down in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, running a record national debt, and failing to shore up the dollar, the future of American hegemony now seems to be facing a serious contest: potential rivals - acting like sharks smelling blood in the water - wish to challenge the U.S. on a variety of fronts. This has led numerous commentators to forecast the U.S.'s imminent fall from grace. Not all hope is lost however. With the impending systemic crisis of global warming on the horizon, the U.S. again finds itself in a position to address a transnational problem in a way that will benefit both the international community collectively and the U.S. selfishly. The current problem is two-fold. First, the competition for oil is fueling animosities between the major powers. The geopolitics of oil has already emboldened Russia in its 'near abroad' and China in far-off places like Africa and Latin America. As oil is a limited natural resource, a nasty zero-sum contest could be looming on the horizon for the U.S. and its major power rivals - a contest which threatens American primacy and global stability. Second, converting fossil fuels like oil to run national economies is producing irreversible harm in the form of carbon dioxide emissions. So long as the global economy remains oil-dependent, greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Experts are predicting as much as a 60% increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the next twenty-five years. That likely means more devastating water shortages, droughts, forest fires, floods, and storms. In other words, if global competition for access to energy resources does not undermine international security, global warming will. And in either case, oil will be a culprit for the instability. Oil arguably has been the most precious energy resource of the last half-century. But "black gold" is so 20th century. The key resource for this century will be green gold - clean, environmentally-friendly energy like wind, solar, and hydrogen power. Climate change leaves no alternative. And the sooner we realize this, the better off we will be. What Washington must do in order to avoid the traps of petropolitics is to convert the U.S. into the world's first-ever green hegemon. For starters, the federal government must drastically increase investment in energy and environmental research and development (E&E R&D). This will require a serious sacrifice, committing upwards of $40 billion annually to E&E R&D - a far cry from the few billion dollars currently being spent. By promoting a new national project, the U.S. could develop new technologies that will assure it does not drown in a pool of oil. Some solutions are already well known, such as raising fuel standards for automobiles; improving public transportation networks; and expanding nuclear and wind power sources. Others, however, have not progressed much beyond the drawing board: batteries that can store massive amounts of solar (and possibly even wind) power; efficient and cost-effective photovoltaic cells, crop-fuels, and hydrogen-based fuels; and even fusion. Such innovations will not only provide alternatives to oil, they will also give the U.S. an edge in the global competition for hegemony. If the U.S. is able to produce technologies that allow modern, globalized societies to escape the oil trap, those nations will eventually have no choice but to adopt such technologies. And this will give the U.S. a tremendous economic boom, while simultaneously providing it with means of leverage that can be employed to keep potential foes in check.

**- CP Increases Demand and Price of natural gas**

**Kopp 12** (Ray Kopp, RFF senior fellow and director of RFF’s Center for Climate and Electricity Policy, Resources for the Future, “Considering a U.S. Carbon Tax: Frequently Asked Questions,” June 2012,

<http://www.rff.org/centers/climate_and_electricity_policy/Documents/carbon-tax-FAQs.pdf>)

Research suggests that the most significant effect of a **carbon tax** on **electricity generation** technology would be less use of coal and **greater use of natural gas**. If the tax is substantial, natural gas might serve as a bridge to an increased use of non-emitting technologies over time, including renewables and nuclear power. However, a substantial tax might also bring about the widespread introduction of carbon capture and storage technology, which might enable a new wave of investment in coal-fired generation. 14. How might a carbon tax impact the natural gas market? A carbon tax is likely to increase the use of natural gas in the electricity sector because natural gas is the less carbon-intensive fossil fuel. This would **raise natural gas prices**, though recent increases in natural gas production suggest that the change in gas prices would be moderate. Because power plants fueled by renewable and nuclear energy do not emit CO2, natural gas demand may decline relative to demand for these fuels. The net effect depends on the level of a carbon tax. For a relatively low tax, it is likely that natural gas would **replace coal and oil.** As the tax goes higher, natural gas may be increasingly displaced by renewables and nuclear power.

**-- Turns the case – price increase key to industry survival**

**Hutchinson 12** (Robert, Managing Director of the Rocky Mountain Institute, “Booms and Busts, Tulips and Gas,” 6-7-12, <http://blog.rmi.org/blog_booms_busts_tulips_and_gas>)

There is no doubt that unconventional natural gas resources such as shale gas and tight gas, liberated by horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and other technologies, are fundamentally changing the U.S. natural gas supply equation and, over time, maybe that of the rest of the world. We are in a boom yet **spot prices are absurdly low**; below costs in many fields with limited associated liquids (which trade based on oil prices). Many firms say they would not be drilling if they had any choice. So, what’s the deal? Why a boom when the owners of the natural gas supply are not making money (from gas)? A look back to the Netherlands in the early 1600s offers some lessons. Back then, wealthy merchants liked tulips. They were singularly bright colored decorations for their showy houses, in the generally grey world of water and cloud that is the Netherlands. Tulip bulbs saw a significant price spike, at least in the “spot” or “options” portions of the exchange and side deal markets that were set up at the time. The trade—perhaps it was even betting—was widespread enough to attract lawmakers, attempting to structure the markets, which included many players with no intent of taking delivery. Analysts now debate whether this was a full-fledged speculative boom—a national frenzy of trading absurd amounts for single, rare bulbs—or a more rational situation, paying high prices for the unusual (diseased, in fact) bulbs that produced multiple colors but were difficult and slow to propagate—pricey breeding stock, as it were. Fast forward to today, where there are some interesting linkages between tulips and unconventional natural gas. Like the tulip situation, when we look at natural gas it’s important to take into account what is rare—and not rare. Knowledge of fracking is temporarily rare; learning takes time and effort and is fraught with failures, just like in the early years of propagating a handful of fragile tulip bulbs. But as in the tulip case, as the supply and knowledge spreads, the rarity decreases, even if bid up by foreigners eager to take it home. When those wanting into the fracking game—by buying companies with leases and expertise under conditions that encourage continued drilling and production even when not economic—dwindle, then the “knowledge and position grab” stage of getting in on the early special “tulips deal” is over. What happens, then, when next stage, “real” economics take over? For gas, it’s a bit complicated, because many of the shale fields have enough liquids to ensure that, at current **high oil prices**, the gas can temporarily be treated as an afterthought. The **liquids pay** for the well. **Flaring**, seldom seen onshore, **is back** in some fields, as many wells are not yet connected to gas gathering systems and liquids are hauled by truck. This will prolong the supply boom a bit, but it's still not “**real” economics**. Rather, it’s picking off the richest (wettest) plays first, knowing that paying the piper and figuring out how to make money with fewer or less valuable liquids is still to come. Business plans focusing on this strategy abound, so this phase may **continue for a while**. But in due course, the liquids game, like the knowledge grab game, ends too. Real economics will happen. And **gas prices will go up**. No one knows when and how much—yet another **overshoot,** or a more steady market due to the large supply (at decent prices).

### Solvency

#### Repealing EPA regs triggers a massive anti-fracking backlash---collapses the industry

Paul Tullis 12, Bloomberg Businessweek Contributor, 4/18/12, “New EPA Rules Could Prevent 'Fracking' Backlash,” http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-18/new-epa-rules-could-prevent-fracking-backlash

The Environmental Protection Agency on Wednesday released new rules to limit methane emissions from natural gas production, a rare set of regulations that may serve the industry well, even if it cuts into producers’ profit margins.

The new rules seek foremost to cut down on cancer-causing chemicals released during hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.” But the new regulations will have another benefit: They’ll reduce by 25 percent the amount of methane gas that escapes during fracking operations. This is critical, because methane is at the center of a growing debate whether natural gas really is a “cleaner” source of energy than coal.

As fracking has unlocked remote and, until recently, prohibitively expensive reserves of natural gas, the industry has said the risks involved are outweighed by the fact that natural gas has half the climate impact as coal for the same amount of electricity generated. A number of environmental groups have even embraced natural gas as a “bridge fuel” to a renewable energy future. “Over its full cycle of production, distribution, and use, natural gas emits just over half as many greenhouse gas emissions as coal for equivalent energy output,” wrote the Worldwatch Institute last August.

C02 is not the only greenhouse gas, however, and several environmental groups and scientists have begun to question if methane released during fracking operations negates the advantage of less C02.

Natural gas, which is about 80 percent methane, leaks into the atmosphere when it’s extracted, transported, stored, distributed, and processed. Most of the leakage occurs where it’s taken from the ground, and how much gets out at that stage may be greater than previously thought. If the leak rate is high enough, the global warming advantage over coal may be lost. A 2011 Cornell study determined suggested that was already the case; the study was the target of much criticism (pdf), though, for assuming high rates of methane leakage.

Scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], which conducts much of the government’s climate science, then surprised nearly everyone in February when they revealed that air samples from an area of Colorado with a lot of fracking wells contained twice the amount of methane the EPA estimated came from that production method. NOAA’s finding was closer to Cornell’s numbers.

A split has emerged between the industry lobbying group American Petroleum Institute, which opposed the new rule, and gas drillers Southwestern Energy and Devon Energy, which both told Bloomberg News that reducing leakage is worth the investment using existing methods. New technologies to capture leaking methane were the subject of a conference in Denver last week.

Whether or not abiding by the new rule improves the atmosphere, scientists at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) argue that it’s good for business: The lost methane represents wasted revenue for the industry. Moreover, cleaning up the air near fracking drills will be good public relations. “If industry wants to make the case [that it's greener than coal],” says Dan Lashof, a senior scientist at NRDC and director of its climate and clean air program, “then supporting sensible safeguards like these regulations is in their interest.”

#### Gas production is booming, despite the regs

Robert Pirog 12, Specialist in Energy Economics at the Congressional Research Service, and Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy at the CRS, 11/6/12, “Natural Gas in the U.S. Economy: Opportunities for Growth,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42814.pdf

Due to the growth in natural gas production, primarily from shale gas, the United States is benefitting from some of the lowest prices for natural gas in the world and faces the question of how to best use this resource.

Different segments of the U.S. economy have different perspectives on the role natural gas can play. Suppliers, which have become the victims of their own production success, are facing low prices that are forecast to remain low. Some companies that have traditionally produced only natural gas have even turned their attention to oil in order to improve their financial situation. Smaller companies are having a difficult time continuing operations and larger companies, including international companies, have bought into many shale gas assets. Prices have remained low even as consumption has increased, in part, because producers have raised production to meet the demand and because companies have improved efficiency and extraction techniques. Some companies, many with large production operations, have applied for permits to export natural gas. This has raised concerns from consumers of natural gas that domestic prices will rise. The debate regarding exports is ongoing.

Industries that consume natural gas have seen input costs drop, and some have heralded low natural gas prices as the impetus for a manufacturing revolution in the United States. Some companies have begun to make major investments to take advantage of the low natural gas prices, particularly in petrochemicals. Other companies are waiting to see if prices will remain low long enough to warrant major investments in new facilities. Meanwhile, the electric power sector has already seen a transition from coal-fired generation to natural gas. Low natural gas prices are also putting pressure on renewable sources of power generation. However, increases in demand will put upward pressure on natural gas prices.

The transportation sector, the one part of the economy vulnerable to foreign energy supplies, is beginning to explore ways to use more natural gas. Transportation makes up less than 1% of U.S. natural gas consumption and would require billions of dollars in investment to increase that share significantly.

All of the change that has taken place so far has occurred despite environmental concerns and regulatory developments at the state and federal level that might curtail production. Natural gas is a fossil fuel that produces various pollutants, some more than other fossil fuels and some less. Methane, the major component of natural gas, is also a potent greenhouse gas when released without burning. Other environmental concerns focus on water use and disposal in hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas from shale formations.

#### Industry concedes they can comply with the regs

Bob Weinhold 12, MA, has covered environmental health issues for numerous outlets since 1996, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, July 2012, “The Future of Fracking: New Rules Target Air Emissions for Cleaner Natural Gas Production,” Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 120, No. 7, p. a272–a279

The oil and natural gas industry has its own concerns about the new rules but has indicated it can work with them. In a press release issued the day the rules were announced, Howard Feldman, director of regulatory and scientific affairs for the American Petroleum Institute, said, “EPA has made some improvements in the rules that allow our companies to continue reducing emissions while producing the oil and natural gas our country needs.”

#### The regs were revised to only apply starting in 2015

Ronald J. Tenpas 12, partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and co-chairs the environmental and climate change practices, and Charles B. "Chip" Moldenhauer, associate in the firm's energy practice and assists with the representation of electric utilities and other nuclear industry clients on a variety of regulatory and litigation matters before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 7/31/12, “Federal Regulation of Fracking: A Changing Landscape,” <http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publicationID/56e11e09-029c-47da-8536-00f5c201cfce/fuseaction/publication.detail>

On April 17, the EPA issued a final rule regulating the emission of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and certain other pollutants emitted by fracking and equipment used in the upstream and midstream sectors of the oil and gas industry. The rule marks the first time the EPA will regulate air emissions from fracking operations by mandating significant reductions in VOC emissions through the use of "green completions," devices that capture methane and other air emissions that would otherwise escape during well completions. This is the most controversial requirement in the rule. The rule applies to gas wells that are hydraulically fractured or will be refractured after Jan. 1, 2015. Responding to comments on the rule, the EPA noted that it intends "to continue to evaluate the appropriateness of regulating methane with an eye toward taking additional steps if appropriate." Thus, the rule may portend further greenhouse gas regulation of the upstream and midstream oil and gas industry.

#### Industry concedes that solves the entire impact

NYT 12 – New York Times, 4/18/12, “U.S. Caps Emissions in Drilling for Fuel,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/science/earth/epa-caps-emissions-at-gas-and-oil-wells.html?\_r=0#h[]

The agency said that the industry could meet the standards by deploying existing technology, and that nearly half the wells drilled using hydraulic fracturing already had the gas capture equipment, known as “green completions.”

The agency said that once the rule was fully effective, in January 2015, the industry would save $11 million to $19 million a year because drillers would be able to capture and sell the methane that is now burned off, or flared.

Methane is a potent heat-trapping gas, 20 times more powerful in its effect on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. The E.P.A. estimates that capturing methane from thousands of new wells will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by the equivalent of 28 million to 44 million tons a year, making the rule one of the federal government’s largest measures to mitigate climate change.

The American Petroleum Institute, which had lobbied to weaken the proposed rule, said the revised standards issued Wednesday were an improvement over the original proposal. Howard Feldman, the institute’s director of regulatory and scientific affairs, said the industry had already adopted many of the requirements of the new rule and welcomed the delay in its effective date.

“The industry has led efforts to reduce emissions by developing new technologies that were adopted in the rule,” Mr. Feldman said. “E.P.A. has made some improvement in the rules that allow our companies to continue reducing emissions while producing the oil and natural gas our country needs.”

#### Sales of captured commodities offset costs for producers

Bob Weinhold 12, MA, has covered environmental health issues for numerous outlets since 1996, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists, July 2012, “The Future of Fracking: New Rules Target Air Emissions for Cleaner Natural Gas Production,” Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 120, No. 7, p. a272–a279

One company that has been using green completion equipment for more than half a dozen years is Devon Energy, headquartered in Oklahoma City. “It’s the right thing to do,” spokesman Chip Minty says. “It reduces emissions and keeps gas in the pipeline. And [the captured] commodities are just as valuable as any commodity from any well,” with no unusual impurities reducing their value.

**No increase in cost or significant drop in production from EPA rules**

**Heidorn 12** (Richard, analyst for Bloomberg Government, MBA at Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management, “Fracking Emissions Rules: Re-estimating the Costs,” 7-19-12, <http://about.bgov.com/2012/07/19/fracking-emissions-rules-re-estimating-the-costs/>)

The **E**nvironmental **P**rotection **A**gency on April 17 issued regulations on natural gas drilling that it says will not only improve air quality but also increase producer profits. The regulations, which will take full **effect in 2015**, require producers to capture about 90 percent of the volatile organic compounds and methane that can escape into the air as a result of natural gas production using hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. EPA says the rule will cost producers about $170 million a year, but that cost will be more than offset by the sales of the captured methane and natural gas liquids, resulting in a **net gain** of about $15 million a year. The industry, on the other hand, projects net annual compliance cost at more than $2.5 billion. The Bloomberg Government Study, titled “Fracking Emission Rules: EPA, Industry Miss Mark On Costs, Consequences” (subscription required) analyzes available data on the number of wells affected by the rule, compliance costs per well, the volume of fuel captured and the price for which it can be sold. The study finds that the regulation is neither the profit driver EPA claims nor the billion-dollar burden industry has portrayed. The study finds: • The regulations will increase producer costs by $316 million to $511 million a year, or **less than 1 percent** of producer revenues. • Drillers are **already capturing emissions** in geological formations where the volume of methane and liquids makes the capture cost effective. For some wells covered by the new rules, the cost of capture may exceed the incremental revenue from captured fuel. • Producers voluntarily capturing emissions or operating in states that already require capture will face little or **no change** to their operations aside from reporting requirements. Other producers may reduce drilling for new wells as they divert capital now spent on production to complying with the regulations. • The regulations may generate annual revenue of about $383 million for well service providers and more than $125 million in sales for equipment manufacturers.

### Econ

#### Manufacturing high now

Reuters 3/1

[ U.S. Manufacturing Activity Hits 1-1/2 Year High, 3/1/13, http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/03/01/us-manufacturing-activity-hits-1-12-year-high/]

The pace of growth in the U.S. manufacturing sector picked up to its fastest rate in over a year and a half in February as new orders continued to accelerate, an industry report showed on Friday. The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) said its index of national factory activity rose to 54.2 from 53.1 in January, topping economists' forecasts for a pullback to 52.5. It was the highest level since June 2011. A reading above 50 indicates expansion in manufacturing. The sector lost traction in the second half of last year and contracted in November in the wake of the massive storm that hit the U.S. Northeast. The new orders index jumped to 57.8 from 53.3, making for the highest level since April 2011. The gauge of production gained to 57.6 from 53.6, while inventories edged up to 51.5 from 51.

#### No economic challengers – Aging crisis

Zhang 2/20

[Moran, IBTimes, 2/20/13, Asia’s Demographic Peaks Could Spark A US Manufacturing Renaissance <http://www.ibtimes.com/chart-asias-demographic-peaks-could-spark-us-manufacturing-renaissance-1094014>]

China’s working-age population peaked last year, marking the end of a major mobilization of China’s labor surplus into the global economy over the last three decades. In the past China's National Bureau of Statistics has counted anyone between 15 and 64 years old as of working age. That age range is consistent with international convention and China’s own statistical yearbook. But in announcing last year's decline, the NBS adopted a narrower definition: 15- to 59-year-olds. By doing so, it drew early attention to a demographic downturn that will soon apply to 15- to 64-year-olds and to the population as a whole. China’s National Bureau of Statistics said in January that the size of the country’s working-age population shrank for the first time in recent decades, in 2012. By the end of December, China's population between 15 and 59 was 937.27 million, a decrease of 3.45 million from 2011. That represents a major demographic turning point, not just for China, but also for Asia and the world. And this turning point has come three years ahead of schedule, as most demographers had put China’s peak at 2015. “A U.S. manufacturing renaissance looks much more probable if China’s shrinking labor force deters FDI [foreign direct investment] inflows,” said Chua Hak Bin, Southeast Asian economist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, in a note to clients. “Cheap labor may emerge as the next scarce resource in the coming decade, as the labor force starts falling in China and the rest of Northeast Asia.”

#### No escalation

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### If we run out of natural gas, we’ll just switch back to coal

Cicio 07

[Paul Cicio President Industrial Energy Consumers of America June, 2007, <http://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/NationalCoalCouncilPresentation_06.07.07_002.pdf>]

Energy intensive manufacturing in the US is losing competitiveness due to high relative natural gas and electricity costs Problem: Electric generators are consuming large amounts of natural gas –– driving up the price of natural gas and electricity Solution: Greater use of coal for base load power generation and as future source of methane and feedstock for manufacturing.

**-- Economy is resilient**

**Behravesh 06** (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now **strong enough to absorb shocks** that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly **adept at crisis management**, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

**No risk of price spikes – price will stabilize at a sustainable level**

**Dlouhy 12** (Jennifer A., report at Hearst Newspapers, Bachelor of Journalism, Journalism, Political Science at University of Missouri-Columbia, “Natural gas glut a dilemma for Obama,” FuelFix, 7-16-12, <http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/07/16/natural-gas-glut-a-dilemma-for-obama/>)

Energy companies and analysts have argued that current U.S. natural gas prices are unsustainable. It closed Friday at $2.874 per million British thermal units in trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The opposing argument is that exports could cause prices to spike, sending electricity bills upward and jeopardizing a resurgence in domestic manufacturing tied to abundant, cheap natural gas. Manufacturers that use natural gas to fuel their plants and as a building block to make other products were hit hard over the past two decades by volatile swings in prices, which last peaked over $15 in 2005. Because any position risks alienating important constituencies – energy producers and manufacturers as well as voters – few elected officials are pushing the issue. ‘Safer for politicians’ “It’s a lot safer for politicians who don’t want to be on the wrong side to defer it,” said Kevin Book, an analyst with ClearView Energy Partners. Even key stakeholders in the debate are keeping low profiles. Several major energy industry groups have kept mostly quiet, possibly for fear of advocating an export strategy linked to higher prices. Many manufacturers, meanwhile, are wary of visibly opposing energy exports and being painted as free trade foes. Some companies also are torn because their foreign operations could benefit from an influx of cheaper U.S. natural gas. President Barack Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney also have avoided making big pronouncements. Democratic U.S. Rep. Gene Green, whose east Houston district includes several **chemical plants**, says the key is finding a threshold that keeps prices low enough for manufacturers and **high enough** to sustain production levels. “I don’t want our gas prices to get so outrageous as seven years ago, when the chemical industry was transferring jobs to other places,” said Green, who backs case-by-case approvals. “I don’t want to kill the good things we’re doing, but I also know we want to **keep those drillers working**.” Advances in drilling technology have allowed energy companies to extract natural gas from dense rock formations coast to coast and tap what analysts widely describe as a 100-year supply of the fossil fuel. A few congressional critics are pushing for a timeout. Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., has introduced legislation that would halt new natural gas exports until 2025. Markey argues that the domestic natural gas explosion gives the U.S. a major global advantage that would be squandered by exports. “This is our biggest game-changing moment in a generation,” he said. “Low-priced natural gas is driving an American manufacturing renaissance.” Linking U.S. natural gas production with global markets would hamper moves to power more cars and produce more electricity with the gas, Markey said. “Natural gas producers do not want low prices. They want a global natural gas market that maximizes consumer pain domestically in the same way the global oil market does,” Markey added. “That would be painful for American consumers and catastrophic for the fertilizer manufacturers, the chemical and plastic makers, and the steel manufacturers who are relying on low-priced natural gas.” Prices to rise? Many analysts contend natural gas prices are destined to rise even without more exports, as companies scale back production. Bob Ineson, the head of North American natural gas research for IHS CERA, said he anticipates U.S. natural gas prices will rise without exports and stabilize around $3.50 to $4. “The current price environment is **unsustainably low**,” he said, because in some areas, gas costs more to produce than its price. A bipartisan group of lawmakers from areas rich in natural gas drilling warned the Energy Department in a letter earlier this month that if prices **don’t rise**, it could jeopardize **domestic natural gas production** and all of the jobs and **economic activity** tied to it.

**Gas drilling doesn’t create long term growth – Jobs tradeoff**

**Levi 12** (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations “Think Again: The American Energy Boom,” 8-10-12, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom>)

"The U.S. Energy Boom Will Create Millions of New Jobs." Overstated. The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA. It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more **normal economy.** Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. The oil and **gas boom won't change these much**. That's why we should be **skeptical** about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, these will mostly come at **the expense of jobs elsewhere**. That hardly means all the new oil and gas coming online is worthless. In the near term, it can support hundreds of thousands of workers who would otherwise be unemployed. In the long term, it should deliver a boost to the overall U.S. economy, raising GDP by as much as three percentage points, according to my colleague, Citigroup's Daniel Ahn. But we can't drill our way out of America's job crisis. The **numbers just don't add up**.

**Turn – EPA regulations increase manufacturing industry**

**Gowrishankar 12** (Vignesh, PhD in solar cells from Stanford, “EPA's regulations would not be a burden on the natural gas industry, says Bloomberg Government,” 8-1-12, National Resources Defense Council,

<http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/vgowrishankar/epas_regulations_would_not_be.html>)

The report also identifies an important market opportunity in the natural gas industry, which is of immense significance in our stagnant economy. Increased spending on pollution control services would especially be a boon for smaller regional service companies that offer green completions, such as privately held Hughes Specialty Services, a 90-employee company that serves western Oklahoma and eastern Texas, and privately held Cimarron Energy, of Norman, Oklahoma, which serves areas in Pennsylvania, Texas, Colorado and North Dakota. Increased expenditure on green completion (and other) equipment would also drive business for equipment manufacturers, such as privately-owned Process Equipment and Service Co. Inc., of Farmington, New Mexico. Putting aside all this talk of business implications for a moment, let’s not forget the main purpose behind EPA’s regulations – to start to clean up the operations of the natural gas industry. Actually, we really need to be focusing on renewable energy and energy efficiency as central pillars of a sustainable **energy economy**. However, natural gas can be a transitory step towards a truly sustainable energy mix. If produced in an environmentally-responsible manner, natural gas can be cleaner than other fossil fuels due to the fact that it burns cleaner than these other fuels. It may also offer some advantages in this stagnant economy, such as an inexpensive fuel and an avenue for job-creation. But at the very least we need to get it right – there’s no justification for sacrificing our environment and harming our health in our quest for natural gas. The EPA’s regulations begin to ensure protection for these priceless assets. Nonetheless, natural gas is a fossil fuel, and we, as a community, really need to be looking much further towards truly clean energy resources such as renewables and energy efficiency.

**Manufacturing gas demand declining – high wages prevent a renaissance**

**Tverberg 12** (Gail, Editor of The Oil Drum, Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries. She also has a Masters Degree in Mathematics from the University of Illinois, Chicago, 3-23-12, “Why US natural gas prices are so low – Are changes needed?,” Our Finite World, <http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/23/why-us-natural-gas-prices-are-so-low-are-changes-needed/>)

2. Little growth in historical uses. One of the underlying reasons why there is a mismatch between supply and demand is the fact that since 1997, US natural gas consumption has remained close to flat, **regardless of price** (Figure 4, below). With very low prices in 2011, consumption rose by 2.2% in 2011 compared to 2010. Natural gas prices recently have been low enough to compete with coal prices. Even at these low price levels, there has been little increase in **industrial demand**, and **no effect** on residential and commercial usage (for heating of buildings, hot water, and cooking). Industrial demand used to be the largest source of natural gas use, but this has been **trending downward**. Part of this downward trend is likely related to industries **moving overseas** for reasons related to **wages**. (Part may be related to spiking natural gas prices, as well.) Residential and commercial use has not been growing because furnaces have been becoming more efficient, and because more attention is being paid to insulation and other conservation measures.

**Manufacturing not key to the economy**

**Wessel 12** (David Wessel, economics editor of The Wall Street, “Manufacturing Industry Gained Momentum In 2011,” 1-19-12, <http://www.npr.org/2012/01/19/145437593/are-more-u-s-manufacturing-jobs-being-created>)

WESSEL: Well, that's a good question. So basically, factories have added more than 300,000 jobs in the past two years, and that's pretty good news - certainly better than losing jobs. But it would take **two million more jobs** to get manufacturing back to where it was in 2007 before the recession. Factories are managing to produce more without hiring a lot more workers, because they're getting more productive; technology, reorganization, making people work harder, making them work smarter. It's all made for a remarkable surge of productivity. Factories get 40 percent more output out of every out of work today, compared to what they got 10 years ago. MONTAGNE: Still though, if sales keep growing, would factories not hire more? Maybe not as many workers as they had before, but more, and couldn't that be one part of the answer, at least, to the jobs problem? WESSEL: Well, it would definitely be one part, but it's a small part. For all the romance about manufacturing, **we are no longer a manufacturing economy** when it comes to jobs. Only nine percent of the jobs in America today are in manufacturing. It just isn't big enough to put Americans back to work. Even if factory employment doubled, which isn't going to happen, that wouldn't be enough new jobs to put all the 13 million unemployed people back to work. So yes, it's a plus. But no, it's not enough to solve our unemployment problem.

### China

#### Chinese shale is a pipedream – and they don’t model us

Ngo 5/11/12

http://energyinasiablog.com/2012/05/11/3-reasons-why-shale-gas-is-a-pipe-dream-in-china-part1/

Diana Ngo holds a Masters in International Affairs from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland and a Double Bachelors in Political Science and Global Studies from the University of California- Los Angeles (UCLA). As an Energy Analyst with the U.S. Department of Energy- Beijing in the Winter of 2010-2011, Diana directed a project analyzing China’s future energy supply and demand, the country’s current energy security strategies, and potential opportunities for foreign governments and companies. This project was considered by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as a theme for bilateral talks and is now being used as the “China Energy Primer” for the U.S. Department of the State and the U.S. Department of Energy. As the Energy and Environmental Analyst with UNESCO- Bangkok in the Summer of 2010, Diana identified public policy challenges and options to increase energy equity and environmental security to developing countries in Southeast Asia. Her work lead her to speak at the Fifth UNESCO Asia-Pacific School of Ethics Roundtable entitled “Mundialization, Bioethics, and Policy” in Singapore, where her research was well-received by academics, government officials, and climate change experts. Her interest in energy stems from her need to uncover the political, geographical, environmental and diplomatic constraints that limited resources bring to the global economy. While her passion in Asia stems from a lifelong interest in the cultures, languages, and cuisines of the region. Currently living in Beijing, Diana hopes to meet like-minded individuals and explore exciting new opportunities.

3 Reasons Why Shale Gas is a Pipe Dream in China China dreams of energy independence via shale gas, but challenges abound due to geography, infrastructure, and water. In recent years, much attention has been paid to shale gas, an unconventional natural gas that was traditionally found to be too expensive to extract. But with rising fossil fuel costs and technological innovation, the United States has made shale gas into a serious game-changer for the future trade of natural gas around the world. Countries, such as China, are now finding ways to tap into this resource to boost their national energy security. But how accessible is Chinese shale gas and what problems does the production of this unconventional gas face in the People’s Republic of China? n April 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) released estimates on the world’s technically recoverable shale gas reserves. The report garnered mixed reviews as it placed China as the leading holder of shale gas reserves in the world with “36 trillion cubic meters,” while the United States followed closely behind at “23.4 trillion cubic meters.” But can China actually dominate the shale gas market? EIA’s claims were unfounded as China was only beginning to identify and explore domestic shale rock basins. Since then, however, Beijing has been able to suggest that 2 out of the country’s 7 shale rock basins (Tarim and Sichuan Basins) could be commercially produced. With the help of joint ventures with BP (Sinopec), Total (CNPC), and Royal Dutch Shell (PetroChina), China began exploratory drilling in Sichuan in 2010. These joint ventures have found “major shale gas reserves in… [the]western Sichuan region” and have helped Chinese energy companies practice shale gas technologies. More importantly, these initial drillings have helped the government, specifically the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), survey China’s actual recoverable shale gas reserves. MLR now believes China holds “25 trillion cubic meters” of exploitable onshore shale gas. This is 11 trillion cubic meters less than the estimate EIA had proposed earlier, dropping China’s abilty to meet demand (at current rate of consumption) from about 400 to 300 years. Difficulties in Commercially Developing Shale Gas in China Faced with criticism to reduce carbon emission and reduce dependence on foreign fossil fuels, the Chinese government is set to move ahead with shale gas exploration and production. Earlier this year, the government has set targets for “developing 6.5 bcm of shale gas per year by 2015” and moving exponentially “up to 60-100 bcm by 2020.” However, are these targets practical? More important, what difficulties does China face in making shale gas commercially available in the near future? Difficulties in Geography The production of shale gas is technologically challenging since “water, sand, and chemicals” are used to blast deep into wells to allow shale gas to come to the surface. This technology, also known as hydraulic fracking, is the key element that has drastically changed the unconventional natural gas industry in the U.S. However, unlike the U.S., China’s shale rock is much more geographically challenging. Chinese shale gas is found in much rougher terrain and is found much deeper underground than American shale gas. American shale gas can be typically found within “two to six kilometers deep, whereas in China some key deposits are found six kilometers deep.” To developers, this means that experiences learned in the U.S. may not be readily applied to China as the geographical challenge will require more experienced personnel, additional equipment, technological innovation, and increased costs. This will be especially the case when exploring and developing Sichuan Province, an area prone to earthquakes. The quality of the shale rock and gas in China is also different than the U.S. The shale rock, for instance, is “non-marine” and contains much larger amounts of clay than its North American counterpart. This means that it is “more difficult to be fractured” and will require much more energy and highly skilled human capital to produce the same amount of gas. Chinese shale gas is also inferior to American shale as it contains much more “non-hydrocarbon gasses.” The lower quality gas may be costly in the long-term as China may be forced to develop ways in which to refine the gas into a more usable state. Lack of Infrastructure Many of China’s shale gas reserves are located in rural areas that lack basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, electricity, and gas pipelines. Without these transportation features, each level of shale gas development will be stalled. For example, without substantial roads, developers will be unable to carry in the necessary vehicles, sand, chemicals, and steel needed to create exploratory wells. China also faces a bottleneck in transporting shale gas as the country lacks an extensive gas pipeline network. More pipelines or liquefied natural gas centers will need to be built near shale gas wells in order to make the unconventional gas more commercially viable. In addition, China will need to adopt or develop infrastructure that can safely dispose of the contaminated material used to “frack” the shale rock. This will protect the environment, as well as help reclaim land that was used to drill into the earth. These factors are important as they will reduce costs caused by environmental damage and the chances of earthquakes occurring in the future. Moreover, these precautionary steps will also help China exponentially speed up their well development timeline (PetroChina took 11 months to complete the country’s first horizontal well). Water Shortages and Suitability One of the larger problems facing shale gas development in China is the shortage of water. Water is a necessary component in the process of hydraulic fracking, with no other alternative at the moment. In shale gas rich Sichuan Basin, this is of extreme concern due to the region’s agricultural heritage which provides the country with about “7 percent of China’s rice, wheat, and other grains.” Diverting water from the agricultural sector to shale gas could be devastating, especially if the contaminated water also contaminates China’s farmlands. For other shale gas basins in Tarim, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, water shortage is a real challenge due to the arid and hot climate. Shale gas development will require water to be transported from other parts of the country, a feat that is expensive as it is momentarily impossible.

#### Europe solves

Zhang, Analyst, International Market & Strategy Analysis Group, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, June 2010

(Yue, “The Shale Gas Boom Shift to China,” http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3179.pdf)

Besides the US, recently, **European majors** seeing shale gas exploration positively **are** also **working** together **actively in Chinese companies to develop shale** gas reserves **in China**. After Shell and PetroChina signed an agreement on shale gas development in the Sichuan area last December, since the beginning of this year, **BP and Sinopec have been discussing developing shale** gas reserves **in Guizhou** province **and Jiangsu** province as well.

#### No China-Russia war

Spears, chief foreign policy writer – Brooks Foreign Policy Review, 5/1/’9

(Collin, <http://brooksreview.wordpress.com/2009/05/01/leery-bear-rising-dragon-life-along-the-sino-russian-border/>)

Although China is facing water shortages and will need inordinate amounts of resources to keep its economy growing, there is no evidence the Chinese government is purposefully moving “settler populations” into Russia to prepare for impending annexation of the Far East or Siberia. In addition, China has shown no interest in territorial expansion since the Qing Dynasty. For the last decade, China’s primary interest has been to secure a stable border to its West and North, where it can gain access to energy supplies and expand its political and economic reach into East and Southeast Asia. Any move at colonization by China could result in a very destruction war that could become nuclear. In fact**,** Russia’s vast nuclear deterrent is its security guarantee for the region, as China has proved to be a rational actor.

#### No CCP collapse—the government represses instability

Pei 9(Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12. “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis)

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

#### Chinese economic growth strong now – World Bank GDP projections, no signs of hard landing

Rapoza 12/19/12 (Kenneth, Forbes, "China Economy Better Than Expected," http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2012/12/19/china-economy-better-than-expected/)

The world’s No. 2 economy is better than early forecasts have suggested. On Wednesday, the World Bank upped the ante for China GDP, saying it would grow at 8.4 percent instead of their previous forecast of 8.1 percent.¶ “China’s economy has been slowed by weak exports and the government’s efforts to cool down the overheating housing sector, but the recovery has set in the final months of this year,” the bank said today in its East Asia and Pacific Economic Update.¶ The World Bank said the challenge in the short term was to sustain growth through a soft landing, with the longer-term challenge to steer the economy toward a more sustainable path.¶ China’s gross domestic product grew 7.4 percent in the third quarter, the slowest pace in more than three years. Some investors and commentators have suggested that a mix of over spending on behalf of the government, and a housing bubble would eventually pull the rug out from the Chinese economy. But that hard landing theory has not come to pass. Most large investment banks believe that while China will no longer be a double digit growth economy, it is far from crash landing.¶ China’s leaders have been calling for sustainable growth of around 7 percent nominally, with real growth rates of around 5 percent.¶ The World Bank report said that Asia remains a bright spot in the world economy, and not just China.

#### No impact to the Chinese economy and the CCP solves econ collapse

Coonan ‘8 (10/25, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe worried,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html)

All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn. The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold. It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.

#### No china war

Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)

While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players, and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies, including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now, since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological commitment to national security.

### Methane

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves the impact to ANY warming

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Methane hydrates don’t reach the atmosphere – no impact

Kvenolden 99 (Keith A. – USGS, “Potential Effects of Gas Hydrate on Human Welfare”, 1999, JSTOR)

For almost 30 years. serious interest has been directed toward natural gas hydrate, a crystalline solid composed of water and methane, as a potential (i) energy resource, (ii) factor in global climate change, and (Wi) submarine geohazard. Although each of these issues can affect human welfare, only (iii) is considered to be of immediate importance. Assessments of gas hydrate as an energy resource have often been overly optimistic, based in part on its very high methane content and on its worldwide occurrence in continental margins. Although these attributes are attractive, geologic settings, reservoir properties, and phase-equilibria considerations diminish the energy resource potential of natural gas hydrate. The possible role of gas hydrate in global climate change has been often overstated. Although methane is a "greenhouse" gas in the atmosphere, much methane from dissociated gas hydrate may never reach the atmosphere, but rather may be converted to carbon dioxide and sequestered by the hydrosphere/biosphere before reaching the atmosphere. Thus, methane from gas hydrate may have little opportunity to affect global climate change. However, submarine geohazards (such as sediment instabilities and slope failures on local and regional scales, leading to debris flows, slumps, slides, and possible tsunamis) caused by gas-hydrate dissociation are of immediate and increasing importance as humankind moves to exploit seabed resources in ever-deepening waters of coastal oceans. The vulnerability of gas hydrate to temperature and sea level changes enhances the instability of deep-water oceanic sediments, and thus human activities and installations in this setting can be affected.

**EPA Regulations are key to stop air pollution and methane release, impact is extinction**

**Doniger 12** (David, Policy Director, Climate and Clean Air Program, National Resources Defense Council, “Separating Fracked From Fiction: The Truth About the American Petroleum Institute's Attacks on EPA's New Air Pollution Standards For Natural Gas Fracking,” 4-9-12, <http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/separating_fracked_from_fictio.html>)

These important public health safeguards are now under final review by the White House Office of Management and Budget and must be issued by April 17th under a court-ordered deadline obtained by two western environmental groups, WildEarth Guardians and the San Juan Citizens Alliance. NRDC has been working hard, along with partner organizations, for the strongest protections from the soup of dangerous air pollutants coming from these wells and associated oil and gas production operations. But the standards are under attack from the American Petroleum Institute and other powerful industry lobbyists. Fracking produces a lot of natural gas, but also a host of air and water contaminants. Millions of Americans are exposed, and they need national standards to protect their health and their surroundings. These standards are an important start on delivering the air pollution safeguards they deserve. Fracked wells and other oil and gas production and processing sources release millions of tons of air pollution – including benzene that causes cancer, volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that form the ozone smog that triggers asthma attacks, and **methane** that contributes to climate change. These air pollutants are a clear and present **danger to our** children, our communities and our **planet**. The EPA standards will be an **important start** – cutting the sector’s VOCs and methane pollution by about 25 percent and air toxics emissions by about 30 percent.

#### EPA air pollution regs are key to solve methane leakage---repealing them locks in catastrophic warming tipping points

Robert W. Howarth et al 12, the David R. Atkinson Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology at Cornell University, February 2012, “Venting and leaking of methane from shale gas development: response to Cathles et al.,” Climatic Change, DOI 10.1007/s10584-012-0401-0

In July 2011, EPA (2011b, e) proposed new regulations to reduce emissions during flowback. The proposed regulation is aimed at reducing ozone and other local air pollution, but would also reduce methane emissions. EPA (2011b, e) estimates the regulation would reduce flowback methane emissions from shale gas wells by up to 95%, although gas capture would only be required for wells where collector pipelines are already in place, which is often not the case when new sites are developed. Nonetheless, this is a very important step, and if the regulation is adopted and can be adequately enforced, will reduce greatly the difference in emissions between shale gas and conventional gas in the U.S. We urge universal adoption of gas-capture policies.

To summarize, most studies conclude that methane emissions from shale gas are far higher than from conventional gas: approximately 40% higher, according to Skone et al. (2011) and using the mean values from Howarth et al. (2011), and approximately 60% higher using the estimates from EPA (2011a) and Hultman et al. (2011). Cathles et al. assertion that shale gas emissions are no higher seems implausible to us. The suggestion by Burnham et al. (2011) that shale gas methane emissions are less than for conventional gas seems even less plausible (see Electronic Supplementary Materials).

4 Time frame and global warming potential of methane

Methane is a far more powerful GHG than carbon dioxide, although the residence time for methane in the atmosphere is much shorter. Consequently, the time frame for comparing methane and carbon dioxide is critical. In Howarth et al. (2011), we equally presented two time frames, the 20 and 100 years integrated time after emission, using the global warming potential (GWP) approach. Note that GWPs for methane have only been estimated at time scales of 20, 100, and 500 years, and so GHG analyses that compare methane and carbon dioxide on other time scales require a more complicated atmospheric modeling approach, such as that used by Hayhoe et al. (2002) and Wigley (2011). The GWP approach we follow is quite commonly used in GHG lifecycle analyses, sometimes considering both 20-year and 100-year time frames as we did (Lelieveld et al. 2005; Hultman et al. 2011), but quite commonly using only the 100-year time frame (Jamarillo et al. 2007; Jiang et al. 2011; Fulton et al. 2011; Skone et al. 2011; Burnham et al. 2011). Cathles et al. state that a comparison based on the 20-year GWP is inappropriate, and criticize us for having done so. We very strongly disagree.

Considering methane’s global-warming effects at the decadal time scale is critical (Fig. 2). Hansen et al. (2007) stressed the need for immediate control of methane to avoid critical tipping points in the Earth’s climate system, particularly since methane release from permafrost becomes increasingly likely as global temperature exceeds 1.8°C above the baseline average temperature between 1890 and 1910 (Hansen and Sato 2004; Hansen et al. 2007). This could lead to a rapidly accelerating positive feedback of further global warming (Zimov et al. 2006; Walter et al. 2007). Shindell et al. (2012) and a recent United Nations study both conclude that this 1.8°C threshold may be reached within 30 years unless societies take urgent action to reduce the emissions of methane and other short-lived greenhouse gases now (UNEP/WMO 2011). The reports predict that the lower bound for the danger zone for a temperature increase leading to climate tipping points – a 1.5°C increase – will occur within the next 18 years or even less if emissions of methane and other short-lived radiatively active substances such as black carbon are not better controlled, beginning immediately (Fig. 2) (Shindell et al. 2012; UNEP/WMO 2011).

#### Gas doesn’t displace coal---other factors caused coal to decline---if gas hadn’t filled in, renewables would have

Shakeb Afsah 12, the President and CEO of CO2 Scorecard, and Kendyl Salcito, Policy Communications Specialist for the CO2 Scorecard, 8/7/12, “Shale Gas And The Overhyping Of Its CO2 Reductions,” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/07/651821/shale-gas-and-the-fairy-tale-of-its-co2-reductions/

Between 2006 and 2011, America’s electricity generation mix changed dramatically. Though the US increased its electrical output by 41 million MWh, electricity generated from coal and petroleum dropped by a total of 292 million MWh (256 million shed from coal and 36 million from oil—EIA 2012A). Meanwhile, natural gas generation increased by 200 million MWh – a major gain but not enough to cover the loss from coal and petroleum, let alone the additional 41 million MWh generated over the period (Exhibit-2).

Natural gas doesn’t account for all of the reductions in coal- and petroleum-fueled electricity, but we take industry experts at their word that low shale gas prices helped fuel the shift. To quantify the price effect, we need an empirical estimate of the short-run elasticity of fuel substitution, which is provided by a recent EIA analysis (EIA 2012B). The analysis estimates that a 1% increase in the ratio of the delivered fuel price of coal to the delivered price of natural gas to power plants leads to an average 0.14% increase in the fuel input ratio of natural gas to coal. Short-run elasticity is appropriate for the analysis because most of the switch from coal to gas is expected to utilize the existing capacity of gas-fired units (Kaplan 2010; see data notes 1 & 2).

During the shale gas boom, the price of coal increased 109% relative to the price of natural gas (Exhibit-3). This relative price effect would increase the ratio of gas to coal use by around 15% if the EIA’s methodology and elasticities are used (supplemental Exhibit-S1). That 15% translates to an increase in the predicted fuel input ratio of gas to coal from 0.31 to 0.36 over those five years. This is equivalent to a shift of around 728,790 billion BTU shift in energy generation from coal to natural gas (Appendix-1 and data note #3). Natural gas power plants need on average 8,185 BTU to generate one KWh of electricity (EIA 2011). Therefore, 728,790 billion BTU will translate into an average displacement of around 89 million MWh of electricity from coal to natural gas. This quantity, it turns out, accounts for just around 35% of the total electricity generation shed by coal. If the replacement is entirely through natural gas combined cycle units this number will increase to 37% (data note #4).

Petroleum-to-coal displacement: As expected, the EIA study found that petroleum to natural gas switching is equally responsive to the relative price changes. The EIA report states that fuel switching between petroleum and gas is quite common and well established, specifically in the peak and intermediate load ranges—hence factors of production are already well adjusted. It is therefore appropriate to use long-run cross price elasticity of substitution, which gives an estimate of 19 million MWh of electricity from petroleum that shifted to natural gas (Appendix-2). EIA data shows that petroleum based generation fell by 36 million MWh—indicating that more than half of oil was replaced by natural gas. This is not surprising, because the relative price of petroleum to natural gas increased by more than 200% during the period 2006 to 2011.

Further accounting of displaced coal

If only 89 million MWh (35%) from coal was displaced by natural gas due to the relative price advantage, how do we account for the remaining 167 million MWh that coal lost during the period of the shale gas boom?

Stephen Lacey of Climate Progress (Lacey 2012) and David Roberts of Grist (Roberts 2012A) have put forth seven factors that are together shutting down coal generation—two are the respective prices of coal and gas, as calculated above. The remaining 167 million MWh (65%) that coal lost during the period of the shale gas boom was due to Roberts’ and Lacey’s other five factors— (1) regulations, (2) energy efficiency/demand management, (3) improving cost-competitiveness of renewables, (4) recession and (5) NGO campaigns.

Where the low price of natural gas failed to fill the void left by coal, the other five factors show their significance. Renewables filled in about 120 million MWh of the coal generation gap—with wind accounting for around 82 million (Appendix-3). These non-carbon sources typically don’t have much price advantage over coal, yet they account for 46% of its replacement. This gives some indication of the impacts of clean energy programs like production and investment tax credit (PTC & ITC), state level Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and the increasing cost competiveness of wind. Nuclear supplied around 2 million MWh.

Gas stepped in to fill up the remaining 48 million MWh (~19%) of power shed by coal—but it’s not appropriate to say it “displaced” coal; rather it “replaced” coal which was “displaced” by other non-price factors (Exhibit-4). That 48 million MWh of electricity was not going to be generated by coal, regardless of the price differential with gas. If gas were not excessively cheap, it is quite likely that some of this 48 million MWh would have come from renewables.

#### Natural gas can’t serve as a bridge fuel---crowds out renewables

Jesse Jenkins And Alex Trembath 12 are Director and Policy Associate, respectively, with the Breakthrough Institute's Energy and Climate Program. January 19, 2012 6:21 PM 9 agree Submit Avoiding a Natural Gas Bridge to Nowhere By Jesse Jenkins Director of Energy and Climate Policy, Breakthrough Institute By Jesse Jenkins and Alex Trembath <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/01/whats-ahead-for-natural-gas.php>

Cheap gas simultaneously puts pressure on higher-cost nuclear, wind, and solar energy, however. If cheap gas leads to complacency in the development of sustainable, low-carbon electricity sources, today’s gas boon may become tomorrow’s curse, as natural gas eclipses not only coal, but also cleaner, carbon-free energy sources. An increasingly dominant role for natural gas in America’s energy mix also exposes the United States to the inherent volatility of natural gas markets. As a gas, methane flows much faster from wells than crude oil. Natural gas wells thus produce and deplete quite rapidly, with roughly 50 percent of a typical well’s lifetime production expended in the first three or four years. This basic dynamic of rapid production and depletion often leads to a boom-bust cycle in markets, as anyone observing North American natural gas markets over the past half century can attest. If North America begins to export large quantities of natural gas, this inherent volatility will only be exacerbated. The future of natural gas is unlikely to part with this history of boom and bust – unless the United States once again commits to long-term investment in the development of affordable, clean, domestic energy technologies. Without significant and strategic investments in next-generation solar, wind, nuclear, and electric vehicles, there’s every reason to believe the natural gas revolution will continue and gas will ultimately become an increasingly dominant share of the U.S. energy supply. The result will likely be near-term declines in CO2 and pollutants along with growing reliance on another volatile and increasingly costly fossil energy source. The shale gas “bridge fuel” may well become a bridge to nowhere. If instead the United States makes smart, sustained investments in clean energy R&D, demonstration, manufacturing, and infrastructure, there’s no reason to believe America can’t continue to unlock even greater supplies of cleaner, cheaper, domestic energy technologies, from next-generation solar to advanced nuclear reactors. In short, America’s energy future, just like its past, depends on our willingness to invest in innovation.

**Warming is slowing – ocean currents**

**Science Daily 8** (“Will Global Warming Take A Short Break? Improved Climate Predictions Suggest A Reduced Warming Trend During The Next 10 Years”, 5-5, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/05/080502113749.htm)

To date climate change projections, as published in the last IPCC report, only considered changes in future atmospheric composition. This strategy is appropriate for long-term changes in climate such as predictions for the end of the century. However, in order to predict short-term developments over the next decade, models need additional information on natural climate variations, in particular associated with **ocean currents**. Lack of sufficient data has hampered such predictions in the past. Scientists at IFM-GEOMAR and from the MPI for Meteorology have developed a method to derive ocean currents from measurements of sea surface temperature (SST). The latter are available in good quality and global coverage at least for the past 50 years. With this additional information, natural decadal climate variations, which are superimposed on the long-term anthropogenic warming trend, can be predicted. The improved predictions suggest that global **warming will weaken** slightly during the **following 10 years.** “Just to make things clear: we are not stating that anthropogenic climate change won’t be as bad as previously thought”, explains Prof. Mojib Latif from IFM-GEOMAR. “What we are saying is that on top of the warming trend there is a long-periodic oscillation that will probably lead to a to a **lower temperature increase** than we would expect from the current trend during the next years”, adds Latif. “That is like driving from the coast to a mountainous area and crossing some hills and valleys before you reach the top”, explains Dr. Johann Jungclaus from the MPI for Meteorology. “In some years trends of both phenomena, the anthropogenic climate change and the natural decadal variation will add leading to a much stronger temperature rise.”

**Plan causes warming— Extraction releases methane**

**Romm 11** (Joe, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, “Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100,” 9-9-11 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/09/09/315845/natural-gas-switching-from-coal-to-gas-increases-warming-for-decades/>)

A key finding of the NCAR study is: In summary, our results show that the substitution of gas for coal as an energy source results **in increased** rather than decreased **global warming** for many decades — out to the mid 22nd century for the 10% leakage case. This is in accord with Hayhoe et al. (2002) and with the less well established claims of Howarth et al. (2011) who base their analysis on Global Warming Potentials rather than direct modeling of the climate…. The most important result, however, in accord with the above authors, is that, unless leakage rates for new methane can be kept below 2%, substituting gas for coal is not an effective means for reducing the magnitude of future climate change. What is the leakage rate for methane? Well, as I’ve written, we don’t know exactly because the gas companies won’t release all of their data. We do know that total life-cycle leakage and fugitive emissions from extraction, production, transport, and consumption is higher for shale gas than conventional gas. The controversial — but peer-reviewed — paper by Cornell’s Robert Howarth, which I wrote about here, seeks to quantify the impact of the leakage from the **best available data**. It **concluded**: Natural gas is composed largely of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas production escapes to the atmosphere in venting and leaks over the life-time of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at the time wells are hydraulically fractured — as methane escapes from flow-back return fluids — and during drill out following the fracturing. Methane is a **powerful greenhouse gas**, with a global warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following emission.

**Coal switch ineffective – even with the plan natural gas prices rise enough to make coal competitive**

**NGI 12** (Natural Gas Intelligence, Shale Daily, “EIA Says Shale Driving Natural Gas Production to Record Highs,” 9-12-12, <http://shaledaily.com/news/pdf/sd20120912.pdf>)

Natural gas spot prices averaged $2.84/MMBtu at the Henry Hub in August, down 11 cents/MMBtu from the July average and $1.21/MMBtu (30%) lower than the August 2011 average, according to the report. "While abundant supplies have kept prices relatively low, a hot summer and associated increases in demand for natural gas for power generation contributed to the increase in prices in July," EIA said. The Henry Hub price is expected to average **$2.65**/MMBtu this year, with prices remaining below $3.00/MMBtu until December and climbing to an average $3.34/MMBtu in 2013. EIA expects gas consumption will average 69.8 Bcf/d in 2012, an increase of 3.2 Bcf/d (4.8%) from 2011. "Large gains in electric power use in 2012 more than offset declines in residential and commercial use," EIA said. "Projected consumption of natural gas in the electric power sector averages 25.2 Bcf/d in 2012, 21% higher than in 2011, primarily driven by the improved relative cost advantages of natural gas over coal for power generation in some regions." Total natural gas consumption is expected to increase by 0.2 Bcf/d in 2013, with increases in residential, commercial and industrial consumption offset by declines in the power sector. Because of the projected **increase in natural gas prices** relative to coal, EIA said it expects the recent trend of substituting coal-fired electricity generation with natural gas generation to slow and likely reverse over the next year. "From April through August 2012, average monthly natural gas prices to electric generators increased by 34%, while coal prices fell slightly. EIA expects that **coal-fired** electricity generation will **increase by 9%** in 2013, while natural gas generation will fall by about 10%," EIA said. Working natural gas inventories are at historically high levels for this time of year. As of Aug. 31, working inventories totaled 3,402 Bcf, according to EIA's Weekly Gas Storage Report, 395 Bcf more than last year's level and 329 Bcf above the fiveyear average. EIA said it expects that inventory levels at the end of October will set a new record of 3,950 Bcf, slightly lower than the 3,954 Bcf the agency forecast in its previous outlook (see Shale Daily, Aug. 10)

**Natural Gas prices not responsible for coal-switch – grass-roots activism prevented plant construction**

**Hertsgaard 12** (Mark, fellow of New America Foundation, is The Nation's environment correspondent, “The Biggest Climate Victory You Never Heard Of,” 5-29-12, <http://www.constitutionworld.com/2012/05/the-biggest-climate-victory-you-never-heard-of.html>)

Coal is going down in the United States, and that's good news for the Earth's climate. The US Energy Information Administration has announced that coal, the dirtiest and most carbon-intensive conventional fossil fuel, generated only 36 per cent of US electricity in the first quarter of 2012. That amounts to a staggering 20 per cent decline from one year earlier. And the EIA anticipates additional decline by year's end, suggesting a historic setback for coal, which has provided the majority of the US' electricity for many decades. Even more encouraging, however, is the largely unknown story behind coal's retreat. Mainstream media coverage has credited low prices for natural gas - coal's chief competitor - and the Obama administration's March 27 announcement of stricter limits on greenhouse gas emissions from US power plants. And certainly both of those developments played a role. But a third factor - a persistent grassroots citizens' rebellion that has **blocked the construction** of 166 (and counting) proposed coal-fired power plants - has been at least as important. At the very time when President Obama's "cap-and-trade" climate legislation was going down in flames in Washington, local activists across the United States were helping to impose "a de facto moratorium on new coal", in the words of Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute, one of the first analysts to note the trend. Another surprise: most of these coal plants were defeated in the politically red states of the South and Midwest. Victories were coming "in places like Oklahoma and South Dakota, not the usual liberal bastions where you'd expect environmental victories", recalls Mary Anne Hitt, the director of the Beyond Coal campaign, which provided national coordination for the local efforts. The victories in Oklahoma were particularly sweet, coming in the home state of Capitol Hill's leading climate denier, Senator James Inhofe. Of course the activists had help: the falling cost of natural gas and a decline in electricity demand following the 2008 financial collapse made coal vulnerable. But it was grassroots activism that turned this vulnerability into outright defeat, argues Thomas Sanzillo, a former deputy comptroller for the New York state government who has collaborated with Beyond Coal. "If the activists hadn't been there talking to government regulators and newspaper editorial boards and making the case that coal was a bad bet," Sanzillo explains, "the **plants would have gone forward**, because the utility companies would say, ‘We can handle the costs,' and those [government] boards are often good ol' boy boards."

**No bridge fuel effect - Cheap Gas increases consumption, crowds out renewables**

**Drum 12** (Kevin, writer for Mother Jones on Energy, Environment, Top Stories, “Is Fracking Good for the Environment?,” 9-7-12, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/09/fracking-good-environment)

Unfortunately, the story doesn't stop there, and it gets a lot grimmer as you dig deeper. The problem is simple: If you make something cheaper, people will use more of it. In the case of natural gas, this is fine as long as people are using more of it as a **substitute for coal**. But that accounts for only a **small fraction** of natural gas usage: Less than a third of natural gas is used for electrical generation. Cheap gas will mean more consumption by buildings, industry, and perhaps for transportation. In many of these sectors, cheap gas won’t edge out coal or any other fuel. We'll just burn more of it. So when you make natural gas cheaper, there's a net benefit from the one-third of it that squeezes out coal but a net loss from the two-thirds that simply represents higher consumption of natural gas. What's worse, even in the power generation market there are tradeoffs: Cheap shale gas will also make electricity cheaper, **increasing consumption**, which will chip away at the emission reduction from switching from coal to gas…Quantifying all this requires modeling the effect of unconventional gas on energy markets and emissions, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) recently did. Their report predicts that if these gas resources are widely exploited, globally, CO2 emissions in 2035 will only drop by 1.3%. …In short, if we assume current policies, shale gas is almost a wash for global CO2, and methane will decrease or eliminate any small climate benefits of shale gas. If cheap shale gas crowds out renewables or increases energy demand more than IEA predicts, or methane leaks are worse than we think, cheap shale gas will actually hasten climate emissions, even in the short term (2035). Via email, McCabe tells me that the most important factor in the IEA model is crowding out: Cheap shale gas will reduce coal usage (good) but will also **reduce development** of new nuclear, wind, and solar power (bad). So this is your bad climate news for the day—to go along with shrinking Arctic ice, extreme weather, killer droughts, more wildfires, and monsoons increasingly inundating low-lying areas. Natural gas fracking may be good for North Dakota, but the evidence suggests that, in the end, it won't do much of anything to rein in climate change.

**Low prices cause flaring - leads to warming**

**Henkel 12** (Karl, reporter at The Detroit News, degree from Wayne State University, “Natural gas industry in a crash (and burn),” 4-18-12, <http://www.vindy.com/news/2012/apr/18/crash-and-burn/>)

The nice weather doesn’t seem to be going anywhere, and neither do cheap gas prices. The latter is having an impact on the oil-and-gas industry, which for the past decade has explored and extracted from gas-rich shale plays in Texas and Pennsylvania, to name two. Just three years ago, natural gas was $10 per 1,000 cubic feet, which allowed drillers a comfortable profit margin on their investments, which in unconventional shale plays can reach $10 million per horizontal well. But today, natural-gas prices are below $2 per 1,000 cubic feet for the first time in a decade. Gone is the prospect of gas-only exploration. The operating gas-rig count nationwide was 624 last week, the lowest weekly figure in a decade, according to Houston oil-and gas-services company Baker Hughes. Gone, too, is the gaping profit margin. Energy analysts estimate that $5 per 1,000 cubic feet is the profitability point for most drillers; any price less than that, coupled with a deficient way of transporting or storing, makes for an unfavorable business model. “There are no hard-and-fast rules on that,” said Dan Whitten, spokesman for Americas Natural Gas Alliance. “What you’re seeing is some companies are making those decisions, and I think some of that is areas where there are only dry gas potential.” Low natural-gas prices have changed the strategy for drillers in various ways. First, companies such as Oklahoma City-based Chesapeake Energy Corp., a large mineral-rights holder in Ohio, has decided to back out of natural-gas plays such as the Barnett Shale in Texas and the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania. The company’s rig count in the Barnett, which was 43 in 2008, is just six this year. Meanwhile, the company hopes to have 40 rigs in the Utica Shale by 2015. But drillers must also consider what they want to do with natural gas from current wells. Storage is the most obvious option, but because of the aforementioned mild weather, there’s a surplus of natural gas, and underground storage space is now at a premium. **Drillers** can “dial back” natural-gas production at well heads, but not nearly to the extent that it could alleviate the gas surplus. That brings in another option: **flar**ing, the process in which gas is elevated and burned. The process has been used for operations reasons for years, but never to the extent it is used today. In North Dakota’s oil-rich Bakken Shale, it is estimated that as much as one-third of all produced natural gas is flared. Natural gas normally accompanies oil in the production and extraction process, which means that even if drillers target oil- and wet-gas-heavy shale plays, natural-gas production still will occur. That is the case in the Utica Shale, where the most heavily oil-producing well in Ohio also produced 1.5 million MCF of natural gas, albeit in just about six months’ time. Chesapeake says it is prepared for Utica Shale exploration and low natural-gas prices. “The purpose of flaring is to safely consume any produced gas before it has reached sufficient conditions to enter a sales pipeline,” said Pete Kenworthy, Chesapeake spokesman. “After the well is connected to the pipeline, if market circumstances warrant, we can wait to turn the well online. In similar conditions, we can also cut back on production.” Environmentalists have criticized natural-gas flaring as an even worse hazard than the actual extraction process, which is done by fracking, or blasting a mix of water, chemicals and sand thousands of feet below the ground to open shale rock formations. “It seems we should **slow down the drilling** until **natural-gas prices rise** so that it becomes a smart business model,” said Vanessa Pesec, president of the Network for Oil and Gas Accountability. “[Flaring] contributes to organic compounds in the air that will affect everyone’s health and **greenhouse gases**,” she added.

**-- Low Prices kill Uranium Market**

**Cowie 12** (Dr. Alex Cowie, Editor, Money Morning, “How Low Natural Gas Prices Are Causing Energy Havoc,” 8-1-12, <http://countingpips.com/forex-news/2012/08/how-low-natural-gas-prices-are-causing-energy-havoc/>)

Uranium is now in the cross hairs. ‘Permanently **cheap’ natural gas** is giving the economics of nuclear energy a run for its money too. The uranium spot price held above $52/ lb between last September and this May. But in the last few months, the **uranium price** has been slipping, and is back down to $49 / lb, which is a worrying sign. The CEO of General Electric, Mr Immelt, also had a few words to say about uranium. His company is a major manufacturer of nuclear equipment. He recently said (my emphasis in bold): ‘It’s just hard to justify nuclear. Really hard. Gas is so cheap and at some point, really, **economics rule** … So I think some combination of gas, and either wind or solar … that’s where we see most countries around the world going.”

**-- Hurts Kazakhstan’s industry**

**McDermott 11** (Roger, Senior Fellow, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, “Kazakhstan: Countering nuclear proliferation, Action to develop a nuclear and terrorist-free world,” in Kazakhstan 2011: Twenty Years of Peace and Creation, *First: The Forum for Global Decision Makers*, 2011, <http://www.firstmagazine.com/Publishing/SpecialReportsDetail.aspx?RegionId=4&SpecialReportId=96>)

Kazakhstan’s ambitions are likely to be realized if **uranium prices stay high** and Kazatomprom is successful in further expanding its international partnerships. Kazatomprom’s most immediate task is to secure customers for its final nuclear fuel product--fuel assemblies, an extra fuel fabrication stage which Kazatomprom plans to start carrying out domestically. Having a nearly complete nuclear fuel cycle, save for enrichment, will ensure a stable cash flow for Kazatomprom and limit its dependence on the fluctuating market price of raw uranium. In the meantime, increased **uranium sales** will help alleviate the country’s overdependence on oil exports and help modernize its nuclear sector. If Kazakhstan does become the world’s leading uranium and nuclear fuel supplier, the ramifications for the country both in terms of increased **gross domestic product** and status on the world stage will be profound.

**-- Prevents diversification of Kazakhstan’s economy**

**Pleitgen 12** (Frederick, CNN, “Kazakhstan hopes uranium, oil and gas will fuel its future,” 7-18-12,

<http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-18/asia/world_asia_kazakhstan-natural-resources-economy_1_vladimir-shkolnik-kazakhstan-uranium>)

Kazakhstan's mineral wealth will be a **major source of income** for decades to come, but it won't last forever. The country is trying to use it wisely to transition to a broader economic base while developing the natural resources industries to the maximum. Last year Kazakhstan was the world's top producer of **uranium**, accounting for over a third of global production. The industry's rapid expansion, plus the good quality of the uranium and the comparatively cheap method of mining it have combined to give Kazakhstan an advantage over other big exporters like Australia and Canada. With continued investment, Vladimir Shkolnik, the head of Kazakhstan's national atomic energy company, Kazatomprom, is keen to maintain that position. "We are hoping to keep our leadership position in the uranium field," he says. "We have dozens of facilities and **hundreds of mines** and we think we will remain a world leader in the uranium sector." Kazakhstan's government is also trying to encourage more foreign investment. Since independence in 1991, around $150 billion of foreign investment has flowed into the country; $18 billion dollars last year alone, according to the government. Companies like GE and Eurocopter have been attracted to the country, entering partnerships with national companies that have helped bring training and new skills to the local workforce. While money is flowing from the country's natural resources industry, the government is using some of its revenue to boost other sectors, like IT and engineering. The aim is to make the economy **more resilient** when **commodities prices fall** and better prepared for the day when the gush of oil and gas reduce to a trickle. "Of course revenues from raw materials are still by far the largest share of the country's budget," says energy analyst, Murat Karymsakov. "But in recent years the president (of Kazakhstan) has announced and put into place a plan for industrial and technological development to diversify the economy."

**-- Destroys stability**

**Hamm 12** (Nathan, founder and Principal Analyst for Registan, MA in Central Asian Studies from the University of Washington, “Kazakhstan’s Stability, Central Asia’s Stability,” 1-31-12, <http://registan.net/2012/01/31/kazakhstans-stability-central-asias-stability/>)

I’m paraphrasing, but on the first two items, Dr. Roberts argues that the thoroughly Soviet education and background of Kazakhstan’s leadership leaves it out of touch and unable to adequately respond to the public. The government’s response to labor strikes, including the violence in Zhanaozen, he says, show that the government was not prepared to deal with dissatisfaction over unmet **economic expectations**. Dr. Roberts says that these challenges are not extreme nor likely to cause widespread unrest in the near term, but that the stagnancy of the political system means that the government lacks mechanisms to deal with large socio-economic changes. [Note: Alima wrote about the crisis of unmet expectations at length recently.] This is good, succinct analysis of the situation that puts risks to Kazakhstan’s stability in good context. The risks are there, the government is ill-prepared to deal with them at present, but it’s unlikely that it will be overwhelmed by them soon. These risks, however, aren’t present only in Kazakhstan. They exist in similar forms and combinations throughout Central Asia. Growing segments of society throughout the region are bringing (or attempting to…) Islam into the public square, where it is responded to with shock and terror by secular officials. National economies are failing to meet the expectations, and in many areas, even the basic needs, of the public. And though nationalism is not so clearly a problem the way it is Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the rest of Central Asia, there are small signs that society is challenging the state’s monopoly on defining what it means to be Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, etc. In talking about risks to stability, there is often a tendency to focus on presidential succession, the specter of fundamentalism and political Islam, and a more recent tendency to talk about replication of the Arab Spring. Recent history should make it abundantly clear though, that analysts, experts, and observers are taken by surprise in the region. Game-planning what happens after Karimov dies or a resurgence of the IMU activity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan might be worthless because they assume state and society lack the mechanisms to respond to and manage succession or terrorist groups. The greatest risks to stability **throughout the region** are medium- to long-term risks arising from the three aforementioned factors and the oppositional relationship between state and society. Devising a list of indicators and warnings based on the three factors Dr. Roberts identifies — rising public religiosity, increasing nationalism, and **under-performance in the economy** — are more likely not only to lead to better anticipation of the trajectory of stability in Central Asia but also to provide a better idea of when serious risks to stability are likely to arise.

**-- Spreads throughout the region**

**Assenova 8** (Margarita Assenova, IND Director; Natalie Zajicova, Program Officer (IND); Janusz Bugajski, CSIS NEDP Director; Ilona Teleki, Deputy Director and Fellow (CSIS); Besian Bocka, Program Coordinator and Research Assistant (CSIS), “Kazakhstan’s Strategic Significance,” 2008, CSIS-IND Taskforce Policy Brief team, European Dialogue, <http://eurodialogue.org/Kazakhstan-Strategic-Significance>)

The decision by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to award Kazakhstan the chairmanship of the organization for 2010 underscores a growing recognition of the country’s regional and continental importance. **Kazakhstan is a strategic linchpin** in the vast Central Asian-Caspian Basin zone, a region rich in energy resources and a potential gateway for commerce and communications between Europe and Asia. However, it is also an area that faces an assortment of troubling security challenges. Ensuring a **stable and secure Central Asia** is important for the international interests of the United States and its European allies for several prescient reasons: • Asian Security: Because of its proximity to **Russia,** **China**, Iran, and the South Asian sub-continent, Kazakhstan’s security and stability is an increasingly **vital interest** to all major powers. Kazakhstan’s tenure as chair of the OSCE will become an opportunity for greater multilateral cooperation in achieving this objective while strengthening the role and prestige of the OSCE throughout Central Asia.

**-- Nuclear war**

**Ahrari 1** (M. Ehsan, Professor of National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College, August 2001, “Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game,” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub112.pdf)

South and **Central Asia** constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might well help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence building. Insecurity has led the states of the region to seek **weapons of mass destruction**, missiles and conventional arms. It has also led them toward policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or a **thermonuclear exchange**. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

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#### Renewables will be successful now – prices are lower and demand for NEW energy sources are triggering investment – that’s Tickell. Prefer it –

#### A. Conclusive – it’s specific to wind and solar – both have high levels of investment.

#### B. It’s comparative – renewables are getting cheaper than all fossil fuels.

#### Experts predict continued renewable growth

Unger, 12/23/12 – environmental reporter for Medill News Service (David J, “Energy in 2013: What's next for oil, gas, renewables?” http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2012/1223/Energy-in-2013-What-s-next-for-oil-gas-renewables)

Last year saw a shift from a reliance on oil and coal to an exploration of untapped natural gas resources and renewable energy. Few will bet against this topsy-turvy, transitional energy state persisting through 2013 and beyond. For the coming year, fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy market, but renewables will continue their slow and steady gains, experts say. "Alternative" no more Clean energy will continue its creep into the mainstream. Wind-powered generation grew by 27 percent in 2011 and is projected to grow 15 percent in 2013, according to the US Energy Information Administration. Solar energy will continue robust growth, according to the EIA, with a projected 28 percent jump in consumption in 2013. At this rate, alternative energy may even lose its distinguishing adjective. "The word 'alternative', with its connotations of hand-wringing greenery and a need for taxpayer subsidy, has to go," writes Geoffrey Carr in The Economist. "And in 2013 it will. 'Renewable' power will start to be seen as normal."

#### You should view uniqueness through the direction of the link – uniqueness is inherently probabilistic, but at least some renewable investment is occurring. You can determine that the aff definitely hampers investment – if we win that part of the debate it means the aff causes a tradeoff, which is a reason to vote neg regardless of the degree of current investment

#### Renewables viable now

Negin, 12/7/12 – director of news and commentary at the Union of Concerned Scientists (Elliott, “Koch Brothers Fund Bogus Studies to Kill Renewable Energy.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/elliott-negin/koch-brothers-fund-bogus-\_b\_2253472.html)

The good news is renewables have been a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy economy. Over the last five years--with the help of state renewable electricity standards, stimulus spending and production tax credits--U.S. wind capacity has more than tripled and solar capacity has more than quadrupled, boosting employment and attracting private investment. Even with a deep recession and slow recovery, U.S.-based wind turbine, blade, tower and gearbox manufacturing has jumped 25 to 60 percent since 2005. Likewise, the potential for non-hydro renewables is tremendous. They currently generate only about 5 percent of U.S. electricity, but by 2030 they could produce more than 40 percent, according to a 2009 UCS study. That would more than replace the share currently generated by coal, which is still responsible for roughly 75 percent of U.S. utility sector carbon emissions. Looking even further down the road, NREL concluded earlier this year that today's commercially available renewable technologies could adequately generate 80 percent of U.S. electricity by 2050.

#### Prefer our evidence – media accounts consistently underplay clean energy boosts

Winston, 9/26/12 – founder of Winston Eco-Strategies, the author of Green Recovery, globally recognized expert on green business (Andrew, “The Supposed Decline of Green Energy.” Bloomberg. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-26/the-supposed-decline-of-green-energy)

Here's a surprising new fact about energy in the United States: the percentage of our electricity coming from the greenest sources — that is, the non-hydroelectric renewables such as solar, wind, geothermal and biomass — has doubled in just four years to nearly 6 percent. (Thanks to climate uberblogger Joe Romm for uncovering this data from the Energy Information Agency). This significant win for clean energy has gone mostly unnoticed in the press. If anything, the story has been the opposite: recent reports herald the decline of wind, and for a year the media has made a big deal out of the demise of solar panel manufacturer Solyndra.

#### Transition to renewables and efficiency’s underway now

der Hoeven, 11/14/12 – Executive Director, International Energy Agency (Maria van der Hoeven, “Maria van der Hoeven (IEA): Tapping Technology and Efficiency to Secure a Clean Energy Future.” http://www.planetbmagazine.com/2012/11/14/tapping-technology-and-efficiency-to-secure-a-clean-energy-future/)

However, both renewable energy and the trajectory of energy efficiency gains have changed in recent years. We are seeing the rapid development of a portfolio of renewable technologies, including newer forms such as wind and solar power. That kind of renewable energy is emerging as a fundamental part of the global energy mix. At the same time, the rise of emerging economies has risen millions out of poverty, but these countries tend to put relatively less emphasis on energy efficiency, reversing the global trend toward lower energy intensity in the past few years. The technologies are often already there, but new enabling frameworks and mechanisms are being developed to unlock efficiency gains, both in developed and emerging economies. Looking forward, energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies will play a vital role in the transition to the secure and sustainable energy future that we seek. This transition certainly entails challenges for policy, but experience shows us time and again that unlocking the power of private sector investment is the only way to achieve the sustainability goals that societies demand. Creating the proper market structures and incentives, while at the same time minimising interference in business decisions and ensuring policy stability, can be tricky. That is why cooperation between government and business is so important – to recognise what works and what does not, to learn from our experiences, and to follow the right path to optimal technology deployment. At the International Energy Agency, energy security sits at the core of our mandate, and that is precisely why we recognise that sustainability is such a prized goal. An efficient and low carbon energy system reduces reliance on energy supply for economic growth, mitigates threats to energy security coming from climate change, and reduces the global economy’s exposure to disruptions in fossil fuel supply. Energy efficiency measures, by reducing energy intensity, contribute to short-term energy security by reducing our dependence on global energy supply chains. The most secure energy is the barrel or megawatt we never have to use. However, over the longer term, energy security is also linked to environmental developments. Rapidly rising energy use and emissions of greenhouse gases will have severe impacts on the natural environment and the global climate. Rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns, and increasing incidence of droughts, floods and heat waves will affect ecosystems, food production, water resources, and of course, energy production itself. Fossil reserves are not unlimited, and the costs of producing the marginal barrel, cubic metre or tonne will rise over time. Countries will need more resilience factors (such as expensive emergency stocks) to ensure their energy security. Exceptional natural disasters could delay the exploration of offshore oil and natural gas fields, and more hurricanes could force the shut-down of oil production in the affected regions. Furthermore, an increasing share of oil and gas production will come from unconventional sources and production methods with higher production costs and greater environmental footprints. The question then is: How to achieve a transition to greater deployment of clean technologies and energy efficiency? Improving energy efficiency is not always easy – good governance capacities (including legislative frameworks, funding mechanisms, institutional arrangements and coordination mechanisms) are needed to support implementation of energy efficiency strategies, policies and programmes. Enabling frameworks confer authority, build consensus, attract attention to, and provide resources for energy efficiency policy implementation. Important enabling frameworks include laws and decrees, strategies and action plans and funding mechanisms. Institutional arrangements, such as implementing agencies, resourcing requirements, energy providers, public-private cooperation, stakeholder engagement, and international development assistance, reflect the broad range of actors that play leading roles in energy efficiency policy implementation. Lastly, coordination mechanisms, such as targets and evaluation, influence the quality and effectiveness of energy efficiency policy outcomes. The IEA has developed 25 energy efficiency policy recommendations which are regularly updated in order to help countries achieve energy efficiency savings in the transport, buildings, industry and power sector, at little or no cost. But, the other key driver in the transition to a low-carbon economy will be technology and innovation. Technological change and development will significantly enhance the portfolio of options available, and over time will bring down the cost of achieving global climate change goals. Governments have an important role in this context. They can help by creating an attractive environment for research, development and demonstration (RD&D), and by safeguarding the drivers of innovation. Well-designed and targeted technology policies on both the supply and demand sides are a fundamental ingredient in a strategy to accelerate innovation.

#### New FERC data proves

Peixe, 10/24/12 – writer for Oilprice.com (Joao, “100% of US Energy Projects Installed During September were Solar or Wind.” http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/100-of-US-Energy-Projects-Installed-During-September-were-Solar-or-Wind.html)

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has just released the latest version of the “Energy Infrastructure Update” from its Energy Projects Office. The new report shows that a total of 433MW of new electricity generation capacity was installed in the US during the month of September, and the amazing thing is that all was in the form of solar or wind power projects. The 5 wind projects with a capacity of 300MW, and 18 solar energy projects with a capacity of 133MW, mean that so far this year a total of 77 wind projects (4,055MW), and 154 Solar projects (936MW) have been installed. That is on top of 76 biomass projects (340MW), 7 geothermal plants (123MW), 10 water power projects (9MW), and just one waste heat project (3MW). In comparison to these renewable energy installations, natural gas capacity grew by just 61 projects (4,587MW), and 3 coal projects were added (2,276MW). The amount of renewable energy capacity which came on line in 2012 marks a 29% increase from the year before, and brings the contribution of renewable sources to the US energy matrix to a total of 14.9%. The EIA, however, warns that these figures in the FERC report are not entirely accurate as the “additions **understate actual solar capacity gains**. Unlike other energy sources, significant levels of solar capacity exist in smaller, non-utility-scale applications - e.g., rooftop solar photovoltaics.”

#### Renewable growth now – prefer our evidence, it’s predictive and uses economic analysis

IEA, 12 – International Energy Agency (7/5, “IEA sees renewable energy growth accelerating over next 5 years.” <http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/july/name,28200,en.html>)

Renewable power generation is expected to continue its rapid growth over the next five years,according to a new report from the International Energy Agency(IEA) that acknowledges the coming-of-age of the renewable energy sector. The report says that despite economic uncertainties in many countries, global power generation from hydropower, solar, wind and other renewable sources is projected to increase by more than 40% to almost 6 400 terawatt hours (TWh) – or roughly one-and-a-half times current electricity production in the United States.¶ The study, released today, marks the first time the IEA has devoted a medium-term report to renewable power sources, a recognition of the dynamic and increasing role of renewable energy in the global power mix. The study examines in detail 15 key markets for renewable energy, which currently represent about 80% of renewable generation, while identifying and characterising developments that may emerge in other important markets. It completes a series of IEA medium-term market reports also featuring oil, natural gas and coal. Like the others, it presents a forecast of global developments and detailed country projections over the next five years.¶ The new study, Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report 2012, says that renewable electricity generation should expand by 1 840 TWh between 2011 and 2017, almost 60% above the 1 160 TWh growth registered between 2005 and 2011. Renewable generation will increasingly shift from the OECD to new markets, with non-OECD countries accounting for two-thirds of this growth. Of the 710 GW of new global renewable electricity capacity expected, China accounts for almost 40%. Significant deployment is also expected in the United States, India, Germany and Brazil, among others.¶ This growth is underpinned by the maturing of a portfolio of renewable energy technologies, in large part due to supportive policy and market frameworks in OECD countries. However, rapidly increasing electricity demand and energy security needs in recent years have been spurring deployment in many emerging markets – both large and small. These new deployment opportunities are creating a virtuous cycle of improved global competition and cost reductions.¶ “Renewable energy is expanding rapidly as technologies mature, with deployment transitioning from support-driven markets to new and potentially more competitive segments in many countries,” IEA Executive Director Maria van der Hoeven said during today’s launch. “Given the emergence of a portfolio of renewable sources as a crucial pillar of the global energy mix, market stakeholders need a clear understanding of the major drivers and barriers to renewable deployment. Based on these factors, this report forecasts global renewable development and, in so doing, provides a key benchmark for both public and private decision makers.”

#### Renewables growing at record rates

Gallucci, 12/21/12 – clean economy reporter for InsideClimate News (Maria, “2012 Was a Big Year for America's Clean Energy Economy, Despite Solyndra.” http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20121220/clean-energy-economy-2012-year-end-solyndra-wind-energy-solar-power-feed-in-tariff-germany-low-carbon-california?page=2)

It wasn't easy being green in 2012. But record growth in the clean economy was the reality behind this year's negative headlines and political backlash. Solyndra was the never-ending story of the year. The bankruptcy of a solar company that got a half a billion dollars in taxpayer money provided election-year fodder for Republicans, who used it to bash Pres. Obama's clean energy programs. Fossil fuel interests spent tens of millions of dollars trying to make Solyndra a political liability—to no avail, in the end. It wasn't just about Solyndra. In 2012, it seemed every major clean energy policy became a target of prominent conservative groups. Campaigns were waged to block renewal of a key production tax credit (PTC) for wind developers that will lapse on Dec. 31. Long-standing renewable energy standards also came under fire. Of the 30 states that have such mandates, nearly one-third of them introduced bills this year or last year to weaken or repeal those laws. Plans for a low-carbon fuel standard in the Northeast struggled to endure attacks from opponents. Three states abandoned the program. It's now on hold—just as carbon-heavy tar sands oil could soon flow into the region. At the same time, however, there were hints of a rebirth of cap and trade, the controversial scheme for curbing greenhouse gases. Even after Gov. Chris Christie pulled New Jersey from the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, news spread that the scheme was sending millions into state coffers. That fact swayed cash-strapped states to begin to give carbon trading a second look. It was a banner year for California. With the eyes of the nation watching, the country's climate policy leader launched the first economywide cap-and-trade program in November. The year also saw California approve the most aggressive U.S. clean car mandate, which requires 15 percent of cars sold in the state to be electric, plug-in hybrid or hydrogen by model year 2018. Ten states are gearing to adopt it. On top of that, the Golden State started the world's first low-carbon fuel standard—though the program remains stuck in legal limbo. For industry backers, the biggest story of the year was the rapid growth of the clean energy economy. The United States will install a record 3,200 megawatts of solar power this year—the size of a large nuclear power plant—bringing the nation's solar capacity to 7,600 megawatts. The boom is partly due to a record drop in solar panel costs, which have plummeted 80 percent in five years. The U.S. wind sector had its strongest year ever, as companies rushed to get wind farms built before the PTC runs out. In total, 50,000 megawatts' worth of wind turbines power 13 million American homes. Together, wind and solar make up about 5 percent of the nation's electricity supply and employ nearly 200,000 Americans. The most important clean energy development—and perhaps the sector's biggest future growth engine—was the rise of creative renewable financing schemes in the states. Those wonky initiatives became crucial this year, as Obama's green stimulus program started to dry up. For instance, states are increasingly using little-known clean energy funds, or CEFs to invest in research hubs, cleantech startups and green job training programs. Some are laying the groundwork for green banks, in which state agencies become lending institutions for loans and bonds to renewable energy and green building developers. A handful of cities and counties are helping homeowners do energy-efficiency retrofits and install solar panels using the Property Assessed Clean Energy, or PACE, model. The financing program lets people repay their debt over one or two decades through an assessment on their property tax bills. About a dozen U.S. cities, regions or states have adopted European-style feed-in tariffs in recent years, which give solar panel owners a fixed price for every kilowatt-hour of clean electricity they feed back into the grid over 20 years. This year, advocates dropped the loaded "tariff" moniker for PR purposes, calling them Clean Local Energy Accessible Now (CLEAN) policies instead. In Germany, feed-in tariffs were critical in making its clean energy economy the world's biggest by far—renewables account for 25 percent of energy production. An InsideClimate News Kindle ebook on Germany's renewable power transformation, published last month, revealed an even bigger driver: Germany passed a federal law in 2000 that decentralized electricity production, which gave small renewable power producers incentives to compete with big utilities. The United States is still far from that, but as the year closes, the first rumblings of efforts to break the monopoly of utilities and fossil fuels are being heard.

#### We are on the brink of a clean energy transition – the plan wrecks it

**Bakal, 8-9** – Director of the Electric Power Program at Ceres, an organization that mobilizes a powerful network of investors, companies and public interest groups to accelerate and expand the adoption of sustainable business practices and solutions to build a healthy global economy (Dan, 8/9. “As Coal Sinks, Renewables Soar: Emissions Report Shows Start Of Clean Energy Transition.” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/09/663261/as-coal-sinks-renewables-soar-emissions-report-shows-start-of-clean-energy-transition/)

For the electric power industry, the signs of change are in the air. Power plants are emitting less pollution than in prior years, and renewable power is a bigger part of the energy mix than ever before. That adds up to cleaner air and a more diverse, resilient and lower-carbon electricity system. The industry is in the midst of a real transition, and a new Ceres report shows that it’s happening even faster than experts predicted. On a biannual basis, Ceres assesses the environmental performance and progress of the electric power sector by analyzing the air emissions of the nation’s top 100 power producers in collaboration with M.J. Bradley & Associates, the National Resources Defense Council, Entergy, Exelon, Tenaska and Bank of America. This is the eighth edition of the *Benchmarking Air Emissions* report, and this year, the findings were particularly significant: From 2008 to 2010, sector-wide sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions both fell by over 30 percent. Over the same period, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell four percent and preliminary data show another five percent reduction in 2011. Non-hydroelectric renewable energy accounted for nearly five percent of U.S. electricity generation in 2011. Including large hydroelectric projects, renewables now provide over 10 percent of our power. Those results speak volumes. Cutting SO2 and NOx emissions by a third in just a couple years is remarkable, and it reflects that a clean energy transition is within reach. The drop in carbon emissions is also encouraging, but it is important to ensure that the trend continues by continuing to emphasize renewable energy and efficiency. What we did with SO2 and NOx, we can do with CO2. What are the drivers of this remarkable change? Primarily, power producers are shifting away from coal-fired generation to natural gas-fired plants and even cleaner, zero-emissions renewable energy resources such as wind, solar and geothermal energy. They have also installed emissions controls for the coal plants they are running, as additional Clean Air Act rules are set to go into effect over the next few years. Some experts have been anticipating the coal to gas switch for several years now, but these results show that it’s happening faster than expected. In late 2010, Deutsche Bank’s *Natural Gas and Renewables: A Secure Low Carbon Future Energy Plan for the United States* report predicted that gas-fired generation would overtake coal between 2020 and 2030: But when you look at the findings of the Benchmarking report and the latest data from the Energy Information Administration, you can see that even Deutsche Bank’s bullish predictions may have been too conservative. The shift has come sooner than projected. In April 2012, coal- and gas-fired generation were equal for the first time ever: Though we can expect generation sources to fluctuate somewhat with seasonal demand and the price of natural gas, this is still an historic shift for the U.S. grid. As power producers adjust their generating fleets, gas is being swapped for coal in some cases, but in others, coal plants are being retired outright. According to the 2012 *Benchmarking Air Emissions* report, 12 percent of the nation’s coal-fired generation fleet—about 40 gigawatts of capacity—will be retired. And as the chart below indicates, the plants that are being phased out are largely older, high-emitting generating units: In my opinion, these projections are still too moderate—but it is encouraging to see the EIA, which tends to use conservative assumptions, predicting that this important shift will continue just as utilities are entering a large-scale build cycle of new generation. The Brattle Group estimates that the electric power sector’s total capital expenditures will be about $100 billion a year through 2030. And as Ceres’s previous reports have shown, renewables and efficiency are among the lowest-risk, lowest-cost resources available.

#### Renewable investment is strong –

#### Venture capital

McGinn, 9-12 – U.S. Navy Retired Vice Admiral, vice chairman of the CNA Military Advisory Board, and president of the American Council on Renewable Energy (Dennis V., 9/12. “Ending renewable energy’s villainy.” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/09/12/ending-renewable-energys-villainy/)

The fact is that the U.S. renewable energy industry is far stronger today than it was when the bipartisan Energy Policy Act passed in 2005; since then private investment has leveraged government support and both have played an important role in the industry’s success. Overall last year, U.S. solar installations doubled. Since 2007, 35 percent of all new electricity-generating capacity in the U.S. came from wind power. And last year, America produced 14 billion gallons of biofuels – double the amount of oil we import from Venezuela. The U.S. now leads global clean energy investment, and clean technology is the leading venture capital category. Recent weeks have seen the announcement of hundreds of millions of dollars in new private investments in these technologies. For example, on July 25 investment bank Credit Suisse announced $300 million in new funding for rooftop solar installers SunRun and SolarCity. That is in addition to more than $120 billion in commitments to renewable energy by Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and other major financial institutions. The U.S. military has also become a major supporter of energy efficiency and solar, wind, biofuels and other clean technologies for the tremendous value they provide in combat effectiveness, cost savings and energy security. There are plans to install 160,000 solar systems on military residence rooftops across 33 states. Military investments have led the nation and helped reduce the cost of advanced biofuels by more than 80 percent. And the Army is planning to invest $7 billion over the coming years to obtain 25 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2025. Most importantly, these investments will save lives and make America a more secure nation. And herein lies the contradiction: Our nation’s biggest investors and armed forces clearly support the renewable energy technologies. Why, then, are so many politicians so far behind? Why are our nation’s biggest investors and our armed forces sticking with renewable energy technologies when some in Congress have abandoned them? Because those politicians have failed to look at the big picture. Anyone who has invested in a new growth industry understands that success is often accompanied by some failure. To take the solar industry as one example, verticals that experience exponential growth will also have their share of falling costs. In the end, some companies go under, while others thrive. It happened with the American auto industry. It happened with the American software industry. And today, it is happening with solar. That is why leaders with the long view aren’t heading for the hills. They are doubling down. Indeed, the investment flowing into the U.S. solar industry has driven record growth and impressive cost reductions. In the first quarter of this year, more than 18,000 solar electric systems came online in the United States – an 85 percent increase over the same quarter in 2011. Overall last year, U.S. solar installations doubled, and the average price of solar installations in the U.S. fell by 20 percent.

#### Renewable transition occurring now in electricity

**EIA 8-20** – U.S. Energy Information Administration (8/20, “[Natural gas, renewables dominate electric capacity additions in first half of 2012](http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7610&src=email).” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7610&src=email)

Most of the new generators built over the past 15 years are powered by natural gas or wind. In 2012, the addition of natural gas and renewable generators comes at a time when natural gas and renewable generation are contributing increasing amounts to total generation across much of the United States. In particular, efficient combined-cycle natural gas generators are competitive with coal generators over a large swath of the country. And, in the first half of 2012, these combined-cycle generators were added in states that traditionally burn mostly coal (with the exception of Idaho, which has significant hydroelectric resources). Only one coal-fired generator was brought online in the first half of 2012, an 800-MW unit at the Prairie State Energy Campus in Illinois. In its 2011 annual survey of power plant operators, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) received no new reports of planned coal-fired generators. Of the planned coal generators in EIA databases, 14 are reported in the construction phrase, with an additional 5 reporting a planned status but not yet under construction. However, only one of the 14 advanced from a pre-construction to an under-construction status between the 2010 and 2011 surveys. More small generators were added than large generators: of the 165 generators added, 105 were under 25 MW. Many of these use renewable energy sources, most commonly solar and landfill gas; wind plants aggregate many individual turbines into one large "generator" for reporting purposes. So far, 2012 has also seen a significant number of new peaking generators, the combustion turbines and internal combustion engines that operate when electric demand is at its highest, which also tend to be on the small side. These technologies are usually fueled by natural gas or petroleum, but can also burn landfill gas (Michigan alone added 8 of these in the first half of 2012) or agricultural byproducts.

#### Investment in renewables booming now – doubling in the next eight years

Lacey, 11 – Deputy Editor for Climate Progress at American Progress (Stephen, 11/16. “[Investments in Renewable Energy to Double by 2020, Reaching $395 Billion Per Year, Says Bloomberg New Energy Finance](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/11/16/369591/investments-in-renewable-energy-to-double/).” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/11/16/369591/investments-in-renewable-energy-to-double/)

The good news: renewable energy investments are projected to double over the next eight years and reach $395 billion per year, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance. That’s up from $195 billion in 2010. The not-so-good news: That still is not be enough to stabilize emissions and control climate change, according to the International Energy Agency. In 2009, the IEA issued a report concluding that global investments in renewables and efficiency needed to reach roughly $37 trillion by 2030 in order to prevent dangerous global warming. Even with the strong increases in private and public financing across a range of clean energy technologies, we’re still not at the levels IEA says we need to be. If the BNEF numbers are accurate, we’ll only be at $7 trillion in total investments. By 2030, Bloomberg researchers project that global investments in renewable energy could reach $460 billion per year. But these figures don’t count efficiency and smarter grids — two sectors that could have a dramatic impact on our ability to use less energy. But we can be hopeful that, despite the growing number of nonsensical claims that renewable energy is a “fad,” the industry is still moving ahead. Guy Turner, director of commodity market research at Bloomberg New Energy Finance, said: “These results indicate that last year’s record renewable energy investment was no one-off despite the recent economic gloom. Big winners over the next 20 years will be the emerging renewable energy hubs in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa.” In energy generation, the fastest-growing sectors will be wind (both onshore and offshore) and solar over the next two decades. And by 2020, roughly 50% of all investment will come from outside Europe and North America, according to BNEF.

#### Clean energy transition occurring now

**Bakal, 12** – Director of the Electric Power Program at Ceres, an organization that mobilizes a powerful network of investors, companies and public interest groups to accelerate and expand the adoption of sustainable business practices and solutions to build a healthy global economy (Dan, 8/9. “As Coal Sinks, Renewables Soar: Emissions Report Shows Start Of Clean Energy Transition.” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/09/663261/as-coal-sinks-renewables-soar-emissions-report-shows-start-of-clean-energy-transition/)

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#### Investment in renewables and energy efficiency strong and growing now

McGinn, 12 – U.S. Navy Retired Vice Admiral, vice chairman of the CNA Military Advisory Board, and president of the American Council on Renewable Energy (Dennis V., 9/12. “Ending renewable energy’s villainy.” http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/09/12/ending-renewable-energys-villainy/)

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#### Renewables on the upswing now

**Hunt, 12** – president of Global Energy Advisors (Gary, 7/26. “Why Energy Will be Driven By Profitability in the Future.” http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Why-Energy-Will-be-Driven-By-Profitability-in-the-Future.html)

•    **From Renewable Energy for Fuel Diversity to Clean Energy and Back.** As marginal costs rose concerns were raised about putting too many of our eggs in one fuel basket.  Too much coal, too much nuclear energy and then later too much natural gas.  The Clean Air Act and other environmental legislation raised our consciousness about smog and greenhouse gas emissions that caused acid rain conditions in New England from Midwest coal plants.  The adoption of the foundational environmental legislation of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act created a market for clean energy resources from wind and solar.  The technologies were new, untested and costly.  Renewable Portfolio Standards were designed to create a slice of system place in the power supply mix for these new technologies in hope that their marginal cost would fall as the installed capacity increased much as it did with coal and natural gas generation previously.  Today, more than thirty years later the marginal cost of wind and solar are falling due mostly to oversupply of wind turbine and PV panel production in China, the states are nearing achievement of their RPS targets, wind and solar resources are considered mainstream and their market share has growth to about 13% of total installed generation capacity.  The problem is few are satisfied with this outcome.  Hydropower remains the largest contributor to renewable energy today at 63% of the total as it did 30 year ago.  Without hydro factored in wind makes up 60% of the renewable market share (23% when hydro is included in the total) but solar energy is still tiny at 1%.  Subsidies are still required for renewable energy to be economically viable. Low natural gas prices force renewables to learn to compete without subsidies—or else.  Tough love.

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**Natural Gas: 2NC**

**A. Lock-In - plan destroys renewables, keeps us hooked on gas**

**Inman 12** (Mason, reporter for National Geographic, specializes in reporting climate change and energy, “Shale Gas: A Boon That Could Stunt Alternatives, Study Says,” 1-7-12, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/01/120117-shale-gas-boom-impact-on-renewables/>)

"Given current U.S. policies, abundant and relatively cheap natural gas puts all other energy sources at a competitive disadvantage," he said. "It is particularly important for decision-makers to . . . usher in more renewable energy by creating incentives to help this industry thrive," including policies to increase innovation and encourage investment in electric grids. The infrastructure people build today—power plants fired by coal or **natural gas**, or solar panels or wind turbines—will likely **last for decades**, Bradbury said. "The longer it takes for the [United States] to pass climate policy," he added, "the more likely it is that we will see . . . gas-related infrastructure become effectively **locked in** to our energy system for decades." The MIT study noted that natural gas is often thought of as a "bridge" to a low-carbon future. But the study also emphasizes that there is also a risk of "**stunting" other technologies** for reducing carbon emissions. "While taking advantage of this gift in the short run, treating gas as a 'bridge' to a low-carbon future," the study said, "it is crucial not to allow the greater ease of the near-term task to erode efforts to prepare a landing at the other end of the bridge."

**B. Renewable market – gas devastates short-term investment**

**Friedman 12** (Thomas L., three time Pulitzer winner, “Get It Right on Gas,” 8-4-12,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/opinion/sunday/friedman-get-it-right-on-gas.html?_r=1&smid=pl-share>)

The enormous stores of natural gas that have been locked away in shale deposits across America that we’ve now been able to tap into, thanks to breakthroughs in seismic imaging, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” are enabling us to replace much dirtier coal with cleaner gas as the largest source of electricity generation in America. And natural gas may soon be powering cars, trucks and ships as well. This is helping to lower our carbon emissions faster than expected and make us more energy secure. And, if prices **stay low**, it may enable America to bring back manufacturing that migrated overseas. But, as the energy and climate expert Hal Harvey puts it, there is just one big, hugely important question to be asked about this natural gas bounty: “Will it be a transition to a clean energy future, or does it **defer a clean energy future**?” That is the question — because natural gas is still a fossil fuel. The good news: It emits only half as much greenhouse gas as coal when combusted and, therefore, contributes only half as much to global warming. The better news: The recent glut has made it inexpensive to deploy. But there is a hidden, long-term, cost: A **sustained gas glut** could **undermine new investments** in wind, solar, nuclear and energy efficiency systems — which have zero emissions — and thus keep us **addicted to fossil fuels** for decades. That would be reckless. This year’s global extremes of droughts and floods are totally consistent with models of disruptive, nonlinear climate change. After record warm temperatures in the first half of this year, it was no surprise to find last week that the Department of Agriculture has now designated more than half of all U.S. counties — 1,584 in 32 states — as primary disaster areas where crops and grazing areas have been ravaged by drought. That is why on May 29 the British newspaper The Guardian quoted Fatih Birol, the chief economist for the International Energy Agency, as saying that “a golden age for gas is not necessarily a golden age for the climate” — if natural gas ends up sinking renewables. Maria van der Hoeven, executive director of the I.E.A., urged governments to keep in place subsidies and regulations to encourage investments in wind, solar and other renewables “for years to come” so they remain competitive.

**C. Trade-off – the plan means business forgo renewable development in favor of gas**

**Begos 12** (Kevin, “AP IMPACT: CO2 emissions in US drop to 20-year low,” 8-17-12,

<http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-co2-emissions-us-drop-20-low-174616030--finance.html>)

Wind supplied less than 3 percent of the nation's electricity in 2011 according to EIA data, and solar power was far less. Estimates for this year suggest that coal will account for about 37 percent of the nation's electricity, natural gas 30 percent, and nuclear about 19 percent. Some worry that cheap gas could **hurt renewable energy** efforts. "Installation of new renewable energy facilities has now all but dried up, **unable to compete** on a grid now flooded with a low-cost, high-energy fuel," two experts from Colorado's Renewable and Sustainable Energy Institute said in an essay posted this week on Environment360, a Yale University website. How much further the shift from coal to natural gas can go is unclear. Bentek says that power companies plan to retire 175 coal-fired plants over the next five years. That could bring coal's CO2 emissions down to 1980 levels. However, the EIA predicts **prices of natural gas** will start to rise a bit next year, and then **more about eight years from now**.

#### Nat gas turns renewables

**OEP 12** (Our Energy Policy, “Can We Get It Right on Gas?,” 8-5-12,

http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/can-we-get-it-right-on-gas/)

“A sustained [natural] gas glut could **undermine new investments** in wind, solar, nuclear and energy efficiency systems – which have zero emissions – and thus keep us addicted to fossil fuels for decades,” Friedman writes. He suggests that such a scenario would reduce natural gas’ societal value because the economic and energy security benefits of domestic natural gas come with significant environmental trade-offs, such as climate impact and hydraulic fracturing. To maximize natural gas’ value to society, Friedman argues for “nationally accepted standards for controlling methane leakage, for controlling water used in fracking — where you get it, how you treat the polluted water that comes out from the fracking process and how you protect aquifers — and for ensuring that communities have the right to say no to drilling.” He goes on to say that a carbon tax, which would **raise the price** of natural gas, could raise enough revenue to help pay down the national debt, lower income and corporate taxes, and help make renewables cost-competitive with natural gas.

**A2 Plan = Bridge Fuel**

**Cheap Gas increases consumption, crowds out renewables, no bridge fuel effect**

**Drum 12** (Kevin, writer for Mother Jones on Energy, Environment, Top Stories, “Is Fracking Good for the Environment?,” 9-7-12, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/09/fracking-good-environment)

Unfortunately, the story doesn't stop there, and it gets a lot grimmer as you dig deeper. The problem is simple: If you make something cheaper, people will use more of it. In the case of natural gas, this is fine as long as people are using more of it as a **substitute for coal**. But that accounts for only a **small fraction** of natural gas usage: Less than a third of natural gas is used for electrical generation. Cheap gas will mean more consumption by buildings, industry, and perhaps for transportation. In many of these sectors, cheap gas won’t edge out coal or any other fuel. We'll just burn more of it. So when you make natural gas cheaper, there's a net benefit from the one-third of it that squeezes out coal but a net loss from the two-thirds that simply represents higher consumption of natural gas. What's worse, even in the power generation market there are tradeoffs: Cheap shale gas will also make electricity cheaper, **increasing consumption**, which will chip away at the emission reduction from switching from coal to gas…Quantifying all this requires modeling the effect of unconventional gas on energy markets and emissions, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) recently did. Their report predicts that if these gas resources are widely exploited, globally, CO2 emissions in 2035 will only drop by 1.3%. …In short, if we assume current policies, shale gas is almost a wash for global CO2, and methane will decrease or eliminate any small climate benefits of shale gas. If cheap shale gas crowds out renewables or increases energy demand more than IEA predicts, or methane leaks are worse than we think, cheap shale gas will actually hasten climate emissions, even in the short term (2035). Via email, McCabe tells me that the most important factor in the IEA model is crowding out: Cheap shale gas will reduce coal usage (good) but will also **reduce development** of new nuclear, wind, and solar power (bad). So this is your bad climate news for the day—to go along with shrinking Arctic ice, extreme weather, killer droughts, more wildfires, and monsoons increasingly inundating low-lying areas. Natural gas fracking may be good for North Dakota, but the evidence suggests that, in the end, it won't do much of anything to rein in climate change.

#### Not a bridge fuel – guarantees tradeoff and only displaces emissions – and methane wipes out any benefits

Harvey, 12 – environmental correspondent for the Guardian (Fiona, 5/29. “'Golden age of gas' threatens renewable energy, IEA warns.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/29/gas-boom-renewables-agency-warns)

A "golden age of gas" spurred by a tripling of shale gas from fracking and other sources of unconventional gas by 2035 will stop renewable energy in its tracks if governments don't take action, the International Energy Agency has warned. Gas is now relatively abundant in some regions, thanks to the massive expansion of hydraulic fracturing – fracking – for shale gas, and in some areas the price of the fuel has fallen. The result is a threat to renewable energy, which is by comparison more expensive, in part because the greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels are still not taken into account in the price of energy. Fatih Birol, chief economist for the IEA, said the threat to renewables was plain: "Renewable energy may be the victim of cheap gas prices if governments do not stick to their renewable support schemes." Maria van der Hoeven, executive director of the IEA, told a conference in London: "Policy measures by governments for renewable energy have to be there for years to come, as it is not always as cost-effective as it could be." Shale gas fracking – by which dense shale rocks are blasted apart under high pressure jets of water, sand and chemicals in order to release tiny bubbles of methane trapped inside them – was virtually unknown less than ten years ago, but has rapidly become commonplace. In places like the US, the rising price of energy has made such practices economically worthwhile. On current trends, according to the IEA, the world is set for far more global warming than the 2C that scientists say is the limit of safety, beyond which climate change is likely to become catastrophic and irreversible. "A golden age for gas is not necessarily a golden age for the climate," warned Birol. The IEA report comes as the Guardian revealed that gas has been rebranded in secret documents as a form of green energy by the EU. Gas produces only about half of the carbon emissions of coal when burnt, which has led some industry lobbyists to attempt to rebrand it as a "clean" or "low-carbon" fuel. But its effect on the climate is less clear-cut than the direct comparison with coal would suggest. In the US, gas-fired power stations have taken over in some areas from coal-fired power, reducing the nominal carbon emissions from US power stations. But that does not necessarily equate to a global cut in emissions. Last year, the consumption of coal in Europe rose by 6%, according to Birol, which was a result of an excess of cheap coal on the market because of less consumption in the US, while the price on carbon emissions under the EU's emissions trading scheme – supposed to discourage coal – was too low to have any effect. That rise in coal consumption will have increased emissions in the EU, though the data has not yet been fully collected. This example shows that gas can simply displace emissions rather than cut them altogether, according to Birol. "**Gas cannot solve climate change – we need renewable energy**," he told the Guardian. Another important factor is the release of methane – natural gas – from shale gas fracking operations. Methane – a greenhouse gas more than 20 times as potent as carbon dioxide in terms of global warming – leaks from fracking sites, and is rarely captured by the gas companies because the technology to capture it costs money and they face no penalty for the leaks. A report by Scottish Widows found that these "fugitive emissions" were enough to offset the global warming benefits of switching from coal to gas-fired power generation.

## Solvency

### 2NC Blitz

#### Federal regulation of fracking key to avoiding toxic groundwater contamination – state regulations are insufficient

Wiseman 9 (Hannah, Prof of Law @ Florida State, "Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation," http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/thester/courses/Emerging%20Tech%202011/Wiseman%20on%20Fracking.pdf)

Although only a thorough scientific study will determine the breadth of regulation needed, ¶ there are known risks of fracing that should be addressed immediately. The gravest concern – ¶ and one that is most easily regulated within existing statutory framework – is groundwater contamination. The EPA report on fracing recognized that some hazardous fluids are used in fracing, that fluids are often injected into formations at high volumes (a maximum average of ¶ 150,000 gallons per well, and a minimum average of 57,500 gallons per well),¶ 381¶ and that not all ¶ fluids are removed post-fracing. The rate at which the fluids are removed from the formation ¶ after fracing varies from 30 to 61 percent in studies summarized by the EPA, although some predict that total recovery could be as high as 68 or 82 percent.¶ 382¶ Furthermore, the recovery process lasts 10 to 20 years,¶ 383¶ meaning that nearly all of the fluid initially injected may remain in the ¶ ground for years before being even partially recovered. The EPA report also recognizes that fluids can leak away from the hydraulically induced fracture “into smaller secondary fractures” and ¶ “become trapped in the secondary fractures and/or pores of porous rock.”¶ 384¶ “[S]ome fluid constituents may not completely mix with groundwater,” thus preventing their recovery when the ¶ producer pumps groundwater as part of the production process.¶ 385¶ Of greatest concern is the ¶ EPA’s acknowledgement that some chemical constituents in fracing fluids that are not captured ¶ in recovery “will likely be transported by groundwater flowing according to regional hydraulic ¶ gradients,”¶ 386¶ and its conclusion, without adequate scientific support, that concentrations of contaminants in the aquifer would be sufficiently reduced as a result of processes such as adsorption ¶ and dilution to avoid substantial human harm.¶ 387¶ ¶ Because some fracing fluids are injected directly into groundwater sources and may contaminate those sources, Congress should consider repealing the exemption of fracing from the ¶ Safe Drinking Water Act. Efforts along these lines have already commenced, although they may ¶ not be ultimately successful. On September 29, 2008, Representative Diana DeGette of Colo-rado introduced a bill “[t]o repeal the exemption for hydraulic fracturing in the Safe Drinking ¶ Water Act.”¶ 388¶ The bill was referred to a House Committee,¶ 389¶ however, and does not appear to ¶ have made progress. Further congressional attention to this matter is important. ¶ Even if all states had relatively comprehensive protections against pollution of underground ¶ drinking water by fracing, there are valid arguments for federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Underground sources of drinking water are of national concern, yet the existing ¶ state protections tend to address pollution of local sources of water, focusing on landowner wells ¶ or local lakes, streams, or aquifers.¶ 390¶ A contaminant released underground will not necessarily ¶ remain where it is released. Particularly with fracing, which may induce or lengthen fractures of ¶ unanticipated size or connect fractures in one formation to another naturally fractured formation, ¶ the migration of pollutants underground and across state lines is difficult to predict.¶ 391¶ Despite ¶ improved technology to better identify natural fractures and underground formations, the impact ¶ of a pollutant released thousands of feet below ground remains unpredictable, not only for landowners lacking the technology to identify underground pollutants and bring a nuisance or trespass suit, but also for scientists who must drill thousands of samples or produce a complex model ¶ that determines the pollutant’s location and migration.¶ 392¶ Furthermore, even in an area that is ¶ currently sparsely populated, a fracing fluid that enters a formation or an underground drinking ¶ water source may remain there for decades,¶ 393¶ posing problems for future inhabitants. The Safe ¶ Drinking Water Act was designed to protect against these very types of concerns: originally ¶ aimed at problems arising from state regulations of varying effectiveness,¶ 394¶ the Act attempted to ¶ unify drinking water regulation to ensure that all communities were protected against contamination of their drinking water sources.¶ 395¶ And the Underground Injection Control program in particular was a direct response to the dearth of federal limitations on ground water pollution, as ¶ Congress worried that underground water sources were not adequately protected.¶ 396

#### Toxic accumulation risks extinction

Montague 91 (Peter, Editor @ Rachel's Health and Environment Weekly, "REAL HOPE FOR THE GREAT LAKES: LOCAL GROUPS FORM 'ZERO DISCHARGE ALLIANCE'," 3/20,[http://www.ejnet.org/rachel/rhwn225.htm](http://www.ejnet.org/rachel/rhwn225.htm" \t "_blank))

Bioaccumulative toxins are dangerous because amounts that seem harmless are multiplied as they pass through the food chain; often the result is environmental destruction. The adverse consequences of bioaccumulative toxins may become understood only after it is too late. For example, human breast milk is now contaminated with hundreds of persistent, bioaccumulative toxins (see RHWN #193), but the effects of these poisons upon breast-fed infants is not known except in rare cases. Such dousing of infant children with persistent, bioaccumulative toxins is a massive experiment; the full results may become known in the future, but one thing is known beyond any doubt today: it cannot help the human species to expose it from birth onward to a constant bath of industrial toxins. (People who are tempted to think that the human species might be improved by random meddling with our genetic structure should remind themselves that a human is something like a TV set [though of course much more complex] and the hope of improving a human by randomly introducing poisons into its diet at an early age is like splashing hot solder into a TV set's electronic circuits hoping to improve the picture.)¶ It is important to note that many of the most toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative chemicals are formed by the use of the element chlorine. DDT, PCBs, dioxins, CFCs, and many pesticides are chlorine compounds. Most people know of chlorine because it disinfects their drinking water, kills germs in the local swimming pool, or bleaches their clothes in the washing machine. Unfortunately, when it is used by industry, chlorine produces a broad spectrum of toxins that persist in the environment and bioaccumulate. In a very real sense, chlorine lies at the heart of the toxics problem, world-wide.¶ For two decades, government has tried to control toxic pollutants one at a time, by establishing the exact amount that could be safely released into the environment, issuing "permits" giving industry permission to discharge toxics into air and water, then trying to police the polluters to force compliance with the permitted limits. The entire effort was foolish from the start: there are over 40,000 chemicals in use today and 1000 to 2000 new ones enter commercial channels each year. Meanwhile during its 20-year effort, government has managed to establish "safe" limits for fewer than 100 chemicals. Meanwhile, government has gone ahead and issued permits that ignored most chemicals entirely (because there was no basis for saying how much was safe). Finally, government never showed any real interest (or ability) in enforcing these silly permits. A classic house of cards. This wrong-headed effort at pollution control (instead of pollution prevention) has led to massive damage to wildlife throughout the Great Lakes (see RHWN #146) **and, worldwide**, a dangerous accumulation of toxics in creatures that eat at the top of the food chain, like large birds, large fish, bears, and humans.¶ It is now crystal clear that the old way has been a complete failure, which, if it is continued, can only lead to the extinction of humans.

#### The regs solve gas flaring

Robert LaCount 12, Executive Vice President of MJB&A, firm that provides strategic consulting services to address energy and environmental issues for the private, public, and non-profit sectors, 4/19/12, “EPA Finalizes Emissions Standards for the Oil and Gas Industry, Including First-Ever Federal Air Standards for Hydraulic Fracturing,” <http://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/MJBA_EPAReleasesFinalOGNSPS_19April2012fnl.pdf>

Delayed Operational Impacts. The O&G NSPS requires, with certain exceptions, that fractured and refractured gas wells rely on reduced emissions completions (RECs) or green completions to reduce VOC emissions during production operations. In short, the practice captures gas produced during well completions and well workovers following hydraulic fracturing, significantly reducing the need to flare. Traditionally, affected sources would need to comply with an NSPS standard within 60 days of its publication in the Federal Register. However, during the course of the rulemaking, industry stakeholders had raised concerns about the availability of the portable equipment used to separate the gas from the solids and liquids produced during flowback. In response, the final rule phases in implementation of the REC requirement. By delaying the requirement to perform RECs until 2015, but requiring the use of combustion devices to reduce emissions in the interim, EPA has responded to industry concerns about the availability of REC equipment while at the same time ensuring an immediate reduction in emissions. In addition, EPA extended the compliance date for storage vessels (one year after publication in the Federal Register) and pneumatic controllers (one year after publication in the Federal Register).

#### Extinction

Jason Osai 2, Professor, Rivers State of Arts & Science, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, formerly Faculty of the Social Sciences of the University of Port Harcourt, 3/17/12, “SHELL AS AGAMA LIZARD,” http://www.waado.org/Environment/OilCompanies/Shell-Communities/ShellsFalsePR.html

Talking of the impact of gas flaring on the environment, in 1984/85, I was part of a team of professors and graduate students from the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Port Harcourt that undertook a field trip to what is now called the Orashi Region. I guided the team to the gas flare site at Obagi, Obrikom, Ebocha, Ukwugba and Izombe. From one site to another, we took sample of cassava and other crops; we observed the plantains, palm trees and the general vegetation within a certain radius of the gas flared racks and we noted that though the cassava stems and leaves looked unaffected, their tubers were rotten. We also observed a pathetic degeneration from the lush vegetation with giant trees that used to be a rustic meadow; giant racks, spewing roaring flames into the sky had taken the place of the giant trees. These findings were published in Newswatch. It is, therefore, an insult on the collective intellect of the peoples of the Niger Delta for Shell to aver that "gas flaring is not detrimental to the immediate environment." Matter-of-factly, the statement is an insult on the collective intellect of humanity, which is facing imminent extinction as a result of the depletion of the ozone layer - a phenomenon that gas flaring contributes immensely to. Incidentally, I did my administrative internship in 1977 at the Cleveland Division of Air Pollution Control, Cleveland, Ohio, USA and I think I learned quite a bit about pollution and its negative impact on the environment - immediate or otherwise.

#### The CP solves regulatory litigation

Burleson 12 (Elizabeth, LL.M. from the London School of Economics, a J.D. from the¶ University of Connecticut School of Law, and teaches property and energy law at Pace Law School, "Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing:¶ A Human Right to a Clean Environment," http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2074494)

In the vacuum of federal governance, jurisdictions and stakeholders have brought suits¶ against one another to act or refrain from acting to regulate unconventional natural gas extraction.¶ Hydraulic fracturing bans passed by local communities are being challenged by states on¶ preemption grounds.113 The New York Attorney General has sued the federal government¶ including the EPA114 to conduct an environmental impact assessment pursuant to NEPA.115 At¶ the same time EPA has challenged the environmental impact statement issued by the New York¶ Department of Conservation as wholly inadequate. As federal-state responsibilities remain in¶ limbo subject to the manner in which arguments play out in the judicial system, ordinary citizens¶ have organized protests that have resulted in delaying a decision on whether to hydraulically¶ fracture in the Delaware River Basin. The fate of the drinking water for nine million people in New York City remains up in the air in the face of regulatory indecision among civil society,¶ local governments, states, the federal government, courts, and a transboundary water commission.

#### Regulatory litigation slows energy development and increases the cost of production – turns case

Huntley 10/1/12 (Chase, director of renewable energy @ Wilderness Society, "NEPA Helps our Land, Energy, and Wallets," http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/10/energy-project-permitting-the.php?comments=expandall#comments)

NEPA recognizes that the public—which includes industry, landowners, local and state governments, tribes, and business owners among others—can make important contributions by providing unique expertise. Citizens, including local elected officials, across the country have engaged on energy projects at a very local scale. The opportunity to do so is a hallmark of our democratic system. Too often, reasonably foreseeable concerns are raised about energy projects late in the process and are painted as ‘not in my backyard’ opposition. Far from the source of roadblocks, NEPA and other public participation statutes actually offer a roadmap to avoiding conflict and controversy to anyone willing to listen. Upfront planning prevents conflict down the road, creating more certainty for industry and less litigation that slows development and increases costs.

**Solvency: 2NC**

**Compliance easy and cheap – no impact on production**

**Gowrishankar 12** (Vignesh, PhD in solar cells from Stanford, “EPA's regulations would not be a burden on the natural gas industry, says Bloomberg Government,” 8-1-12, National Resources Defense Council,

<http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/vgowrishankar/epas_regulations_would_not_be.html>)

Southwestern Energy, the eighth largest natural gas producer in the US, can perform green completions at an additional cost of precisely $0. That’s right, with their deep experience and honed business practices, they need to spend no more on undertaking green completions than just venting the gas into the atmosphere. Of course, they reap all the additional revenue from the captured methane. In an informal setting, a Southwestern representative remarked that if a company cannot make money off green completions, it is not doing it right. Southwestern’s Mark Boling has been quoted as saying, “API’s experience has not been our experience”. Taking a step back: The capital cost of green completion equipment set is about $500,000 (API estimates it to be about $467,000), and the equipment lasts at least 5 years. It strains credulity to think that a level-headed market participant would pay as much as $80,000 every 15 days to lease equipment, when it could very well buy or build its own equipment for just six times as much and operate it for five years. The difference between the former and the latter could add up to several million dollars wasted on leasing equipment. Moreover, there have been no reports of firms actually paying green completion costs approaching $80,000. Most reports are closer to or under EPA’s $33,000 per green completion. And if Southwestern’s experiences are anything to go by, even these reported costs may go down over time. Accordingly, we think that the cost of green completions would be closer to EPA’s estimates than those provided by BGov. As such, we continue to believe that compliance with EPA regulations will be cost-effective and **likely profitable**. Notwithstanding this discord, NRDC does strongly agree with some of the overarching conclusions of the BGov report. The BGov report acknowledges that the estimated net compliance costs would not be a burden on industry. While it could affect natural gas drilling, the report is quick to point out that the net compliance costs would be about 0.5 – 0.7 percent of total industry revenue. Our recent publication titled “Leaking Profits”, actually provided numerous examples of how some of the measures required in the EPA regulations could be profitable, not a net cost. Regardless, NRDC agrees that, at the very least, the regulations would not be a burden on industry. The report further acknowledges that the price of natural gas and natural gas liquids is the dominant driver affecting production. As such, the report recognizes that it is difficult to parse out the impact of any potential small increase in compliance costs on natural gas production. In fact, the report notes that in Colorado and Wyoming **drilling permits increased** even after green completions were made mandatory in 2009 and 2010.

**Regulations key to prevent public backlash – shuts down fracking entirely**

**Medlock 11** (Dr. Kenneth B. Medlock, Ph.D. in economics, fellow in Energy and Resource Economics at the Baker Institute, and former advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy and the California Energy Commission, Amy Myers Jaffe, graduate from Princeton University, fellow of Energy Studies and director of the Energy Forum at the Baker Institute, and associate director of the Rice Energy Program, Dr. Peter R. Hartley, Ph.D in economics at Rice University, “Shale Gas and National Security,” July 2011, <http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-DOEShaleGas-07192011.pdf>)

It should be pointed out that the sustained, rapid development of shale gas is not a certainty. A stable regulatory environment that fosters responsible development of domestic resources is critical to achieving the potential benefits presented by shale. There are several factors that could stymie development not only in the United States but also elsewhere in the world. While comprehensive discussion of these factors is beyond the scope of this report, we do note that these variables could greatly impact the pace of shale gas development not only in the United States but also in Europe and other international locations. In particular, environmental concerns regarding the use and potential contamination of water resources have recently dominated the news headlines in the United States and France and therefore are among the kind of major issues that will need to be addressed before governments will allow full realization of shale's growth potential.

**Even the American Petroleum Institute agrees that is enough time – no risk of production loss**

**Bloomberg 12** (Jim Efstathiou Jr., “Drillers Say Costs Manageable From Pending Gas Emissions Rule,” 4-17-12,

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-17/drillers-say-costs-manageable-from-pending-gas-emissions-rule.html>)

The rule would take effect about 60 days after it is issued. The **A**merican **P**etroleum **I**nstitute says it will take up to **three years** to manufacture equipment needed to comply and train people to use it. Benjamin Salisbury, a senior energy policy analyst at FBR Capital Markets Corp. in Arlington, Virginia, said he expects the EPA to **delay the effective date** of the rule to prevent any “short-term dislocations.” “We have every reason to believe that the Obama administration wants to ensure that they maintain a vibrant natural gas industry,” Salisbury said in an interview. “Assuming that EPA grants adequate phase-in time, then our read is that this is something that should be **manageable for the industry**.” An Obama administration plan to cut air pollution from natural-gas wells that was delayed after a flurry of last-minute comments won’t slow the gas boom sweeping the U.S., some drillers and industry analysts said. Southwestern Energy Co. (SWN) and Devon Energy Corp. (DVN) say they already use systems to capture methane and other fumes at wells, the key requirement of a rule that may be issued as early as today. **Drilling hasn’t slowed** in Colorado or Wyoming where technology to capture emissions has been required by the state since 2009 and 2010, Christine Tezak, senior policy analyst at Robert W. Baird & Co. in McLean, Virginia, wrote in a March 16 research note.

**All their evidence describes the proposed rule, not the actual rule it gives companies more than enough time**

**AP 12** (Associated Press, “EPA to slash air pollution from natural gas wells,” 4-18-12, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/04/18/ap-newsbreak-epa-to-reduce-gas-drilling-pollution/>)

WASHINGTON – The Obama administration on Wednesday set the first-ever national standards to control air pollution from gas wells that are drilled using a method called hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, but not without making **concessions to the** oil and gas **industry.** President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address strongly backed natural gas drilling as a clean energy source, and recently announced an executive order calling for coordination of federal regulation to ease burdens on producers. But he has come under criticism by the industry and Republicans for policies they say discourage energy development. Top EPA officials said Wednesday that the new regulations would ensure pollution is controlled without slowing natural gas production. "By ensuring the capture of gases that were previously released to pollute our air and threaten our climate, these updated standards will protect our health, but also lead to more product for fuel suppliers to bring to market," said EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson in a statement. Much of the air pollution from fracked gas wells is vented when the well transitions from drilling to actual production, a three- to 10-day process which is referred to as "completion." An **earlier version** of the rule limiting air pollution from gas wells would have required companies to install pollution-reducing equipment **immediately** after the rule was finalized. Drillers now will be given **more than two years** to employ technology to reduce emissions of smog- and soot-forming pollutants during that stage. The Environmental Protection Agency will require drillers to burn off gas in the meantime, an alternative that can release smog-forming nitrogen oxides, but will still slash overall emissions. Industry groups had pushed hard for the delay, saying the equipment to reduce pollution at the wellhead during completion was not readily available. About 25,000 wells a year are being fracked, a process where water, chemicals and sand are injected at high pressure underground to release trapped natural gas. Besides the new standards for oil and gas wells, the EPA also on Wednesday updated existing rules for natural gas processing plants, storage tanks and transmission lines that will reduce amounts of cancer-causing air pollution, such as benzene, and also reduce methane — the main ingredient in natural gas, but also one of the most potent global warming gases. There were other changes made since the EPA proposed the rule last July under a court order that stemmed from a lawsuit brought by environmental groups. Wells drilled in low-pressure areas, such as coalbed methane reserves, would be exempt because they release less pollution during completion. And companies that choose to re-fracture wells using the pollution-reducing equipment prior to the January 2015 deadline would not be covered by other parts of the regulation. Since companies could capture the natural gas and sell it, the EPA estimates that they would save about $11-$19 million a year starting in 2015. The American Petroleum Institute, the main lobbying group for the oil and gas industry, said that much of the industry was **already doing that**. "We don't need (the EPA) to come and tell our members we will save you money," said Howard Feldman, the institute's director of regulatory and scientific affairs. "Their business is natural gas. They get it that they are trying to capture as much gas as they can."

**Certainty: 2NC**

**No uncertainty for companies – this is their 1AC author**

**Gerard 12** (Jack, a degree in political science and J.D. from George Washington University, formerly worked with the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, President and CEO of the American Petroleum Institute, “Supporting Common-Sense Regulation,” 6-19-12, energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/06/epas-cleanair-rules-defend-del.php)

A look at recent EPA decisions and pronouncements suggests an agency looking for guidance in the areas framed by this week’s National Journal question. The approach we need for the intersection of industrial activity, public health and environmental protection is, to borrow a phrase, all of the above. We need an approach based on sound science that also factors in the costs of compliance compared to the achieved benefits, effects on jobs and the overall economic impacts of Washington rule-making. I write this representing an industry that has improved its own efficiency while helping the country use less energy. The U.S. uses about half as much energy for every dollar of GDP as it did in 1980. Meanwhile, our industry has spent more than $239 billion since 1990 to improve the performance of its products, facilities and operations. The result has been a steady reduction in pollution. That said, the oil and natural gas industry supports common-sense environmental regulation. EPA’s current incremental approach, which often comes with a price tag that dwarfs estimated benefits, needs to be replaced with one that’s not unnecessarily burdensome or counter-productive. EPA seems to have **understood this principle** in some cases recently. In others, it hasn’t. For example, EPA and the administration appropriately recognized concerns raised by industry and others and pulled back a proposed new standard for ozone. By some estimates the proposal would’ve put 85 percent of the country in non-compliance. Millions of jobs might have been in jeopardy, and the economy could have faced $1 trillion a year in costs. EPA also **recognized concerns** about a proposed rule on emissions resulting from oil and natural gas development, **agreeing to allow companies until 2015** to develop the equipment needed for compliance and to train workers to use it. But in other areas legitimate concern about the cost effectiveness of proposals seemingly has been dismissed. Our industry urged EPA to consider keeping the current standard on fine-particle soot that had lowered concentrations 27 percent between 2000 and 2010 – evidence that this pollution problem is being addressed, that air quality is improving. But the agency released a more stringent standard last week based, we believe, on faulty data and without sufficient correlating benefit. As written it could discourage investment in areas that fail to meet the standard, costing jobs and economic opportunity. The scenario is similar when it comes to EPA’s push for E15 gasoline, which could damage the engines of millions of vehicles now on our roads, and its aggressive mandate to refiners on cellulosic biofuels, basically requiring them to use a fuel that doesn’t exist. In this context it’s not hard to understand why some are concerned about EPA’s forthcoming Utility MACT Rule on emissions from coal-fired power plants and industrial boilers. The larger point is the signal government is sending to industry and investors with the current approach: inconsistency and uncertainty. Both profoundly hinder economic activity and job creation. Coupled with a sense that legitimate cost-benefit analysis isn’t being uniformly conducted, the seeming disconnect between the regulators and the regulated isn’t surprising. Our industry supports environmental protection and is constantly striving to improve the safety and efficiency of its operations. But without a common-sense regulatory approach that sees the entire picture, America will continue to create problems for itself in terms of fostering economic growth, creating jobs and, in the case of our industry, generating the energy we need for better lives now and in the future.

**Public Opposition: 2NC**

**Regulations prevent public backlash**

**Tullis 12** (Paul, “New EPA Rules Could Prevent 'Fracking' Backlash,” 4-18-12, <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-18/new-epa-rules-could-prevent-fracking-backlash>)

**The E**nvironmental **P**rotection **A**gency on Wednesday released new rules to limit methane emissions from natural gas production, a rare set of regulations that may **serve the industry well**, even if it cuts into producers’ profit margins. The new rules seek foremost to cut down on cancer-causing chemicals released during hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.” But the new regulations will have another benefit: They’ll reduce by 25 percent the amount of methane gas that escapes during fracking operations. This is **critical**, because methane is at the **center of a growing debate** whether natural gas really is a “cleaner” source of energy than coal. As fracking has unlocked remote and, until recently, prohibitively expensive reserves of natural gas, the industry has said the risks involved are outweighed by the fact that natural gas has half the climate impact as coal for the same amount of electricity generated. A number of environmental groups have even embraced natural gas as a “bridge fuel” to a renewable energy future. “Over its full cycle of production, distribution, and use, natural gas emits just over half as many greenhouse gas emissions as coal for equivalent energy output,” wrote the Worldwatch Institute last August. C02 is not the only greenhouse gas, however, and several environmental groups and scientists have begun to question if methane released during fracking operations negates the advantage of less C02. Natural gas, which is about 80 percent methane, leaks into the atmosphere when it’s extracted, transported, stored, distributed, and processed. Most of the leakage occurs where it’s taken from the ground, and how much gets out at that stage may be greater than previously thought. If the leak rate is high enough, the global warming advantage over coal may be lost. A 2011 Cornell study determined suggested that was already the case; the study was the target of much criticism (pdf), though, for assuming high rates of methane leakage. Scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], which conducts much of the government’s climate science, then surprised nearly everyone in February when they revealed that air samples from an area of Colorado with a lot of fracking wells contained **twice the amount** of methane the EPA estimated came from that production method. NOAA’s finding was closer to Cornell’s numbers. A split has emerged between the industry lobbying group American Petroleum Institute, which opposed the new rule, and gas drillers Southwestern Energy and Devon Energy, which both told Bloomberg News that reducing leakage is worth the investment using existing methods. New technologies to capture leaking methane were the subject of a conference in Denver last week. Whether or not abiding by the new rule improves the atmosphere, scientists at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) argue that it’s good for business: The lost methane represents wasted revenue for the industry. Moreover, cleaning up the air near fracking drills will be **good public relations**. “If industry wants to make the case [that it's greener than coal],” says Dan Lashof, a senior scientist at NRDC and director of its climate and clean air program, “then supporting sensible safeguards like these regulations is in their interest.”

**Public opposition threatens all fracking**

**Stevens 12** (Paul, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Developments and Changes,” Energy, Environment and Resources, August 2012, Chatham House Briefing Paper, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp0812_stevens.pdf>)

**The** second **threat** to shale gas operations in the United States is growing concern about the negative environmental consequences of fracking, expressed in **growing opposition** from local communities and NGOs. The 2005 Energy Act explicitly excluded fracking from the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Water Act, a clause that has become known as the ‘Cheney-Halliburton Loophole’. It was known that fracking involved injecting chemicals, and when companies refused to disclose which chemicals were being used, allegedly for reasons of ‘commercial confidentiality’, this inevitably fed conspiracy theories. 17 The Loophole also meant that not only were many shale gas operations done without a proper environmental impact assessment, since they had begun with no measurement of the ‘baseline’, but they could not be properly assessed after the event either. 18 The growing pressure on operators to divulge the chemicals they are using has resulted in many companies now openly declaring them. The ‘Fracking Act’ is currently wending its way through Congress and if successful will force all operators to divulge all chemicals. 19 In general the evidence suggests that media coverage in the United States is not favourable to fracking. Thus the Energy Institute (2012) concluded that media coverage in the Barnett, Haynesville and Marcellus shale areas was overwhelmingly negative – about two-thirds of coverage was on the side of the opposition.

## Econ

### Analytics

No card says US k2 global econ -- Judis says US must restructure international market which they don't do

No econ UQ -- Rampell says many economists are expecting the economy to fall back into recession

### 2NC No Econ War

#### No more wars from economic collapse – we’re in a state of turboparalysis

Lind 12 -- co-founder of the New America Foundation, policy director of the Economic Growth Program, graduate of the University of Texas and Yale, taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, been an editor or staff writer for The New Yorker, Harper’s, The New Republic and The National Interest (Michael, 12/15, "The age of turboparalysis," <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8789631/the-age-of-turboparalysis/>)

More than half a decade has passed since the recession that triggered the financial panic and the Great Recession, but the condition of the world continues to be summed up by what I’ve called ‘turboparalysis’ — a prolonged condition of furious motion without movement in any particular direction, a situation in which the engine roars and the wheels spin but the vehicle refuses to move.¶ The greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression might have been expected to produce revolutions in politics and the world of ideas alike. Outside of the Arab world, however, revolutions are hard to find. Mass unemployment and austerity policies have caused riots in Greece and Spain, but most developed nations are remarkably sedate. Scandal and sputtering economic growth appear unlikely to prevent another peaceful transition of power within the Communist party of China. And in the US, the re-election of President Obama and the strengthening of his Democratic party in the US Senate reflect long-term demographic changes in an increasingly non-white and secular American electorate, not the endorsement of a bold agenda for the future by the Democrats. They don’t have one.¶ In the realm of ideas, turboparalysis is even more striking. On both sides of the Atlantic, political and economic debate proceed as though the bursting of the global bubble economy did not discredit any school of thought. Right, left and centre, the players are the same and so are their familiar moves. Public debate is dominated by the same three groups — market fundamentalists, centrist neoliberals, and mildly reformist social democrats — who have been debating one another since the 1980s. Someone who went to sleep like Rip Van Winkle in the 1980s when Reagan and Thatcher were in power and awoke today would find nothing new in the way of economic theories or political doctrines.¶ By now one might have expected the emergence of innovative and taboo-breaking schools of thought seeking to account for and respond to the global crisis. But to date there is no insurgent political and intellectual left, nor a new right, for that matter. In the US, the militant Tea Party right, many of whose candidates went down to defeat in this year’s elections, represents the last gasp of the Goldwater-Reagan coalition, not something fresh. The American centre-left under Obama is intellectually exhausted and politically feeble, reduced to rebranding as ‘progressive’ policies like the individual mandate system (‘Obamacare’) and tax cuts for the middle class which originated on the moderate right a generation ago. In Britain, the manifestos of various ‘colour revolutions’ — Blue Labour, Red Tory and so on — have the feel of PR brochures promoting rival cliques of ambitious apparatchiks rather than the epochal thinking the times require.¶ Why has a global calamity produced so little political change and, at the same time, so little rethinking? Part of the answer, I think, has to do with the collapse of the two-way transmission belt that linked the public to the political elite. Institutions such as mass political parties, trade unions, and local civic associations, which once connected elected leaders to constituents, have withered away in more individualistic and anonymous societies. One result is a perpetual crisis of legitimacy on the part of political elites, who owe their electoral successes increasingly to rich donors and skilful advertising consultants. New political movements are hard to found. At the same time, anachronistic movements can continue to raise funds or entertain audiences, even if, like America’s conservative movement, they lose election after election.¶ But there is a deeper, structural reason for the persistence of turboparalysis. And that has to do with the power and wealth that incumbent elites accumulated during the decades of the global bubble economy.¶ In essence, the bubble economy was a dysfunctional marriage of export-driven economies like China, Japan and Germany and debt-addicted nations like the US and many of Germany’s European neighbours. As international trade imbalances built up, from the 1980s to the 2000s, so did the wealth and power of elites who profited from the system, from Chinese Communist princelings with a stake in overbuilt export industries to the financiers of Wall Street and the City of London.¶ A global economic system that relied on excessive borrowing by consumers, particularly in the US, was bound to grind to a halt when fearful consumers switched from borrowing to saving. But the crash was only the first stage of the adjustment. The second stage is rebalancing. Countries like China and Germany must rely more on domestic consumption; countries like the US and UK must rely less on private consumer debt and shift resources from finance and housing to productive, traded industries.¶ But these reform agendas, from the downsizing of the overbuilt industrial sectors of mercantilist Asian nations to the pruning of finance in the Anglo-American world, threaten the very interests that profited from the preceding bubble and now glare defensively at a changing world, like Fafnir crouched upon his hoard. In the US, the wealth of the bubble-swollen financial sector has been transmuted into political power via campaign contributions. While Mitt Romney, the candidate of Wall Street, lost his bid for the presidency, the American financial industry overall has been successful in blocking reforms like the nationalising of failed banks (rather than government bailouts with few conditions) and the restructuring of private household mortgage debt. These reforms, along with a dose of moderate inflation and much more aggressive fiscal policies like massive investment in infrastructure, would have helped the economy recover more rapidly. But they would have imposed significant costs on economic elites who have wielded their power to thwart them.¶ For their part, the masses seldom unite against the classes in democracies because they are divided among themselves. When nations realise that they will be collectively poorer in the future than they had expected, the usual result is not solidarity but rather civil war, by means of ballots and sometimes bullets. Confronted by a crisis like the Great Recession, each section of society uses its political influence to try to maintain its share of the national wealth, while forcing the cost of economic adjustment to others. The rich try to shift adjustment costs to the middle class, who in turn try to pay for their own subsidies and entitlements by cutting the programmes of the poor.History is sobering, in this regard. The Great Recession, which continues despite a technical ‘recovery’, can be viewed as the third great economic collapse of the industrial era, following the ‘Long Depression’ of the 1870s-1890s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The earlier two episodes of global economic crisis witnessed setbacks for liberalism, democracy and free trade and the flourishing of illiberal nationalism, racism, imperialism and beggar-thy-neighbour economics. While slow growth combined with national rivalries have not yet engendered anything like the autarkic economics of the earlier two crises, it would be premature to predict the survival of present levels of financial and economic integration in a world that wobbles between feeble recoveries and renewed recessions.¶ Nowhere is there greater potential for conflict than in the relationship between the two poles of the now-collapsed bubble economy — the US, which specialised in exporting debt to China, and China, which specialised in exporting manufactured goods to the US. Since the Great Recession began, American attitudes toward China have grown strikingly more negative. The much-discussed ‘pivot’ in American strategy away from fighting jihadists in the Middle East and Central Asia towards unnamed great power rivals in East Asia is manifestly a shift toward greater military containment of China.¶ And in the recently concluded US elections, both candidates competed in promising to protect American producers from unfair Chinese competition. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which China is excluded, combines military and trade concerns in a single set of America-centred Asian alliances. Gone is the Clinton-era vision of China as a liberalising and democratising partner of the US in a world of great-power harmony.¶ The last global depression was brought to an end by the second world war. This time a ‘hot’ war is extremely unlikely and a cold war merely possible. Nevertheless, geopolitics may do what domestic politics has failed so far to do and free the world’s leading countries from ongoing turboparalysis.

#### AND - even if wars occur, they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states’ desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### 93 examples are on our side

Miller 2k [Morris Miller, Winter 2K. economist and adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration and former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25.4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Their chain of causation is backwards

Ferguson 6 (Niall, prof. of history, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### No impact – econ decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett ‘9(Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how **globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape**. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

### 1NC Biodiversity / Species

#### Marginal losses don’t erode ecosystem resilience

Sagoff ‘8 (Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy @ School of Public Policy @ U. Maryland, Environmental Values, “On the Economic Value of Ecosystem Services”, 17:2, 239-257, EBSCO)

What about the economic value of biodiversity? Biodiversity represents natureʼs greatest largess or excess since species appear nearly as numerous as the stars except that ʻscientists have a better understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there are on Earthʼ.41 The ʻnextʼ or ʻincrementalʼ thousand species taken at random would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available, and another thousand after that. No one has suggested an economic application, moreover, for any of the thousand species in the USA listed as threatened.42 To defend the ʻmarginalʼ value of biodiversity on economic grounds is to trade convincing spiritual, aesthetic and ethical arguments for bogus, pretextual and disingenuous economic ones.43 As David Ehrenfeld has written, We do not know how many [plant] species are needed to keep the planet green and healthy, but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than quarter of a million we have now. Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut, extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bringing the eastern deciduous forest down with it. And if we turn to the invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological diversity, what biologist is willing to find a value – conventional or ecological – for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?44 The disappearance in the wild even of agriculturally useful species appears to have no effect on production. The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened. The genetic material of crop species is contained in tens of thousands of landraces and cultivars in use – rice is an example – and does not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types. Genetic engineering can introduce DNA from virtually any species into virtually any other – which allows for the unlimited creation of biodiversity. A neighbour of mine has collected about 4,000 different species of insects on his two-acre property in Silver Spring, Maryland. These include 500 kinds of Lepidoptera (mostly moths) – half the number another entomologist found at his residence.45 When you factor in plants and animals the amount of ʻbackyard biodiversityʼ in suburbs is astounding and far greater than you can imagine.46 Biodiversity generates no price ʻat the marginʼ because nature provides far more of it than anyone could possibly administer. If one kind of moth flies off, you can easily attract hundreds of others. The price of a building lot in suburban Maryland, where I live, is a function of its proximity to good schools and to Washington, DC. The thousands of kinds of insects, weeds, microbes, etc. that nature lavishes on the typical suburban lot do not increase its price. No one wants to invest to see if any of these creatures contains a cancer-curing drug, although a raccoon in my attic did test positive for rabies.47 No one thinks that property values are a function of biodiversity; no one could suppose that a scarcity of critters looms that might create a competitive advantage for housing lots that are more generously endowed with deer, opossums, muskrats, raccoons, birds or beavers. (A neighbour who has a swimming pool plays unwilling summer host to a beaver who at night jumps off the diving board into the pool, swims around, and jumps again.) An astronomical variety of biodiversity is thrown in with every acre zoned for residential use. Buy an acre or two, and an immense amount of biodiversity is yours for nothing.

### 1NC US Econ Resilient

#### Economy’s resilient – can survive shocks

Bloomberg 12 (“Fed’s Plosser Says U.S. Economy Proving Resilient to Shocks,” 5-9, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-09/fed-s-plosser-says-u-s-economy-proving-resilient-to-shocks.html)

Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser said the U.S. economy has proven “remarkably resilient” to shocks that can damage growth, including surging oil prices and natural disasters. “The economy has now grown for 11 consecutive quarters,” Plosser said today according to remarks prepared for a speech at the Philadelphia Fed. “Growth is not robust. But growth in the past year has continued despite significant risks and external and internal headwinds.” Plosser, who did not discuss his economic outlook or the future for monetary policy, cited shocks to the economy last year, including the tsunami in Japan that disrupted global supply chains, Europe’s credit crisis that has damaged the continent’s banking system and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. “The U.S. economy has a history of being remarkably resilient,” said Plosser, who doesn’t have a vote on policy this year. “These shocks held GDP growth to less than 1 percent in the first half of 2011, and many analysts were concerned that the economy was heading toward a double dip. Yet, the economy proved resilient and growth picked up in the second half of the year.” Plosser spoke at a conference at the Philadelphia Fed titled, “Reinventing Older Communities: Building Resilient Cities.” Urban Resilience His regional bank’s research department is working on a project to measure the resilience of different cities, to learn more about the reasons that some urban areas suffer more than others in downturns, Plosser said. He mentioned one early finding of the study: Industrial diversity increases a city’s resilience. “I do want to caution you that resilient and vibrant communities are not just about government programs or directed industrial planning by community leaders,” Plosser said. “The economic strength of our country is deeply rooted in our market- based economy and the dynamism and resilience of its citizenry.”

### 2NC Nat Gas Spikes – Steady Rise

**Steady rise in prices coming now – no sudden jump**

**Conti 12** (John J., Assistant Administrator of Energy Analysis, United States Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2012,” June 2012, <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf)>

U.S. **natural gas prices** are determined largely by supply and demand conditions in North American markets. At current (2012) price levels, natural gas prices are below average replacement cost. However, over time natural gas prices rise with the cost of developing incremental production capacity (Figure 103). After 2017, natural gas prices rise in the AEO2012 Reference case more rapidly than crude oil prices, but oil prices remain at least three times higher than natural gas prices through the end of the projection (Figure 104). As of January 1, 2010, total proved and unproved natural gas resources are estimated at 2,203 trillion cubic feet. Development costs for natural gas wells are expected to grow slowly. **Henry Hub spot prices** for natural gas rise by **2.1 percent per year** from 2010 through 2035 in the Reference case, to an annual average of $7.37 per million Btu (2010 dollars) in 2035.

### 2NC Nat Gas Spikes – No Impact

**No Impact to Natural Gas volatility – market corrections solve**

**Whitman 11** (Austin F. Whitman, M.J. Bradley & Associates LLC, “Natural Gas Price Volatility: Lessons from Other Markets,” Report for the American Clean Skies Foundation and the Task Force on Ensuring Stable Natural Gas Markets, 1-26-11,

<http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Natural%20Gas%20Price%20Volatility%20-%20Lessons%20from%20Other%20Markets.pdf>)

Natural gas prices do not always move in step with other commodities, but the least regulated markets of the U.S. and UK have seen greater natural gas price volatility than a core set of other global industrial, agricultural, and metals commodities – this in spite of the notorious commodity market boom and bust cycle that happened from 2006 to 2008. Yet excess volatility in the natural gas market **may not**, in the end, **be cause for alarm**. Price volatility is both a **necessary and permanent** part of a liquid market, as concluded in a 2003 study by the American Gas Foundation. 44 It may be that, to paraphrase President Franklin Roosevelt, the only thing we have to fear is fear of volatility – not volatility itself. If a free and open market lets buyers, sellers, and traders innovate and use market-based tools to cope with price fluctuations, **the net economic costs may be trivial**.

**Companies aren’t crushed by volatility – many coping mechanisms**

**Whitman 11** (Austin F. Whitman, M.J. Bradley & Associates LLC, “Natural Gas Price Volatility: Lessons from Other Markets,” Report for the American Clean Skies Foundation and the Task Force on Ensuring Stable Natural Gas Markets, 1-26-11,

<http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Natural%20Gas%20Price%20Volatility%20-%20Lessons%20from%20Other%20Markets.pdf>)

The second section identifies recent price shocks in all five markets and looks for same-year economic impacts on 12 large companies that rely on natural gas as a fuel or feedstock input. It finds that reporting on company filings is imprecise and inconsistent, but provides some insights into how companies **have coped with unexpected price swings**. In most cases companies were well protected headed into periods of unexpected price changes, or were able to adjust business plans so as to minimize price impacts. There were no apparent regional differences in the degree to which companies could cope with price volatility. This analysis is anecdotal and focuses on a single year. As such, it does not capture impacts on long term investment decisions or corporate strategies. But within the narrow scope of the analysis, price volatility does not appear to pose a disproportionate risk to companies that depend on natural gas. **Devices to mitigate** risk include financial and **strategic hedges**, **pricing power**, and access to substitutes. The goal of companies‟ natural gas procurement strategies per se is not to gamble and make money on unexpected price movements in the markets; the goal is to average out to some reasonable, sustainable cost level that leaves room for other operating expenses and a reasonable rate of return. 2 Large companies are often sophisticated when it comes to **managing price volatility**, and treat natural gas price volatility as they do other unavoidable risks from exchange rates, economic cycles, natural disasters, and political factors – to name just a few.

### Manufacturing Not K2 Econ – 1NC

#### Manufacturing not key to the economy

Florida 2/13

[Richard Florida is Co-Founder and Editor at Large at The Atlantic Cities. He's also a Senior Editor at The Atlantic, Director of the Martin Prosperity Institute at the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management, and Global Research Professor at New York University, 2/13/13, Sorry Mr. President, Manufacturing Will Not Save Us, http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2013/02/sorry-mr-president-manufacturing-will-not-save-us/4656/#]

While there is much to applaud about the recent revival of American industry, manufacturing is simply insufficient to help revive lagging industrial regions or power the job creation the nation so badly needs. Here's why: 1. Manufacturing does not generate a lot of jobs: American manufacturing is making a comeback, but is remains an anemic job creator. Manufacturing output is projected to grow from $4.4 trillion in 2010 to a projected $5.7 trillion by 2020, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. But this increased manufacturing output — which stems from improvements in **technology**, greater use of **robots** and automation, and improved production **organization** — will not necessarily translate into a whole lot more jobs. In fact, the BLS projects the U.S. will lose another 73,100 manufacturing jobs by 2020, as manufacturing falls to just seven percent of total employment. 2. Not all manufacturing jobs are good jobs: Americans often think of manufacturing jobs as good, family-supporting union jobs, but unfortunately that's not actually the case. Production workers across the United States average just $34,220 per year according to the BLS, less than half that of knowledge, professional and creative workers ($70,890) and not that much more than what low skill service workers in fields like food preparation, clerical work and retail sales ($30,597) take home. Pay varies considerably across different types of manufacturing jobs. As I noted here last March: The 66,530 tool and die makers or the 36,200 aircraft assemblers have great jobs earning - $48,710 and $45,230, respectively. But the nearly 150,000 sewing machine operators average just $22,630 a year, or $10.88 per hour. While we like to think manufacturing jobs are secure, they are actually among the most vulnerable to the ups and downs of the business cycle. As I noted on Cities this past October, the unemployment rate for workers in blue-collar jobs increased to 14.6 percent during the economic crisis, more than three times the rate of 4.1 percent for knowledge, professional, and creative workers, and considerably higher than the 9.3 percent rate for workers in low-skill service jobs which we typically think of as more vulnerable. Also, many manufacturing jobs that are being brought back onshore offer substantially lower wages then existing manufacturing jobs. "U.S. manufacturing wages have come under further pressure as large established companies like General Electric, Ford and others have instituted two-tier pay practices," I wrote on Cities last year based on a report by the New York Times, which found new hires making just $12 to $19 per hour compared to $21 to $32 per hour for established employees. 3. Manufacturing jobs are concentrated in only some parts of the country: According to a recent Cleveland Fed study, manufacturing remains massively concentrated in the United States. Manufacturing makes up an 11 percent share of U.S. employment. But as the graph below (from the report) shows, the distribution of manufacturing employment in the U.S. is highly skewed. As the report notes: The top 25 percent of counties in terms of their share of manufacturing employment derive about 18 percent or more of their employment from manufacturing. While these counties contain about one-fourth of the manufacturing employment in the United States, they contain only one-eighth of the U.S. population. As the map below (also from the study) shows, manufacturing jobs are overwhelmingly concentrated in the middle of the country, not just in the industrial Midwest but in adjacent parts of the Sun Belt, especially along Interstate 75 in the states of Kentucky down to Georgia, forming a southern industrial heartland. There are only a few red spots in the West. 4. Manufacturing does not translate into local economic growth and development: While many continue to pin their hopes on manufacturing revival, the Cleveland Fed study finds that the counties with high concentrations of manufacturing activity experienced low rates of economic growth over the past decade. According to the report: Since 2000, this set of high-manufacturing-share counties has usually experienced lower employment growth than the rest of the counties in the United States. This was particularly true during the recent recession, when employment losses reached almost 6 percent per year in these counties compared to a peak employment loss of only 3.7 percent per year in the rest of the country. The study finds that while high-manufacturing share counties did rebound during the economic recovery, in the "last year or two employment growth has been roughly the same in the high-manufacturing-share counties as it has been in the rest of the country." The chart above from the report makes this abundantly clear, comparing the trend in employment growth for high-manufacturing counties compared to all other counties. Employment in high-manufacturing counties experienced a five percent decline, employment in the rest of the nation's counties increased by five percent "revealing a stark divergence," according the report. The findings from the Cleveland Fed's report are in line with two related studies by Bill Testa of the Chicago Fed, which found the heavy concentration of manufacturing in the Midwest actually hindered the economic development of its cities and metros (I wrote about this study last year on Cities). Testa's detailed research concluded that "even after accounting for the influence of educational attainment, a historical manufacturing orientation tended to depress subsequent growth" - an effect which was felt for the better part of two decades. As Cities contributor Micheline Maynard pointed out last year, betting on manufacturing's revival is likely to be a "big economic miscalculation" for Midwest cities, ultimately doing "more harm than good." President Obama should know better. It's time for our leaders to stop looking backward, trying to breathe life back into an economy that no longer exists, and develop an economic and job's strategy for the one that actually exists and will shape our future. When all is said and done, it's not manufacturing that drives economic growth and creates new jobs, but innovation, creativity and talent. The big job generators for the past several decades and for the foreseeable future remain high-skill, high-pay knowledge jobs and low-pay, low-skill service jobs. We need to leverage and deepen the former, investing in the knowledge, technology and skill that drive innovation and economic growth. At the same time, we need to transform the more than 60 million low-wage service jobs into good family-supporting jobs like manufacturing jobs used to be.

### Extra

**Gas drilling doesn’t create long term growth – Jobs tradeoff**

**Levi 12** (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations “Think Again: The American Energy Boom,” 8-10-12, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom>)

"The U.S. Energy Boom Will Create Millions of New Jobs." Overstated. The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA. It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more **normal economy.** Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. The oil and **gas boom won't change these much**. That's why we should be **skeptical** about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, these will mostly come at **the expense of jobs elsewhere**. That hardly means all the new oil and gas coming online is worthless. In the near term, it can support hundreds of thousands of workers who would otherwise be unemployed. In the long term, it should deliver a boost to the overall U.S. economy, raising GDP by as much as three percentage points, according to my colleague, Citigroup's Daniel Ahn. But we can't drill our way out of America's job crisis. The **numbers just don't add up**.

**Turn – EPA regulations increase manufacturing industry**

**Gowrishankar 12** (Vignesh, PhD in solar cells from Stanford, “EPA's regulations would not be a burden on the natural gas industry, says Bloomberg Government,” 8-1-12, National Resources Defense Council,

<http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/vgowrishankar/epas_regulations_would_not_be.html>)

The report also identifies an important market opportunity in the natural gas industry, which is of immense significance in our stagnant economy. Increased spending on pollution control services would especially be a boon for smaller regional service companies that offer green completions, such as privately held Hughes Specialty Services, a 90-employee company that serves western Oklahoma and eastern Texas, and privately held Cimarron Energy, of Norman, Oklahoma, which serves areas in Pennsylvania, Texas, Colorado and North Dakota. Increased expenditure on green completion (and other) equipment would also drive business for equipment manufacturers, such as privately-owned Process Equipment and Service Co. Inc., of Farmington, New Mexico. Putting aside all this talk of business implications for a moment, let’s not forget the main purpose behind EPA’s regulations – to start to clean up the operations of the natural gas industry. Actually, we really need to be focusing on renewable energy and energy efficiency as central pillars of a sustainable **energy economy**. However, natural gas can be a transitory step towards a truly sustainable energy mix. If produced in an environmentally-responsible manner, natural gas can be cleaner than other fossil fuels due to the fact that it burns cleaner than these other fuels. It may also offer some advantages in this stagnant economy, such as an inexpensive fuel and an avenue for job-creation. But at the very least we need to get it right – there’s no justification for sacrificing our environment and harming our health in our quest for natural gas. The EPA’s regulations begin to ensure protection for these priceless assets. Nonetheless, natural gas is a fossil fuel, and we, as a community, really need to be looking much further towards truly clean energy resources such as renewables and energy efficiency.

**Manufacturing gas demand declining – high wages prevent a renaissance**

**Tverberg 12** (Gail, Editor of The Oil Drum, Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society and a Member of the American Academy of Actuaries. She also has a Masters Degree in Mathematics from the University of Illinois, Chicago, 3-23-12, “Why US natural gas prices are so low – Are changes needed?,” Our Finite World, <http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/23/why-us-natural-gas-prices-are-so-low-are-changes-needed/>)

2. Little growth in historical uses. One of the underlying reasons why there is a mismatch between supply and demand is the fact that since 1997, US natural gas consumption has remained close to flat, **regardless of price** (Figure 4, below). With very low prices in 2011, consumption rose by 2.2% in 2011 compared to 2010. Natural gas prices recently have been low enough to compete with coal prices. Even at these low price levels, there has been little increase in **industrial demand**, and **no effect** on residential and commercial usage (for heating of buildings, hot water, and cooking). Industrial demand used to be the largest source of natural gas use, but this has been **trending downward**. Part of this downward trend is likely related to industries **moving overseas** for reasons related to **wages**. (Part may be related to spiking natural gas prices, as well.) Residential and commercial use has not been growing because furnaces have been becoming more efficient, and because more attention is being paid to insulation and other conservation measures.

## Methane

### 2NC No XTC

#### Adaptation solves catastrophic impacts to warming

Goklany 11 -- PhD, author and researcher associated with IPCC, expert reviewer and U.S. delegate to that organization (Dr. Indur M., 12/11, "Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming," http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf)

So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more. The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. 39 The Stern Review’s time horizon extends to 2100– 2200 and beyond. 40 Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators. 41 Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, 42 and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100. 43 It should be noted that some of the newer impacts assessments have begun to account for changes in adaptive capacity. For example, the CIESIN study of 2006, in an exercise exploring the vulnerability to climate change under various climate change scenarios, allowed adaptive capacity to increase between the present and 2050 and 2100. 44 However, the researchers arbitrarily limited any increase in adaptive capacity to “either the current global mean or to a value that is 25% higher than the current value—whichever is higher.” 45 Such a limitation would, for example, have missed most of the increase in U.S. adaptive capacity during the twentieth century that virtually eliminated death and disease from climate-sensitive water-borne vector diseases. More recently, another study analyzed the sensitivity of deaths from malaria, diarrhea, schistosomiasis and dengue fever to warming, economic development and other determinants of adaptive capacity through the year 2100. 46 The results indicate, unsurprisingly, that economic development alone could reduce mortality substantially. For malaria, for instance, deaths would be eliminated before 2100 in a number of the more affluent sub-Saharan countries. 47

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

### AT Methane Hydrates

#### Methane hydrates don’t reach the atmosphere – no impact – xt Kvenolden

#### -- No impact to methane release

Dorrite 7 (Dan, “Killer in Our Midst”, http://www.killerinourmidst.com/methane%20catastrophe.html)

First, methane itself is, like carbon dioxide, an asphyxiating gas, depriving aerobic organisms of needed oxygen. When released in the ocean, it would have impaired the metabolism of aerobic marine organisms, and, in sufficient concentrations, would have caused death. Although, upon reaching the atmosphere, methane could have had similar effects on non-marine organisms, its concentrations would have been unlikely to do much harm, because methane is lighter than air and would have been easily dispersed by winds.

### Extra

#### EPA air pollution regs are key to solve methane leakage---repealing them locks in catastrophic warming tipping points

Robert W. Howarth et al 12, the David R. Atkinson Professor of Ecology & Environmental Biology at Cornell University, February 2012, “Venting and leaking of methane from shale gas development: response to Cathles et al.,” Climatic Change, DOI 10.1007/s10584-012-0401-0

In July 2011, EPA (2011b, e) proposed new regulations to reduce emissions during flowback. The proposed regulation is aimed at reducing ozone and other local air pollution, but would also reduce methane emissions. EPA (2011b, e) estimates the regulation would reduce flowback methane emissions from shale gas wells by up to 95%, although gas capture would only be required for wells where collector pipelines are already in place, which is often not the case when new sites are developed. Nonetheless, this is a very important step, and if the regulation is adopted and can be adequately enforced, will reduce greatly the difference in emissions between shale gas and conventional gas in the U.S. We urge universal adoption of gas-capture policies.

To summarize, most studies conclude that methane emissions from shale gas are far higher than from conventional gas: approximately 40% higher, according to Skone et al. (2011) and using the mean values from Howarth et al. (2011), and approximately 60% higher using the estimates from EPA (2011a) and Hultman et al. (2011). Cathles et al. assertion that shale gas emissions are no higher seems implausible to us. The suggestion by Burnham et al. (2011) that shale gas methane emissions are less than for conventional gas seems even less plausible (see Electronic Supplementary Materials).

4 Time frame and global warming potential of methane

Methane is a far more powerful GHG than carbon dioxide, although the residence time for methane in the atmosphere is much shorter. Consequently, the time frame for comparing methane and carbon dioxide is critical. In Howarth et al. (2011), we equally presented two time frames, the 20 and 100 years integrated time after emission, using the global warming potential (GWP) approach. Note that GWPs for methane have only been estimated at time scales of 20, 100, and 500 years, and so GHG analyses that compare methane and carbon dioxide on other time scales require a more complicated atmospheric modeling approach, such as that used by Hayhoe et al. (2002) and Wigley (2011). The GWP approach we follow is quite commonly used in GHG lifecycle analyses, sometimes considering both 20-year and 100-year time frames as we did (Lelieveld et al. 2005; Hultman et al. 2011), but quite commonly using only the 100-year time frame (Jamarillo et al. 2007; Jiang et al. 2011; Fulton et al. 2011; Skone et al. 2011; Burnham et al. 2011). Cathles et al. state that a comparison based on the 20-year GWP is inappropriate, and criticize us for having done so. We very strongly disagree.

Considering methane’s global-warming effects at the decadal time scale is critical (Fig. 2). Hansen et al. (2007) stressed the need for immediate control of methane to avoid critical tipping points in the Earth’s climate system, particularly since methane release from permafrost becomes increasingly likely as global temperature exceeds 1.8°C above the baseline average temperature between 1890 and 1910 (Hansen and Sato 2004; Hansen et al. 2007). This could lead to a rapidly accelerating positive feedback of further global warming (Zimov et al. 2006; Walter et al. 2007). Shindell et al. (2012) and a recent United Nations study both conclude that this 1.8°C threshold may be reached within 30 years unless societies take urgent action to reduce the emissions of methane and other short-lived greenhouse gases now (UNEP/WMO 2011). The reports predict that the lower bound for the danger zone for a temperature increase leading to climate tipping points – a 1.5°C increase – will occur within the next 18 years or even less if emissions of methane and other short-lived radiatively active substances such as black carbon are not better controlled, beginning immediately (Fig. 2) (Shindell et al. 2012; UNEP/WMO 2011).

#### Gas doesn’t displace coal---other factors caused coal to decline---if gas hadn’t filled in, renewables would have

Shakeb Afsah 12, the President and CEO of CO2 Scorecard, and Kendyl Salcito, Policy Communications Specialist for the CO2 Scorecard, 8/7/12, “Shale Gas And The Overhyping Of Its CO2 Reductions,” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/08/07/651821/shale-gas-and-the-fairy-tale-of-its-co2-reductions/

Between 2006 and 2011, America’s electricity generation mix changed dramatically. Though the US increased its electrical output by 41 million MWh, electricity generated from coal and petroleum dropped by a total of 292 million MWh (256 million shed from coal and 36 million from oil—EIA 2012A). Meanwhile, natural gas generation increased by 200 million MWh – a major gain but not enough to cover the loss from coal and petroleum, let alone the additional 41 million MWh generated over the period (Exhibit-2).

Natural gas doesn’t account for all of the reductions in coal- and petroleum-fueled electricity, but we take industry experts at their word that low shale gas prices helped fuel the shift. To quantify the price effect, we need an empirical estimate of the short-run elasticity of fuel substitution, which is provided by a recent EIA analysis (EIA 2012B). The analysis estimates that a 1% increase in the ratio of the delivered fuel price of coal to the delivered price of natural gas to power plants leads to an average 0.14% increase in the fuel input ratio of natural gas to coal. Short-run elasticity is appropriate for the analysis because most of the switch from coal to gas is expected to utilize the existing capacity of gas-fired units (Kaplan 2010; see data notes 1 & 2).

During the shale gas boom, the price of coal increased 109% relative to the price of natural gas (Exhibit-3). This relative price effect would increase the ratio of gas to coal use by around 15% if the EIA’s methodology and elasticities are used (supplemental Exhibit-S1). That 15% translates to an increase in the predicted fuel input ratio of gas to coal from 0.31 to 0.36 over those five years. This is equivalent to a shift of around 728,790 billion BTU shift in energy generation from coal to natural gas (Appendix-1 and data note #3). Natural gas power plants need on average 8,185 BTU to generate one KWh of electricity (EIA 2011). Therefore, 728,790 billion BTU will translate into an average displacement of around 89 million MWh of electricity from coal to natural gas. This quantity, it turns out, accounts for just around 35% of the total electricity generation shed by coal. If the replacement is entirely through natural gas combined cycle units this number will increase to 37% (data note #4).

Petroleum-to-coal displacement: As expected, the EIA study found that petroleum to natural gas switching is equally responsive to the relative price changes. The EIA report states that fuel switching between petroleum and gas is quite common and well established, specifically in the peak and intermediate load ranges—hence factors of production are already well adjusted. It is therefore appropriate to use long-run cross price elasticity of substitution, which gives an estimate of 19 million MWh of electricity from petroleum that shifted to natural gas (Appendix-2). EIA data shows that petroleum based generation fell by 36 million MWh—indicating that more than half of oil was replaced by natural gas. This is not surprising, because the relative price of petroleum to natural gas increased by more than 200% during the period 2006 to 2011.

Further accounting of displaced coal

If only 89 million MWh (35%) from coal was displaced by natural gas due to the relative price advantage, how do we account for the remaining 167 million MWh that coal lost during the period of the shale gas boom?

Stephen Lacey of Climate Progress (Lacey 2012) and David Roberts of Grist (Roberts 2012A) have put forth seven factors that are together shutting down coal generation—two are the respective prices of coal and gas, as calculated above. The remaining 167 million MWh (65%) that coal lost during the period of the shale gas boom was due to Roberts’ and Lacey’s other five factors— (1) regulations, (2) energy efficiency/demand management, (3) improving cost-competitiveness of renewables, (4) recession and (5) NGO campaigns.

Where the low price of natural gas failed to fill the void left by coal, the other five factors show their significance. Renewables filled in about 120 million MWh of the coal generation gap—with wind accounting for around 82 million (Appendix-3). These non-carbon sources typically don’t have much price advantage over coal, yet they account for 46% of its replacement. This gives some indication of the impacts of clean energy programs like production and investment tax credit (PTC & ITC), state level Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and the increasing cost competiveness of wind. Nuclear supplied around 2 million MWh.

Gas stepped in to fill up the remaining 48 million MWh (~19%) of power shed by coal—but it’s not appropriate to say it “displaced” coal; rather it “replaced” coal which was “displaced” by other non-price factors (Exhibit-4). That 48 million MWh of electricity was not going to be generated by coal, regardless of the price differential with gas. If gas were not excessively cheap, it is quite likely that some of this 48 million MWh would have come from renewables.

#### Natural gas can’t serve as a bridge fuel---crowds out renewables

Jesse Jenkins And Alex Trembath 12 are Director and Policy Associate, respectively, with the Breakthrough Institute's Energy and Climate Program. January 19, 2012 6:21 PM 9 agree Submit Avoiding a Natural Gas Bridge to Nowhere By Jesse Jenkins Director of Energy and Climate Policy, Breakthrough Institute By Jesse Jenkins and Alex Trembath <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/01/whats-ahead-for-natural-gas.php>

Cheap gas simultaneously puts pressure on higher-cost nuclear, wind, and solar energy, however. If cheap gas leads to complacency in the development of sustainable, low-carbon electricity sources, today’s gas boon may become tomorrow’s curse, as natural gas eclipses not only coal, but also cleaner, carbon-free energy sources. An increasingly dominant role for natural gas in America’s energy mix also exposes the United States to the inherent volatility of natural gas markets. As a gas, methane flows much faster from wells than crude oil. Natural gas wells thus produce and deplete quite rapidly, with roughly 50 percent of a typical well’s lifetime production expended in the first three or four years. This basic dynamic of rapid production and depletion often leads to a boom-bust cycle in markets, as anyone observing North American natural gas markets over the past half century can attest. If North America begins to export large quantities of natural gas, this inherent volatility will only be exacerbated. The future of natural gas is unlikely to part with this history of boom and bust – unless the United States once again commits to long-term investment in the development of affordable, clean, domestic energy technologies. Without significant and strategic investments in next-generation solar, wind, nuclear, and electric vehicles, there’s every reason to believe the natural gas revolution will continue and gas will ultimately become an increasingly dominant share of the U.S. energy supply. The result will likely be near-term declines in CO2 and pollutants along with growing reliance on another volatile and increasingly costly fossil energy source. The shale gas “bridge fuel” may well become a bridge to nowhere. If instead the United States makes smart, sustained investments in clean energy R&D, demonstration, manufacturing, and infrastructure, there’s no reason to believe America can’t continue to unlock even greater supplies of cleaner, cheaper, domestic energy technologies, from next-generation solar to advanced nuclear reactors. In short, America’s energy future, just like its past, depends on our willingness to invest in innovation.

**Warming is slowing – ocean currents**

**Science Daily 8** (“Will Global Warming Take A Short Break? Improved Climate Predictions Suggest A Reduced Warming Trend During The Next 10 Years”, 5-5, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/05/080502113749.htm)

To date climate change projections, as published in the last IPCC report, only considered changes in future atmospheric composition. This strategy is appropriate for long-term changes in climate such as predictions for the end of the century. However, in order to predict short-term developments over the next decade, models need additional information on natural climate variations, in particular associated with **ocean currents**. Lack of sufficient data has hampered such predictions in the past. Scientists at IFM-GEOMAR and from the MPI for Meteorology have developed a method to derive ocean currents from measurements of sea surface temperature (SST). The latter are available in good quality and global coverage at least for the past 50 years. With this additional information, natural decadal climate variations, which are superimposed on the long-term anthropogenic warming trend, can be predicted. The improved predictions suggest that global **warming will weaken** slightly during the **following 10 years.** “Just to make things clear: we are not stating that anthropogenic climate change won’t be as bad as previously thought”, explains Prof. Mojib Latif from IFM-GEOMAR. “What we are saying is that on top of the warming trend there is a long-periodic oscillation that will probably lead to a to a **lower temperature increase** than we would expect from the current trend during the next years”, adds Latif. “That is like driving from the coast to a mountainous area and crossing some hills and valleys before you reach the top”, explains Dr. Johann Jungclaus from the MPI for Meteorology. “In some years trends of both phenomena, the anthropogenic climate change and the natural decadal variation will add leading to a much stronger temperature rise.”

**Plan causes warming— Extraction releases methane**

**Romm 11** (Joe, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, Ph.D. in physics from MIT, “Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100,” 9-9-11 <http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/09/09/315845/natural-gas-switching-from-coal-to-gas-increases-warming-for-decades/>)

A key finding of the NCAR study is: In summary, our results show that the substitution of gas for coal as an energy source results **in increased** rather than decreased **global warming** for many decades — out to the mid 22nd century for the 10% leakage case. This is in accord with Hayhoe et al. (2002) and with the less well established claims of Howarth et al. (2011) who base their analysis on Global Warming Potentials rather than direct modeling of the climate…. The most important result, however, in accord with the above authors, is that, unless leakage rates for new methane can be kept below 2%, substituting gas for coal is not an effective means for reducing the magnitude of future climate change. What is the leakage rate for methane? Well, as I’ve written, we don’t know exactly because the gas companies won’t release all of their data. We do know that total life-cycle leakage and fugitive emissions from extraction, production, transport, and consumption is higher for shale gas than conventional gas. The controversial — but peer-reviewed — paper by Cornell’s Robert Howarth, which I wrote about here, seeks to quantify the impact of the leakage from the **best available data**. It **concluded**: Natural gas is composed largely of methane, and 3.6% to 7.9% of the methane from shale-gas production escapes to the atmosphere in venting and leaks over the life-time of a well. These methane emissions are at least 30% more than and perhaps more than twice as great as those from conventional gas. The higher emissions from shale gas occur at the time wells are hydraulically fractured — as methane escapes from flow-back return fluids — and during drill out following the fracturing. Methane is a **powerful greenhouse gas**, with a global warming potential that is far greater than that of carbon dioxide, particularly over the time horizon of the first few decades following emission.

**Coal switch ineffective – even with the plan natural gas prices rise enough to make coal competitive**

**NGI 12** (Natural Gas Intelligence, Shale Daily, “EIA Says Shale Driving Natural Gas Production to Record Highs,” 9-12-12, <http://shaledaily.com/news/pdf/sd20120912.pdf>)

Natural gas spot prices averaged $2.84/MMBtu at the Henry Hub in August, down 11 cents/MMBtu from the July average and $1.21/MMBtu (30%) lower than the August 2011 average, according to the report. "While abundant supplies have kept prices relatively low, a hot summer and associated increases in demand for natural gas for power generation contributed to the increase in prices in July," EIA said. The Henry Hub price is expected to average **$2.65**/MMBtu this year, with prices remaining below $3.00/MMBtu until December and climbing to an average $3.34/MMBtu in 2013. EIA expects gas consumption will average 69.8 Bcf/d in 2012, an increase of 3.2 Bcf/d (4.8%) from 2011. "Large gains in electric power use in 2012 more than offset declines in residential and commercial use," EIA said. "Projected consumption of natural gas in the electric power sector averages 25.2 Bcf/d in 2012, 21% higher than in 2011, primarily driven by the improved relative cost advantages of natural gas over coal for power generation in some regions." Total natural gas consumption is expected to increase by 0.2 Bcf/d in 2013, with increases in residential, commercial and industrial consumption offset by declines in the power sector. Because of the projected **increase in natural gas prices** relative to coal, EIA said it expects the recent trend of substituting coal-fired electricity generation with natural gas generation to slow and likely reverse over the next year. "From April through August 2012, average monthly natural gas prices to electric generators increased by 34%, while coal prices fell slightly. EIA expects that **coal-fired** electricity generation will **increase by 9%** in 2013, while natural gas generation will fall by about 10%," EIA said. Working natural gas inventories are at historically high levels for this time of year. As of Aug. 31, working inventories totaled 3,402 Bcf, according to EIA's Weekly Gas Storage Report, 395 Bcf more than last year's level and 329 Bcf above the fiveyear average. EIA said it expects that inventory levels at the end of October will set a new record of 3,950 Bcf, slightly lower than the 3,954 Bcf the agency forecast in its previous outlook (see Shale Daily, Aug. 10)

**Natural Gas prices not responsible for coal-switch – grass-roots activism prevented plant construction**

**Hertsgaard 12** (Mark, fellow of New America Foundation, is The Nation's environment correspondent, “The Biggest Climate Victory You Never Heard Of,” 5-29-12, <http://www.constitutionworld.com/2012/05/the-biggest-climate-victory-you-never-heard-of.html>)

Coal is going down in the United States, and that's good news for the Earth's climate. The US Energy Information Administration has announced that coal, the dirtiest and most carbon-intensive conventional fossil fuel, generated only 36 per cent of US electricity in the first quarter of 2012. That amounts to a staggering 20 per cent decline from one year earlier. And the EIA anticipates additional decline by year's end, suggesting a historic setback for coal, which has provided the majority of the US' electricity for many decades. Even more encouraging, however, is the largely unknown story behind coal's retreat. Mainstream media coverage has credited low prices for natural gas - coal's chief competitor - and the Obama administration's March 27 announcement of stricter limits on greenhouse gas emissions from US power plants. And certainly both of those developments played a role. But a third factor - a persistent grassroots citizens' rebellion that has **blocked the construction** of 166 (and counting) proposed coal-fired power plants - has been at least as important. At the very time when President Obama's "cap-and-trade" climate legislation was going down in flames in Washington, local activists across the United States were helping to impose "a de facto moratorium on new coal", in the words of Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute, one of the first analysts to note the trend. Another surprise: most of these coal plants were defeated in the politically red states of the South and Midwest. Victories were coming "in places like Oklahoma and South Dakota, not the usual liberal bastions where you'd expect environmental victories", recalls Mary Anne Hitt, the director of the Beyond Coal campaign, which provided national coordination for the local efforts. The victories in Oklahoma were particularly sweet, coming in the home state of Capitol Hill's leading climate denier, Senator James Inhofe. Of course the activists had help: the falling cost of natural gas and a decline in electricity demand following the 2008 financial collapse made coal vulnerable. But it was grassroots activism that turned this vulnerability into outright defeat, argues Thomas Sanzillo, a former deputy comptroller for the New York state government who has collaborated with Beyond Coal. "If the activists hadn't been there talking to government regulators and newspaper editorial boards and making the case that coal was a bad bet," Sanzillo explains, "the **plants would have gone forward**, because the utility companies would say, ‘We can handle the costs,' and those [government] boards are often good ol' boy boards."

**No bridge fuel effect - Cheap Gas increases consumption, crowds out renewables**

**Drum 12** (Kevin, writer for Mother Jones on Energy, Environment, Top Stories, “Is Fracking Good for the Environment?,” 9-7-12, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/09/fracking-good-environment)

Unfortunately, the story doesn't stop there, and it gets a lot grimmer as you dig deeper. The problem is simple: If you make something cheaper, people will use more of it. In the case of natural gas, this is fine as long as people are using more of it as a **substitute for coal**. But that accounts for only a **small fraction** of natural gas usage: Less than a third of natural gas is used for electrical generation. Cheap gas will mean more consumption by buildings, industry, and perhaps for transportation. In many of these sectors, cheap gas won’t edge out coal or any other fuel. We'll just burn more of it. So when you make natural gas cheaper, there's a net benefit from the one-third of it that squeezes out coal but a net loss from the two-thirds that simply represents higher consumption of natural gas. What's worse, even in the power generation market there are tradeoffs: Cheap shale gas will also make electricity cheaper, **increasing consumption**, which will chip away at the emission reduction from switching from coal to gas…Quantifying all this requires modeling the effect of unconventional gas on energy markets and emissions, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) recently did. Their report predicts that if these gas resources are widely exploited, globally, CO2 emissions in 2035 will only drop by 1.3%. …In short, if we assume current policies, shale gas is almost a wash for global CO2, and methane will decrease or eliminate any small climate benefits of shale gas. If cheap shale gas crowds out renewables or increases energy demand more than IEA predicts, or methane leaks are worse than we think, cheap shale gas will actually hasten climate emissions, even in the short term (2035). Via email, McCabe tells me that the most important factor in the IEA model is crowding out: Cheap shale gas will reduce coal usage (good) but will also **reduce development** of new nuclear, wind, and solar power (bad). So this is your bad climate news for the day—to go along with shrinking Arctic ice, extreme weather, killer droughts, more wildfires, and monsoons increasingly inundating low-lying areas. Natural gas fracking may be good for North Dakota, but the evidence suggests that, in the end, it won't do much of anything to rein in climate change.

## China

### AT Nankivell

#### Your author concludes pollution causes coop

Nankivell 9 Nathan is a Senior Researcher at the Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Canadien Department of National Defence. (Asia-Pacific Journal, “China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability”, 3/21/2009. <http://japanfocus.org/-Nathan-Nankivell/1799>)

While there is little agreement among scholars about whether resource shortages lead to greater cooperation or conflict, either scenario encompasses security considerations. Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese territorial designs on the region. They note Russia’s falling population in the Far East, currently estimated at some 6 to 7 million, and argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over. While these concerns smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations. While a significant concern, the larger and more realistic implication for Western security analysts must be greater cooperation and a possible alliance with Moscow. It should be assumed that China will court Russia or even pursue an alliance with its northern neighbor to gain access to water, oil, and other natural resources. Indicative of growing strategic cooperation include a number of recent developments between the two countries, including a joint military exercise and continued investment and work on an oil pipeline. Such warming ties between Moscow and Beijing could threaten Western interests in the region and beyond.

### China Shale Fails – 2NC

#### Chinese shale is impossible---Ngo says it’s too geographically difficult to get to the gas, clay concentrations are too high, and there’s not enough water

#### US DOESN’T SOLVE—our ev is EXPLICITY that US experiences with shale are COMPLETELY DIFFERENT

#### BUT—Europe solves any adv they do win, because they’re helping with extraction now—that’s Zhang.

#### Tons of obstacles to Chinese shale – and U.S. expertise doesn’t translate

KPMG Global Energy Institute 2012

(“Shale Gas: Global M&A Trends Focus on Argentina, China and United States,” http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/shale-gas/Documents/global-m-and-a-trendsv2.pdf)

With shale gas development still in its early stages, the success and speed of growth of this market within China **depends on a series of unknowns**, both below and above the ground. Below the ground, **shale gas has been identified in many locations in China but little is known about its gas composition**. Early findings have revealed potential extraction issues that could prove time-consuming and costly.

• Gas reserves in the Sichuan basin tend to contain high amounts of corrosive and potentially lethal hydrogen sulphide, and levels of carbon dioxide and nitrogen could also be high.

• Some of China’s shale gas reserves are buried twice as deep as those in the United States, which could hinder drilling and increase its expense as **techniques used in the** United States **may not be appropriate** at these sites.

• The country’s key gas fields are situated in mountainous regions, making drilling a challenge and increasing the cost of building roads, bridges, pipelines and other infrastructure supports.

• China’s key reserves are located in areas with high tectonic activity, which could prevent the use of existing extraction techniques.

Above the ground, **water availability may be an issue**. The hydraulic fracturing process consumes water in large quantities, but water is scarce around some of China’s larger reserves. Other reserves located in areas such as Sichuan have water in abundance; however, China relies on these areas to grow much of its food supplies, including rice, which is also water-intensive.

**China’s gas infrastructure is less developed than other countries with large shale gas reserves**. Some analysts have suggested its pipelines will not be able to handle the capacity if targeted output is reached. Costly, large-scale pipelines may need to be built to convey product from the major gas fields, which presents a barrier to entry for smaller exploration and production firms.

In addition, **the Chinese government has not issued legislation or set any clear guidance for shale gas exploration**, **market application**, **and strategic planning**. Even though shale gas development is part of China’s current 5 year strategic plan, detailed guidance has not been provided.

#### Domestic restrictions block

Peak Oil News 6/6/12

<http://peakoil.com/production/can-shale-gas-meet-chinas-energy-needs-call-the-fracker/>

Peakoil.com was started in 2005 by Dan C., a software engineer coming to a realization about the importance of understanding then improving the world’s hydrocarbon energy systems. The web is full of diversions, distractions, fluff, and filth, but there are few rare places on the web where you can discuss the things that actually matter to our lives, our families, and to future generations. Our site’s mission has been “exploring the issue of hydrocarbon depletion” AKA Peak Oil, undoubtedly the most serious economic and cultural crossroads in several generations

Geography is one obstacle. But there are others, not least of which is the rewards on offer to investors in a heavily state-dominated sector of China’s economy. China has invited private companies to take up to 49% share in gas drilling ventures, and this includes foreign-invested firms. Shell isn’t the only potential fracker. The question is at what price would gas be sold, and who owns the downstream industry. The ongoing battle to control China Gas Holdings, a Hong Kong-listed gas distributor, is one clue to the high stakes. Any privately invested upstream producer of shale gas will require assurances that they can get a fair price. That isn’t the case with China’s natural gas imports; state-owned importers must bear the loss from subsidies. Two cities have begun experimenting with regulated gas prices pegged to global oil prices, but this would need to be adopted more widely. Investing in unconventional gas fields, with all the technology required to make it feasible, sounds like a loser’s game without market-based pricing. So China’s desire for cleaner energy runs up against its need to tamp down inflation and protect the turf of national oil companies. Don’t expect a wildcat boom in shale gas in China’s western heartland.

#### It’s small

Platt’s 10/3/12

<http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/NaturalGas/7120533>

Startup of shale gas production in China is unlikely to affect the situation in the global energy market in the near future, China's former national energy administrator Zhang Guobao said Wednesday. "China is rich in shale gas resources but... activization of shale gas production in China is unlikely to affect either the domestic or global energy situation," Zhang told the Kazenergy forum, according to a translation provided by the event organizers. Shale gas production in China in the next several years is unlikely to be significant, he added.

#### Slow and small

Financial times, 6/6/12

<http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/06/06/chinas-shale-future-not-as-bright-as-promised/>

Over the past two years, China has drilled dozens of exploratory shale gas wells, which typically involve “fracking” shale rock to release gas. Beijing has unveiled a range of policies to encourage production, including a five-year blueprint for shale development published earlier this year. But none of this has resulted in commercial production and it could take much longer than expected for to develop China’s shale resources. As WoodMac analyst Gavin Thompson puts it: Although the industry has been focused on China’s shale gas developments, this is a long-term story and while substantial, will not satisfy China’s demand. Instead the focus will also need to be on China’s import options to meet rapidly increasing demand which is expected to quadruple by 2030. This presents opportunities for pipe suppliers in Central Asia and Russia in addition to liquefied natural gas suppliers, including potentially from North America. Meanwhile, Coal-to-gas will play the dominant role in near-term domestic supply. The report says that despite Beijing’s ambitious targets, shale gas production will be delayed because of geological challenges, lack of infrastructure, land access issues and uncertainties over whether China’s state-owned oil companies will provide the huge investments needed. “China will therefore require new imported LNG and pipe supply in addition to growth in domestic conventional and unconventional gas supply,” it says. All good news for companies, and countries, in the business of selling gas to China.

### Analytics

You don't cause effective modeling -- China can't model patchwork approach because they are a centralized state

You lead to unsustainability -- Hart says groundwater pollution collapses their economy -- that's what the regs prevent

### 2NC Russia/China War

#### Border deal cemented relations and eradicated the possibility of war

AFP 08(Agence France-Presse, 7/22. “China, Russia finally fix long-disputed border.” http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/wars/China\_Russia\_finally\_fix\_long-disputed\_border130016228.php)

China and Russia signed an agreement Monday that ended a decades-long territorial dispute and finally determined their borders, in the latest sign of warming ties between the former Cold War foes. The protocol, signed by the two countries' foreign ministers in Beijing, added to an existing agreement on their 4,300-kilometre (2,700-mile) boundary, meaning all of the frontier is now set. "China and Russia have discussed their border for over 40 years. It's no simple matter that we have now demarcated the border in its entirety," Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said, after the agreement was signed. "At a political level, it's a mutually beneficial, win-win result," he told reporters at a briefing at the Diaoyutai State Guest House in the Chinese capital. A bitter rift during the Cold War saw the one-time communist allies fight skirmishes along their border. For years, both nations deployed enormous tank armies on both sides of the border, and if full-scale war had broken out, it could have led to one of the largest land battles in history. Recently, however, Russia and China have drawn closer together, motivated partly by a joint ambition to prioritise economic growth. "As we preserve domestic stability in our respective societies, we have now created a very good external environment for social and economic development, which is of huge benefit to us both," Yang said. Yang's Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, described how the border -- once one of the world's most heavily fortified frontiers -- would gradually come to bring the two nations closer. "From a legal point of view we have created the preconditions for the border to become a link of stability, openness, mutual benefit, friendship and cooperation," Lavrov said. There were no specific details given to the press about the agreement, but the state-run China Daily newspaper said the agreement involved Russia handing back 174 square kilometres (69.6 square miles) of island territory to China. All of Yinlong island, known as Tarabarov in Russian, and half of Heixiazi island, Bolshoi Ussuriysky in Russian, in the rivers that border the countries in China's far northeast were returned, according to the paper. The area will now become the "first place on the mainland to see sunlight", forming the easternmost tip of the country, the China Daily said. The area, long claimed by China, was occupied by the former Soviet Union in a border skirmish as early as 1929, according to the paper. After his meeting with Lavrov, Yang spoke positively about the future of bilateral relations. "We exchanged views about how to further promote our bilateral strategic relationship and strengthen our cooperation at the regional and global levels. We reached a broad consensus. I think our discussions were positive," Yang said.

#### -- No Russia/China war – deterrence and economics

Garnett 1 (Sherman, Dean of James Madison College – Michigan State University, Washington Quarterly, Autumn, Lexis)

Perceiving this partnership as a reversal of the balance in the old strategic triangle is also a mistake. Such a view overestimates Sino-Russian leverage, especially given Russia's **economic weakness** and the current **military** **balance**. Most critically, it misdiagnoses an emerging security environment that cannot be reduced to a triangle. Japan, the two Koreas, key Central Asian states, India and many other countries have a direct say in many of the core issues of interest to Russia, China, and the United States. All three powers must adjust to these new actors and to the new patterns their actions will engender on important trade, energy, environmental and security questions. Such a view underestimates the continued leverage Washington has in its bilateral ties over both Moscow and Beijing, even in the aftermath of the Friendship Treaty and the crisis in Sino-U.S. relations over the downed spy plane earlier this year. Russia and China need trade and investment far in excess of what the other can provide.

### 2NC US/China War – Economics

#### Economics places multiple checks on conflict

Haixia 12 (Qi, Lecturer at Department of International Relations – Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(2), Summer, p. 105-127, http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/105.full)

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’. Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the United States and China. Involvement in the globalization process has rapidly expanded China's involvement in international organizations in ever-growing fields,36 within many of which China accepts West-led international norms.37 The country has thus shifted from ‘opposing the international order’ to ‘reforming the international order’ to ‘maintaining the international order’.38 Globalization has changed not only China's but also United States’ behavioral principles. The growth of Sino–US economic interdependence has prompted the United States’ adoption of a two-pronged policy of military and political containment and of economic engagement. Its aim is to reduce the risk of a head-on conflict that could considerably damage United States’ interests. These contradictory strands of US policy towards China are an indicator of superficial friendship. Under the context of economic globalization, China has also developed economic interdependence with United States’ allies. This has reduced incentives to participate in containment of China and also dampened United States’ resolve to maintain a policy of complete containment. As a result, certain scholars argue that enhanced levels of interdependence among China and other nations have diminished the probability of China's opting to rise through forceful expansion.39

### 2NC China Econ – Resilient

#### -- Chinese economy resilient

Overholt 4 (Dr. William H., Asia Policy Chair – Center for Asia Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation, “China’s Economy, Resilience and Challenge”, Harvard China Review, Spring, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2005/RP1116.pdf)

China's economy has demonstrated **extraordinary resilience** in the face of the global economy slowdown, the SARS tragedy, and the stresses of WTO entry. This resilience results from the successful shift to domestic-led growth and from rising productivity caused by economic reform, rising competition, and highly entrepreneurial economic structure, and high levels of foreign direct investment. China's successes are being achieved by reforms that **overcome severe challenges**. Among these challenges are a pressures on China to revalue its currency and China's rapidly expanding money supply and overheating economic expansion. What distinguishes China from other countries facing similar challenges is that it has chosen a process of gradual reform and opening that has proved successful in other Asia countries. It has also demonstrated an ability to form a workable leadership consensus regarding its most important problems, to implement solutions in the face of great political and social stress, and to overcome the stress by delivering large benefits for most of the Chinese people.

#### -- China can take a hit

Global Insight 8 (“Momentum of Chinese Growth Proves Resilient to Natural Disasters, Global Risks”, 7-17,

http://www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail13363.htm)

Growth in the Chinese economy moderated in the first half of the year, but proved **durable in the face of cataclysms** at home and an increasingly grim outlook for external demand. Although momentum moderated, the Chinese economy showed **resilience** in the first half of 2008 in the face of a string of natural disasters and mounting downside risks in the global economic outlook. Data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) today r**e**vealed that the economy expanded by 10.4% y/y in the first half of the year, after expanding by 10.1% in the second quarter. In the three months through March, the economy expanded by 10.6%. Severe snowstorms at the beginning of the year, the huge earthquake in Sichuan province in May, and recent flooding in other areas had been expected to rob growth of some traction, compounded by reversals in U.S.-led global demand. The second-quarter outturn marked the slowest rate of growth since 2005, but also the 14th consecutive quarter of double-digit growth.

#### -- China’s economy is resilient

Asia Times 2 (Francesco Sisci, “China and the Global Security We”, 7-25, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DG25Ad01.html)

Furthermore, growth in the past 20 years in China has proved not only buoyant but **resilient.** In spite of crisis in one year or another, the economy has **never plunged into a real recession**, and the nation has forfeited the whole socialist welfare system in a matter of a couple of years. Education and health assistance are now organized on a strictly profit bases, without state support, housing has been privatized and jobs are no longer for life. These changes would have caused more than one revolution in any other country, but in China they were digested without major uprisings. Therefore in the future China can well be expected to carry on with economic reforms that appear modest compared with the ones it has already achieved, and continue its high growth.

### 2NC China Econ – No War

#### -- No war: downturn causes China to rely on neighbors for growth

SCMP 2 (South China Morning Post, 11-2, Lexis)

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Apparently oil-rich islands in the South China Sea have for decades been a sticking point in relations between China and Southeast Asian nations. At times from the early to mid-1990s, the issue even teetered on the brink of military confrontation. But the meltdown of Asian economies in 1997 steered the region's focus from territorial claims to matters closer to home - fiscal survival. China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations **moved towards one another**, seeking mutual benefits as a matter of necessity. The mainland assisted by providing financial support and maintaining the value of the yuan.

### Extra

#### Europe solves

Zhang, Analyst, International Market & Strategy Analysis Group, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, June 2010

(Yue, “The Shale Gas Boom Shift to China,” http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3179.pdf)

Besides the US, recently, **European majors** seeing shale gas exploration positively **are** also **working** together **actively in Chinese companies to develop shale** gas reserves **in China**. After Shell and PetroChina signed an agreement on shale gas development in the Sichuan area last December, since the beginning of this year, **BP and Sinopec have been discussing developing shale** gas reserves **in Guizhou** province **and Jiangsu** province as well.

#### No China-Russia war

Spears, chief foreign policy writer – Brooks Foreign Policy Review, 5/1/’9

(Collin, <http://brooksreview.wordpress.com/2009/05/01/leery-bear-rising-dragon-life-along-the-sino-russian-border/>)

Although China is facing water shortages and will need inordinate amounts of resources to keep its economy growing, there is no evidence the Chinese government is purposefully moving “settler populations” into Russia to prepare for impending annexation of the Far East or Siberia. In addition, China has shown no interest in territorial expansion since the Qing Dynasty. For the last decade, China’s primary interest has been to secure a stable border to its West and North, where it can gain access to energy supplies and expand its political and economic reach into East and Southeast Asia. Any move at colonization by China could result in a very destruction war that could become nuclear. In fact**,** Russia’s vast nuclear deterrent is its security guarantee for the region, as China has proved to be a rational actor.

#### No CCP collapse—the government represses instability

Pei 9(Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12. “Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis)

It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.

## 1NR – Politics

### 2NC Multi-Condo Good

**Condo’s good**

**1. Neg flex – can’t use kritiks and counterplans and test the aff from different angles**

**2. Information processing – multiple choices make for more tactile and harder debate – fosters 2ac tech skills**

**3. Real-world – policy-makers aren’t forced to stick to their opinions if they realize a flaw**

**[4. Research – sides have to learn a broader variety of issues instead of relying on generics**

**5. Checks new affs – neg needs to be able to test multiple options on the fly]**

**Counter-interpretation – we get** 1 CP 1 K **– it’s a logical fixed limit that mitigates their offense**

**Not a voter - just a reason conditional worlds should be banned – solves 1AR allocation**

**AT: Strat Skew**

**No reason we skewed you any more than disads, T, or impact turns would – our advocacies aren’t contradictory**

**AT: In-depth education**

**2NR checks – still gain education but are forced to think about time allocation too – eventually will come down to the best option**

**AT: Neg Bias**

**Aff has first and last speech, gets to pick the focus of the debate, and can go for a single dropped arg in the 2ar – this topic proves there is no predictable neg ground**

**AT: C/I – One Condo**

**Can’t solve either teams offense – means we can’t test new options on the fly and leads to staler debate**

**Arbitrary and self-serving – like saying you can cheat just not in the specific way you cheated in this debate – if theory is entirely offense/defense, then all of our offense is a linear disad**

**AT C/I – Dispo**

**Arbitrary and not real-world – forces us into random rules to stick us with advocacies, let’s the aff frame the debate**

### Hegemony Impact 2NC

#### Heg solves war – deters conflict - primacy is responsible for a 99% drop in war-related death. Prefer our evidence because he is a professor of warfare analysis at the U.S. Naval Academy

#### Leadership reduces the probability of conflict.

**Thayer**, November/December **2006** (Bradley A., In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, p. EBSCO Host)

Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.

### AT: Hegemony Doesn’t Solve War

#### Extend the 1NC Barnett 2011 evidence ---.

#### Spread of human rights prevents WMD conflict.

**Burke-White**, Spring **2004** (William – Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean – Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. – Cambridge, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation, The Harvard Human Rights Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis)

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [\*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

### Turns Economy 2NC

#### Economy ---

#### Turns economy --- failure to pass immigration reform results in economic decline --- kills jobs, wages and revenue.

Center for American Progress, 1/14/2010 (How Immigration Reform Would Help the Economy, p. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2010/01/14/7130/how-immigration-reform-would-help-the-economy/)

A new report, “Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” by Dr. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, finds that comprehensive immigration reform that includes a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants and enables a future flow of legal workers would result in a large economic benefit—a cumulative $1.5 trillion in added U.S. gross domestic product over 10 years. In stark contrast, a deportation- only policy would result in a loss of $2.6 trillion in GDP over 10 years. Hinojosa uses a computable general equilibrium model based on the historical experience of the 1986 legalization program, and finds that: Comprehensive immigration reform that includes a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants would stimulate the U.S. economy. Immigration reform would increase U.S. GDP by at least 0.84 percent. This would translate into at least a $1.5 trillion cumulative increase in GDP over 10 years, which includes approximately $1.2 trillion in consumption and $256 billion in investment. The benefits of additional GDP growth would be spread broadly throughout the U.S. economy, but immigrant-heavy sectors such as textiles, electronic equipment, and construction would see particularly large increases. The higher earning power of newly legalized workers would mean increased tax revenues of $4.5 billion to $5.4 billion in the first three years. Higher personal income would also generate increased consumer spending—enough to support 750,000 to 900,000 jobs in the United States. Experience shows that legalized workers open bank accounts, buy homes, and start businesses, further stimulating the U.S. economy. Comprehensive immigration reform increases all workers’ wages. The real wages of less-skilled newly legalized workers would increase by roughly $4,405 per year, while higher-skilled workers would see their income increase $6,185 per year. The wages of native-born high-skill and low-skill U.S. workers also increase modestly under comprehensive immigration reform because the “wage floor” rises for all workers. Legalized workers invest more in their human capital, including education, job training, and English-language skills, making them even more productive workers and higher earners. Mass deportation is costly, lowers wages, and harms the U.S. economy. Mass deportation would reduce U.S. GDP by 1.46 percent, amounting to a cumulative $2.6 trillion loss in GDP over 10 years, not including the actual costs of deportation. The Center for American Progress has estimated that mass deportation would cost $206 billion to $230 billion over five years. Wages would rise for less-skilled native-born workers under a mass deportation scenario, but higher-skilled natives’ wages would decrease, and there would be widespread job loss. Studies from various researchers with divergent political perspectives confirm these findings. A report by the libertarian CATO Institute using a similar CGE model came to startlingly similar conclusions. CATO found that legalization would yield significant income gains for American workers and households. Legalization would boost the incomes of U.S. households by $180 billion in 2019. CATO also concluded that tighter restrictions and a reduction in less-skilled immigration would impose large costs on native-born Americans by shrinking the overall economy and lowering worker productivity.

#### Econ doesn’t turn heg.

**Kagan**, 1/11/**2012** (Robert – senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, Not Fade Away, The New Republic, p. International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI)

SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for America’s relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.

### 1NC – India

#### Turns China Econ

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**2012** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

### L.A.

#### Reform key to Latin American relations

**Shifter, Inter-American Dialogue president, 2012**

(Michael, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>, DOA: 2-9-13, ldg)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation. The **inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the U**nited **S**tates **and** nearly **every other country in the Americas**. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Extinction

**Shifter, Inter-American Dialogue president, 2012**

(Michael, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>, DOA: 2-9-13, ldg)

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties. Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a **vital** market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology **for Latin America**, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance. For its part, **Latin America’s rising economies will** inevitably **become** more and more **crucial to the U**nited **S**tates’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such **global matters as climate change**, nuclear non-proliferation, and **democracy and human rights.** With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

### U – 2NC

#### Will pass – GOP

Smith 3/8

[Larry, Left Foot Forward, The Week in Washington: Obama and GOP talk budget, filibuster fails to block CIA director and more, 3/8/13,

<http://www.leftfootforward.org/2013/03/the-week-in-washington-obama-and-gop-talk-budget-filibuster-fails-to-block-cia-director-and-more/>]

Republican senators involved in talks on immigration reform have said they are still prepared to offer undocumented aliens a pathway to full citizenship, despite unexpected opposition to the idea from Jeb Bush. In press interviews this week, the three most influential GOP senators in favour of an overhaul – John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio - restated their support for a pathway and rejected an alternative plan floated by the former Florida governor which would allow immigrants legal residency but not citizenship. Bush’s intervention – which comes in a new book written last year – took many observers by surprise given his previous support for large-scale reform. Some have wondered whether the ex-governor is positioning himself for a Republican presidential primary, although it seems more likely he formulated the alternative to woo his party away from hardline positions it took during the 2012 election. Bush has already indicated he could change his position on the issue. The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that the cross-party group of senators working on an immigration reform bill would not have a draft ready until April at the earliest. However, there are signs of progress in the House of Representatives. Judiciary Chair Bob Goodlatte has announced he will hold classes for members on immigration to ensure a lack of in-depth knowledge does not hinder legislation, and small **GOP working groups are aiding bipartisan House talks on the issue**. Aides to Speaker Boehner have said his chamber may end up passing ‘**small-bore’ bills that could then be reconciled with a comprehensive Senate blueprint**.

**A2: DA Not Intrinsic**

**-- Our disad is intrinsic – the link proves that the plan results in no immmigration.**

**-- Destroys all ground –**

**A) No disad is intrinsic – “make-up calls” can be crafted to solve any link or impact – even purely reaction-based DAs like Relations can be avoided by having the government cut the offended nation a big check**

**B) Fairness outweighs – logical debate is worthless if the Neg always loses. Fairness protects the forum that makes debate educational**

**-- Moving target – intrinsicness makes the plan conditional – destroys fairness because it's the locus of debate**

**-- Not logical: no single actor can do the plan and other actions. Even Congress is made up of many individual legislators.**

**-- Empirical intrinsicness checks – the Aff can read evidence that Congress will react to the plan by taking action – but not fiat that it occurs**

### Immigration Answers – Poison Pill

#### GOP will backlash to Obama’s PC – they think he will just make the issue political

O’Brien 2-22 [GOP fears Obama will jilt them on immigration, February 22nd, 2013, <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/22/17057820-gop-fears-obama-will-jilt-them-on-immigration?lite>, Chetan]

A recurring fear has colored Republicans’ attitude toward the current immigration reform debate in Congress: President Barack Obama has no actual interest in reaching a deal, and is instead pursuing the issue to exacerbate the GOP’s problems with Hispanic voters. Yet all of the evidence so far – whether in his speeches and or his relations with Congress – suggests he and his administration clearly want a deal that he could sign into law. Politics, of course, play an undeniable role in the renewed effort to overhaul the nation’s immigration laws, especially given that Obama won more than 70 percent of the Latino vote in the 2012 election. Consequently, Republicans who had previously resisted any legislation that offered a pathway to citizenship for the nation’s some 11 million undocumented immigrants have now reversed course. “The Republican Party is losing the support of our Hispanic citizens and we realize that there are many issues on which we think we are in agreement with our Hispanic citizens but this is a preeminent issue with those citizens,” Arizona Sen. John McCain, a Republican member of the bipartisan Senate group working toward an immigration accord, said bluntly upon the introduction of that proposal’s framework. But Republicans have warily engaged the new debate over immigration with active fears that the president’s true intentions on immigration are half-hearted, at best. Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, who’s established himself as an outspoken conservative after just a couple of months on the job, was only the latest Republican to give voice to that fear. “I don’t believe President Obama wants an immigration bill to pass, instead I think he wants a political issue,” he said in a speech on Wednesday, according to a report by the Houston Chronicle. ”His objective is to push so much on the table that he forces Republicans walk away from the table because then he wants to use that issue in 2014 and 2016 as a divisive wedge issue.” It’s a fear that many of Cruz’s fellow elected Republicans appear to share.

### A2: Heg Sustainable

#### Immigration reform spurs military nanotech --- key to precise weaponry.

**Carafano 7** (James, Ph.D., Deputy Driector – Institute for International Studies and Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation, and Andrew Gudgel, “Nanotechnology and National Security: Small Changes, Big Impact”, Heritage Backgrounder, 9-21, http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology -and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact)

Nanotechnology is an emerging transformational technology that promises wide and dual-use applica­tions in many fields, particularly national security. The United States is the world's acknowledged leader in nanoscience, but stiff international competition is nar­rowing America's lead. Many other countries, specifi­cally European nations and China, have large, established nanotechnology initiatives. Most commer­cial applications of nanotechnology are still nascent. In the near term, the most promising develop­ments for national security will likely come from government research rather than from the applica­tion of commercial off-the-shelf nanotechnologies. To meet national security needs in the near term, the U.S. government needs to adopt new legislative and policy innovations, including promoting long-term research, distributing federal grants more widely, and promoting scientific travel and exchanges to maintain a supply of skilled experts. Over the long term, the government should remove capital and regulatory barriers to lower the cost of research and emerging technologies and should address safety and environmental issues. What Is Nanotechnology? "Nanotechnology" is derived from "nano," the Greek word for dwarf. It involves manipulating and manufacturing particles at the microscopic and even atomic levels, between 1 nanometer and 100 nanom­eters. By comparison, a human hair is roughly 100,000 nanometers wide. Combining the ability to manipulate molecular structures with advances in genomics and other bio­logical sciences has created a wealth of new research opportunities. By putting these unique properties to work, scientists are developing highly beneficial dual-use products in medicine, electronics, and many other industries that will also provide enor­mous defense and homeland security capabilities. These scientific developments are creating new industries. The market opportunities are so sub­stantial that many government and business lead­ers describe nanotechnology as "the next industrial revolution." Nanotechnology was incorporated into manu­factured goods worth more than $30 billion in 2005, and this figure is projected to reach $2.6 tril­lion by 2015.[[1]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn1" \o ") However, since nanotechnology is relatively new, government research is critical for developing applications of this new technology, par­ticularly in the field of national security. A Small Beginning The birth of nanotechnology can be traced to 1981, when Gerd Binning and Heinrich Rohrer, sci­entists at IBM Research, Zurich, created the scan­ning tunneling microscope (STM). The STM was the first instrument capable of performing opera­tions at the atomic scale, such as adding or remov­ing individual electrons to or from atoms and molecules. It gave researchers the unprecedented ability to change materials "from the bottom up." The two scientists won the Nobel Prize in physics for their invention in 1986.[[2]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn2) Within a few years, scientists had demonstrated the capability to manufacture nanoparticles. The discovery of fullerines (isomers or molecules of pure carbon that can be manipulated into unique structures, such as "buckyballs") in 1985 and car­bon nanotubes (manufactured one-atom-thick sheets of carbon rolled into cylinders) in 1991 sparked further interest in nanotechnology. These molecules have novel properties that make them potentially useful in a wide variety of applica­tions, including electronics, optics, and other fields of material science. They also exhibit extraordinary strength and unique electrical properties. Carbon nanotubes are 100 times stronger than steel at one-sixth the weight, while buckyballs are hollow, mak­ing them well-suited for use as carriers of drugs or other materials.[[3]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn3) Nanotechnology Today Current commercial nanotechnological prod­ucts are limited to first-generation passive applica­tions, such as nanoparticles, coatings, catalysts, and nanocomposites (materials formed from organic and inorganic components at the nanos­cale). Products include cosmetics, automobile parts, clothing, and sports equipment. Research is quickly leading nanotechnology to converge with other fields, including biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. Using techniques commonly found in semicon­ductor manufacture, researchers have created adjustable "quantum dots" by making "wells" and "corrals" on silicon chips where individual elec­trons can be trapped and held. The shell of elec­trons around every atom determines its properties, such as color and electrical conductivity. By filling these quantum corrals with differing numbers of electrons, researchers can create artificial "atoms" that have the same properties as any element on- or beyond-the periodic table, although these "atoms" are temporary and lack nuclei. Simply adding or subtracting electrons from these wells changes the type of "atom." Grids of quantum corrals built across the surface of a silicon semiconductor chip would allow the creation of artificial molecules, which would theoretically allow the entire chip to have-at least on its sur­face-the physical properties of almost any mate­rial imaginable. Some aspects of current nanotechnology also blur the line with biotechnology. For example, nanoparticles (clusters of tens to hundreds of indi­vidual atoms) have been used in medical research to fight diseases, including cancer. Researchers are also exploring ways to manipulate the genetic code that have tremendous implications in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. A nanoparticle that encapsu­lates medication with biomolecules could be designed to bind only to the cells that need the medicine. Such research could also affect other dis­ease research and possibly change the medical response to national catastrophic disaster.[[4]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn4) Nanophotonics is another growing field of nano­technology research. Photonics, which uses light, is the ability to control photons for the purpose of car­rying, processing, storing, or displaying informa­tion. Well-known applications of photonics include fiberoptic cable, television screens, computer dis­plays, and laser and imaging systems. In nanophotonics, scientists control the mor­phology of materials and, as a result, can now change how a material refracts light. Thus, nano­photonics is not simply the scaling-down of existing systems, but utilizing physics, functionalities, and design strategies that are different from regular pho­tonics to produce tiny waveguides, microscopes on a single chip, better optical communications equip­ment, and chemical and biological sensors.[[5]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn5" \o ") National Security Implications In 2000, the federal government established the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to pro­mote nanotechnology research at the federal level. The NNI is managed by the Nanoscale Science Engineering and Technology Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council, an inter­agency organization of 26 federal agencies that coordinates planning, budgeting, and program implementation among defense and national secu­rity stakeholders. This structure is vital to dissemi­nating information and fostering cross-disciplinary networks and partnerships. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are NNI members. In addition to funding research, federal support through the NNI provides crucial funds for the cre­ation of nanotech support infrastructure, such as nanoscale research labs, and for educational re­sources to develop a skilled workforce capable of advancing nanotechnology. These programs en­courage business, including small business, to pur­sue nanotechnology opportunities.[[6]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn6" \o ") Military Applications. All branches of the U.S. military are currently conducting nanotechnology research, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Office of Naval Research (ONR), Army Research Office (ARO), and Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The Air Force is heavily involved in research of composite materials.[[7]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn7" \o ") Among other projects, the Navy Research Laboratory's Institute for Nanoscience has studied quantum dots for application in nanopho­tonics and identifying biological materials.[[8]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn8" \o ") In May 2003, the Army and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology opened the Institute for Soldier Nano­technologies, a joint research collaboration to develop technologies to protect soldiers better.[[9]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn9" \o ") Nanotechnology has numerous military applica­tions. The most obvious are in materials science. Carbon nanotubes and diamond films and fibers have higher strength-to-weight ratios than steel, which allows for lighter and stronger armor and parts for vehicles, equipment, and aircraft. Such upgraded military Humvees would better protect soldiers from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small-arms fire. In another application, adding nickel nanostrands (ropes of material no wider than a few molecules), which can conduct electricity, could make aircraft more resistant to lightning strikes. The nickel strands also have magnetic properties that may prove useful in filters and energy storage devices.[[10]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn10" \o ") The U.S. Army is actively pursuing nanotech­nology for use in soldiers' uniforms, equipment, and armor. As part of the planned Objective Force Warrior Soldier Ensemble, the Army hopes to cre­ate a uniform that provides flexible armor protec­tion for soldiers' limbs through the use of shear thickening liquids that solidify when force is applied to them. This would greatly reduce the weight that a soldier must carry. (Current body armor weighs around 25 pounds.) Other features of the planned uniform include medical sensors, medical treatment capabilities, communications, and individual environmental control for the soldier and integrated thermal, chemical, and biological sensing systems woven into the garment's fabric.[[11]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn11" \o ") Nanotechnology would allow for more precise control of fuel combustion and detonation of explosives. Explosives and propellants could be constructed atom by atom to optimal particle sizes and ratios of ingredients so that the materials approach their theoretical limits of energy release. This would lead to smaller, more powerful rock­ets, propellants, warheads, bombs, and other explosive devices. For slower release of energy, nanotechnology would allow for more powerful batteries, fuel cells, photovoltaic panels, and perhaps even more exotic methods of generating electrical power. Researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology recently developed piezoelectric fibers, which someday may be used in fabrics that generate their own electricity, completely eliminating the need for batteries.[[12]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn12" \o ") In electronics, nanotechnology would allow the creation of ever-smaller computers and sensors, leading to integrated packages that could sense, dis­criminate, decide, report information, and provide control input to other devices. For example, tires that sense the surface over which they are traveling could automatically adjust tire pressure to maintain optimal traction. Smart sensors could be used in single-chip chemical and biological agent laboratories that would be smaller, faster, and more accurate than current testing methods. They could also be attached to miniature disposable sensor platforms, allowing monitoring of a large battlespace at mini­mal cost, effort, and danger to soldiers. In the more distant future, combining nanocom­puters, sensors, and nanomechanical architectures into one system would make possible autono­mously targeted and guided projectiles, such as bul­lets and rockets. Nanotechnology could also improve communications and information process­ing, whether on the battlefield or with the Oval Office, through microscopic computers, switches, lasers, mirrors, detectors, and other optical and electrical devices. The laws of physics and optics change funda­mentally at the near-atomic level. Instead of being masked by the manipulation of particles on the sur­face, materials can be changed at the optical elec­tronic level. Materials that display one optical or electronic property at the macro level may display a different property at the nanometer level. Remark­able mechanisms become possible, such as nega­tively refractive optics that bend light at angles and in directions otherwise impossible.[[13]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn13" \o ") Such devices could lead to the development of lenses that focus almost instantaneously and light-bending camou­flage that changes as the solider or vehicle moves. One theoretical and exotic use of nanophotonic materials would be fiberoptic waveguides that actu­ally strengthen the light beams passing through them. These could be used for long-distance, strate­gic-level communications systems or high-power narrow-beam lasers. With nanophotonics, optical computing, data storage, and signal processing become possible. If the Defense Department is to remain a leader in exploiting nanotechnology, the Pentagon must ensure that it adequately understands how nano­technology could be exploited for U.S. security and competitive advantage. Homeland Security Applications. Only 0.25 percent of the government's 2004 funding for nan­otechnology goes to the Department of Homeland Security. This is inadequate given that nanotechnol­ogy could play a major role in advancing the DHS capabilities. Nanomaterials could be used to create highly sensitive sensors capable of detecting hazard­ous materials in the air. For example, carbon-based nanotubes are relatively inexpensive and consume minimal power. Other areas of nanotechnology pertinent to homeland security are emergency responder de­vices. Lightweight communications systems that require almost no power and have a large contact radius would give rescuers more flexibility. Nano­tech robots could be used to disarm bombs and save trapped victims, reducing the risks to rescue workers. Enlisting the Private Sector In the United States, the commercial nano­science industry is composed of traditional indus­trial sectors, newly formed startups, Fortune 500 companies, and academic research institutions. These groups will play a significant role in future developments of nanotechnology. The most recent analysis estimates that nanoscience will produce $2.6 trillion in economic output by 2015.[[14]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn14" \o ") The U.S. is currently the global leader in nano­technology. The National Nanotechnology Initiative coordinates over $1 billion in annual federal research and grants. Total U.S. public and private spending on nanotechnology research and develop­ment totals about $3 billion annually, or one-third of the estimated $9 billion that is spent worldwide.[[15]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn15" \o ") Global competition in nanotechnology is fierce, and many countries are challenging the U.S.'s supremacy, specifically in the European Union and Asia. The EU is strengthening its research and development capabilities by promot­ing partnerships among companies and universi­ties through its Nanosciences/Nanotechnology Action Plan for Europe. The Chinese government has implemented initiatives that employ over twice as many engineers as are working in nano­technology in the U.S.[[16]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn16" \o ") Thus, U.S. government-sponsored research is still vital if America is to remain a global leader in the national security applications of nanotechnology. Toward the Future Congress and the Administration have done much to encourage the development of nano­science. The challenge is to maintain this momen­tum, facilitating commercial innovation and the application of new advances for national security purposes. A few key initiatives would bolster Amer­ica's global leadership in the science of small things. Smarter Funding. In the near term, government research and development funds will continue to play a critical role in jump-starting national security innovations in nanotechnology. Congress should continue to provide strong support for nanoscience research programs in the Department of Defense and other federal agencies that support national security purposes. Big Industry is currently averse to risk and is not providing the innovations needed for national secu­rity. In fact, investments in the private sector have been concentrated in just a few mature nanotech companies. In the first quarter of 2005, almost all of the venture capital invested in the nanotech indus­try went to four companies: NanoTex ($33 millon), Nanomix ($17 million), Nantero ($17 million), and NanoOpto ($12 million).[[17]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn17" \o ") The NNI needs to focus grants on the companies willing to pursue national security research. In doing so, however, it must walk a fine line between fostering cutting-edge technology advances and establishing a form of corporate welfare. Funding of the private sector should be limited to projects with such prohibitive risk and entry costs that companies would otherwise be unable to pursue them on their own. Interagency Coordination. The DOD recently cited maintaining a consistent vision and stable funding as critical to future nanotechnology research and development.[[18]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn18" \o ") Although federal agencies con­tinue to coordinate through the NNI, each agency retains full control of its own budget decisions and sets its own research priorities. The National Academy of Sciences has con­cluded that the "NNI is successfully establishing R&D programs with wider impact than could have been expected from separate agency funding with­out coordination." Increased coordination within the NNI would produce a centralized list of priori­ties and leverage resources even more effectively.[[19]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn19" \o ") Reform of Visa Issuance and Management. Congress needs to promote policies that continue to bring the best and the brightest in nanotechnology to study and work in the United States. Current visa policies are making it increasingly difficult to recruit students and scientists and to hold scientific confer­ences in the United States. The nation's security and competitiveness relies heavily on people's ability to travel to the United States, but the current visa system is unnecessarily challenging, depriving the United States of many of the world's best and brightest scientists, students, and entrepreneurs. Long wait times for personal interviews are among the most frequently cited fac­tors that make travel to the United States difficult.

# Rd. 5 vs. JMU MM (Solar)

## 1NC

### 1

#### Will pass, PC key – Obama Pushing

Merica 3/8

[Dan ,CNN, Obama pushes expedited timetable on immigration reform in meeting with faith leaders, 3/8/13, <http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/08/obama-pushes-expedited-timetable-on-immigration-reform-in-meeting-with-faith-leaders/>]

President Barack Obama emphasized the need to get immigration reform accomplished this year in a meeting with a diverse group of faith leaders at the White House on Friday. Religious leaders that attended the meeting said the president spent more than an hour with them, and after making a few remarks at the top of the meeting he let each group discuss their priorities and problems with comprehensive immigration reform. During the discussion, these faith leaders said, Obama made it clear that he wanted to see a bill on immigration reform in the next 60 days. “I really sensed that this is a high priority for him,” Jim Wallis, president of Sojourners, a Christian social justice group, told CNN. “We are all looking at something being introduced this month and then the bill passing in May or June. We are all hoping that kind of time frame could work.” Since winning reelection in 2012, the Obama administration has made it clear that immigration reform is a top priority for the president’s second term – and something they want to see quick action on. According to people who attended the meeting, in attendance, the president reiterated that support and laid out a timetable for the religious leaders. Wallis, who has spearheaded a group of evangelical leaders on immigration reform, said that Obama particularly mentioned the importance of faith leaders in the immigration debate. “He said that while every issue has politics, but on this question, it really was am moral issue to him and he sees the faith community as lifting that up,” Wallis said. “He was really fervent about the role of faith in this debate.” “This was the broadest, most well-rounded group of folks that I have ever met with on this issue,” said Stephan Bauman, the president of World Relief. “And pretty much everyone in the room had a chance to share their opinion on the issue.” In addition to Wallis and Bauman, both evangelical leaders, representatives from the Jewish, Muslim, Mormon and Catholic faiths were in attendance. Bauman and Wallis said this was not only a religiously diverse group, but also politically diverse. The Christian leaders said that politically, the group represented both liberal and conservative political traditions. “This was not a bunch of left-leaning religious groups,” Wallis said. A source who attended the meeting provided the full list of attendees to CNN: Leith Anderson, National Association of Evangelicals Stephan Bauman, President and CEO, World Relief Bishop Minerva Carcaño, United Methodist Church Rev. Luis Cortés, President, Esperanza Barrett Duke, Southern Baptist Convention Bishop Orlando Findlayter, Senior Pastor, New Hope Christian Fellowship Archbishop José Horacio Gomez, Archdiocese of Los Angeles Mark Hetfield, President and CEO, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Rev. Kathryn Lohre, National Council of Churches Imam Mohamed Magid, President, Islamic Society of North America Rev. Samuel Rodriguez, President, National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference Rev. Gabriel Salguero, President, National Latino Evangelical Coalition Dieter Uchtdorf, Second Counselor, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Jim Wallis, President and CEO, Sojourners Cecilia Muñoz, Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council In a statement about the meeting, the White House thanked the religious leaders for their attendance and said the group talked about how they could work to "swiftly pass... a commonsense immigration reform bill." "The President and the leaders discussed the pillars the President has put forward for reform, including that any bill must include a pathway to earned citizenship, as well as measures to crack down on employers who game the system and exploit both American and immigrant workers, continuing to strengthen our border security, and strengthening the legal immigration system for families, employers, and workers," the statement said. At the end of the meeting, the group offered a prayer, according to the White House. Some faith leaders have long called for comprehensive immigration reform, but demand for reform has increased in the last few months. “I think we have a window of opportunity in these first months of 2013,” Richard Land, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, told CNN in January. “I think there is a real, new conversation on immigration reform.”

#### Solar costs massive capital

Cardwell, 12 (Diane, “Energy Tax Breaks Proposed, Despite Waning Support for Subsidies”, New York Times, January 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/business/energy-environment/clean-energy-projects-face-waning-subsidies.html?pagewanted=all)

But the lobbying by the wind and solar industries comes at a time when there is little enthusiasm for alternative-energy subsidies in Washington. **Overall concerns about the deficit** are making lawmakers more skeptical about any new tax breaks for business in general. And taxpayer losses of more than half a billion dollars on Solyndra, a bankrupt maker of solar modules that defaulted on a federal loan, has tarnished the image of renewable power in particular. “Most of the folks I think recognize that this is not a Solyndra effort here,” said Representative David G. Reichert, Republican of Washington, who introduced a bill to extend a renewable tax credit last year. Solyndra was financed under a now-expired program, part of the 2009 stimulus package, that provided government loan guarantees for clean-energy projects, some of which administration officials expected to be risky. The wind and solar companies argue that the tax breaks they are seeking are different. The tax credits can be taken only by businesses that are already up and running, so taxpayers are less likely to be stuck subsidizing a failing company, proponents say. “This is a program that doesn’t pick winners or losers,” said Rhone Resch, president and chief executive of the Solar Energy Industries Association. “It’s hard to argue against a program like this that is creating jobs.” Without the new breaks, industry executives warn, they will be forced to scale back production and eliminate jobs in a still-weak economy. The American division of Iberdrola, a big Spanish producer of wind turbines, is already feeling the impending loss of one tax break that expires this year. “We’ve seen the prospects for new wind farms really fall off,” said Donald Furman, a senior vice president at Iberdrola Renewables, which announced this week that it was laying off 50 employees. “We’re not getting out of the business and we’re not in any financial trouble, but we are doing the prudent thing so that we don’t have issues.” The tax break that Iberdrola and other wind companies rely on, called the production tax credit, has been in place since 1992 but after repeated extensions is now scheduled to expire at the end of 2012. It allows for a credit of 2.2 cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated for the first 10 years of a project’s operation, which the industry says is sometimes enough to eliminate the price difference between wind power and fossil fuels. The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation recently estimated that the production tax credit would cost the government $6.8 billion from 2011 to 2015 for projects in place before the end of this year. The other tax break, which expired at the end of last year and was especially popular with solar companies, allows renewable energy companies to get 30 percent of the cost of a new project back as a cash grant once construction is complete. Without the cash grant program, a company can still take the 30 percent credit, but must spread the benefit over a period of years. The industry says the grant program is more effective because it encourages a broader range of private investors to help finance its projects. As of early this year, the cash-grant program, known as the 1603 program, had awarded $1.76 billion for more than 22,000 solar projects, according to the Treasury Department. Mr. Obama, who has been a steadfast supporter of clean-energy programs, has already begun making a case for new government investment in clean energy projects as a way to foster both energy independence and employment at a time when Capitol Hill evaluates new laws in terms of job creation as well as budget cost or savings. “Because of federal investments, renewable energy use — sources like wind and solar — has nearly doubled,” Mr. Obama said at a stop at Buckley Air Force Base in Aurora, Colo., where he promoted the increasing use of renewable power by the military and repeated a call for Congress to approve the tax credits. “Thousands of Americans have jobs because of those efforts.” Mr. Obama used his trip to press for increased use of liquid natural gas in transportation, appearing at a United Parcel Service center in Las Vegas that received a stimulus grant to support natural gas-fueled trucks. He also said that the Interior Department would open up about 38 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico to gas and oil exploration and development, selling leases in June. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management estimates drilling there could yield one billion barrels of oil and four trillion cubic feet of natural gas. According to the American Wind Energy Association, wind projects account for more than a third of all the new electric generation installed in recent years, while over the last six years, domestic wind turbine production has grown twelvefold, to more than 400 facilities in 43 states. A recent study by Navigant Consulting found that this year the industry would support 78,000 jobs, but that the number would fall to 41,000 in 2013 without an extension of the production tax credit. Solar, too, is growing quickly in the United States. According to the Solar Energy Industries Association, more solar was installed in the third quarter of 2011 than in all of 2009 combined. A one-year extension of the 1603 tax-grant program would create an additional 37,000 solar industry jobs in 2012, according to a report by EuPD Research. Lobbyists for both industries say the new tax breaks need to be passed quickly and are trying to get Congress to include them in a bill to extend the payroll tax cut. That bill, like all tax cuts these days, has **Congress at loggerheads**. “But true performance-based incentives, where incentives are only provided when actual production occurs, seem to be maintaining their support,” said Robert Gramlich, senior vice president for public policy for the American Wind Energy Association. How this will play out in Congress is anybody’s guess, lawmakers say. Mr. Reichert said the credits were not yet part of the negotiations over the payroll tax cut, which is due to expire at the end of February. Republican leaders may look to revive the Keystone XL oil pipeline — as proposed, the pipeline would run 1,700 miles from oil sands in Canada to refineries on the Gulf Coast — as part of a compromise to approve the renewable energy credits, according to lobbyists and lawmakers involved in the discussions. But there is a lot of ideological opposition to more tax credits, said Senator Jeff Bingaman, Democrat of New Mexico and the chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, who supports the extension.

#### **Key to heg**

Nye 12. [Joseph S., a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye]

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. **Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the** decline of American power**.**¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation**, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.**¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**, skilled immigrants can be important to** particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely **because the US attracts the best and brightest** from the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting **immigration reform** in his second term, he **will** have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US.

#### Heg solves multiple scenarios for nuke war

Kagan 7 (Robert, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership”, Policy Review, August/September, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would–be nations is a second defining feature of the new post–Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not only on the goodwill of peoples but also on American power. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. Conflicts are more likely to erupt if the United States withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore  to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.

### 2

#### Energy security militarizes energy – justifies intervention and causes serial policy failure

Ciuta 10 -- Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre of European Politics, School of Slavonic and East European Studies @ University College London, UK (Felix, 2010, "Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?" Security Dialogue 41(123), Sage)

Even casual observers will be familiar with the argument that energy is a security issue because it is either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict. Two different strands converge in this logic of energy security. The first strand focuses on energy as an instrument: energy is what states fight their current wars with. We can find here arguments regarding the use of the ‘energy weapon’ by supplier states (Belkin, 2007: 4; Lugar, 2006: 3; Winstone, Bolton & Gore, 2007: 1; Yergin, 2006a: 75); direct substitutions in which energy is viewed as the ‘equivalent of nuclear weapons’ (Morse & Richard, 2002: 2); and rhetorical associations that establish policy associations, as exemplified by the panel ‘Guns and Gas’ during the Transatlantic Conference of the Bucharest NATO Summit. The second strand comes from the literature on resource wars, defined as ‘hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources’ (Victor, 2007: 1). Energy is seen as a primary cause of greatpower conflicts over scarce energy resources (Hamon & Dupuy, 2008; Klare, 2001, 2008). Alternatively, energy is seen as a secondary cause of conflict; here, research has focused on the dynamics through which resource scarcity in general and energy scarcity in particular generate socio-economic, political and environmental conditions such as population movements, internal strife, secessionism and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate and intrastate conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 2008; Solana, 2008; see also Dalby, 2004). As is immediately apparent, this logic draws on a classic formulation that states that ‘a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able . . . to maintain them by victory in such a war’ (Lippmann, 1943: 51). The underlying principle of this security logic is survival: not only surviving war, but also a generalized quasi-Darwinian logic of survival that produces wars over energy that are fought with ‘energy weapons’. At work in this framing of the energy domain is therefore a definition of security as ‘the absence of threat to acquired values’ (Wolfers, 1952: 485), more recently reformulated as ‘survival in the face of existential threats’ (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 27). The defining parameters of this traditional security logic are therefore: (1) an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict (Walt, 1991: 212; Freedman, 1998: 48); and (2) a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security. In the war logic, energy security is derivative of patterns of international politics – often captured under the label ‘geopolitics’ (Aalto & Westphal, 2007: 3) – that lend their supposedly perennial attributes to the domain of energy (Barnes, Jaffe & Morse, 2004; Jaffe & Manning, 1998). The struggle for energy is thus subsumed under the ‘normal’ competition for power, survival, land, valuable materials or markets (Leverett & Noël, 2007). A key effect of this logic is to ‘arrest’ issues usually not associated with war, and thus erase their distinctive characteristics. Even the significance of energy qua energy is abolished by the implacable grammar of conflict: energy becomes a resource like any other, which matters insofar as it affects the distribution of capabilities in the international system. As a result, a series of transpositions affect most of the issues ranked high on the energy security agenda. For example, in the European context, the problem is not necessarily energy (or, more precisely, gas, to avoid the typical reduction performed by such accounts). The problem lies in the ‘geopolitical interests’ of Russia and other supplier states, whose strength becomes inherently threatening (Burrows & Treverton, 2007; Horsley, 2006). Energy security policies become entirely euphemistic, as illustrated for example by statements that equate ‘avoiding energy isolation’ with ‘beating Russia’ (Baran, 2007). Such ‘geopolitical’ understanding of international politics also habituates a distinct vocabulary. Public documents, media reports and academic analyses of energy security are suffused with references to weapons, battles, attack, fear, ransom, blackmail, dominance, superpowers, victims and losers. It is therefore unsurprising that this logic is coterminous with the widely circulating narrative of the ‘new’ Cold War. This lexicon of conflict encourages modulations, reductions and transpositions in the meanings of both energy and security. This is evident at the most fundamental level, structuring encyclopaedic entries (Kohl, 2004) and key policy documents (White House, 2007), where energy security becomes oil security (security modulates energy into oil), which becomes oil geopolitics (oil modulates security into geopolitics). Once security is understood in the grammar of conflict, the complexity of energy is abolished and reduced to the possession of oilfields or gas pipelines. The effect of this modulation is to habituate the war logic of security, and also to create a hierarchy between the three constitutive dimensions of energy security (growth, sustenance and the environment). This hierarchy reflects and at the same time embeds the dominant effect of the war logic, which is the militarization of energy (Russell & Moran, 2008), an argument reminiscent of the debates surrounding the securitization of the environment (Deudney, 1990). It is of course debatable whether this is a new phenomenon. Talk of oil wars has been the subject of prestigious conferences and conspiracy theories alike, and makes the headlines of newspapers around the world. A significant literature has long focused on the relationship between US foreign policy, oil and war (Stokes, 2007; in contrast, see Nye, 1982). The pertinence of this argument cannot be evaluated in this short space, but it is worth noting that it too reduces energy to oil, and in/security to war. The key point is that this logic changes not only the vocabulary of energy security but also its political rationality. As Victor (2008: 9) puts it, this signals ‘the arrival of military planning to the problem of natural resources’ and inspires ‘a logic of hardening, securing and protecting’ in the entire domain of energy. There is, it must be underlined, some resistance to the pull of the logic of war, as attested for example by NATO’s insistence that its focus on energy security ‘will not trigger a classical military response’ (De Hoop Scheffer, 2008: 2). Yet, the same NATO official claims that ‘the global competition for energy and natural resources will re-define the relationship between security and economics’, which hints not only at the potential militarization of energy security policy but also at the hierarchies this will inevitably create. New geographies of insecurity will thus emerge if the relationship between the environment, sustenance and growth is structured by the militarized pursuit of energy (Campbell, 2005: 952; Christophe Paillard in Luft & Paillard, 2007).

#### Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought

Neoclous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debatesand discussionsthat animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 3

#### Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### The plan changes how energy is produced, rather than restricting how much is produced-voting issue- ruins limits- infinite types of extraction makes it impossible to debate – kills fairness

### 4

#### **They should specify a type of financial incentive, they don’t –**

#### **Voting issue –**

#### Ground – each type of incentive and the ground against those incentives – they can spike our links which makes the aff a moving target.

#### **Key to solvency and meaningful research**

Vaughn 8 (John R., Chairperson – National Council on Disability, “The State of 21st Century Financial Incentives for Americans with Disabilities,” National Council on Disability, 8-11, http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2008/Aug2008#\_Toc204703675)

1. Financial incentives are complex and need explanations pertaining to definition and type.

There is no simple definition of financial incentives. While some operational definitions might involve disability-based, case, in-kind, or other funding streams as categories of financial incentives, this report uses three overarching categories—direct, indirect, and community based—according to the topology developed for this research. **Efforts to gain an understanding of these variations and to account for as many of them as possible will contribute to making this research meaningful**.

#### “financial incentives” are distinct and exclude tax credits

Chi and Hoffman 2k (Keon S., Senior Fellow – CSG, and Daniel J., Research Associate, “State Business Incentives: Trends and Options for the Future,” The Council of State Governments, http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/Misc00BusinessIncentives.pdf)

In this report, the term “business incentives” is broadly defined as public subsidies, including, but not limited to, tax abatement and financial assistance programs, designed to create, retain or lure businesses for job creation. The term is used interchangeably as “industrial” or “development incentives.” The term “tax incentives” broadly refers to any credits or abatements of corporate income, personal income, sales-and-use, property or other taxes to create, retain or lure business. **The term “financial incentives” broadly refers to any type of direct loan, loan guarantee grant, infrastructure development, or job training assistance** offered to help create, retain or lure businesses.

### 5

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should grant authority for decision making over restrictions for decentralized solar power to the states. The fifty state governments of the United States should substantially reduce restrictions on and increase financial incentives for decentralized solar energy production in the United States.

#### Devolving control of regulating energy solves better and promotes more efficient production

Bryner 2 (Gary C. - Professor, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, and Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center. University of Colorado School of Law., “ARTICLE: Policy Devolution and Environmental Law: Exploring the Transition to Sustainable Development”, Fall, 26 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 1, lexis)

Devolution theory calls for increased policy authority and discretion to be delegated to state governments in order to improve the efficiency of public policies, ensure they effectively resolve specific problems, and foster political accountability. Devolution also gives different communities the opportunity to strike their own balance among the competing policy objectives of economic growth and reducing environmental risks. n10 Devolution to regulated industries promises **to reduce the cost of regulation**, **create incentives for sources of pollution** **to find** the most efficient and effective means **of reducing emissions**, encourage reductions that go beyond minimum mandates, and allow for flexibility in business decision making. Devolution to citizens is championed as a way to get the public involved in regulatory initiatives that will change the behavior of citizens. Reducing emissions through energy conservation and increased use of [\*5] mass transit, for example, require major commitments on the part of citizens to change their behavior, and that commitment **cannot simply be mandated from the top down**. Other forms of participatory policy making have been proposed to respond to the demands of citizens for a role in decisions that affect their health and quality of life.¶ Advocates of devolution argue that the current federal regulatory structure is plagued by burdensome procedures and a cumbersome chain of command. The combination of environmental statutes, EPA regulations, and guidance documents result in an impenetrable pyramid of paperwork, planning, and reports. A tremendous amount of effort at all levels of governments is required to manage this process. Compliance with these requirements often replaces energy and resources that could be used to actually reduce pollution and improve environmental quality. Accountability is difficult to identify since so many policy makers compete and jostle for influence, that citizens do not know who to hold accountable when environmental goals are not achieved. Federal officials lay claim to credit for issuing ambitious environmental goals, while state and local officials bear the brunt of criticism for imposing regulatory burdens. The EPA seeks vainly to develop and impose national requirements on conditions that vary widely throughout the nation. n11¶ Critics have identified a host of problems with centralized, command and control regulation: it has not only failed to remedy many environmental problems and threats, but **it has engendered** significant opposition because of the restraints on freedom it imposes, the costs and burdens of compliance, and the apparent ease by which some businesses are able to escape liability and responsibility for their actions. n12 There are real limits to the power of government to promote and ensure the preservation of air, water, land, and other resources. Government agencies alone cannot accomplish these environmental goals, but must be combined with clear and effective economic incentives and with a widely held ethic of care for the land and resources on which all life is so dependent. But the dominant role the federal government plays in environmental policy making focuses too much attention on Washington, and fails to encourage more local efforts. n13¶ Other critics of the current structure of regulatory federalism argue that some state and local governments had a long tradition of ambitious environmental regulation and enacted ambitious pollution control legislation well before Congress or the executive branch acted. The first clean air laws in the United States were enacted by cities in the 1880s, [\*6] some 75 years before the first federal program aimed at air pollution. n14 Many states passed water pollution laws in the 1920 and 30s, and by 1948, every state had an environmental protection agency. n15 While it is true that many federal initiatives for air and water pollution predated the 1970 Earth Day, when the modern era of environmental regulation began, states are not newcomers to environmental regulation. Nor is federal regulation a clear success story. Federal environmental policy has been, in many areas, problematic, and has threatened environmental quality. Federal subsidies for road building in national forests, grazing on public lands, the development of fossil fuels, and the emptying of rivers and streams into reservoirs for irrigation, for example, have taken a tremendous toll on natural systems and resources and have encouraged waste, unsustainable consumption, and pollution. n16 One of the consequences of environmental federalism has been to place limitations on more aggressive state regulations. A major impetus for federal air pollution regulation, for example, was a concern by the auto industry that states would impose different emission standards on new vehicles; this fear of having to meet a maze of state regulatory requirements prompted Detroit to lobby for federal regulation of new vehicle emissions. n17 Another example, from the mid-1990s, is the development of federal emission standards for hazardous emissions from coke ovens that were less stringent than those devised in some states, such as Pennsylvania, where environmental advocates had pushed for and won more ambitious limits. n18¶ One way of responding to this debate over policy devolution is to try to sort out federal/local roles in environmental policy on a statute-by-statute basis. In the case of air pollution, for example, some regulatory goals require efforts that go beyond the capacity of individual states. The Clean Air Act provides for regional efforts to deal with the long-range transport of ozone pollution from motor vehicles and with haze in national parks and wilderness areas. Pollution problems that cross state [\*7] boundaries and involve interstate transfers can be similarly addressed by several states working together, under the EPA's umbrella. The EPA can maintain responsibility for emission standards for products that are sold in national and international markets, such as motor vehicles. n19 In other areas of implementation, such as permitting, inspection, enforcement, and monitoring, however, the EPA could cut back significantly what it does and help direct political accountability to state and local governments for local environmental quality. It could provide technical assistance, draft model state environmental laws, and disseminate more information about environmental problems and conditions and about innovative policy efforts. n20 The EPA could take on fewer tasks, and then perform those functions more expeditiously.¶ The debate over policy devolution is difficult to resolve in ways that provide clear guidance for what specific policies should be pursued at what level of government. Devolution is not without risks. Political boundaries often conflict with the extension of ecosystems and environmental effects spill over political borders. Urban air pollution problems, for example, are a function of local sources as well as those that are transported long distances. Policy devolution in one area, such as the formulation of local air pollution clean up programs, as is currently provided for by law, must be combined with regional and national programs to deal with the transport of air pollution and emissions from motor vehicles. The goal of giving communities the choice of what mix of risk reduction and economic growth strategies to pursue conflicts with the expectations of a national commitment to protect the health of all Americans, regardless of where they live. There may be some backsliding in some states as more autonomy is delegated to them, and polluting industries may find ways to exercise their political clout more ambitiously in local governments in ways that reduce their regulatory obligations. Proponents of less environmental regulation, of unbridled economic growth and consumption may use devolution arguments to pursue their anti-government agenda. But, in the long run, a more ambitious, pollution-preventing approach to regulation requires more participation and involvement by those whose behaviors are targeted for change, and state and local-level government forums are required for citizens, industry officials, and policy makers to work closely together. Any losses in short-run regulatory stringency (if that is an accurate description of current regulatory efforts) will likely be offset by more fundamental, long-term gains.¶ Despite these problems there is significant support for devolution in environmental policy making. There is clearly some role in environmental [\*8] policy making for all levels of government. International commitments require national legislation, but state and local governments can also contribute to implementation of these agreements. Interstate commerce and pollution flows also require at least a multi-state response. Beyond that, there is a compelling case for allowing states to tailor the implementation of national goals to meet differing ecological, economic, social, and political differences. n21 Economic theories suggest that decentralization of decisionmaking "increases social well-being as compared with a centralized solution requiring more uniform level of public services across all jurisdictions" because of the resultant freedom of people to choose for themselves how to balance competing concerns. n22 Competition among businesses and among states is essential in encouraging innovation, experimentation, and improved policy making. Progressives have also joined the call for devolution, arguing that shifts in power to states can be harnessed to enact better public policies and also nourishes democracy and the opening up of politics to groups that have had little success, at least recently, in shaping national policies. n23¶ Nevertheless, Congressional leaders have largely abandoned, with a few exceptions such as in welfare reform, the promises made in 1994 and 1995 to deliver a smaller federal government and devolve more power to states. n24 Instead, legislation **to strengthen the federal role in** taxing Internet commerce, property rights, **electric industry** deregulation, telecommunications, and a host of other areas demonstrate strong Congressional interest in maintaining and even expanding federal power. n25 Members of Congress appear to be much more interested in responding to the demands of business that they be given one set of federal standards to meet, rather than 50 different state requirements. The globalization of the economy and the emphasis on uniform standards provides strong pressure for increased federal policy making rather than policy devolution. n26 The exception of welfare policy seems to prove the rule: in areas where there is strong industry interest in uniform standards, including environmental policy making, there is little devolution; in areas [\*9] where industry has little interest, like welfare, Congress has responded to state demands for more flexibility and discretion.¶ III. RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT¶ An alternative approach to sorting out the debate over policy devolution and national regulatory programs is to consider what kinds of changes are needed in environmental laws and policies in order to encourage the transition from the current command and control approach to the idea of sustainable development. However, the next generation of environmental laws and regulatory programs, if they are to be more efficient and effective than their predecessors in preventing pollution, integrating economic and environmental values, and promoting sustainability, **will still need to address the arguments made by proponents of devolution**. The balance of this paper examines the definition of sustainable development, reviews the case for reshaping environmental regulation toward that goal, and explores the implications of the theory of sustainable development for policy devolution.

#### States can provide financial incentives for energy policy – already being done

Piscitello and Bogach 97 (E. Scott and V. Susan, “Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy Development”, 1997, pg. 33)

Financial incentives for renewable energy development in the United States are set at both the federal and **state levels**. In many cases, policy frameworks are set by the federal government with states required to design and implement policy details. As a result, financial incentive policies for renewable energy development in the United Slates vary greatly among individual states. States often formulate financial incentive policies to promote development of a resource within their particular borders, but which is not as prominent in other states (such as financial incentives for energy from biomass in Georgia, Alabama, and other states located in the southeastern United States). The State of California, however, developed strong financial incentive policies that have succeeded in promoting a broad range of renewable energy resources, including wind and solar resources. California was therefore chosen as a focus for the financial incentives offered for renewable energy development in the United States. Examples of incentives used in other states arc documented at the end of this section-In reaction to the oil crisis of the 1970s, the State of California adopted energy policies for (a) promoting energy diversity; (b) reducing dependence on fossil fuels; (c) using indigenous energy resources; and (d) promoting environmentally benign energy sources. These principles led to a series of financial incentive policies for renewable energy development that has resulted in significant installed capacity. By the early 1990s, renewable energy facilities comprised approximately 10 percent of the installed generating capacity in California Due to an oversubscription by renewable energy facilities in the late 1980s and 1990s, financial incentives for renewable energy development were removed. At the same time, California was and is continuing to move toward deregulating its electric utility industry. Despite uncertainties regarding future evolution of the deregulated industry, energy prices are expected to remain below those at which renewable energy facilities are financially viable- As a result, California is presently developing new financial incentives aimed at maintaining its existing renewable energy facilities as well as promoting further development of the most promising technologies in the deregulated power market.

### Solvency

#### Problem isn't investment – resource production for solar is impossible

EC 12 -- European Commission, DG Environment News Alert Service, edited by SCU, The University of the West of England, Bristol (1/26/12, "Photovoltaic supply falls short of solar power targets," http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/pdf/271na7.pdf)

Europe could struggle to meet the target set by the renewable energy sector of 25 per cent of electricity produced by solar energy by 2040 because the supply of materials, including rare metals, needed to produce photovoltaics (PV) is unlikely to meet demand. Production rates need to be drastically improved, according to a new study. Calculations based on available appropriate land, global irradiance and conversions of solar energy to electricity demonstrate that technically, solar energy could provide 7.5 to 9 times the expected electricity demand in 2050. However, several PV technologies employ rare metals, which could limit the capacity for electricity generation. The new study looked at whether current global production of rare metals could support the huge increase in solar panels generation required to meet ambitious energy targets for 2040 laid out by the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC). The scientists looked at the four main PV technologies: crystalline silicon (c-Si), amorphous silicon (a-Si), cadmium tellurium (CdTe) and copper indium gallium diselenide (CIGS). The scientists assumed that by 2040, each technology would have an equal market share of 25 per cent. This reflects the fact that although c-Si currently has the largest share (81 per cent), a shift is already taking place towards the other technologies, which require a thinner layer of PV material. They simulated a 'neutral' future scenario, where moderate technological developments gradually improve the efficiency of electricity generation, in line with current policy expectations. The results showed that the maximum demand for gallium and indium in tonnes per year for use in CIGS technology surpasses current production (2008) by a factor of 7.3 and 2.8, respectively. Even under an 'optimistic' future scenario, in which more ambitious technological advances in cell efficiency require less PV material, demand still outstrips current supply by a factor of 3.9 and 1.5, respectively. Neither cadmium nor copper were found to be seriously limiting, even when the scientists simulated a 'pessimistic' scenario in which technological advances do not meet current expectations. However, the predicted demand for tellurium was found to be 30-180 times higher than today's production rate, depending on the scenario used. Although silicon is the second most abundant element in the earth.s crust, only very high purity silicon is used in the solar industry and production will need to increase by 15 times to meet demand in the neutral scenario and by 10 times in the optimistic scenario. Even bigger shortages may result from competition with the electronics industry, which also uses high-purity silicon. On the other hand, amorphous silicon technology represents the only realistic option for large-scale electricity production since the cumulative demand by 2040 would equal just 20 per cent of production. The research shows that reaching solar power targets for 2040 will not necessarily be limited by known global reserves of silicon and rare metals, but that current production rates will be the limiting factor. Better refining techniques, increased exploitation of deposits and strategic planning of technological shifts are needed to satisfy the demand for PV materials. This poses a challenge as tellurium, indium, gallium, selenium and cadmium are by-products of other processes and are not currently mined separately. New production methods are also likely to take up to 10 years to develop and so research should be initiated soon to meet the anticipated demand.

#### Incentives can’t solve the solar industry

Glover 9/13 -- European associate editor for the independent online magazine Energy Tribune (Peter, 2012, "Solar Eclipsed?" http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/11672/Solar-Eclipsed)

The global solar power industry is in crisis. The industry blames widespread national subsidy cuts and over productivity; China, in particular, being widely vilified on the second count. However, the real cause of the solar industry’s malaise runs deeper, rooted, as it is, in the inescapable fact that, in terms of current technology, commercial scale solar energy remains a non-viable proposition. Wherever you look the solar power industry is mired in financial problems, all of which lead back to the (life support) of public subsidy, the impact of market-skewing regulations (creating the appearance of commercial viability) and, ultimately, protectionist trade wars (US and Europe v China). In economic good-times, three natural consequences of government-sponsored global industries that can be obfuscated by a network of feed-in tariffs, levies and other ‘green’ taxes to pay for them. But in leaner economic climes, the real cost of ‘free’ energy becomes all too clear. Germany’s solar industry has led the way in Europe. Until recently the country was the world leader in manufacturing solar cells. Half of the world’s total solar power generating capacity is installed in Germany. But, according to Klaus Dieter Maubach, Technology Chairman at the country’s power major EON, Germany’s solar industry is in a death spiral. Speaking to Focus magazine, Maubach states that “not a single company is in the black” and that the entire German solar industry “will disappear within five years”. His bleak prediction merely echoed the view of investment consultants Citigroup who warned in March that Germany’s subsidy cuts would “nearly kill Germany’s solar industry”. Widespread complaints of Chinese solar companies dumping cut price solar panels on the European market have merely added to the malaise. In early September, the European Commission announced a formal inquiry into this allegation that could well trigger a cut-throat solar trade war with China. But as Eon’s Maubach points out with regard to the international solar market, China itself is suffering from precisely the same market problems as all its competitors. While Beijing will attempt to stave off decline through government stimulus, it is only a question of time before the loss of European and US markets for cheap Chinese goods, including solar panels, causes an economic downturn there, too. In fact, the threat of a Europe v China solar ‘war’ is little more than a replay of last year’s dust up between the United States and China. In the wake of the infamous Solyndra scandal (which Solyndra execs blamed on cheap Chinese imports), the U.S. imposed savage protectionist anti-dumping tariffs. These ranged from 31 percent to as high as 250 percent on imported Chinese-made panels. No surprise then that the Chinese companies should turn their attention to key European markets to offload a product they are unable to sell domestically. The problems for U.S. solar cannot be laid at the door of Chinese competition alone. Once the massive infusion of government stimulus cash ran out and subsidies slowed in early 2011, U.S. solar companies had already begun filing for bankruptcy. And Solyndra wasn’t the only company desperate for more cash. One heavily-subsidized firm, First Solar, was even caught using the U.S. taxpayer loan guarantee to sell solar panels to itself. So are the Chinese really the chief villains of the global solar piece? Depends how you look at it. China’s over production only came about because Beijing’s economic stimulus for its solar industry led to explosive growth and, ultimately, unfettered over production. Given enormous government subsidies there was literally no incentive to slow production down. In the game of who could sustain massive public subsidy longest, cash-rich China clearly won. But the fact is that the sun looks to be setting on China’s solar industry, too. Beijing has also become aware it cannot go on subsidizing its solar and renewable industries. China is dumping its solar panels in a bid to at least redeem some of its costs. Meanwhile the dark clouds have gathered over China’s economy too with the solar sector there also now facing bankruptcy. Since 2005, Chinese solar companies saw heady growth receiving significant government support as a “strategic emerging industry”. But since 2010, the price of the key polysilicon wafers crucial to production has fallen by around 75 percent. In recent times, China’s big five firms have all reported disastrous trading losses. Worse still, according to the investment boys at Energy and Capital and others, China’s much-vaunted booming economy, already over-heating, is about to implode. Taken as a whole, government incentive schemes around the world have created a glut of suppliers that the capitalist free market would never have sanctioned. The eclipse of Europe’s solar industry is in truth down to simple economic realities hitting home as commercial scale solar power is simply too expensive a proposition to attract serious private sector investment and end massive public subsidies. In January, Spain’s economic crisis forced it to cut its renewable subsidy regime entirely. In April, a near-bankrupt Italian government estimated that its subsidy regime left it facing a $60 billion bill to photovoltaic generators over the next 20 years. In The Great British Solar Scam I wrote about how the UK’s bid to cuts its ludicrously generous solar subsidy regime saw it prevented from making subsidy cuts by a European court after the UK solar industry inevitably claimed widespread bankruptcies would result(1). What marks out both the entire renewable energy sector for economic decline above all else is the fact that it is effectively an expensive government-sponsored enterprise, not a child of the free and democratic marketplace. Consider again the elements colluding to produce the current crisis: the lifeline of public subsidy, energy levies and taxes and market-skewing regulation dove-tailing with incentivized over-capacity, protectionism and, ultimately, trade wars. All marks of an industry kept afloat by ideological fiat and not free market capitalism geared to meeting actual market need. To gain a final key perspective, a report by United Nations Environment Programme in June announced that global renewable energy investment generally reached $257 billion in 2011 rivalling the $302 billion invested in hydrocarbon power. Germany alone has committed over €100 billion in solar subsidies over the next 20 years – for a power that will produce a very small energy return. In total, renewable energy, of which solar is just a tiny fraction, makes up just 3 percent of our electricity. As the green utopian clouds obscuring the real cost of ‘free’ solar power clear, it’s easy to see why the industry is in eclipse.

#### Nat gas prevents solar development

Dumaine 12 -- senior editor-at-large @ CNNMoney (Brian, 4/17/12, "Will gas crowd out wind and solar?" http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/04/17/yergin-gas-solar-wind/?iid=HP\_LN)

Fracking technology has given the U.S. a 100-year supply of cheap natural gas. What's its impact on coal, nuclear, wind, and solar power? Inexpensive natural gas is transforming the competitive economics of electric power generation in the U.S. Coal plants today generate more than 40% of our electricity. Yet coal plant construction is grinding to a halt: first, because of environmental reasons and second, because the economics of natural gas are so compelling. It is being championed by many environmentalists as a good substitute for coal because it is cleaner and emits about 50% less carbon dioxide. Nuclear power now generates 20% of our electricity, but the plants are getting old and will need to be replaced. What will replace them? Only a few nuclear plants are being built in the U.S. right now. The economics of building nuclear are challenging -- it's much more expensive than natural gas. Isn't the worry now that cheap natural gas might also crowd out wind and solar? Yes. The debate is over whether natural gas is a bridge fuel to buy time while renewables develop or whether it will itself be a permanent, major source of electricity. What do you think? Over the past year the debate has moved beyond the idea of gas as a bridge fuel to what gas means to U.S. manufacturing and job creation and how it will make the U.S. more globally competitive as an energy exporter. The President's State of the Union speech was remarkable in the way it wrapped the shale gas boom into his economic policies and job creation. I believe natural gas in the years ahead is going to be the default fuel for new electrical generation. Power demand is going to go up 15% to 20% in the U.S. over this decade because of the increasing electrification of our society -- everything from iPads to electric Nissan Leafs. Utilities will need a predictable source of fuel in volume to meet that demand, and natural gas best fits that description. And that won't make the environmental community happy? Well, natural gas may be a relatively clean hydrocarbon, but it's still a hydrocarbon. So wind and solar will have a hard time competing? Remember that wind and solar account for only 3% of our electric power, whereas natural gas is 23%, and its share will go up fast. Most of that 3% is wind. Natural gas has a new role as the partner of renewables, providing power when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining. Will solar scale? Solar is still under 1% of U.S. electric generation, and even though its costs have come down dramatically, they must come down a lot more. Solar is generally much more expensive than coal and natural gas. You have to remember that energy is a huge, capital-intensive business, and it takes a very long time for new technologies to scale. The euphoria that comes out of Silicon Valley when you see how quickly a Twitter or a YouTube can emerge doesn't apply to the energy industry.

#### Silver fine but solar power strains the market

Phil et al 12 -- research study conducted by Division of Energy Technology and Division of Environmental Systems Analysis @ Chalmers University of Technology (Erik, Duncan Kushnir, Bjorn Sanden, Filip Johnson, 2/28/12, "Material constraints for concentrating solar thermal power," ScienceDirect)

The use of silver in mirrors for CSP requires a closer look as it is difficult to substitute, would constitute a large new demand for silver and the metal is potentially constrained in rate and available reserves. As Fig. 7 shows, there has been a significant supply deficit in terms of the difference between silver mining and fabrication demand for more than a decade. This deficit has been filled by drawing down government stockpiles and by recycling scrap and jewellery. The dwindling use of silver in photography has been offset by the increase in electronic, photovoltaic, medical and nanomaterial demand, applications which have a high ability to pay for silver and which do not typically result in a recyclable stock [55,56] The industrial demand for silver is thus very competitive at present, and represents 55% of fabrication demand and 75% of mine supply. The remaining demand is for new jewellery, coins, silverware and bullion. Diminishing recycled silver supplies may be difficult to compensate through mining; roughly two thirds of silver production occurs as a by-product of mining other base metals, predominantly copper and lead [56]. Furthermore, silver has been mined for thousands of years, and there is not a large potential for new primary silver mines. This situation implies that the mine supply response to higher prices would be muted for silver. There is thus a potential for a large increase in price that all prospective silver users should be considering in strategic plans. Reducing silver use for mirrors is a difficult challenge since it is already applied in extremely thin layers of about 100 nm. Alternative materials for reflective coating have been investigated, but none offer the same broadband reflection qualities [57]. The silver layer thickness could possibly be slightly reduced but there are durability and manufacturing issues strongly prohibiting layers thinner than about 50 nm [58]. A possible substitute is to instead use aluminium as reflective layer, on an aluminium substrate with a covering layer of oxides or polymer to protect from corrosion. Changing from silver to aluminium reflectors typically decreases the maximum reflectivity from w95% to w90% [59]. This decrease could be compensated by scaling up the reflector area which would increase the use of other less constrained materials and degrade the plant economics, but would not rule out feasibility. As silver is a small component of cost, the silver price would have to increase by multiples to make the increased reflector area needed for aluminium mirrors a cost-effective substitution.

#### Silver supply k2 global economy and turns solar development

SD 12 -- teaches at a local university, retired "Wall Streeter" (Silver Doctor, 6/25/12, "Silver Supply Crisis Looms, Price Expected to Soar!" http://034dc62.netsolhost.com/WordPress/2012/06/25/silver-supply-crisis-looms/)

In contrast, when the looming silver supply-crisis strikes this will produce a global, industrial crisis. Unlike gold, which must only satisfy investment/monetary demands, silver is becoming an essential raw material of the 21st century global economy. This can be illustrated by simply listing some of the current and future industrial uses of this most precious metal. Silver has reflective, chemical, and conductive properties that are superior to all other metals. This provides two key uses for silver in the production of solar energy. As the world’s most-reflective metal (reflecting 97% of all solar energy), silver is used to make the world’s best mirrors — a vital component of solar energy production. In addition, because silver is such a superb catalyst, it also can improve the efficiency of “solar cells,” by being blended with these semiconductor materials to increase the power output of any such power unit by approximately 12% (as reported by The Silver Institute).

### Warming

#### Long timeframe and adaptation solves

Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

**Warming is slowing – ocean currents**

**Science Daily 8** (“Will Global Warming Take A Short Break? Improved Climate Predictions Suggest A Reduced Warming Trend During The Next 10 Years”, 5-5, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/05/080502113749.htm)

To date climate change projections, as published in the last IPCC report, only considered changes in future atmospheric composition. This strategy is appropriate for long-term changes in climate such as predictions for the end of the century. However, in order to predict short-term developments over the next decade, models need additional information on natural climate variations, in particular associated with **ocean currents**. Lack of sufficient data has hampered such predictions in the past. Scientists at IFM-GEOMAR and from the MPI for Meteorology have developed a method to derive ocean currents from measurements of sea surface temperature (SST). The latter are available in good quality and global coverage at least for the past 50 years. With this additional information, natural decadal climate variations, which are superimposed on the long-term anthropogenic warming trend, can be predicted. The improved predictions suggest that global **warming will weaken** slightly during the **following 10 years.** “Just to make things clear: we are not stating that anthropogenic climate change won’t be as bad as previously thought”, explains Prof. Mojib Latif from IFM-GEOMAR. “What we are saying is that on top of the warming trend there is a long-periodic oscillation that will probably lead to a to a **lower temperature increase** than we would expect from the current trend during the next years”, adds Latif. “That is like driving from the coast to a mountainous area and crossing some hills and valleys before you reach the top”, explains Dr. Johann Jungclaus from the MPI for Meteorology. “In some years trends of both phenomena, the anthropogenic climate change and the natural decadal variation will add leading to a much stronger temperature rise.”

#### Status quo solves – emissions are declining

Levi 12 (Michael, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment – CFR, “Why Have U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Plummeted?,” Council on Foreign Relations, 9/25/2012, http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/09/25/why-have-u-s-carbon-dioxide-emissions-plummeted/)

U.S. carbon dioxide emissions for January-May are down six percent from 2011 to 2012. Headlines have highlighted the fact that emissions from January-March hit a twenty year low. What explains the shift? That question has been the subject of intense debate. John Hanger argues that 77 percent of that decline can be attributed to the shift from coal to gas. The folks over at CO2Scorecard, looking at January-March data, put that number at a more modest 21 percent. These are drastically different figures. What number should we believe? Part of the discrepancy comes from looking at different time periods. January-March emissions were affected more by the warm winter than April-May ones were. That makes sense because January-March is part of the winter. April-May emissions were affected more by rock bottom natural gas prices than January-March ones were. That makes sense because it was April-May when rock bottom (i.e. sub-two-dollars wellhead) natural gas prices prevailed. Let’s focus on the full January-May span, since it’s now the longest period for which we have 2011 and 2012 data, and do the analysis for ourselves. First the basics: Carbon dioxide emissions fell from 2,303 metric tons (Mt) in 2011 to 2,158 Mt in 2012, a drop of 145 Mt. (To keep things simple, the January-May time period is implicit in all this.) The basic story is that emissions from coal consumption plummeted by 132 Mt. Falling oil emissions chipped in another 18 Mt. Natural gas emissions were nearly flat; they were actually down 5 Mt. This would seem to suggest that natural gas played little role in falling emissions. Instead, it appears to suggest, reduced demand for coal is what did the trick. This’s roughly the intuition behind the conclusion from CO2Scorecard that natural gas has played a modest role in the U.S. emissions decline. Hanger contests this by making three basic points. First, he notes, “about 85% (132 of 144 million tons) of the 2012 U.S. Carbon emission decline is a product of falling emissions from coal.” Second, he argues, the decline in emissions from coal are “almost entirely as a result of more gas displacing coal generation this year. Indeed, coal’s electricity generation market share fell from 42% for all of 2011 to 32% in April and 34% in May.” Third, he observes, “Electricity demand is down 2% in the first 5 months of 2012 compared to 2011 so that is a small reason for declining emissions and probably explains about 10% of the 132 million ton decline of coal emissions.” Hanger puts these together with a few other estimates to come to his conclusion that 77 percent of the emissions decline is due to gas.

#### Warming is irreversible

ANI 10 (“IPCC has underestimated climate-change impacts, say scientists”, 3-20, One India, http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/20/ipcchas-underestimated-climate-change-impacts-sayscientis.html)

According to Charles H. Greene, Cornell professor of Earth and atmospheric science, "Even if all man-made greenhouse gas emissions were stopped tomorrow and carbon-dioxide levels stabilized at today's concentration, by the end of this century, the global average temperature would increase by about 4.3 degrees Fahrenheit, or about 2.4 degrees centigrade above pre-industrial levels, which is significantly above the level which scientists and policy makers agree is a threshold for dangerous climate change." "Of course, greenhouse gas emissions will not stop tomorrow, so the actual temperature increase will likely be significantly larger, resulting in potentially catastrophic impacts to society unless other steps are taken to reduce the Earth's temperature," he added. "Furthermore, while the oceans have slowed the amount of warming we would otherwise have seen for the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the ocean's thermal inertia will also slow the cooling we experience once we finally reduce our greenhouse gas emissions," he said. This means that the temperature rise we see this century will be largely irreversible for the next thousand years. "Reducing greenhouse gas emissions alone is unlikely to mitigate the risks of dangerous climate change," said Green.

#### Alt cause – china – no reason the plan spills over to solve emissions overseas

#### **No resource wars – prefer statistical evidence**

Pinker 11 (Steven, Harvard College Professor and Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology – Harvard University, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Google Books)

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is "maybe, but maybe not." Though climate change can cause plenty of misery and deserves to be mitigated for that reason alone, it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharn countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to armed conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or two, he concluded, "those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support in the large-N literature." Salehyan adds that relatively inexpensive advances in water use and agriculture practices in the developing world can yield massive increases in productivity with a constant or even shrinking amount of land, and that better governance can mitigate the human costs of environmental damage, as it does in developed democracies. Since the state of the environment is at most one ingredient in a mixture that depends far more on political and social organization, resource wars are far from inevitable, even in a climate-changed world.

#### CO2 is not the one cause for climate change – solar radiation and ocean interactions are ignored

Patterson 11 [Norman Paterson is a Professional Engineer and Consulting Geophysicist with 60 years’ experience in Mineral and Environmental Geophysics. He obtained his Ph. D in Geophysics at the University of Toronto in 1955, and was elected Fellow, Royal Society of Canada in 1977. “Global Warming: A Critique of the Anthropogenic Model and its Consequences”, Geoscience Canada - Volume 38, Number 1, March 2011, Chetan]

WHAT CAUSES WARMING? It is likely that the cyclical warming and cooling of the earth results from a number of different causes, none of which, taken alone, is dominant enough to be entirely responsible. The more important ones are solar changes (including both irradiance and magnetic field effects), atmosphere–ocean interaction (including both multidecadal climatic oscillations and unforced internal variability), and greenhouse gases. All of these factors have been discussed by IPCC, but the first two have been dismissed as negligible in comparison with the greenhouse-gas effect and man’s contribution to it through anthropogenic CO2 . It is claimed (e.g. Revelle and Suess 1957) that the particular infrared absorption bands of CO2 provide it with a special ability to absorb and reradiate the sun’s longer wavelength radiation, causing warming of the troposphere and an increase in high-altitude (cirrus) cloud, further amplifying the heating process. Detailed arguments against this conclusion can be found in Spencer et al. (2007) and Gerlich and Tscheuschner (2009). These scientists point out (among other arguments, which include the logarithmic decrease in absorptive power of CO2 at increasing concentrations), that clouds have poor ability to emit radiation and that the transfer of heat from the atmosphere to a warmer body (the earth) defies the Second Law of Thermodynamics. They argue that the Plank and Stefan-Boltzman equations used in calculations of radiative heat transfer cannot be applied to gases in the atmosphere because of the highly complex multi-body nature of the problem. Veizer (2005) explains that, to play a significant role, CO2 requires an amplifier, in this case water vapour. He concludes that water vapour plays the dominant role in global warming and that solar effects are the driver, rather than CO2 . A comprehensive critique of the greenhouse gas theory is provided by Hutton (2009).

#### No impact—negligible pH change and animal response

NIPCC 10 (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, multi-national scientific coalition comprised of leading climate scientists, “Speculations beyond the Scope of Reality,” http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/may/05may2010a1.html, AM)

In the introductory material to their paper on potential effects of predicted near-future increases in CO2-driven ocean acidification on shell-producing calcification in a certain species of oyster, Watson et al. (2009) report that over the past two centuries, CO2 emissions from deforestation and the burning of fossil fuels have increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations from 280 to 380 ppm, citing NOAA/ESRL records produced and maintained by Pieter Tans. They additionally say that the portion of this extra CO2 that has been taken up by the planet's oceans has caused a 0.1 unit drop in the pH of their surface waters, which would appear to be correct. However, they predict there will be a further reduction in ocean pH of 0.3 to 0.5 units by 2100, citing the work of Haugan and Drange (1996), Orr et al. (2005) and Caldeira and Wickett (2005), while noting that these predicted changes in ocean pH "are not only greater but far more rapid than any experienced in the last 24 million years," citing Blackford and Gilbert (2007), or "possibly the last 300 million years," citing Caldeira and Wickett (2003). But how likely are such predictions? Consider the findings of Tans himself, who Watson et al. approvingly cite in regard to the CO2 history they mention. In a paper published inOceanography, Tans (2009) concluded that the future trajectory of oceanic pH will likely be significantly different from that suggested by the scientists cited by Watson et al., while at the same time bravely criticizing the IPCC reports that have also accepted the highly inflated acidification predictions of those scientists. Indeed, whereas Watson et al. and the IPCC accept the claims of those who project a decline in pH somewhere in the range of 0.3 to 0.5 between now and the end of the century, Tans' projections yield a pH decline somewhere in the range of 0.09 to 0.17, which is much smaller, and which would be expected to have significantly reduced biological impacts compared to those suggested by the experimental work of Watson et al. for that future point in time. Based on the results of their experiments and the maximum decline in ocean-water pH that they accept, for example, Watson et al. predict a significantdecline of 72% in Sydney rock oyster (Saccostrea glomerata) larval survival by the year 2100. However, utilizing Watson et al.'s data, but with the maximum ocean-water pH decline calculated by Tans, one obtains a non-significant larval survival decline of only 14%, based on interpolation of the graphical results portrayed in Watson et al.'s paper. In like manner, similar assessments of changes in antero-posterior measurement yield asignificant decline of 8.7% using Watson et al.'s assumptions about ocean pH, but a non-significant decline of only 1.8% according to Tans' pH calculations. Corresponding results for dorso-ventral measurement were a significant decline of 7.5% with Watson et al.'s pH values, but a non-significant decline of only 1.5% with Tans' values; while for larval dry mass there was a decline of 50% in Watson et al.'s analysis, but an actualincrease (albeit non-significant) of 6% using Tans' pH analysis. Last of all, for empty shells remaining there was a significant decline of 90% in the Watson et al. study, but a non-significant decline of only 6% when Tans' pH projections were used. In summation, based on their experimental data and the ocean pH projections for the end of the century that are promoted by them and the IPCC, Watson et al. find what they characterize as "a dramatic negative effect on the survival, growth, and shell formation of the early larval stages of the Sydney rock oyster." On the other hand, employing the pH values projected by Tans, there are no statistically significant reductions in any of the five biological parameters measured and evaluated by Watson et al., which is an amazingly benign response to an environmental threat that is being suggested by some to be more serious or extreme than it was at any other time that it may have reared its ugly head over the past 300 million years!

#### No ocean impact

Dulvy et al in ‘3

(Nicholas, (School of Marine Science and Tech. @ U. Newcastle), Yvonne Sadovy, (Dept. Ecology and Biodiversity @ U. Hong Kong), and John D. Reynolds, (Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Conservation @ School of Bio. Sci. @ U. East Anglia), Fish and Fisheries, “Extinction vulnerability in marine populations”, 4:1, Blackwell-Synergy)

Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace 1996; Matsuda et al. 1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the (1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of 'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively. These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations. Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinops sagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common in exploited fish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).

#### Solar insufficient in solving warming

Post 12 -- BSME New Jersey Institute of Technology, MSME Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, MBA, University of Connecticut. P.E. Connecticut. Consulting Engineer and Project Manager (Willem, 7/1/12, "Wind Energy CO2 Emissions Reductions are Overstated," http://theenergycollective.com/node/89476)

Solar energy is variable (during a day and during variable cloudiness) and intermittent; usually it is minimal in the morning, maximal at noon about 3-5 hours before the daily peak demand, minimal in the afternoon, minimal during foggy, overcast, snowy days, and zero at night. About 65-70 percent of the hours of a year solar energy is near zero, and it cannot be turned off, as in Southern Germany with about 1 million PV systems, when on sunny summer days solar energy surges to about 12,000 MW to 14,000 MW and has to be partially exported to France and the Czech Republic at fire sale prices, 5.5 euro cent/kWh or less, after having been subsidized at an average of about 50 euro cent/kWh. Example: German solar power is as little as 2% of rated capacity, or 340 MW, on cloudy days and when snow covers the panels. This means there are many hours during a year when no wind or solar energy is generated. Therefore, all conventional generator units will need to be kept in good operating condition, AND staffed 24/7/365, AND fueled to serve the daily demand when wind and solar energy is near zero. Without utility-scale energy storage, wind turbines and solar systems cannot replace any conventional units. All the units that would be needed WITHOUT the existence of wind turbines and solar systems, would also be needed WITH the existence of wind turbines and solar systems. Some of the conventional units would have less energy production with wind and solar energy on the grid, thereby adversely affecting their economics, due to increasingly inefficient start/stop, part-load and part-load-ramping operations, but without wind and solar energy on the grid, the energy production of almost all the conventional units would be needed to serve the daily demand. Building Wind Turbines Everywhere?: There are some (mostly wind turbine vendors, project developers, trade organizations, NRELs, financial types setting up LLC tax shelters for the top 1% of households, etc.) who say that building wind turbines everywhere there is wind, and connecting all of them with a national HVDC overlay grid into a super grid (similar to the US Interstate Highway System overlaying state and local roads), the variation and intermittency of wind energy in the diverse geographical areas will largely be canceling each other out so that the overall energy production will become increasingly steadier as more wind turbines are connected to the super grid, and that therefore there will be little need for balancing plants, and that there will always be wind energy somewhere no matter what the weather conditions in one or more geographical areas. Several National Renewable Energy Laboratories and other entities have made studies of this scheme, using mathematical modeling, as described in the EWITS and NEWITS reports. However, someone went one step further and combined the outputs of 5 widely dispersed geographical areas: - http://transmission.bpa.gov/Business/Operations/Wind/default.aspx Bonneville Power Administration, which serves 3.5 GW of installed capacity in the Pacific Northwest - The Australian Energy Market Operator, which serves 1.8 GW of installed capacity in New South Wales - The Independent Electricity System Operator, which serves 1.2 GW of installed capacity in Ontario - The Alberta Electric System Operator, which serves 0.8 GW of installed capacity in Alberta - http://www.eirgrid.com/operations/systemperformancedata/windgeneration/ EirGrid, which serves 1.4 GW of installed capacity in Ireland The result of the analysis is described in this article which concludes geographical dispersion of wind turbines does not reduce the variation and intermittency of wind energy. http://www.ethiopianreview.com/business/122605 A French energy systems analyst, Hubert Flocard, combined the wind energy outputs of several European nations. The results of his analysis yielded the same conclusion. http://www.dimwatt.eu/index.php/our-campaigns/keeping-the-lights-on/documents/108-ground-breaking-french-study-should-stop-further-expenses-on-the-so-called-super-grid Energy Cost Projections The US Energy Information Administration projects levelized production costs (national averages, excluding subsidies) of NEW plants coming on line in 2016 as follows (2009$) : Offshore wind $0.243/kWh, PV solar $0.211/kWh (higher in marginal solar areas, such as New England), Onshore wind $0.096/kWh (higher in marginal wind areas with greater capital and O&M costs, such as on ridge lines in New England), Conventional coal (base-loaded) $0.095/kWh, Advanced CCGT (base-loaded) $0.0631/kWh. http://www.energytransition.msu.edu/documents/ipu\_eia\_electricity\_generation\_estimates\_2011.pdf IS WIND ENERGY GOOD ENERGY POLICY? Within federal, state and local governments tens of thousands of people are busying themselves promoting renewables by with holding meetings and public hearings, preparing studies, writing reports, energy plans, laws, rules and regulations, monitoring projects for compliance, etc. Outside of government wind turbine vendors (Siemens, GE, Vestas, Iberdrola, etc,), project developers/owners, financiers managing tax shelters, trade organizations, etc., are busying themselves popularizing wind energy as saving the planet from global warming with PR campaigns that claim there would be significant reductions of fossil fuel consumption and CO2 reductions/kWh, that capital costs/MW would decrease, and that wind energy costs/kWh would be at grid parity in the near future. These claims have largely not been realized. Global Warming is a Given: A just-released report from EIA shows the actual world energy consumption data and projected consumption data for the 1990 to 2035 period. The report shows world energy consumption is estimated to increase from 505 quads in 2008 to 770 quads in 2035, a 52% increase. The biggest part of the increase is by (non-OECD nations + Asia). http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/world.cfm See spreadsheet associated with figure 12 World energy consumption by fuel (quadrillion Btu) Liquids: From 173.2 in 2010 to 225.1 in 2035; 30% more Natural gas: 116.7 to 174.7; 50% more Coal: 149.4 to 209.1; 49% more Nuclear: 27.6 to 51.2; 86% more Renewables: 55.2 to 109.5; 98% more Renewables fraction of total consumption: From 10.6% in 2010 to 15.2% in 2035 Fossil fraction of total consumption: 84.1% to 79.1% The significant increase in projected fossil fuel consumption during the next 24 years means global warming will continue unabated, because (non-OECD + ASIA) will have energy consumption growth far outpacing the energy consumption growth of the rest of the world; i.e., global warming is a given. The above indicates the enormous investments required to achieve the 2035 projected renewables energy production would have practically no benefit regarding global warming.

#### Solar can only account for one sixth of global emissions – this assumes the most liberal estimates

IEA 12 (7-9,"Solar energy could meet one-sixth of global demand for heating and cooling in under 40 years" http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/news/2012/july/name,28298,en.html)

Solar energy could account for around one-sixth of the world’s total low-temperature heating and cooling needs by 2050, according to a roadmap launched today by the International Energy Agency (IEA). This would eliminate some 800 megatonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per year, or more than Germany’s total CO2 emissions in 2009. The IEA’s Solar Heating and Cooling Roadmap outlines how best to advance the global uptake of solar heating and cooling (SHC) technologies, which produce very low levels of greenhouse-gas emissions. Some SHC technologies, such as domestic hot water heaters, are already widely in use in certain countries, but others are just entering the development phase. While solar heating and cooling today makes a modest contribution to world energy demand, the roadmap envisages that if governments and industry took concerted action, solar energy could annually produce more than 16% of total final energy use for low-temperature heat and nearly 17% for cooling. This would correspond to a 25-fold increase in absolute terms of SHC technology deployment in the next four decades. “Given that global energy demand for heat represents almost half of the world’s final energy use – more than the combined global demand for electricity and transport – solar heat can make a significant contribution in both tackling climate change and strengthening energy security,” said Paolo Frankl, Head of the IEA’s Renewable Energy Division. Benefiting warm climate countries In addition to replacing fossil fuels that are directly burned to produce heat, solar heating technologies can also replace electricity used for heating water as well as individual rooms and buildings. This would be especially welcome in warm climate countries without gas infrastructure and lacking alternative heating fuels. South Africa is cited as an example of a country that would benefit, as electric water heating currently accounts for a third of average household (coal-based) power consumption there. On top of this, the report notes that solar thermal cooling technology – in which the sun’s heat can be used to cool air – can reduce the burden on electric grids at times of peak cooling demand by fully or partially replacing conventional electrically powered air conditioners in buildings.

#### No Global Emissions reduction

Sklar 12 -- President, The Stella Group, Ltd & Adjunct Professor GWU (Scott, 7/30/12, "True Global Cooperation Needed," http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/07/is-momentum-building-to-act-on.php)

While the world is in economic decline, the USA's stagnant economy, and the renaissance in natural gas discovery which is significantly displacing coal generation -- all are driving down greenhouse gas emissions by default. But the reduction is far too late and by far too little. The 2009 National Academy of Sciences, "“Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use” study concluded, "The damages the committee was able to quantify were an estimated $120 billion in the U.S. in 2005, a number that reflects primarily health damages from air pollution associated with electricity generation and motor vehicle transportation. The figure does not include damages from climate change, harm to ecosystems, effects of some air pollutants such as mercury, and risks to national security, which the report examines but does not monetize. " In October 2011, The International Energy Agency (IEA) warned on the need to reduce global fossil subsidies. (www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/.../us-iea-idUSTRE7931CF201110... They concluded, "Global subsidies for fossil fuel consumption are set to reach $660 billion in 2020 unless reforms are passed. " Tackling climate change emissions and reducing the harmful impacts requires true global cooperation, selection of options that are absolutely cost-effective and job creating, and accelerating removal of subsidies that promote carbon intensities while extending and enhancing incentives to drive the scale of clean energy and high-value efficiency applications. That is not happening. Bill McKibben's article in Rolling Stone this past week sums it all up, "All told, 167 countries responsible for more than 87 percent of the world's carbon emissions have signed on to the Copenhagen Accord, endorsing the two-degree target..... Even the United Arab Emirates, which makes most of its money exporting oil and gas, signed on. The official position of planet Earth at the moment is that we can't raise the temperature more than two degrees Celsius – it's become the bottomest of bottom lines. Two degrees." I couldn't agree more.

### Econ

#### US economy recovering now

Schlesinger 3/8/13 (Jill, Moneywatch/CBS, "February jobs report: Stronger than expected," http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-34227\_162-57573207/february-jobs-report-stronger-than-expected/)

(MoneyWatch) The Labor Department said 236,000 jobs were created in February and the unemployment rate edged lower to 7.7 percent from 7.9 percent. This level of job growth is welcome, but many are taking a wait and see approach to the job situation until the effects of sequestration are fully known.¶ The February employment report is the last one before the government's across the board spending cuts go into effect. Economists are waiting to see whether the Congressional Budget Office's projection of 750,000 fewer jobs comes to fruition or whether the U.S. economy is strong enough to weather the cuts and continue to create enough private sector jobs to compensate for the government jobs that could vanish.¶ Capital Economics framed the bullish case on the economy, noting, "Despite the continued drag from fiscal austerity, the outlook for the economy is improving." The improvement can be seen in a few ways: Business investment is accelerating, due to robust earnings growth; housing will no longer be a headwind for the economy and instead will contribute to growth; manufacturing has started to pick up after a break; and consumers appear to be absorbing the expiration of the payroll tax cut, without too large a hit to confidence or spending. Taken together, the analysis projects a slowdown in growth to about 1 percent for the first half of the year, followed by a second-half annualized rate of 2.5 percent.¶ While the analysis acknowledges big risks to the economy (U.S. government shutdown or another chapter in the eurozone crisis), the general gist is that the economy is doing just fine and as a result, job creation should continue, despite the Washington antics.¶

#### Electricity prices at historic lows now – shale gas, utility actions prove

Reuters 3/6/13 ("US utilities seen burning more coal as prices decline," http://www.miningweekly.com/article/us-utilities-seen-burning-more-coal-as-prices-decline-2013-03-06)

In 2012, the price of gas, which has historically been more expensive than coal, dropped to a more than ten-year low due primarily to record shale gas production.¶ Those weak gas prices depressed power prices to at least decade lows in most regions and in part caused generators to switch from coal to gas plants in record numbers.¶ Since 2009, generators have announced plans to shut more than 40 000 MW of coal-fired capacity over the next several years as the weak power prices make it uneconomic for them to invest in emission control equipment needed to keep the older coal plants compliant with stricter environmental rules.

#### Alt causes- healthcare, housing market thump the economy

#### Solar raises electricity prices – crashes the economy and makes it cost-ineffective

IER 12 -- Institute for Energy Research, Summer Fellow Natalia Suvorova (7/19/12, "Solar Subsidies Make Electricity Bills More Expensive," http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/07/19/13253/)

Renewable energy supporters have been emphatic in calling for the United States government to provide subsidies comparable to those offered by foreign “competitors,” yet it is worth noting that the foreign experience with renewable energy subsidies has not led to especially effective results. One of the most striking examples is Germany—the world’s largest solar power producer whose energy industry is facing serious economic problems now that the German government is imposing massive cuts to its solar subsidies. In 1990, Germany enacted a feed-in tariff law that requires utilities to purchase electricity generated with renewable electricity at a fixed price that is guaranteed for 20 years. These subsidies, which were then boosted in 2000 and 2004, led to Germany becoming the world leader in solar power. However, after the initial growth that led the country to become the world’s first solar energy producer, today its solar manufacturing and production industry is crashing rapidly due to cuts in these generous subsidies.[i] In February of this year, the German government announced drastic new cuts to the country’s solar incentives. After several months of heated discussion, the German Bundestag (the lower house of the country’s parliament) approved 20 to 30 percent subsidy reductions, depending on the size of the solar energy system.[ii] These subsidy reductions, the first of which began in 2009, have hit the country’s solar industry hard—since December of last year, over a half dozen German solar manufacturers have declared bankruptcy.[iii] These are likely just the first of many, as the country intends to phase all solar subsidies out by 2017. Apart from the fact that enacting massive solar subsidies was a controversial decision for a rather cloudy country, as solar power is intermittent and works only when the sun shines, providing large subsidies for an industry over an extended period of time removed many of the incentives that influence whether a business succeeds or fails in the market. Namely, analysts attempting to determine the reasons why Germany’s solar experiment has floundered have noted that the solar industry increasingly relied on governmental funding, rather than pursuing innovations to improve their product and cut production costs.[iv] Most importantly, Germany’s solar subsidies have been expensive with little evidence to prove they are worth the cost. Last year, over €8 billion ($10.2 billion) was paid out to German solar farm operators and homeowners with solar panels, but only 3.3 of the country’s power supply was generated by solar in the same time period.[v] Two decades of highly-subsidized renewable energy have had a noticeable effect on the country’s electricity prices. Currently, Germany’s solar feed-in tariffs vary from $0.166 per kWh on the low end to $0.297 per kWh on the high end, which makes it $0.2315 per kWh on average.[vi] This represents a large portion of the price of residential electricity: an average customer in Germany pays about $0.3523 per kWh (€0.2781) of electricity used.[vii] Those who believe that the United States should emulate Germany’s model should consider the following: 35 cents per kWh for electricity is three times as much as U.S. customers paid on average for electricity last year (11.8 cents per kWh).[viii]Germany’s solar feed-in tariff alone is 41-152% greater than US total residential electricity rates. Germans also have the 2nd highest electricity prices in Europe—outdone only by wind-dependent Denmark—and this situation will inevitably be made worse by the fact that Germany has pledged to phase out nuclear energy and become more reliant on renewable energy sources.[ix] Germany is not an isolated case. Similarly lavish subsidies to the renewable energy sector have been made by the Spanish government since the mid-2000s. In the summer of 2007, the Spanish government offered its most generous premium payments for solar power yet—58 cents per kWh—which made it possible for virtually any solar power producer to turn a profit.[x] Because the subsidies were so lavish, producers rushed into the solar business faster than the Spanish government expected, with some solar plants set up so hastily and designed so poorly that they could not compete with conventional power producers in terms of cost-effectiveness. The results in Spain were even more stark than in Germany: a study conducted in 2009 found that for every 1 “green” job that Spain created, 2.2 jobs were destroyed elsewhere.[xi] Additionally, there is about 40 billion euros (49 billion dollars) of wind and solar power-related debt in Spain, most of which is owned by local banks.[xii] As a result of this rapid escalating debt, Spain placed a moratorium on all new renewable energy spending in January of this year.[xiii] Affordable energy is essential to economic growth, and examples like Germany and Spain underscore how government attempts to pick winners and losers inevitably come at a cost. Repeating the same mistakes in the United States would be even more economically disastrous, especially considering the fact that it possesses a vast wealth of natural resources. Allowing the market to determine how these resources can be used most efficiently will ensure that Americans will continue to have reliable energy that won’t come at a premium.

#### No escalation

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Economy’s resilient – can survive shocks

Bloomberg 12 (“Fed’s Plosser Says U.S. Economy Proving Resilient to Shocks,” 5-9, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-09/fed-s-plosser-says-u-s-economy-proving-resilient-to-shocks.html)

Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Charles Plosser said the U.S. economy has proven “remarkably resilient” to shocks that can damage growth, including surging oil prices and natural disasters. “The economy has now grown for 11 consecutive quarters,” Plosser said today according to remarks prepared for a speech at the Philadelphia Fed. “Growth is not robust. But growth in the past year has continued despite significant risks and external and internal headwinds.” Plosser, who did not discuss his economic outlook or the future for monetary policy, cited shocks to the economy last year, including the tsunami in Japan that disrupted global supply chains, Europe’s credit crisis that has damaged the continent’s banking system and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. “The U.S. economy has a history of being remarkably resilient,” said Plosser, who doesn’t have a vote on policy this year. “These shocks held GDP growth to less than 1 percent in the first half of 2011, and many analysts were concerned that the economy was heading toward a double dip. Yet, the economy proved resilient and growth picked up in the second half of the year.” Plosser spoke at a conference at the Philadelphia Fed titled, “Reinventing Older Communities: Building Resilient Cities.” Urban Resilience His regional bank’s research department is working on a project to measure the resilience of different cities, to learn more about the reasons that some urban areas suffer more than others in downturns, Plosser said. He mentioned one early finding of the study: Industrial diversity increases a city’s resilience. “I do want to caution you that resilient and vibrant communities are not just about government programs or directed industrial planning by community leaders,” Plosser said. “The economic strength of our country is deeply rooted in our market- based economy and the dynamism and resilience of its citizenry.”

#### US not key—global economies decoupling

Caryl**, Sr. Fellow @ MIT,** 10 [Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Crisis? What Crisis?” 4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis\_what\_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It was impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing economies were going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens impoverished. Many emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect dramatically unemployment, and beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to democracy, and maybe for some cases it can also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it hasn't turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far too many poor people in the world before the crisis, and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and Indonesia, Asia's three biggest emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse. China's robust growth through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as Brazil and Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it still seems remarkable in light of the dire predictions. In short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are **showing remarkable resilience**. It wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai government's devaluation of its currency triggered the Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government. The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world, culminating in the Russian government default and August 1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere, dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So what's different this time around? The answers differ from place to place, but there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.) Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have **embraced globalization** and markets are starting to **build social safety nets**. And there's another factor: **Trade is becoming more evenly distributed** throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that **emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold**. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself." This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs so contrary to our habitual thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently published a report that attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the developing world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course, whether the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the Great Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The global economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds, it is becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these **interconnections are proving to be much more resilient** than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the report notes, receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Perhaps migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us don't. So why should we care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to the story: "Certainly cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding those connections, bringing in a larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster and more individuals climb out of poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing their citizens with education and health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs can fill important gaps -- as long as they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook is bright on every front, of course. As the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since 1970. The reason for that has more to do with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice shot up?) We are still a long way from conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and poor. Yet how remarkable it would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the beginning of a more equitable global economy**.**

#### Solar industry strong and domestic demand robust

Andrew 8/27 -- reporting and writing on a wide range of topics at the nexus of economics, technology, ecology/environment @ Clean Technica (2012, "1H 2012 US Solar PV Installations Grow 120%; US Poised to be World’s 3rd-Largest Market," http://cleantechnica.com/2012/08/27/1h-2012-us-solar-pv-installations-grow-120-us-poised-to-be-worlds-3rd-largest-market/)

Solar photovoltaic (PV) installations in the Americas more than doubled in the first half of 2012 (1H 2012) and will reach nearly 4.3 GW for the year. Solar PV installations rose more than 120% in the Americas in the first six months of 2012, according to IMS Research’s latest quarterly report, to reach 1.7 GW. That compares to 750 MW in the 1H 2011. Looking at the global picture, the German and Americas markets led growth in solar PV installations through June, with global installations exceeding 13 GW for the first time ever. IMS forecasts 3 GW of new solar PV capacity coming on-line for the full year, according to IMS’ “Q3 PV Demand Report.” “Despite the lackluster financial performance of the industry’s suppliers, underlying demand was robust in the first six months of this year, with first half installations 35 percent up on 2011,” commented IMS Research PV Research Director Ash Sharma. “The Americas market, led by the USA was unseasonably strong in the first half and did not show any significant slowdown resulting from the anti-dumping duties.” The US solar PV market will contribute most to growth globally in 2012, making the US the third-largest solar PV market in the world, according to IMS. The US accounted for 40% of new solar PV capacity growth in 1H 2012. The European market, in contrast, is forecast to contract nearly 3 GW for the year despite strong first-half performance in Germany. 1H 2012′s strong growth in US solar PV installations puts paid to the contention that the imposition of anti-dumping tariffs and countervailing duties on imports of crystalline solar PV cells and modules from China would stall growth in US solar PV demand, according to the Coalition for Solar Manufacturing (CASM), which filed the WTO petitions against China with US international trade authorities. “The new report by IMS Research effectively debunks two of the arguments made by Chinese solar manufacturers and their allies regarding the potential impact of tariffs on the U.S. solar market. First, preliminary tariffs did not slow growth of the U.S. solar market in the first half of 2012. Second, they have not had hurt downstream employment,” stated Gordon Brinser, president of SolarWorld Industries America Inc., the Oregon-based subsidiary of Germany’s SolarWorld AG, which leads CASM’s WTO trade litigation effort. “The IMS study notes that demand for solar in the U.S. market grew 120 percent through the end of June, compared with the same period in 2011, and did ‘not show any significant slowdown resulting from the anti-dumping duties.’ “This statement undercuts claims that dumped Chinese panels helped ignite a boom in the U.S. solar market. The fact that demand increased 120 percent – a significantly higher level than in past years, despite significantly reduced Chinese imports over the past three months – shows that there is significant demand for solar, even without dumped and subsidized Chinese products. “At the same time, the 35 percent increase in installations of solar panels cited in the IMS study shows there has been no negative impact on solar employment in the United States,” Brinser continued. “This result undermines the opposition’s prediction of tens of thousands of lost jobs if tariffs were imposed to counter the impact of illegally dumped and subsidized Chinese panels.” Moreover, Brinser added, these early indications show that the penalties being preliminarily imposed on Chinese imports are having the desired effect. “Based on what we are seeing in the marketplace, the U.S. solar market is robust, despite challenges for producers. However, as the Associated Press pointed out, the challenge is greatest for Chinese solar producers who have racked up huge losses in their attempt to dump their way to market dominance over the past two years.” Looking at global solar PV demand going forward, IMS foresees growth in solar PV installations accelerating in the second half of 2012 (2H 2012), despite slowdowns in Germany and Italy, two key European markets. The outlook beyond year-end is uncertain, however, IMS says. “IMS Research remains optimistic about the potential for the US PV market, and we predict it will grow to at least 3.5 GW in 2012 and become the world’s third largest PV market. The longer-term outlook for this market is less certain, although the speed at which it is developing so far in 2012 provides some encouragement,” IMS’ Sharma elaborated.

#### Solar industry can’t create real jobs

Feldman 12 -- PhD, Leader of Baker Hostetler’s international trade practice, former Director of the Canadian-American Business Council and a former Special Project Officer and Consultant in the United States Department of Defense, has been a Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson and Danforth Foundations, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for European Studies and the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University (also as a Member of the Executive Committee) and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (Eliot J., 1/18/12, "The Sun Does Not Shine on Trade Policy: Hypocrisy in Technological Green," http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=93bf3092-e5d9-4d70-b24a-c840af5ae000)

Because there is no public interest exception in U.S. trade law, there is no way for the agencies or courts to consider the competing interests of related industries. The U.S. manufacturers want the price of solar cells to go back up. They prefer unit profits to bulk sales. The companies that install solar cells, however, want the price to continue down. It is less important who sells them solar cells, although they are concerned about quality. More important is a price so attractive that energy produced from the sun is competitive with hydrocarbons. The price stimulated by the surge of Chinese imports has been creating that direct competition. Of course, more jobs for solar installers potentially mean fewer jobs for oil, gas, and coal workers, because as more energy is generated with renewable energy, the less may be required from traditional natural resources. Notwithstanding an overall global growth in demand for energy, in the United States the competition seems to support one industry at the expense of others. Solar wattage has grown more than 70 percent/annum in the United States since 2008. China’s share of that market has grown from close to nothing in 2006 to 50 percent in 2011. In 2008, the average price of solar panels was $3.30/solar watt of capacity. When the U.S. manufacturers filed their petition, the price had fallen to $1.00-1.20. It has been good for consumers, and good for a related industry. Inevitably it is not so good for domestic solar cell manufacturers, some of whom have been moving, themselves, to manufacture in China, while China’s largest producer, SunTech, has put up a factory in Arizona to assemble parts coming from China. The very nature of the solar cell industry makes it a poor candidate for job creation, and the Chinese competition has limited its promise for exports. Of course, the U.S. industry could try to imitate the Chinese industry, committing to huge volumes at low prices. But, the U.S. industry has preferred innovation, which seems to carry more risk. Solyndra was innovating, and it failed. Nonetheless, China, too, has problems, apparently over-producing for a consumer market that, despite rapid adoption and conversion, still cannot keep demand up to the supply.

### Green Tech

#### No impact to chemical explosions

Easterbrook 3 (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

2. Chemical weapons! Spooky-sounding, sure. And dangerous. But bombs and bullets are dangerous, too. In actual use, chemical weapons have proven no more deadly, pound for pound, than conventional explosives. In World War I, the British and German armies expended 1 ton of chemical agents per enemy fatality. Are modern nerve agents like sarin superdeadly in a way World War I mustard gas was not? When the Aum Shinrikyo cult attacked Tokyo's subway system with that substance in 1995 - the subway being an enclosed area, ideal for chemicals - 12 people died. That was 12 too many, but a conventional bomb the same size as the cult's canisters, detonated on a packed subway, would have killed more. During this winter's duct tape scare, I heard a Washington, DC, radio talk-show host sternly lecture listeners to flee if "a huge cloud of poison gas" were slowly floating across the city. Noxious clouds of death may float across movie screens, but no military in the real world can create them. Wind rapidly disperses nerve agents, and sunlight breaks them down. Outdoors, a severe chemical attack likely would be confined to a few city blocks.

#### Their impact author has no quals

#### Impact is small

Eland 4 (Ivan, Senior Fellow – Independent Institute, “Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Overrated as a Threat to America”, Independent Institute Report, 1-28, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1256)

Chemical weapons have a **much smaller area** of contamination than do biological and nuclear arms and historically have been **less deadly** than even conventional bombs. Chemical weapons are best employed by the defending side — if the attacking side uses them, friendly troops would likely have to advance through the gas. Although chemical weapons are probably the easiest of the three to produce, al Qaeda’s efforts to date have been **very crude**. Some infrastructure is needed to produce chemical weapons so detection of production may be possible.

#### Grid fine now

Kemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or isolate failures ().

#### Grid parity already happening and no impact

Schlichting 12 -- SolarBuzz (Wolfgang, 8/10/12, "What does grid parity mean for solar PV?" http://www.climatespectator.com.au/commentary/what-does-grid-parity-mean-solar-pv)

Grid parity – the almost ‘mystical’ point in time when levelised cost of generating electric power from PV energy is equal to the price of purchasing power from the grid – appears to be getting closer every month. Beyond this important point, PV power becomes, in principle, a viable technology for widespread development without subsidy support. This is expected to trigger an accelerated shift in PV adoption. With the PV industry currently focused on cost reduction – to ensure profitability when widespread grid parity is finally achieved – it is prudent to highlight some important aspects of grid-parity: -- Grid parity is not a singular event – it will happen in different geographies at different times -- Grid parity is a moving target – competing energy sources will adjust to the challenge from PV and other alternatives -- Grid Parity will not be the threshold after which PV quickly becomes the dominating energy source – established infrastructure and utility business models will take time to change Today, we are already at – or have passed through – grid parity at several locations in the world. This includes Hawaii and other tropical island nations in the Caribbean and South Pacific where PV competes with electricity from expensive oil imports. Also, grid parity has also been achieved in parts of Spain where there is plenty of sunshine and relatively high electricity cost. In 2013, we expect parts of Italy, Brazil, Chile and Australia to also reach the threshold. Thereafter, the Philippines, California, Japan and others will follow during the period from 2014 to 2016. This accelerated drive towards grid parity is timely because, in many key markets, incentives are declining or disappearing. This trend will continue, especially in Europe. Many coal, gas and nuclear plants are already fully-amortized and produce low-cost, highly-competitive electric power. Also, PV has been most successful in competing within the ‘peak-power’ segment. However, this is changing within locations where PV provides a substantial portion of the energy on sunny days (such as southern Germany). When PV becomes a mainstream energy source, it then competes w ith less expensive sources rather than ‘peak-only’ power plants. In many countries, this segment is primarily serviced by natural gas, coal and other fossil fuel powered plants. The adoption of hydraulic fracking – especially within the US – has caused natural gas production to increase dramatically. This has resulted in prices declining to historic lows, rivaling coal prices. This cheap gas represents serious competition to PV within the US and other areas. Declining fossil fuel prices are also compounded by large subsidies that were four times greater than the total revenues of the global PV industry during 2011. In addition, the grid infrastructure is not optimised for distributed generation – one of PV’s key advantages. Most grids were typically designed to pipe electricity (mainly coal) from power plants to the industrial and population centers. This legacy infrastructure may cause challenges for PV power in being able to access the grid. Infrastructure changes to take advantage of distributed generation will take time to implement, and will likely require significant investments. Also, the intermittent nature of PV energy becomes a challenge as PV contributes more to the overall energy mix. This could be addressed with energy storage or buffering in the future. However, these technologies are still expensive today at the scale necessary to ensure grid stability, if PV were to provide the majority of power generated. Therefore, while grid parity in major electricity markets will mark an important achievement for the PV industry, it will not necessarily represent a single inflection-point in time for overall PV growth.

#### Broader renewable integration technically impossible and hurts the grid in the short-run

Santoianni 12 -- combustion engineer who has worked on energy and environmental issues for 20 years, technical writing consultant @ Tau Technical Communications (Dawn, 5/17/12, "The Backbone of the Electric System: A Legacy of Coal and the Challenge of Renewables," http://news.yahoo.com/backbone-electric-system-legacy-coal-challenge-renewables-152900368.html)

Baseload generation currently provides the backbone for the electric grid. Baseload is the minimum level of electric demand over 24 hours, such as during late evening or early morning and is served by plants that provide steady and low-cost power with few unscheduled outages. Nuclear and coal have predominately served as baseload plants because they operate most efficiently at full, steady output and are slow to ramp up or down. Geothermal and hydropower have also been used in certain areas as baseload power. Hydropower with pumped storage is a flexible energy source able to serve sudden spikes in demand, such as during hot summer days (peak demand). Natural gas turbines, which can quickly ramp up or down to follow electric load, have been a preferred source of peaking power. Load-following or intermediate demand plants provide power in between off-peak and peak hours, which is when solar and wind power have had the most use. Intermittent or diurnal sources such as wind and solar have been widely considered unsuitable for baseload generation because of their variability. In other words, you can t count on them to meet demand 24×7. Energy storage may help bridge the gap for intermittent generating sources. Success with baseload solar power is promising, while other energy storage technologies are still under development. So why can t we just use wind and solar when available, supplement with current energy storage capabilities, and use quick-start resources such as natural gas turbines as needed? The problem lies with transmission constraints. While some studies have shown that load shifting using energy storage could help eliminate minimum generation constraints, these technologies have not reached wide-scale deployment and transmission infrastructure is lacking to fully support distributed renewable generation. Regional differences in available electric generating sources compound the problem. While some states such as California generate only a small percentage of power from coal, in other states including Kentucky and Indiana, over 85 percent of electricity generation is from coal. Hydropower sites are abundant in the Pacific Northwest, but relatively few installations exist in some areas of the U.S.. As a result, regional transmission system operators responsible for balancing load and maintaining electric reliability face a range of technical challenges. What works in the Northeast will not work in Texas. Each system has to find a way to incorporate renewable sources given the existing generating fleet, existing transmission infrastructure, and planned improvements. So we have an electric system based on large, centralized baseload plants that run (nearly) continuously and power that must be delivered in real-time by a transmission grid that needs modernization. To increase the complexity of this high-wire balancing act, increasing numbers of plug-in electric vehicles (EVs) are projected to hit the roadways. While electrification of transportation will help decrease reliance on fossil fuels, where will the power for those EVs come from? In some areas of the country, the answer right now is coal. Retiring older coal plants that operate off-peak can occur without impacting electric reliability, and is evidenced by the slate of recent retirement announcements. But replacing baseload coal generation with alternative power sources will be more difficult. Some people see repowering with natural gas as the solution, as carbon emissions from natural gas generation are 45 percent less than coal per megawatt-hour. Natural gas generation could serve as baseload generation, but opposition to hydraulic fracturing spurs concerns about future supply and potential price spikes. Permitting and constructing new nuclear plants is fraught with difficulties, partly due to opposition from environmental groups and ensuing cost overruns. Some envision smart grid technologies and transmission upgrades completely eliminating the reliance on baseload must-run generation, with an electric system powered mostly by renewable sources. Because renewable sources tend to be much smaller than coal-fired power plants, and located in areas that may not have sufficient transmission access, simply replacing coal for renewables is not straightforward. To reach 80 percent clean energy including combined cycle natural gas generation as clean would require the replacement of 35 percent of summer generating capacity (see Figure 2, coal + petroleum). The technological scale of such build out (over 370 gigawatts) is astounding. That would require about 185,000 2-megawatt wind turbines or over 700 large (500-megawatt) solar farms. Considering that even solar and wind projects have faced local opposition, this is a tall order.

#### Meltdowns don’t cause extinction (empirics)

WNA 12(World nuclear association members are responsible for 95% of the world's nuclear power outside of the U.S., as well as the vast majority of world uranium, conversion and enrichment production, “Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors”, March 2012, WNA, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html>)

In the 1950s attention turned to harnessing the power of the atom in a controlled way, as demonstrated at Chicago in 1942 and subsequently for military research, and applying the steady heat yield to generate electricity. This naturally gave rise to concerns about accidents and their possible effects. However, with nuclear power safety depends on much the same factors as in any comparable industry: intelligent planning, proper design with conservative margins and back-up systems, high-quality components and a well-developed safety culture in operations. A particular nuclear scenario was loss of cooling which resulted in melting of the nuclear reactor core, and this motivated studies on both the physical and chemical possibilities as well as the biological effects of any dispersed radioactivity. Those responsible for nuclear power technology in the West devoted extraordinary effort to ensuring that a meltdown of the reactor core would not take place, since it was assumed that a meltdown of the core would create a major public hazard, and if uncontained, a tragic accident with likely multiple fatalities. In avoiding such accidents the industry has been very successful. In over 14,500 cumulative reactor-years of commercial operation in 32 countries, there have been only three major accidents to nuclear power plants - Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima - the second being of little relevance to reactor design outside the old Soviet bloc. It was not until the late 1970s that detailed analyses and large-scale testing, followed by the 1979 meltdown of the Three Mile Island reactor, began to make clear that even the worst possible accident in a conventional western nuclear power plant or its fuel would not be likely to cause dramatic public harm. The industry still works hard to **minimize the probability of a meltdown accident, but it is now clear that no-one need fear a potential public** health catastrophe simply because a fuel meltdown happens. Fukushima has made that clear, with a triple meltdown causing no fatalities or serious radiation doses to anyone, while over two hundred people continued working on the site to mitigate the accident's effects. The decades-long test and analysis program showed that less radioactivity escapes from molten fuel than initially assumed, and that most of this radioactive material is not readily mobilized beyond the immediate internal structure. Thus, even if the containment structure that surrounds all modern nuclear plants were ruptured, as it has been with at least one of the Fukushima reactors, it is still very effective in preventing escape of most radioactivity. It is the laws of physics and the properties of materials that mitigate disaster, more than the required actions by safety equipment or personnel. In fact, licensing approval for new plants now requires that the effects of any core-melt accident must be confined to the plant itself, without the need to evacuate nearby residents. The three significant accidents in the 50-year history of civil nuclear power generation are: Three Mile Island (USA 1979) where the reactor was severely damaged but radiation was contained and there were no adverse health or environmental consequences Chernobyl (Ukraine 1986) where the destruction of the reactor by steam explosion and fire killed 31 people and had significant health and environmental consequences. The death toll has since increased to about 5 Fukushima (Japan 2011) where three old reactors (together with a fourth) were written off and the effects of loss of cooling due to a huge tsunami were inadequately contained. A table showing all reactor accidents, and a table listing some energy-related accidents with multiple fatalities are appended. These three significant accidents occurred during more than 14,000 reactor-years of civil operation. Of all the accidents and incidents, only the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents resulted in radiation doses to the public greater than those resulting from the exposure to natural sources. The Fukushima accident resulted in some radiation exposure of workers at the plant, but not such as to threaten their health, unlike Chernobyl. Other incidents (and one 'accident') have been completely confined to the plant. Apart from Chernobyl, no nuclear workers or members of the public have ever died as a result of exposure to radiation due to a commercial nuclear reactor incident. Most of the serious radiological injuries and deaths that occur each year (2-4 deaths and many more exposures above regulatory limits) are the result of large uncontrolled radiation sources, such as abandoned medical or industrial equipment. (There have also been a number of accidents in experimental reactors and in one military plutonium-producing pile - at Windscale, UK, in 1957, but none of these resulted in loss of life outside the actual plant, or long-term environmental contamination.) See also Table 2 in Appendix.

## 2NC

## Case

### 2NC Resources

#### Resource production – European Commission cites a scientific study that concluded, even under the most optimistic scenario, demand of critical resources outstrips current supply by a factor of 4 – even if silicon and rare earth metal extraction methods improve, this will take at least 10 years, meaning they can't solve their impact

#### Production constraints collapse investment

Zuser et al 11 -- Vienna University of Technology (Anton and Helmut Rechberger, 4/11/11, "Considerations of resource availability in technology development strategies: The case study of photovoltaics," Resources, Conservation and Recycling 56(1), ScienceDirect)

If current research in the field of PV technology turns out to be practicable and economic competitive, major changes may be experienced in the next decades. Nevertheless, even though these technologies are promising, there are still numerous hurdles that have to be overcome before market penetration. The role of recycling is negligible at the moment, but will play an important role as soon as the huge amounts of installations of recent and future years will go out of service. Therefore, even if electricity production out of photovoltaics is becoming economically affordable without subsidies, it is very unlikely that ambitious scenarios like those of EREC can be achieved by 2040. From our point of view the material constraints will play a major role after an installed capacity of a few hundred GWp in the case of CdTe and CIGS because of competing market forces, production bottlenecks and maybe reserve constraints. Especially production constraints may occur, because the considered metals are byproducts of copper, zinc, lead, tin and aluminum production. Increasing the output of the by-products is very much depended on the production of “parent” metals under the given price schemes.

#### Actual solar development impossible – lead, transportation, cost-effectiveness

Mcardle 11 -- senior editor for The Atlantic who writes about business and economics, worked at three start-ups, a consulting firm, an investment bank, a disaster recovery firm at Ground Zero, and The Economist (Megan, 11/16/11, "Should We Be Bullish on Solar?" http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/should-we-be-bullish-on-solar/248608/#)

On the other hand, it's also possible that people who trade those stocks for a living--some of whom may even be as smart as James Wimberly, have considered this possibility, and don't find it very likely. What might those reasons be? 1) Mindless trend extrapolation is hours of fun for the entire family, but it is incorrect at least as often as it is correct, and possibly more often. Wimberly uses this graph: And very possibly prices will keep falling, the way that microchips have. On the other hand, maybe they'll plateau. Wimberly points out that solar panels are fundamentally a manfuacturing business, not a resource business, which is certainly promising . . . but the prices of other manufactured goods that experienced steep declines did not necessarily keep plummeting to zero. 2) Solar panel costs are not the only cost of a solar installation. According to the Energy Bible (which comports roughly with other figures I've seen online), about half the cost, or a little more, of putting in solar panels comes from the cells. The rest comes from the other stuff you need: batteries, transformers, wiring, and labor. As far as I know, the cost of these things is not falling as fast as the cost of solar panels. Assume that these costs have held relatively steady, with the labor component being the most unstable. Ten years ago, most of the cost of an installation would have been the solar panels. But as those prices decline, the installed cost (without tax incentives) will be increasingly dominated by labor and other materials. Assuming that that graph says what I think it does, that implies that even if cells become free, we'd plateau slightly north of the average electricity price. 3) There's a storage problem. Yes, intriguing things are being done with hot salt and so forth. But how attractive are the costs compared to home installations? What percentage of their total generation costs represent solar cells, versus labor and other things whose prices aren't falling so fast? Traditional batteries will not cut it, as this physicist has helpfully illustrated with a hypothetical "national battery" for all of America's electricity generation: Putting the pieces together, our national battery occupies a volume of 4.4 billion cubic meters, equivalent to a cube 1.6 km (one mile) on a side. The size in itself is not a problem: we'd naturally break up the battery and distribute it around the country. This battery would demand 5 trillion kg (5 billion tons) of lead. A USGS report from 2011 reports 80 million tons (Mt) of lead in known reserves worldwide, with 7 Mt in the U.S. A note in the report indicates that the recent demonstration of lead associated with zinc, silver, and copper deposits places the estimated (undiscovered) lead resources of the world at 1.5 billion tons. That's still not enough to build the battery for the U.S. alone. We could chose to be optimistic and assume that more lead will be identified over time. But let's not ignore completely the fact that at this moment in time time, no one can point to a map of the world and tell you where even 2% of the necessary lead would come from to build a lead-acid battery big enough for the U.S. And even the undiscovered, but suspected lead falls short. What about cost? At today's price for lead, $2.50/kg, the national battery would cost $13 trillion in lead alone, and perhaps double this to fashion the raw materials into a battery (today's deep cycle batteries retail for four times the cost of the lead within them). But I guarantee that if we really want to use more lead than we presently estimate to exist in deposits, we're not dealing with today's prices. Leaving this caveat aside, the naïve $25 trillion price tag is more than the annual U.S. GDP. Recall that lead-acid is currently the cheapest battery technology. Even if we sacrificed 5% of our GDP to build this battery (would be viewed as a huge sacrifice; nearly a trillion bucks a year), the project would take decades to complete. But even then, we aren't done: batteries are good for only so many cycles (roughly 1000, depending on depth of discharge), so the national battery would require a rotating service schedule to recycle each part once every 5 years or so. This servicing would be a massive, expensive, and never-ending undertaking. Moreover, while some sort of battery-replacement would help deal with the base-load problem (solar and wind are more variable than conventional sources, which means they have limited applications), they don't fix the transportation problem. Batteries are heavy and expensive, and as I understand it, absent some fairly radical breakthrough, they won't work at all in aviation; the energy density isn't high enough to permit the plane to take off. They're better for autos, but people don't want the limited range those vehicles currently offer. 4) To really take the market by storm, solar (plus storage) doesn't need to beat the average cost of electricity; it needs to beat the individual cost of each fuel type. DOE seems to think that by 2016 solar is still going to be a lot more expensive per kilowatt hour than other sources: Levelized energy cost chart 1, 2011 DOE report.gif It's a pretty long haul before they overtake new coal--much less already-existing coal plants, or advanced natural gas. The most obvious use for solar is as a replacement for expensive peak-load natural gas power (as I understand it, air conditioning causes most of the demand for these plants, so solar would be a nice complement.) But unless it gets massive subsidies, solar (including any storage mechanism you come up with) is going to have to individually defeat each type of electricity plant on price and/or availability, not "the average retail price of electricity"--which already includes some expensive solar and wind power. Maybe that's possible--though that would still leave transportation to worry about. But that graph doesn't show it. I'd close by restating Tyler's question in a slightly different way: if the price of solar is really likely to keep falling until it's cheaper than coal, why don't we see this revealed in the behavior of global warming activists? Where are Greens saying "We've decided to move on to more pressing issues, because clearly, the carbon emissions problem is just about solved." If solar panels really become cheap enough to replace most electric generation, that will be extraordinarily disruptive, in ways that will be both good and bad for the environment. But I'm not seeing a shift away from climate change in order to focus more on, say, sustainable water-use or species conservation. Everyone seems just as worried about climate change as they've ever been, even though such cheap solar panels would render the issue mostly moot. Revealed preference and market prices certainly can't tell you everything about the future. But they can tell you a lot about what people believe about the future.

#### Rare earth shortages specifically threaten solar

Spence 11 -- independent journalist (Timothy, 11/16/11, "Rare-earth shortage to hamper clean energy: EU study," http://www.euractiv.com/sustainability/rare-earth-shortage-hamper-clean-news-508967)

Looming shortages of metals that are in high demand and dominated by a single supplier – China – threaten Europe’s goals for cleaner transport and sustainable energy, says a new study prepared for the European Commission. The study by the Joint Research Centre says supply shortfalls of component metals in the next two decades risk the production of solar, wind and nuclear technologies as well as electric vehicles and carbon-capture systems. “This adds more evidence to the fact that Europe has to look within itself … and more toward waste management, to re-use existing metals,” said Dr. Raymond Moss, lead author of the report. The findings could have serious implications for the EU’s “Roadmap for moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050” that hinges on development of renewable energy, cleaner transport as well as modernising and integrating Europe’s electricity grids. Such ambitions depend heavily on the availability of neodymium, dysprosium, indium, tellurium and gallium, metals that are in demand globally. EU’s vital raw materials The Commission has already identified many so-called rare-earth minerals as well as metals like cobalt in its lists of 14 economically vital raw materials that are prone to supply disruption. The JRC study is part of the Commission’s examination of raw material needs. Europe depends on imports for nearly all of its rare-earth metals. Though many are in abundant supply on the planet, the metals are dispersed or difficult to access, and despite their importance to green energy, require intensive mining and processing. China controls more than 90% of the market. In July, the World Trade Organisation called on China to ease its export restrictions on 17 rare-earth metals important to energy, transport and electronics manufacturing. Shortages or limitations on supply would have serious impact on many industries. But with solar and wind power expected to account for the biggest energy growth markets over the next 20 years, the impact on alternative energy could be profound. The JRC report says five metals - dysprosium, neodymium, tellurium, gallium, and indium - are at the highest risk of supply “bottlenecks” from high demand, concentration of supply and “high political risks due to an extreme concentration of supply in China.” The study examines 14 rare-earth metals. Solar energy technologies, for example, will require half the current world supply of tellurium and 25% of the supply of indium, the report says. Europe’s wind energy technology will require about 4% of the supply of both neodymium and dysprosium. “While the percent might be small, it could have a significant effect on wind technology,” Moss told EurActiv. The concern, he said is that “90 percent of the source is in China at the moment, and they themselves have a rapidly growing demand for the same metals whilst they have also limited restrictions on export.”

### 2NC Picking Winners

#### Picking winners – Glover says solar collapse inevitable due to expensive and unprofitable nature of the industry – government incentive schemes from Germany to China have failed even with massive public investment and are now in economic crises

#### Government can’t start energy innovation – picking winners empirically failed

Mufson 11 -- energy staff writer for the Washington Post (Steven, 11/11/11, "Before Solyndra, a long history of failed government energy projects," http://www.windtaskforce.org/page/unsustainable-subsidies)

Solyndra, the solar-panel maker that received more than half a billion dollars in federal loans from the Obama administration only to go bankrupt this fall, isn’t the first dud for U.S. government officials trying to play venture capitalist in the energy industry. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor. The Synthetic Fuels Corporation. The hydrogen car. Clean coal. These are but a few examples spanning several decades — a graveyard of costly and failed projects. 478 Not a single one of these much-ballyhooed initiatives is producing or saving a drop or a watt or a whiff of energy, but they have managed to burn through far more more taxpayer money than the ill-fated Solyndra.An Energy Department report in 2008 estimated that the federal government had spent $172 billion since 1961 on basic research and the development of advanced energy technologies. What does Washington have to show for these investments? And should the government even be in the business of promoting particular energy technologies? Some economists, executives and financiers — as well as Energy Secretary Steven Chu — argue that the government must play a role because certain technologies have non-financial benefits, such as producing fewer greenhouse gas emissions or easing U.S. reliance on foreign oil. The semiconductor industry is often held up as a model of how government money can help build a new type of economy. But others argue that the history of government attempts to reach for the holy grail of new energy technology — a history that features both political parties — is not inspiring. “We’re making very large bets, and the decisions seem to be more grounded in politics and geography than in engineering and science,” said Michael Graetz, a professor at Columbia Law School and the author of “The End of Energy.” Consider the saga of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. In 1971, President Richard Nixon set a goal of building an experimental nuclear power plant. The Clinch River reactor was supposed to be a sort of perpetual motion machine, producing power as well as plutonium that could be used in other plants. Private utilities agreed to kick in $175 million, less than half of the $400 million that the Atomic Energy Commission estimated it would cost to build. As expenses ballooned, the government covered all the overruns. The project was criticized by activists and scientists worried about the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Cheap uranium undercut it. After President Ronald Reagan was elected, Clinch River survived the first round of his spending cuts, in part out of deference to Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), a strong supporter of the reactor, which was in his home state. But finally, in 1983, with the Congressional Budget Office saying the cost might exceed $4 billion, Congress terminated the program. Blueprints had been drawn up, modeling done, components ordered and some ground cleared, but the reactor was never built. The price tag for the federal government:$1.7 billion ($3.9 billion in today’s dollars). Then there was the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. President Jimmy Carter called it the “keystone” of U.S. energy policy; Congress authorized $17 billion for it to act as a sort of investment bank, funding projects that would turn plentiful U.S. coal and shale into oil and gas. Carter set a goal of producing 2 million barrels a day of “synfuels” by 1990. Not quite. A handful of coal and auto companies tapped the new funds to build a facility that was intended to produce 50,000 barrels a day, the first of what was supposed to be a network of synfuel plants, many on federal lands. But after oil prices leveled off, then fell, in the early 1980s, the project was not economically sound, even with government help. The private partners pulled out. Congress ousted the corporation’s president in 1983 after the entity was accused of handing out money for political reasons. In 1986 the corporation closed down. It had spent $2 billion (more than $4 billion in today’s dollars). This sort of industrial policy fell out of favor in the Reagan era and into the 1990s, but then it returned, as fears of climate change spawned new “clean energy” ideas. President George W. Bush had his own pet projects. In his 2003 State of the Union address, he called for “a new national commitment” to work toward hydrogen-powered vehicles so that “our scientists and engineers will overcome obstacles to taking these cars from laboratory to showroom.” But on the road to the showroom, the hydrogen car made a wrong turn. From 2004 through 2008, the federal government poured $1.2 billion into hydrogen vehicle projects; the Government Accountability Office noted that about a quarter of that money went to “congressionally directed projects” outside the initiative’s original research and development scope. Visitors to General Motors outside Detroit could drive a vehicle powered by hydrogen, but the technology was costly, and there was no infrastructure to support the vehicles. They died in development. The “clean coal” movement has been no more successful. Politicians on both sides of the aisle have sought to put money into efforts that would make coal more appealing by taking its greenhouse emissions and burying them. After a carbon-capture project in Alaska burned through $117 million during the 1990s, Republican lawmakers tried to give the moribund project another $125 million in 2005. Just this year, the utility AEP, one of the nation’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide, abandoned a pilot project because it was too expensive — even though the Energy Department was willing to kick in $334 million, half the expected cost. A North Dakota project was shelved last December despite a $100 million federal grant. Bush launched what was supposed to be a $1 billion project to separate carbon dioxide from the emissions of a coal power plant in Illinois and bury the gas underground. Several years later, cost estimates have climbed, the project has been scaled back — and it still hasn’t broken ground. Despite this track record and the recent Solyndra failure, Energy Secretary Chu remains undeterred. Citing examples from Civil War-era railroads to airplanes to semiconductors, he has defended government’s role in funding new technologies and promising companies. “Americans have always led by looking ahead. Even in the midst of the Civil War, when our country was under incredible stress, we planned for the future,” Chu said in September. “President Lincoln signed the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, which authorized generous public financing for two private companies — Union Pacific Railroad Company and Central Pacific Railroad Company — to lower the investor risk in building railroads in unsettled territories. In 1869, the first Transcontinental Railroad was completed at Promontory Summit, Utah, revolutionizing transport in this country and opening up a world of possibilities for industry.” Enter Stanford University professor Richard White, a historian of the American West who wrote “Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America.” “I admire Steven Chu a great deal, but his knowledge of the Pacific Railway Act unfortunately appears to be about equal to my knowledge of high-energy physics,” White said in an interview. He said the legislation produced a disaster far larger than the lifeless factory that Solyndra has left behind. White said that Union Pacific and Central Pacific became two of the most hated corporations in the West, spawning political opposition wherever they went. Within 10 years of giving them land grants and loan guarantees, the federal government reversed its policy and eventually sued to recover its investment. The litigation dragged on into the 20th century. Chu has also argued that the government should help ramp up manufacturing. He says that while the internal-combustion engine was invented in Germany, Henry Ford mastered the assembly line and made the United States the world leader in automaking. However, historians note, Ford did not receive government assistance. Some experts also question the semiconductor example, in which the government purportedly created an industry through military purchases. Jack Spencer, a nuclear power and energy expert at the Heritage Foundation, said that the Pentagon supported the semiconductor industry because it wanted “to kill people better through innovation, but its goal wasn’t to create commercial enterprises.” Moreover, he added, if the broader marketplace hasn’t created enough incentives for a new technology such as solar or wind energy to thrive, then loan guarantees or grants will only postpone the death of a company. But Chu isn’t the only one who thinks the government has a role to play. David Eaglesham, chief technology officer at First Solar, a leading maker of thin-film solar panels, says government funding for basic research during the 1990s kept the company alive when it comprised about “10 guys working in Toledo.” He said the Energy Department’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory funded “pretty much everything” when it came to technology, but “at low levels.” Many policy experts say some of government’s biggest energy investment payoffs have come in the small stuff, such as testing the use of magnesium alloys to make lightweight car batteries more efficient or developing ballasts that make compact fluorescent bulbs more efficient. Still others say that the nearly $40 billion paid out by the federal government so far to subsidize corn-based ethanol is a success story; ethanol has displaced more than half a million barrels a day of petroleum. But that benefit must be weighed against whether ethanol has driven up corn prices, along with evidence that it may be worse than oil from a greenhouse gas perspective. Energy innovation is simply different from innovation in other industries, argue Edward Steinfeld and Jason Lee of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In electronics and information technology, they note in an unpublished article, the end products are cheap, consumers buy new ones every few months or years, and much of the value is captured by the front-end designer rather than the manufacturer. (Think Apple.) Energy technologies, however, “are more expensive by several orders of magnitude, and they have much longer life cycles,” they say. “A solar panel is expected to last 20 to 25 years. Moreover, for many of these technologies, including thin-film solar, the key knowledge lies not just in upstream design, but also in learning how to produce inexpensively at high volume.” Essentially, Steinfeld and Lee conclude, “to pull off energy innovation successfully, you need scale.” And, of course, you also need to keep innovating. As First Solar’s Eaglesham says, “there’s never the last word in technology.” Doing all this requires massive sums of money — and an acceptance of the inevitability of frequent failure. That could be a tough sell in Washington, given the downfall of Solyndra and the unsteady status of some other recipients of Energy Department assistance. Massachusetts-based Beacon Power, maker of a nifty and effective — but unprofitable — method of using flywheels for electricity storage, filed for bankruptcy on Oct. 30. Ener1, a maker of lithium-ion batteries and a recipient of an Energy Department grant, was delisted by the Nasdaq Oct. 28 because of its low stock price. Perhaps the federal government is, as former Obama economic adviser Lawrence Summers put it, “a crappy VC,” or venture capitalist. Or perhaps it should stick to funding basic research. But if more recipients of Energy Department loan guarantees falter, they will become part of a long, if undistinguished, history of failure.

### 2NC Utilities Reject

#### Increased solar adoption causes utilities to reject net metering – makes solar development impossible

Martin 9/12 -- reporter for Bloomberg News (Christopher, 2012, "U.S. Solar Industry Bracing for Utility Backlash Over Metering," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-12/u-s-solar-industry-bracing-for-utility-backlash-over-metering.html)

Utilities are required to purchase electricity generated by solar panels installed on consumers’ homes under so-called net- metering policies, an arrangement that may become less viable as solar systems become more common, said Rhone Resch, chief executive officer of the Washington-based trade group. California, the largest solar market, capped the amount of panels utilities are required to connect to their grids and other states are considering similar policies. Some utilities see the requirement to buy solar power from every rooftop system as a threat to their profitability, Resch said. “Net metering works for us now, but we’re going to see a backlash from utilities as solar penetration increases over the next few years,” Resch said today in an interview at the Solar Power International conference in Orlando, Florida. California regulators capped the amount of rooftop solar that may be connected to the grid at 5 percent of a utility’s power needs, and is studying the long-term impact upon their profits. Other states may consider similar actions, said Tony Clifford, chief executive officer of Standard Solar Inc., a closely held developer based in Rockville, Maryland. “I’m really concerned about a utility pushback on net- metering,” Clifford said in an interview. “What we need is an honest assessment of the true costs and benefits of managing distributed generation and I don’t think we’ve seen that yet.” Utilities are considering ways to offset the cost of buying solar, including Sempra Energy (SRE)’s San Diego Gas & Electric, which proposed a fee for residential solar customers, said Aaron Hall, president of the San Diego-based developer Borrego Solar Systems Inc. Regulars blocked the proposal in January. “That would have made almost every installation lose money and prevent new projects from getting financing,” Hall said.

### 2NC Nat Gas Wins

#### Natural gas – Dumaine says new supplies make it the cheapest, largest, and most predictable source of electricity generation – solar still requires massive breakthroughs that take time

#### Nat gas beats out solar adoption

Hunt 12 -- President of Tech and Creative Labs, more than 30 years’ experience as a utility executive, state utility regulator and as a strategic energy consultant and for the last 20 years, he has been a strategic energy strategy consultant serving as global division president for energy analytics and advisory services as Ventyx/Global Energy Advisors; and in Standard & Poor’s Regional and Energy Economics Group; Master’s Degree in Public Administration, University of Kansas (Gary, 7/10/12, "The Importance of Balancing Energy Economics for the Success of Sustainability," http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Importance-of-Balancing-Energy-Economics-for-the-Success-of-Sustainability.html)

The question is what will replace it? Environmental advocates hope it will be renewable wind and solar. We are certainly building plenty of it. But volatility happens and it does not spare the politically correct. Oversupply of photovoltaic panels and wind turbines from China flood world markets to suction up subsidies and feed in tariff supports to capture market share. Today we have two times more PV supply than demand and PV producers and wind manufacturers are feeling the pain. This market imbalance is rapidly bankrupting the solar and wind producers we are counting on to meet the next wave of growth in the energy business cycle. And then there is this. Despite environment policies opposing fossil fuels, the least cost, best fit, most sustainable alternative to coal is not solar and wind but natural gas fired generation. That is why we are fighting over fracking because low gas prices force renewable energy to compete despite rules jury rigged to favour it.

### 2NC No XTC

#### Adaptation solves catastrophic impacts to warming

Goklany 11 -- PhD, author and researcher associated with IPCC, expert reviewer and U.S. delegate to that organization (Dr. Indur M., 12/11, "Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming," http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf)

So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more. The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. 39 The Stern Review’s time horizon extends to 2100– 2200 and beyond. 40 Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators. 41 Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, 42 and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100. 43 It should be noted that some of the newer impacts assessments have begun to account for changes in adaptive capacity. For example, the CIESIN study of 2006, in an exercise exploring the vulnerability to climate change under various climate change scenarios, allowed adaptive capacity to increase between the present and 2050 and 2100. 44 However, the researchers arbitrarily limited any increase in adaptive capacity to “either the current global mean or to a value that is 25% higher than the current value—whichever is higher.” 45 Such a limitation would, for example, have missed most of the increase in U.S. adaptive capacity during the twentieth century that virtually eliminated death and disease from climate-sensitive water-borne vector diseases. More recently, another study analyzed the sensitivity of deaths from malaria, diarrhea, schistosomiasis and dengue fever to warming, economic development and other determinants of adaptive capacity through the year 2100. 46 The results indicate, unsurprisingly, that economic development alone could reduce mortality substantially. For malaria, for instance, deaths would be eliminated before 2100 in a number of the more affluent sub-Saharan countries. 47

#### Experts agree

Hsu 10 (Jeremy, Live Science Staff, July 19, pg. <http://www.livescience.com/culture/can-humans-survive-extinction-doomsday-100719.html>)

His views deviate sharply from those of most experts, who don't view climate change as the end for humans. Even the worst-case scenarios discussed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change don't foresee human extinction. "The scenarios that the mainstream climate community are advancing are not end-of-humanity, catastrophic scenarios," said Roger Pielke Jr., a climate policy analyst at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Humans have the technological tools to begin tackling climate change, if not quite enough yet to solve the problem, Pielke said. He added that doom-mongering did little to encourage people to take action. "My view of politics is that the long-term, high-risk scenarios are really difficult to use to motivate short-term, incremental action," Pielke explained. "The rhetoric of fear and alarm that some people tend toward is counterproductive." Searching for solutions One technological solution to climate change already exists through carbon capture and storage, according to Wallace Broecker, a geochemist and renowned climate scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in New York City. But Broecker remained skeptical that governments or industry would commit the resources needed to slow the rise of carbon dioxide (CO2) levels, and predicted that more drastic geoengineering might become necessary to stabilize the planet. "The rise in CO2 isn't going to kill many people, and it's not going to kill humanity," Broecker said. "But it's going to change the entire wild ecology of the planet, melt a lot of ice, acidify the ocean, change the availability of water and change crop yields, so we're essentially doing an experiment whose result remains uncertain."

#### Warming will be slow, there’s no impact, and adaptation solves

William Yeatman 9, Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, February 3, 2009, “Global Warming 101: Science,” online: <http://www.globalwarming.org/2009/02/03/global-warming-101-science/>

A “planetary emergency—a crisis that threatens the survival of our civilization and the habitability of the Earth”—that is how former Vice President Al Gore describes global warming. Most environmental groups preach the same message. So do many journalists. So do some scientists.

In fact, at the 2008 annual meeting of Nobel Prize winners in Lindau, Germany, half the laureates on the climate change panel disputed the so-called consensus on global warming.

You have probably heard the dire warnings many times. Carbon dioxide (CO2) from mankind’s use of fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas is building up in the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas—it traps heat that would otherwise escape into outer space. Al Gore warns that global warming caused by carbon dioxide emissions could increase sea levels by 20 feet, spin up deadly hurricanes. It could even plunge Europe into an ice age.

Science does not support these and other scary predictions, which Gore and his allies repeatedly tout as a “scientific consensus.” Global warming is real and carbon dioxide emissions are contributing to it, but it is not a crisis. Global warming in the 21 st century is likely to be modest, and the net impacts may well be beneficial in some places. Even in the worst case, humanity will be much better off in 2100 than it is today.

The following is a summary of key points:

Average Annual Heat-Related Mortality: People will not drop like flies from heat waves in a warming world. Heat-related mortality will continue to decline as the world warms.

Far more people die each year from excess cold than from excess heat.

Global warming will not make air pollution worse.

Global warming will not lead to malaria epidemics in Northern Hemisphere countries.

Contrary to Gore, no “strong, new scientific consensus is emerging” that global warming is making hurricanes stronger.

Global Death & Death Rates Due to Extreme Events, 1900-2004: Since the 1920s, death rates related to extreme weather declined by more than 98 percent globally. The impression conveyed by An Inconvenient Truth—that global warming is making the world a more dangerous place—is false.

Gore’s warning that global warming could shut down the Atlantic branch of the oceanic thermohaline circulation (THC) and plunge Europe into an ice age is science fiction.

Gore’s warning that sea levels could rise by 20 feet is science fiction. Sea level rise in the 21 st century is likely to be measured in inches, not in feet.

The world warmed at a rate of 0.17°C per decade since 1978, according to the temperature record compiled by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since most climate models predict that warming will occur at a constant—that is, non-accelerating—rate, it is reasonable to expect that global warming in the 21 st century will be close to the low end of the IPCC’s forecast range, of 1.4°C to 5.8°C.

The actual warming rate may be only half the 0.17°C per decade rate implied in the IPCC temperature record, because the IPCC has not adequately filtered out the warming biases from local factors like urbanization and improper management of monitoring equipment.

A warming near the low end of the IPCC range would produce both benefits—longer growing seasons, more rainfall, fewer cold deaths—and harms—more heat waves, more drought, some acceleration of sea level rise—but nothing resembling catastrophe.

Even in the IPCC high-end warming forecasts, human welfare would improve dramatically over the next 100 years. In the IPCC fossil-fuel-intensive development scenario, per capita GDP in developing countries increases from $875 per year in 1990 to $43,000 per year in 2100—even after taking into account an additional 110 years of global warming. Even in the IPCC worst-case scenario, global warming is not the civilization-ending catastrophe Al Gore purports it to be.

#### Previous temperature spikes disprove the impact

Singer 11 (S. Fred, Robert M. and Craig, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, “Climate Change Reconsidered,” 2011 Interim Report of the Nongovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

Research from locations around the world reveal a significant period of elevated air temperatures that immediately preceded the Little Ice Age, during a time that has come to be known as the Little Medieval Warm Period. A discussion of this topic was not included in the 2009 NIPCC report, but we include it here to demonstrate the existence of another set of real-world data that do not support the IPCC‘s claim that temperatures of the past couple of decades have been the warmest of the past one to two millennia. In one of the more intriguing aspects of his study of global climate change over the past three millennia, Loehle (2004) presented a graph of the Sargasso Sea and South African temperature records of Keigwin (1996) and Holmgren et al. (1999, 2001) that reveals the existence of a major spike in surface air temperature that began sometime in the early 1400s. This abrupt and anomalous warming pushed the air temperatures of these two records considerably above their representations of the peak warmth of the twentieth century, after which they fell back to pre-spike levels in the mid-1500s, in harmony with the work of McIntyre and McKitrick (2003), who found a similar period of higher-than-current temperatures in their reanalysis of the data employed by Mann et al. (1998, 1999).

#### No impact to warming

Idso and Idso 11 (Craig D., Founder and Chairman of the Board – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, and Sherwood B., President – Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path,” February, <http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/> prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf)

As presently constituted, earth’s atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas we call carbon dioxide or CO2. That’s only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earth’s atmosphere eons ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these frightening future scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that combine to determine the state of earth’s climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did -- which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way, and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise, in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming -- poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely more complex (the effect of a rise in the air’s CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater challenge to which they aspire

### 2NC Slow Now

#### Gas and developing countries offset US emissions reductions

Marshall 12 (Michael, climate reporter – New Scientist, 8/20/’12, <http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn22196-lowest-us-carbon-emissions-wont-slow-climate-change.html>)

It looks like good news, but it's not. The US has recorded a sharp fall in its greenhouse gas emissions from energy use. Thanks to a rise in the use of natural gas, emissions are at their lowest since 1992. The fall will boost the natural gas industry, but in reality the emissions have simply been exported. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), energy-related CO2 emissions in the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two decades. Emissions are normally high between January and March because people use more heating in the winter, but last winter was mild in the US. The EIA says that an increase in gas-fired power generation, and a corresponding decline in coal-fired, contributed to the fall in emissions. Burning natural gas produces fewer emissions than burning coal, and natural gas is currently unusually cheap in the US thanks to a glut of shale gas extracted by hydraulic fracturing or "fracking". If gas companies continue to expand their shale gas operations, the US could generate even more electricity from gas, and its emissions could fall for several years, says Kevin Anderson of the University of Manchester, UK. However, this will not slow down climate change. US coal consumption has fallen, but production is holding steady and the surplus is being sold to Asia. As a result, the US is effectively exporting the coal-related emissions. "Gas is less bad than burning the coal, but only if you keep the coal in the ground," Anderson says. Proponents of natural gas argue that it is a "transition fuel" that we can burn for a few years while we install low-carbon infrastructure such as wind farms and nuclear power stations. That viewpoint looks increasingly untenable. "If we want even an outside chance of [limiting global warming to] 2 °C, there is no emission space for gas," Anderson says. In order to hit the 2 °C target, global emissions need to peak by 2020 before dropping again, which means making a rapid transition to low-carbon energy.

**Decade of cooling – 98-08 was the coolest decade on record**

**Carter 11** (Robert M., PhD, University of Cambridge, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report, 8-29-11, <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf>)

Recent reconstructions of climate history find the human influence does not stand out relative to other, natural causes of climate change. While global warming theory and models predict polar areas would warm most rapidly, the warming of Greenland was 33 percent greater in magnitude in 1919–1932 than it was in 1994–2007, and **Antarctica** **cooled** during the second half of the twentieth century.  Perlwitz et al. (2009) reported ―**a decade-long decline** (1998–2007) in globally averaged temperatures from the record heat of 1998‖ and noted U.S. temperatures in 2008 ―not only declined from near-record warmth of prior years, but were in fact colder than the official 30-year reference climatology … and further were **the coldest** since at least 1996.‖  New research disputes IPCC‘s claim that it has ferreted out all significant influences of the world‘s many and diverse urban heat islands from the temperature databases they use to portray the supposedly unprecedented warming of the past few decades.

**Temperature tracking data confirms**

**Morano 8** (Marc Morano, the communications director for the Republican minority on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, “Earth's 'Fever' Breaks: Global COOLING Currently Under Way,” 2-27-8, http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.Blogs&ContentRecord\_id=5CEAEDB7-802A-23AD-4BFE-9E32747616F9

Excerpt: All four major global temperature tracking outlets (Hadley, NASA's GISS, UAH, RSS) have released updated data. All show that over the past year, global temperatures have **dropped precipitously**. A compiled list of all the sources can be seen here. The total amount of cooling ranges from 0.65C up to 0.75C -- a value large enough to erase nearly **all the global warming** recorded over the past 100 years. All in one year time. For all sources, it's the single fastest temperature change every recorded, either up or down. […] Over the past year, anecdotal evidence for a cooling planet has exploded. China has its coldest winter in 100 years. Baghdad sees its first snow in all recorded history. North America has the most snowcover in 50 years, with places like Wisconsin the highest since record-keeping began. Record levels of **Antarctic sea ice**, record cold in Minnesota, Texas, Florida, Mexico, Australia, Iran, Greece, South Africa, Greenland, Argentina, Chile -- the list goes on and on. No more than anecdotal evidence, to be sure. But now, that evidence has been supplanted by hard scientific fact. All four major global temperature tracking outlets (Hadley, NASA's GISS, UAH, RSS) have released updated data. All show that over the past year, global temperatures have dropped precipitously.

**Peer-reviewed sources agree**

**Carter 11** (Robert M., PhD, University of Cambridge, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia, Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report, 8-29-11,

<http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/03Temperature.pdf>)

In a paper titled ―A strong bout of natural **cooling in 2008**‖ published in Geophysical Research Letters Perlwitz et al. (2009) discuss the ―**precipitous drop** in North American temperature in 2008, commingled with a decade-long fall in global mean temperatures.‖ The authors begin their narrative by noting there has been ―a decade-long decline (1998–2007) in globally averaged temperatures from the record heat of 1998,‖ citing Easterling and Wehner (2009). In further describing this phenomenon, they note U.S. temperatures in 2008 ―not only declined from near record warmth of prior years, but were in fact colder than the official 30-year reference climatology (0.2°C versus the 1971–2000 mean) and further were the coldest since at least 1996.‖ With respect to the geographical origin of this ―natural cooling,‖ as they describe it, the five researchers point to ―a widespread coolness of the tropical-wide oceans and the northeastern Pacific,‖ focusing on the Niño 4 region, where they report ―anomalies of about -1.1°C suggest a condition colder than any in the instrumental record **since 1871**.‖ The researchers then push ahead in search of the cause of the global and U.S. coolings that sparked their original interest, seeking out what connects them with other more primary phenomena, the anomalous and significant oceanic coolings. Perlwitz et al. first **discount volcanic** eruptions, noting ―there were no significant volcanic events in the last few years.‖ Next, they write that solar forcing ―is also unlikely,‖ because its radiative magnitude is considered to be too weak to elicit such a response. And these two castaway causes thus leave them with ―coupled ocean-atmosphere-land variability‖ as the ―most likely‖ cause of the anomalous coolings.

### 2NC Irreversible

#### 6 degree warming’s inevitable

AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

#### Low threshold—less than 2 degrees is sufficient to cause their impacts

Harvey 11 (Fiona, Environment Reporter – Guardian, 11/9, “World headed for irreversible climate change in five years, IEA warns,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Climate scientists estimate that global warming of 2C above pre-industrial levels marks the limit of safety, beyond which climate change becomes catastrophic and irreversible. Though such estimates are necessarily imprecise, warming of as little as 1.5C could cause dangerous rises in sea levels and a higher risk of extreme weather – the limit of 2C is now inscribed in international accords, including the partial agreement signed at Copenhagen in 2009, by which the biggest developed and developing countries for the first time agreed to curb their greenhouse gas output.

#### Too little, too late

Harris 9 (Richard, Science Reporter for National Public Radio, Peabody Award Winner, American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Global Warming Irreversible, Study Says,” January 26th, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study. As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists. "We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly." That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide. Turning off the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming. "People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to normal in 100 years or 200 years. What we're showing here is that's not right. It's essentially an irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says. This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the carbon dioxide put into the air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean. And that will take place for many hundreds of years.

#### It’s irreversible - it’s too late to stop the greenhouse effect

Harris 9 (Richard, Science Reporter for National Public Radio, Peabody Award Winner, American Association for the Advancement of Science Journalism Award, “Global Warming Irreversible, Study Says,” January 26th, NPR, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

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#### It’s too late—Earth’s fate is sealed

Adve 8 [Nagraj. Staffer for the South Asia News. “Can We Avoid ‘Dangerous’ Global Warming” One World South Asia News, 23 April 08. Lexis]

As a consequence, the Earth’s average temperature has risen about 0.8 degrees C since the Industrial Revolution, reaching 14.5 degrees C in 2005. This seemingly mild rise has already caused lands to be nibbled by rising sea levels in the Sunderbans and the Gujarat coast, the 2005 floods in Bombay which killed a thousand people, Himalayan glaciers to recede, and rainfall patterns to change. According to the UN, 66 million people were affected by floods this year in South Asia alone. What used to seem ‘natural’ phenomena are not natural any more, as Bill McKibben lamented in The End of Nature nearly 20 years ago. The problem, as Paul Brown explains in Global Warming: The Last Chance for Change, is that there’s more warming in the pipeline. There’s a lag of about 25-30 years between greenhouse gases being emitted and the full effects of their warming. So the recent climate chaos is actually the consequence of emissions in the late 1970s. The full effects of more recent emissions, including from China’s coal-based power stations that some are suddenly and rightly concerned about, will be felt in the years to come. We are committed, Brown writes, to a further 0.7 degrees C. That would add up to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels. At 1.5 degrees, 18% of the world’s species will die, and 400 million more people worldwide will be exposed to water stress. It gets worse. As the Earth gets warmer, it will trigger off certain ‘feedbacks’, which could be understood as the Earth’s systems themselves contributing to warming: as Arctic ice melts, there will be less of it to reflect heat, warming further, melting

### AT Causes War

#### Tech and adaptive advances prevent all climate impacts---warming won’t cause war

Dr. S. Fred Singer et al 11, Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, Professor Emeritus of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and a Member of the International Academy of Astronautics; Robert M. Carter, Research Professor at James Cook University (Queensland) and the University of Adelaide (South Australia), palaeontologist, stratigrapher, marine geologist and environmental scientist with more than thirty years professional experience; and Craig D. Idso, founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Arizona-Nevada Academy of Sciences, and Association of American Geographers, et al, 2011, “Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report,” online: <http://www.nipccreport.org/reports/2011/pdf/FrontMatter.pdf>

Decades-long empirical trends of climate-sensitive measures of human well-being, including the percent of developing world population suffering from chronic hunger, poverty rates, and deaths due to extreme weather events, reveal dramatic improvement during the twentieth century, notwithstanding the historic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations.

The magnitude of the impacts of climate change on human well-being depends on society's adaptability (adaptive capacity), which is determined by, among other things, the wealth and human resources society can access in order to obtain, install, operate, and maintain technologies necessary to cope with or take advantage of climate change impacts. The IPCC systematically underestimates adaptive capacity by failing to take into account the greater wealth and technological advances that will be present at the time for which impacts are to be estimated.

Even accepting the IPCC's and Stern Review's worst-case scenarios, and assuming a compounded annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of only 0.7 percent, reveals that net GDP per capita in developing countries in 2100 would be double the 2006 level of the U.S. and triple that level in 2200. Thus, even developing countries' future ability to cope with climate change would be much better than that of the U.S. today.

The IPCC's embrace of biofuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions was premature, as many researchers have found "even the best biofuels have the potential to damage the poor, the climate, and biodiversity" (Delucchi, 2010). Biofuel production consumes nearly as much energy as it generates, competes with food crops and wildlife for land, and is unlikely to ever meet more than a small fraction of the world's demand for fuels.

The notion that global warming might cause war and social unrest is not only wrong, but even backwards - that is, global cooling has led to wars and social unrest in the past, whereas global warming has coincided with periods of peace, prosperity, and social stability.

### 2NC Warming

#### Solar is insufficient to solve warming – Post says its variability and intermittency require all conventional generators to remain fueled and in use 70% of the time – the developing world also ensures warming is inevitable because they will use fossil fuels to drive growth

#### Even the more liberal estimates agree – IEA has incentives to promote renewable adoption but even they conclude solar can only reduce one-sixth of emissions, assuming widespread global investment 25 times the current solar tech

#### That amount is not enough to stave off the worst effects of warming – incentives are insufficient – prefer the depth of our predictive assessment

Bosetti et al 10 -- senior researcher at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and principal investigator of the European Research Council–funded ICARUS Project (Valentina, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval, Massimo Tavoni, 3/10, "What Should we Expect from Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-Related R&D," http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185642.PDF)

We start by analysing the environmental effectiveness of standalone innovation policies, looking at their impact on carbon emission and concentration trajectories over the century. We simulate innovation policies assuming global R&D funds of various sizes are used to subsidize the three categories of Table 1. As a central value, we use a fund size equal to 0.08% of Global World 6 Product (GWP). This share is consistent with the optimal R&D investments needed to comply with a stringent climate stabilisation policy in the WITCH model (Bosetti et. al. 2009a), and is in line with the peak level of public energy R&D expenditures achieved across the OECD area in the early 1980s. Similar values have also been suggested in other recent analyses (IEA, 2008). For robustness check, and in order to assess the maximum world emission reduction that could be achieved through a stand-alone innovation policy, we pursued additional experiments with incrementally larger funds amounting to up to 2% of GWP. The international R&D fund is assumed to be financed by contributions from OECD regions that are proportional to their GDP (0.08% in most of our analysis). In turn, each world region receives from the international R&D fund a subsidy which adds to its own regional R&D investments in innovation. The fund is distributed across regions on an equal per capita basis, although alternative distribution rules were also tested to check for robustness. Figure 1 and 2 report CO2 emissions and concentrations for the 4 innovation policies, as well as for the reference (BAU, no policy) and a climate stabilisation pathway at 450 CO2 (535 CO2-e) ppmv. The main result is that all innovation policies fall short of generating the mitigation action needed to stabilise carbon concentrations. In all cases, the atmospheric stock of CO2 keeps increasing and so does the global temperature, which remains rather close to the baseline case. There are differences across innovation policies, however. The “Advanced Techs” R&D policy, under which two advanced technologies become competitive via R&D investments, yields the higher mitigation and manages to stabilise carbon emissions – albeit not concentrations. Given the improvements needed and commercialisation lags, these technologies become effectively available around mid-century, leading to some emission reductions afterwards. The “W+S & CCS” R&D policy achieves somewhat smaller reductions relative to BAU, and with a different time profile. Unlike new breakthrough technologies, wind, solar and CCS can quickly penetrate the market if supported by R&D subsidies, allowing some emission reductions during the first half of the century. However, in the long term returns to R&D investments in both technologies are limited by the resource constraints in terms of site availability (for Wind and Solar) and storage repository (for CCS). The last option, namely R&D dedicated to energy efficiency (E.E.), is almost ineffective for two reasons. First, some decline in energy intensity is already embedded in baseline scenarios, consistent with the dynamics of the last 50 years. As a consequence, achieving additional energy efficiency improvements via R&D is fairly expensive at the margin. Second, efforts to decarbonise the economy will ultimately be crucial to make a dent in emissions. This cannot be achieved through improvements in energy efficiency alone, and rather requires the progressive phasing-out of fossil-fuel-based energy technologies. 8 While the above simulations assume sizeable R&D spending, roughly four times higher than current public energy-related expenditures, one open question is whether even higher spending might overturn our conclusions. Likewise, mixed strategies combining all three types of R&D could in principle deliver higher returns, especially since alternative options differ in the time profile and long-run potential of the emission reductions they can achieve. We have therefore carried out a number of sensitivity analyses, varying the size and allocation of the technology fund. A very robust finding across all simulations is that the largest achievable reduction in emissions with respect to the baseline is in the order of 13%-14% in cumulated terms throughout the century, in the range of the “Advanced Techs” case discussed above. In particular, while a larger international R&D fund induces larger emission reductions over the medium term, its long-term impact is limited by declining marginal returns to R&D, as well as by the positive counteracting impact of the fund on world GDP and emissions. This is illustrated in Figure 3 through a comparison between two funds amounting to 2% of GWP and 0.2% respectively, both of which are assumed to subsidise equally all three types of R&D. Although the larger fund implies lower emissions in the medium term, by the end of the century the two innovation policies result in similar and growing emissions, due to the reallocation of consumption from earlier to later periods in time. Furthermore, the medium-term impact of a large R&D fund is insufficient to put world emissions, even for the first few decades, on a path consistent with long-run stabilisation of carbon concentrations at safe levels.

#### Incentives fail to affect climate change without carbon pricing

Bosetti et al 10 -- senior researcher at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and principal investigator of the European Research Council–funded ICARUS Project (Valentina, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval, Massimo Tavoni, 3/10, "What Should we Expect from Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-Related R&D," http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1185642.PDF)

This paper has used WITCH, a global integrated assessment model featuring a reasonably detailed representation of the energy sector and endogenous technological change, to assess the potential for innovation policies to address climate change or to lower the cost of doing so. Two main results stand out. First, innovation policies alone are unlikely to effectively control climate change. Even under large increases in global climate-related R&D spending and fairly optimistic 16 assumptions regarding returns to R&D in new “breakthrough” technologies, emissions can be at best stabilised well above current levels and CO2 concentration be reduced by about 50 ppm relative to baseline by 2100 (from over 700 ppm to about 650 ppm, or over 750 ppm CO2eq). The decarbonisation of energy needed to meet stringent global emission reduction objectives has to be achieved at least partly by pricing carbon.

### Econ Recovery Now – 2NC

#### US economy recovering now – jobs report, business investment, housing strength, manufacturing pickup, consumer spending holding strong, no global econ thumpers -- **Schlesinger**

#### US economy recovering now – job growth, improving housing market, and sequestration/tax increases don’t thump

Rushe 3/8/13 (Dominic, The Guardian, "US unemployment rate falls to four-year low as economy adds 236,000 jobs," http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/mar/08/us-jobless-rate-jobs-february)

The US added 236,000 new jobs in February as the unemployment rate edged down to 7.7%, its lowest level since December 2008. The figures easily beat economists' predictions that the US would add 160,000 jobs in February and look set to drive US stock markets to new record highs.¶ This is 29th month in a row that the US has added jobs. On average, 183,000 jobs were added each month in all of 2012. In past three months, that pace has picked up to an average of about 195,000 a month.¶ The Obama administration said the figures showed that the economy was strengthening. "While more work remains to be done, today's employment report provides evidence that the recovery that began in mid-2009 is gaining traction," said Alan Krueger, chairman of the Council of Economic advisers.¶ But he cautioned that the reference period for the surveys was before sequester budget cuts began, suggesting that the impact of those cuts will be felt later.¶ "The administration continues to urge Congress to move toward a sustainable federal budget in a responsible way; one that balances tax-loophole closing, entitlement reform and sensible spending cuts, while making critical investments in the economy that promote growth and job creation – and protecting our most vulnerable citizens," Krueger said.¶ The Bureau of Labor Statistics said the job gains were made in professional and business services, construction, and healthcare. In a sign of the improving housing market, the construction industry added 48,000 in February. Since September, construction employment has risen by 151,000.¶ There are still major issues in the job market, however. The number of long-term unemployed – those jobless for 27 weeks or more – was unchanged in February at 4.8m. These individuals accounted for 40.2% of the unemployed. The unemployment rates for teenagers (25.1%), black people (13.8%), and Hispanics (9.6%) remained high and showed little or no change.¶ The number of people not in the labour force rose to 90.1 million in February, up from 89.9 million in January and 88.3 million in February 2012.¶ The news comes after payroll giant ADP's latest poll concluded that the private sector added 198,000 jobs in February, higher than the 175,000 forecast by economists. The firm also revised its January number up to 215,000, 22,000 higher than its initial estimate.¶ Mark Zandi, the chief economist of Moody's Analytics, which compiles the report with ADP, said: "The job market remains sturdy in the face of significant fiscal headwinds. Businesses are adding to payrolls more strongly at the start of 2013 with gains across all industries and business sizes. Tax increases and government spending cuts don't appear to be affecting the job market."¶ The jobs figures and better than expected figures from the service sector helped drive US stock markets to all time highs this week. On Tuesday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average passed levels unseen since before the start of the recession.

#### US economy recovering now – job growth in vital sectors, rising biz investment, consumer spending, improved stock prices and housing, strong capital goods orders

Mullaney 3/8/13 (Tim, USA Today, "Jobs analysis: Recovery 1, Austerity 0," http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/03/08/feb-jobs-economy-analysis/1971529/)

Two months after taxes went up, here's the score after the first inning of the U.S. fiscal crackdown: Recovery 1, Austerity 0.¶ That's the upshot of this morning's report that private-company employers added 246,000 jobs in February, with the unemployment rate dropping to 7.7%, the lowest since December 2008. Even with losses of 10,000 government jobs, the overall gain of 236,000 crushed consensus estimates of 160,000 new jobs, and confirmed what other data have suggested. Despite the tax increases that resolved the fiscal cliff, business investment is again rising and consumers, for the most part, are spending.¶ That wasn't necessarily supposed to happen. Concern spiked last month that payroll tax increase and rising gas prices were hamstringing consumers.¶ Instead, austerity has so far mostly rolled off the economy's back, leaving job growth stronger than it was in the fall even after the government revised up its initial estimate for late-2012 growth.¶ One reason: Households have now recovered all of the wealth they lost in the financial crisis and housing bust, thanks to rising stock prices and the beginnings of a housing recovery, the Federal Reserve said yesterday. That has kept businesses buying equipment, consumers buying houses and cars, and now employers stepping to the plate.¶ Today's report points to job strength emerging where it needs to be arriving — in construction, services and to some degree in manufacturing. Construction added 48,000 jobs, mostly in residential building; personal services added 179,000 and manufacturing added 14,000, perhaps because the most-recent report on core capital goods orders, economists at RBS note, was the best monthly gain in nine years. If there;s a concern, it's that state and local governments shed 10,000 jobs.¶ ``This (is) a win for the recovery,'' Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi said. ``Anything less than 125,000 (jobs gains in February) would have been a win for austerity. Of course, the script has a long way to run before we know for sure who wins.''¶

#### US economy recovering now – job growth, consumer spending, effective Fed rate policy

Kowalski 3/8/13 (Alex, Bloomberg, "Payrolls Rise as U.S. Jobless Rate Reaches Four-Year Low," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/payrolls-in-u-s-rose-more-than-forecast-jobless-rate-at-7-7-.html)

Job growth surged last month as auto makers, builders and retailers pushed the unemployment rate to a four-year low, defying concerns that budget battles in Washington would harm the economic expansion.¶ Employment rose 236,000 last month after a revised 119,000 gain in January that was smaller than first estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median forecast of 90 economists surveyed by Bloomberg projected an advance of 165,000. The jobless rate dropped to 7.7 percent, the lowest since December 2008, from 7.9 percent.¶ “It really should cause people to rethink their weak first-half growth estimates,” said Drew Matus, deputy U.S. chief economist at UBS Securities LLC in Stamford, Connecticut, who correctly forecast the unemployment rate. “People counted out the U.S. consumer a little too easily on the payroll-tax increases.”¶ Stocks, the dollar and Treasury yields all rose on signs the world’s largest economy is gaining strength in the face of federal budget cuts and higher payroll taxes. The report may fuel debate among Federal Reserve policy makers considering how long to maintain record stimulus to boost growth and employment.¶ Matus said the report is likely to convince Fed policy makers “that they’re doing exactly the right thing by stimulating the economy.”

#### US economy recovering now - GDP growth projections, jobs report, housing recovery, advancing stock prices

Leonidis 3/8/13 (Alexis, Bloomberg, "Gross Raises U.S. Economic Growth Forecast to 3% in 2013," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/gross-raises-u-s-economic-growth-forecast-to-3-in-2013.html)

Pacific Investment Management Co.’s Bill Gross, manager of the world’s biggest bond fund, said gross domestic product in the U.S. may expand 3 percent this year, an increase from his firm’s most recent growth estimate of less than 2 percent.¶ The U.S. is “moving towards a 3 percent real GDP growth rate” this year, and a nominal growth rate of 5 percent, Gross said today in an interview with Tom Keene on “Bloomberg Surveillance”. Pimco said in December that the U.S. would grow between 1.25 percent and 1.75 percent in 2013.¶ Audio Download: Pimco’s Gross Moves Away From `New Normal’ Forecast¶ The housing recovery and advancing stock prices are making it easier for households to tolerate higher payroll taxes and a logjam in Washington over the nation’s budget. Job growth surged last month as automakers, builders and retailers pushed the unemployment rate to a four-year low, defying concerns that budget battles in Washington would harm the economic expansion.¶ Employment rose 236,000 after a revised 119,000 gain in January, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. A number of 200,000 is consistent with real GDP growth of 3 percent this year, Gross said in the interview.

### Prices Low Now

#### Electricity prices are at historic lows now AND renewables aren’t coming now

Volcovici 3/1/13 ("Campaign says has helped retire 15 percent of coal capacity," http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-01/business/sns-rt-us-usa-coal-climatebre920113-20130301\_1\_coal-fired-power-coal-plant-natural-gas)

The campaign crossed the halfway mark this week after American Electric Power (AEP) announced Monday it will stop burning coal at three Midwest power plants by 2015 as part of a settlement with federal regulators, states and environmental groups, including the Sierra Club.¶ Environmental groups said the Ohio-based company, long known as the biggest coal generator in the country, would retire a total of 2,011 megawatts (MW) of coal-fired capacity at plants in Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky.¶ Since President Barack Obama took office power companies, including AEP, have announced plans to retire over 40,000 MW of coal capacity over the next several years as weak natural gas prices pushed power prices to decade lows.¶ Bloomberg told reporters that natural gas will continue to play a central role in the U.S. energy mix as the country weans itself off of coal use.¶ Solar and wind generation will only play small part in overall U.S. energy consumption, while hydro power can "help in some areas" but is constrained by energy transmission issues, Bloomberg said.

#### Electricity prices are low now - gas supplies, utility companies concede

Jacobs 3/5/13 ("Nuke giant Exelon's future: sustainable or stuck in the mud?," http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=217657)

But hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. has surfaced vast supplies of shale gas in recent years, making natural gas a cheap and attractive fuel source. And, given that it produces cleaner emissions than coal, it’s (managed to avoid the kind of environmental stigma coal plants suffer.) even been given the pass as being relatively sustainable.

“Power prices are typically correlated with natural gas prices,” Miller said. “And as natural gas prices have hovered at decades-low prices, power prices have come down substantially from the peaks they reached in 2008.”

Miller = analyst and director of utilities research for Morningstar

#### Electricity prices low now - gas prices are a key factor

Fuel Fix 3/7/13 ("Summer demand may raise heat on Texas grid," http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/03/07/reliability-versus-low-prices-still-stymies-texas-electricity/)

Low natural gas prices have further decreased the profitability of building new generation, Nelson said, since the structure of Texas’ deregulated power market essentially means gas sets the price of electricity. The average wholesale price for electricity fell more than 50 percent in the last year, chasing away investors.

#### Wholesale electricity prices decreasing now

Boughton 2/28/13 (Kathryn, "Recycling, Lower Electricity Costs Mean Trash Disposal Cost Impact for County Towns," http://www.countytimes.com/articles/2013/02/28/news/northwest\_corner\_journal/doc512fb6a2e44cf847725282.txt)

Currently, towns have contracts for waste removal with huge waste “authorities,” such as the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, which serves 50 municipalities, and the Housatonic Resources Recovery Authority, which covers another 11 western Connecticut towns. The contracts with CRRA and HRRA, negotiated decades ago, depended on towns delivering enough tonnage to ensure trash-to-energy plants operated economically. Now, with contracts expiring, recycling increasing and wholesale electricity prices plummeting, these authorities are facing a changing economic landscape.¶ Trash-to-energy programs that incinerate MSW to generate electricity have been a progressive means of using discarded materials, but the CRRA is facing increased pressure as its Mid-Connecticut facility faces plunging wholesale electricity prices. Jim Hart, director of Regional Refuse Disposal District No. 1, which covers Barkhamsted, New Hartford and Winchester, said this week that when bids went out last year for for the Mid-Connecticut facility, they came back at only 3 cents per kilowatt.¶ The decrease in electricity prices is credited to in the increased prevalence of natural gas.

### Solar/Wind – 2NC

#### Renewable energy skyrockets electricity prices – cost of production and transmission lines

Bryce 12 (Robert, Senior Fellow @ Center for Energy Policy and the Environment – Manhattan Institute, "The High Cost of Renewable Energy Mandates," http://www.manhattan–institute.org/html/eper\_10.htm)

Although supporters of renewable energy claim that the RPS mandates will bring benefits, their contribution to the economy is problematic because they also impose costs that must be incorporated into the utility bills paid by homeowners, commercial businesses, and industrial users. And those costs are or will be substantial. Electricity generated from renewable sources generally costs more—often much more—than that produced by conventional fuels such as coal and natural gas. In addition, large–scale renewable energy projects often require the construction of many miles of high–voltage transmission lines. The cost of those lines must also be incorporated into the bills paid by consumers. These extra costs amount to a "back–end way to put a price on carbon," says Suedeen Kelly, a former member of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.[5] Indeed, with Congress unwilling to approve national carbon dioxide restrictions or renewable–energy quotas, the RPS mandates have become a sprawling state system of de facto carbon–reduction taxes.

#### Renewables are FIVE TIMES more expensive than conventionally produced energy

Zycher 1/17/12 (Benjamin, Visiting Scholar specializing in energy policy @ AEI, "Wind and solar power, part I: uncooperative reality," http://www.aei.org/outlook/energy–and–the–environment/alternative–energy/wind–and–solar–power–part–i–uncooperative–reality/)

The EIA estimates wind (onshore) and solar costs in 2016 at about $149 and $257–396 per mWh, respectively; if we add the rough estimate for backup costs, the total is about $517 for wind and $625–764 for solar generation.13 The EIA estimates for gas– or coal–fired generation are about $80–110 per mWh. Accordingly, the projected cost of renewable power in 2016, including the cost of backup capacity, is at least five times higher than that for conventional electricity. At the same time, outages of wind capacity because of weak wind conditions are much more likely to be correlated geographically than outages of conventional plants, and the same is true for solar electric generation because of the geographic concentrations of thermal solar sites and photovoltaic systems. The higher cost of electricity generated with renewable energy sources is only one side of the competitiveness question; the other is the value of that generation, as not all electricity is created equal. In particular, power produced at periods of peak demand is more valuable than off–peak generation. In this context, wind generation, in particular, is problematic because, in general, winds tend to blow at night and in the winter, which corresponds inversely to peak energy demand during daylight hours and in the summer.

#### Wind and solar power increases electricity prices

**Moors 10–24**–12 (Kent, Global Energy Strategist, "Energy Prices 2013: Renewable Power Could Cause Your Electric Bill to Plummet", http://moneymorning.com/2012/10/24/energy–prices–2013–renewable–power–could–cause–your–electric–bill–to–plummet/)

As we come to the end of an election campaign cycle, something else will be ending as well. Wind subsidies. A poster child for the ongoing debate over government support for renewable energy, the wind subsidy will expire at the end of 2012. Amidst the fog and din of a political war, Congress is not going to renew it. The wind subsidy amounts to a tax credit of some $22 per megawatt hour. Critics note that the wholesale price of electricity in many parts of the U.S. costs $44. That means the credit accounts for 50% of the grid cost. On the solar energy side, the primary federal subsidy provides a tax credit of 30% for the cost of installed equipment. That will drop to 10% at the end of 2016. Already, a separate cash grant for up to 30% for solar energy equipment expired at the end of 2011. Of course, both approaches have generated a considerable amount of criticism from mainly conservative opponents. These critics claim that the only reason wind and solar are even in the game is because of these subsidies. Without them, they argue these sources of energy are not cost effective otherwise. Then, there are others who prioritize environmentally friendly energy sources. But the penchant against government involvement and the assumption that federal subsidies are always an inefficient usage of taxpayer funds are at the core of the argument. So, who is correct? The Hidden Cost of Green Energy Production On Monday, Pilita Clark wrote an interesting piece in the Financial Times exploring the net effect of renewable subsidies in the U.S. and Europe. She highlighted a little considered result of wind and solar production: it runs the risk of destroying profit margins for conventional producers. In fact, according to Clark, “Some utilities risk having as much as half their power generation profits wiped out by 2020 as renewables reshape energy markets say analysts at UBS, which recently downgraded RWE, the German power company, EDF of France, and the Czech Republic’s CEZ Group as a result. Other effects are only starting to be understood as the growth of renewable power soars.” The result could be a dramatic decline in electricity costs. That may seem like a great effect for a house or small business owner wrestling with high energy expenses. But it is a very different matter for the other side of the equation. Market prices could actually crash, as Clark notes, “because renewable power generators, which have large subsidies, low operational costs and free fuel, can offer cheaper prices than owners of plants running on conventional fossil fuels. The crucial element revolves about prices during peak times. These are weekday periods in which demand is highest and where power providers make the bulk of their revenues. Prices and volumes are always elevated during peak times. Yet the experience in Germany, where a government is moving a portion of the nation’s energy infrastructure from reliance on nuclear to wind and solar, is of some concern to conventional generators. Evidence has already surfaced that solar power is diminishing the traditional peak profit opportunity. Clark observes that wind power has demonstrated an ability in the American market to produce “negative prices,” situations in which power ends up begin sold at a loss. This has been the case in Texas, where more wind power has been installed than in any state. A recent study released by the Northbridge Group indicated negative pricing has increased sharply as wind farms spread over the past four years. Not all observers accept such, and what defines an actual market impact remains contentious. Nonetheless, subsidies reaching 50% of the wholesale price of electricity does provide an obvious incentive to sell electricity below generation costs. Why not, if the taxpayer is footing at least some of that bill? Two matters, however, are becoming clear. The first points out that the consumers are still footing a higher cost from the power because it is being generated via taxpayer subsidies. And on that score, while the tax credit for new equipment is expiring, other subsidies of the electricity generated using existing plants will continue. Second, the largess from lower prices is not yet being experienced by the end user.

#### Renewable energy functionally puts a tax on carbon that gets transferred to consumers

Bryce 12 (Robert, Senior Fellow @ Center for Energy Policy and the Environment – Manhattan Institute, "The High Cost of Renewable Energy Mandates," [http://www.manhattan–institute.org/html/eper\_10.htm](http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/eper_10.htm))

There is growing evidence that the costs may be too high—that the price tag for purchasing renewable energy, and for building new transmission lines to deliver it, may not only outweigh any environmental benefits but may also be detrimental to the economy, costing jobs rather than adding them. The mandates amount to a "back–end way to put a price on carbon," says one former federal regulator. Put another way, the higher cost of electricity is essentially a de facto carbon–reduction tax, one that is putting a strain on a struggling economy and is falling most heavily, in the way that regressive taxes do, on the least well–off among residential users. To be sure, the mandates aren't the only reason that electricity costs are rising—increased regulation of coal–fired power plants is also a major factor—and it is difficult to isolate the cost of the renewable mandates without rigorous cost–benefit analysis by the states. That said, our analysis of available data has revealed a pattern of starkly higher rates in most states with RPS mandates compared with those without mandates. The gap is particularly striking in coal–dependent states—seven such states with RPS mandates saw their rates soar by an average of 54.2 percent between 2001 and 2010, more than twice the average increase experienced by seven other coal–dependent states without mandates. Our study highlights another pattern as well, of a disconnect between the optimistic estimates by government policymakers of the impact that the mandates will have on rates and the harsh reality of the soaring rates that typically result. In some states, the implementation of mandate levels is proceeding so rapidly that residential and commercial users are being locked into exorbitant rates for many years to come. The experiences of Oregon, California, and Ontario (which is subject to a similar mandate plan) serve as case studies of how rates have spiraled. A backlash may result that could even imperil the effort to protect the environment. Some of the renewable–energy projects being built in California are so expensive that "people are going to get rate shock," according to Joe Como, acting director of the Division of Ratepayer Advocates, an independent consumer advocacy arm of the California Public Utility Commission. "In the long run," he said recently, the approval of overpriced renewable energy will harm "the states’ efforts to achieve greenhouse gas reductions."

#### Intermittency magnifies the link – producers will establish back–up capacity that jacks up prices

World Nuclear Association 12 ("Renewable Energy and Electricity," August, http://www.world–nuclear.org/info/inf10.html)

In a March 2004 report Eurelectric and the Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers in Europe pointed out that "Introducing renewable energy unavoidably leads to higher electricity prices. Not only are production costs substantially higher than for conventional energy, but in the case of intermittent energy sources like wind energy, grid extensions and additional balancing and back–up capacity to ensure security of supply imply costs which add considerably to the end price for the final consumer." "Reducing CO2 by promoting renewable energy can thus become extremely expensive for consumers," though both organisations fully support renewables in principle. The economic disadvantage referred to will also be reduced as carbon emission costs become factored in to fossil fuel generation.

### 2NC No Econ War

#### No more wars from economic collapse – we’re in a state of turboparalysis

Lind 12 -- co-founder of the New America Foundation, policy director of the Economic Growth Program, graduate of the University of Texas and Yale, taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins, been an editor or staff writer for The New Yorker, Harper’s, The New Republic and The National Interest (Michael, 12/15, "The age of turboparalysis," <http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8789631/the-age-of-turboparalysis/>)

More than half a decade has passed since the recession that triggered the financial panic and the Great Recession, but the condition of the world continues to be summed up by what I’ve called ‘turboparalysis’ — a prolonged condition of furious motion without movement in any particular direction, a situation in which the engine roars and the wheels spin but the vehicle refuses to move.¶ The greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression might have been expected to produce revolutions in politics and the world of ideas alike. Outside of the Arab world, however, revolutions are hard to find. Mass unemployment and austerity policies have caused riots in Greece and Spain, but most developed nations are remarkably sedate. Scandal and sputtering economic growth appear unlikely to prevent another peaceful transition of power within the Communist party of China. And in the US, the re-election of President Obama and the strengthening of his Democratic party in the US Senate reflect long-term demographic changes in an increasingly non-white and secular American electorate, not the endorsement of a bold agenda for the future by the Democrats. They don’t have one.¶ In the realm of ideas, turboparalysis is even more striking. On both sides of the Atlantic, political and economic debate proceed as though the bursting of the global bubble economy did not discredit any school of thought. Right, left and centre, the players are the same and so are their familiar moves. Public debate is dominated by the same three groups — market fundamentalists, centrist neoliberals, and mildly reformist social democrats — who have been debating one another since the 1980s. Someone who went to sleep like Rip Van Winkle in the 1980s when Reagan and Thatcher were in power and awoke today would find nothing new in the way of economic theories or political doctrines.¶ By now one might have expected the emergence of innovative and taboo-breaking schools of thought seeking to account for and respond to the global crisis. But to date there is no insurgent political and intellectual left, nor a new right, for that matter. In the US, the militant Tea Party right, many of whose candidates went down to defeat in this year’s elections, represents the last gasp of the Goldwater-Reagan coalition, not something fresh. The American centre-left under Obama is intellectually exhausted and politically feeble, reduced to rebranding as ‘progressive’ policies like the individual mandate system (‘Obamacare’) and tax cuts for the middle class which originated on the moderate right a generation ago. In Britain, the manifestos of various ‘colour revolutions’ — Blue Labour, Red Tory and so on — have the feel of PR brochures promoting rival cliques of ambitious apparatchiks rather than the epochal thinking the times require.¶ Why has a global calamity produced so little political change and, at the same time, so little rethinking? Part of the answer, I think, has to do with the collapse of the two-way transmission belt that linked the public to the political elite. Institutions such as mass political parties, trade unions, and local civic associations, which once connected elected leaders to constituents, have withered away in more individualistic and anonymous societies. One result is a perpetual crisis of legitimacy on the part of political elites, who owe their electoral successes increasingly to rich donors and skilful advertising consultants. New political movements are hard to found. At the same time, anachronistic movements can continue to raise funds or entertain audiences, even if, like America’s conservative movement, they lose election after election.¶ But there is a deeper, structural reason for the persistence of turboparalysis. And that has to do with the power and wealth that incumbent elites accumulated during the decades of the global bubble economy.¶ In essence, the bubble economy was a dysfunctional marriage of export-driven economies like China, Japan and Germany and debt-addicted nations like the US and many of Germany’s European neighbours. As international trade imbalances built up, from the 1980s to the 2000s, so did the wealth and power of elites who profited from the system, from Chinese Communist princelings with a stake in overbuilt export industries to the financiers of Wall Street and the City of London.¶ A global economic system that relied on excessive borrowing by consumers, particularly in the US, was bound to grind to a halt when fearful consumers switched from borrowing to saving. But the crash was only the first stage of the adjustment. The second stage is rebalancing. Countries like China and Germany must rely more on domestic consumption; countries like the US and UK must rely less on private consumer debt and shift resources from finance and housing to productive, traded industries.¶ But these reform agendas, from the downsizing of the overbuilt industrial sectors of mercantilist Asian nations to the pruning of finance in the Anglo-American world, threaten the very interests that profited from the preceding bubble and now glare defensively at a changing world, like Fafnir crouched upon his hoard. In the US, the wealth of the bubble-swollen financial sector has been transmuted into political power via campaign contributions. While Mitt Romney, the candidate of Wall Street, lost his bid for the presidency, the American financial industry overall has been successful in blocking reforms like the nationalising of failed banks (rather than government bailouts with few conditions) and the restructuring of private household mortgage debt. These reforms, along with a dose of moderate inflation and much more aggressive fiscal policies like massive investment in infrastructure, would have helped the economy recover more rapidly. But they would have imposed significant costs on economic elites who have wielded their power to thwart them.¶ For their part, the masses seldom unite against the classes in democracies because they are divided among themselves. When nations realise that they will be collectively poorer in the future than they had expected, the usual result is not solidarity but rather civil war, by means of ballots and sometimes bullets. Confronted by a crisis like the Great Recession, each section of society uses its political influence to try to maintain its share of the national wealth, while forcing the cost of economic adjustment to others. The rich try to shift adjustment costs to the middle class, who in turn try to pay for their own subsidies and entitlements by cutting the programmes of the poor.History is sobering, in this regard. The Great Recession, which continues despite a technical ‘recovery’, can be viewed as the third great economic collapse of the industrial era, following the ‘Long Depression’ of the 1870s-1890s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. The earlier two episodes of global economic crisis witnessed setbacks for liberalism, democracy and free trade and the flourishing of illiberal nationalism, racism, imperialism and beggar-thy-neighbour economics. While slow growth combined with national rivalries have not yet engendered anything like the autarkic economics of the earlier two crises, it would be premature to predict the survival of present levels of financial and economic integration in a world that wobbles between feeble recoveries and renewed recessions.¶ Nowhere is there greater potential for conflict than in the relationship between the two poles of the now-collapsed bubble economy — the US, which specialised in exporting debt to China, and China, which specialised in exporting manufactured goods to the US. Since the Great Recession began, American attitudes toward China have grown strikingly more negative. The much-discussed ‘pivot’ in American strategy away from fighting jihadists in the Middle East and Central Asia towards unnamed great power rivals in East Asia is manifestly a shift toward greater military containment of China.¶ And in the recently concluded US elections, both candidates competed in promising to protect American producers from unfair Chinese competition. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which China is excluded, combines military and trade concerns in a single set of America-centred Asian alliances. Gone is the Clinton-era vision of China as a liberalising and democratising partner of the US in a world of great-power harmony.¶ The last global depression was brought to an end by the second world war. This time a ‘hot’ war is extremely unlikely and a cold war merely possible. Nevertheless, geopolitics may do what domestic politics has failed so far to do and free the world’s leading countries from ongoing turboparalysis.

#### AND - even if wars occur, they won’t escalate.

Bennett & Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

When engaging in diversionary actions in response to economic problems, leaders will be most interested in a cheap, quick victory that gives them the benefit of a rally effect without suffering the long-term costs (in both economic and popularity terms) of an extended confrontation or war. This makes weak states particularly inviting targets for diversionary action since they may be less likely to respond than strong states and because any response they make will be less costly to the initiator. Following Blainey (1973), a state facing poor economic conditions may in fact be the target of an attack rather than the initiator. This may be even more likely in the context of a rivalry because rival states are likely to be looking for any advantage over their rivals. Leaders may hope to catch an economically challenged rival looking inward in response to a slowing economy. Following the strategic application of diversionary conflict theory and states’ desire to engage in only cheap conflicts for diversionary purposes, states should avoid conflict initiation against target states experiencing economic problems.

#### 93 examples are on our side

Miller 2k [Morris Miller, Winter 2K. economist and adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration and former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 25.4]

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Their chain of causation is backwards

Ferguson 6 (Niall, prof. of history, Foreign Affairs, “The Next War of the World”, lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### No impact – econ decline doesn’t cause war

Barnett ‘9(Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how **globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape**. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### Countries can’t start wars when their economies decline—only growth triggers conflict.

Bennett and Nordstrom 2k [Department of Political Science Professors @ Penn state U, D. Scott and Timothy, “Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic problems in Enduring Rivalries” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Feb., p33-61]

Alternative relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator (1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the historical notion that leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full—in bad times, leaders may simply not be able to afford to go to conflict. Blainey’s argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory.

#### The global trading system prevents a repeat of the 1930’s

Lamy ’11(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

Any doubts about the stability and importance of the global trade architecture should have been dispelled by the remarkable manner in which the system has endured the devastating economic crisis that shook the world from 2008 to 2009. That durability stands in stark contrast with many other elements in the international architecture, which proved too brittle to withstand this shock. For example, governments have yet to devise an international system for managing climate change or currency volatility. Other issues heavily tinged by domestic politics, such as migration, are not even on the international agenda and face fire even at the regional level, as we have seen with the influx of immigrants to Europe following recent events in North Africa. By now, it should be clear that the failure to establish a system of global governance in the area of international finance unquestionably blunted governments' ability to respond effectively to the crisis. Yet even while a great many things went wrong in the crisis, the trading system responded precisely as it was intended to. Compare that with the 1930s, when the last great global economic calamity unfolded. No such system was in place, and the global economy paid a heavy price. The United States passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, quadrupling tariffs and raising duties to at least 60 percent on more than 3,000 types of imported products. Faced with this provocation, America's trading partners did not sit idly by; tit-for-tat retaliation rapidly ensued, closing markets and throttling trade. Between 1929 and 1934, world trade contracted 66 percent. The bulk of this collapse was due to disintegrating demand and the drying-up of credit. But the imposition of prohibitive duties not only pushed the economy further into depression -- it also fostered a profound sense of ill will between governments and contributed to the international tensions that led to World War II. To prevent this from happening again, leaders of great vision and wisdom agreed to create a rules-based, transparent, and nondiscriminatory trading system. Men like James Meade and Cordell Hull succeeded in encouraging 23 countries to accept a compact known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since the GATT came into force in 1948 and since the World Trade Organization (WTO) opened its doors in 1995, the world has not seen protectionist outbreaks like those of the early 1930s. This is not to say that the trading system has not been tested. Protectionist pressures surged in 1971, for example, when the gold standard for currency conversion was abandoned, and during the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis, when Pacific Rim countries saw their economies contract by double-digit margins. In each case, markets stayed open to the flow of goods and services from the affected countries, enabling them to trade their way back to stability and prosperity.

### 2NC Jobs/Econ

#### Solar industry can't stimulate job growth – Feldman is a PhD and says it's impossible to manage competing price interests – renewable sector growth directly trades off with conventional industries that cause no net-increase in jobs

#### Incentives for solar don't create jobs – empirically proven

IER 12 -- Inst for Energy Research, not-for-profit organization that conducts intensive research and analysis on the functions, operations, and government regulation of global energy markets (7/31/12, "The Obama Solar and Oil Shale Legacies," http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/07/31/the-obama-solar-and-oil-shale-legacies/)

Besides subsidies, the solar industry has received loan guarantees that have cost the American public millions – if not billions — of dollars. Of course the most famous is Solyndra, the now bankrupt firm that received $528 million in loans before going belly up. Solyndra was not the only solar panel manufacturer that went under after receiving government funds. Abound Solar Inc. received $400 million in U.S. loan guarantees to build two solar panel manufacturing facilities and has collected about $70 million of its taxpayer-funded loan guarantee.[ii] Other solar-related companies filing for bankruptcy are SpectraWatt, Evergreen Solar, Energy Conversion Devices, Beacon Power, and Amonix; the list goes on. Solar companies are having problems because prices and demand for solar panels have declined, and it is difficult to compete against China’s low labor costs and subsidies. According to GTM Research, solar panel manufacturers are expected to supply 59 gigawatts worldwide this year, but demand is only expected to be 30 gigawatts. The study expects that about 21 gigawatts of existing factories will need to close to re-establish a healthy balance of supply and demand. This oversupply problem that began to surface in early 2011 led to an almost 50 percent decline in wholesale solar panel prices last year.[iii] The Obama administration touted that funding renewable energy will generate so-called “green jobs.” Its National Renewable Energy Laboratory tracked the 1603 grant program from its inception in 2009 through 10 Nov 2011, in a report entitled, Preliminary Analysis of the Jobs and Economic Impacts of Renewable Energy Projects Supported by the 1603 Treasury Grant Program.[iv] The study found that $9 billion in economic “stimulus” funds to solar and wind projects were distributed between 2009 and 2011 that created 910 “direct” jobs. That means that it cost about $9.89 million to establish each of those long-term jobs, covering the technologies’ 20 to 30 year life. However, adding in the 4,200 to 4,600 “indirect” jobs that NREL indicated were created, the cost is about $1.6 million per job. According to NREL’s report, the $9 billion covered 23,692 photovoltaic and 197 large wind projects.[v]

#### No market for green jobs from solar

Sullivan 12 -- Reuters Washington correspondent (Andy, 4/13/12, "Analysis: Obama's "green jobs" have been slow to sprout," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/13/us-usa-campaign-green-idUSBRE83C08D20120413)

(Reuters) - Three weeks ago, President Barack Obama stood in front of a sea of gleaming solar panels in Boulder City, Nevada, to celebrate his administration's efforts to promote "green energy." Stretching row upon row into the desert, the Copper Mountain Solar Project not far from Las Vegas provided an impressive backdrop for the president. Built on public land, the facility is the largest of its kind in the United States. Its 1 million solar panels provide enough energy to power 17,000 homes. And it employs just 10 people. Three years after Obama launched a push to build a job-creating "green" economy, the White House can say that more than 1 million drafty homes have been retrofitted to lower heating and cooling costs, while energy generation from renewable sources such as wind and solar has nearly doubled since 2008. But the millions of "green jobs" Obama promised have been slow to sprout, disappointing many who had hoped that the $90 billion earmarked for clean-energy efforts in the recession-fighting federal stimulus package would ease unemployment - still above 8 percent in March. Supporters say the administration over-promised on the jobs front and worry that a backlash could undermine support for clean-energy policies in general. "All of this stuff is extraordinarily worthy for driving long-term economic transformation but extremely inappropriate to sell as a short-term job program," said Mark Muro, a clean-energy specialist at the Brookings Institution. Others say the green-jobs push has crowded out less fashionable efforts that would have put people back to work quickly. "From my perspective it makes more sense for us to arm our clients with the basic skills, rather than saying, 'By golly, you will do something in the green economy or you won't work,'" said Janet Blumen, the head of the Foundation for an Independent Tomorrow, a Las Vegas job-training organization that has seen positions in trucking and accounting go unfilled because training money had been earmarked for green efforts. A $500 million job-training program has so far helped fewer than 20,000 people find work, far short of its goal. Republicans, meanwhile, have seized on the failure of solar panel maker Solyndra, which received a $535 million loan guarantee, to argue that White House allies have been the only ones who have benefited from the green jobs push. "He handed out tens of billions of dollars to green energy companies, including his friends and campaign contributors at companies like Solyndra that are now bankrupt," Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney said on April 4. VARYING ESTIMATES Backers of the notion of a "green collar" work force argue that earth-friendly energy is a promising growth sector that could create a bounty of stable, middle-class jobs and fill the gap left by manufacturing work that has moved overseas. On the campaign trail in 2008, Obama promised that a $150 billion investment would generate 5 million jobs over 10 years. Obama included $90 billion in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to weatherize drafty buildings, fund electric-car makers and encourage other clean-energy efforts. "We'll put nearly half a million people to work building wind turbines and solar panels, constructing fuel-efficient cars and buildings, and developing the new energy technologies that will lead to new jobs," he said at a wind-turbine plant in Ohio the day before he took office. In December 2009, Vice President Joe Biden said the effort would create 722,000 green jobs. The White House said in November 2010 that its clean-energy efforts had generated work for 225,000 people and would ultimately create a total of 827,000 "job years" - implying average annual employment of around 200,000 over the four years of Obama's presidential term. White House officials stand by that estimate and say job creation is only one aspect of the clean-energy push. "We have a record of success that has created tens of thousands of jobs and is ensuring that America is not ceding these industries to countries like China," White House spokesman Clark Stevens said. "Thanks to the investments we've made, these industries will continue to grow, along with the jobs they create." One problem is that, unlike other elements of the Recovery Act that injected money into the economy quickly, efforts to develop high-speed rail or electric-car batteries Obama also promoted could take a decade or longer to yield dividends. Gains in the sector don't necessarily lead to wider employment. The wind industry, for example, has shed 10,000 jobs since 2009 even as the energy capacity of wind farms has nearly doubled, according to the American Wind Energy Association. Meanwhile, the oil and gas industry has added 75,000 jobs since Obama took office, according to Labor Department statistics. Federal agencies also have struggled to get stimulus money out the door in a timely manner, even for prosaic efforts that help local governments reduce energy costs. The rush of funding encouraged private-sector participants to inflate their job-creation projections as they angled for a piece of the action, insiders say. "They were obviously just guessing," said Robert Pollin, a University of Massachusetts professor and green-energy supporter who helped the Energy Department sort through loan applications. "If an undergraduate gave me a paper of that quality I would have probably given them a C or a C-plus." SLOW PROGRESS The high-profile failures of companies that have benefited from federal backing, such as Solyndra and Beacon Power Corp., have given ammunition to Republicans who paint the effort as a costly boondoggle. They also have targeted the $500 job-training program that aims to train workers for skills they would need in a new "green economy." The program's initial results were so poor that the Labor Department's inspector general recommended last fall that the agency should return the $327 million that remained unspent. The numbers have improved somewhat since then, but the department remains far short of its goal of placing 80,000 workers into green jobs by 2013. By the end of 2011, some 16,092 participants had found new work in a "green" field, according to the Labor Department - roughly one-fifth of its target. The program also helped employed workers upgrade their skills.

#### Prefer our evidence – their estimates assume massive unemployment and aren’t supported by history

Schmalensee 11 -- Howard W. Johnson Professor of Economics and Management, Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, Dean Emeritus, and Director of the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at the MIT Sloan School of Management, member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1989 through 1991, Fellow of the Econometric Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a member of the International Academy of Management and the National Commission on Energy Policy (Richard, 5/11, "Evaluating Policies to Increase the Generation of Electricity from Renewable Energy," http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/66279/2011-008.pdf?sequence=1)

Some advocates claim that such subsidies will create “green jobs.” But the notion that the aggregate level of unemployment can be affected by this sort of program makes sense only under conditions of substantial unemployment. Even then, however, it seems a priori unlikely that the most efficient way to create jobs in a deep recession would be to subsidize switching from one capital-intensive method of generating electricity to another. Of course, subsidies for renewable generation will change the composition of domestic employment. Some argue that there will be rapid growth in the global market for renewable 4 generation equipment, and subsidizing domestic demand for renewables will create a strong domestic industry able to compete in that market. At its base this is an argument that the government has found an economically attractive investment opportunity that private capital markets would fail to exploit without a subsidy, an argument not well-supported by history. Moreover, while growth prospects for renewables may indeed be bright, particularly in the long term, the U.S. auto industry demonstrates that a large domestic market does not guarantee a healthy domestic industry (though, to be fair, it surely never hurts). At the end of 2008, for instance, the U.S. led the world in installed wind generation capacity, but half of new installations that year were accounted for by imports.

### 2NC Multi-Condo Good

**Condo’s good**

**1. Neg flex – can’t use kritiks and counterplans and test the aff from different angles**

**2. Information processing – multiple choices make for more tactile and harder debate – fosters 2ac tech skills**

**3. Real-world – policy-makers aren’t forced to stick to their opinions if they realize a flaw**

**[4. Research – sides have to learn a broader variety of issues instead of relying on generics**

**5. Checks new affs – neg needs to be able to test multiple options on the fly]**

**Counter-interpretation – we get** [INSERT] **– it’s a logical fixed limit that mitigates their offense**

**Not a voter –**

**[If going for] just a reason to stick us with the CP – solves 1AR allocation**

**[If not going for] just a reason conditional worlds should be banned – solves 1AR allocation**

**AT: Strat Skew**

**No reason we skewed you any more than disads, T, or impact turns would – our advocacies aren’t contradictory**

**AT: In-depth education**

**2NR checks – still gain education but are forced to think about time allocation too – eventually will come down to the best option**

**AT: Neg Bias**

**Aff has first and last speech, gets to pick the focus of the debate, and can go for a single dropped arg in the 2ar – this topic proves there is no predictable neg ground**

**AT: C/I – One Condo**

**Can’t solve either teams offense – means we can’t test new options on the fly and leads to staler debate**

**Arbitrary and self-serving – like saying you can cheat just not in the specific way you cheated in this debate – if theory is entirely offense/defense, then all of our offense is a linear disad**

**AT C/I – Dispo**

**Arbitrary and not real-world – forces us into random rules to stick us with advocacies, let’s the aff frame the debate**

## K

### 2NC Overview

#### K outweighs the case

#### -- Magnitude -- logic of security created the most destructive features of the international system -- war, oppression, and ecological destruction are all inevitable when particular decisions become necessities. Try or die -- voting aff makes their impacts inevitable.

#### -- Turns case --

#### -- Independent impact --

#### -- Alt' solves case -- rejecting dominant political discourse challenges the root cause of violent identity construction, undermining the solar reason for war. It's a prerequisite to better policy-making and a matter of sequencing -- good theory now causes better action later.

### 2NC Solar

#### Solar power is a Trojan horse for corporatization of tech—they can’t control the consumerist deployment toward unsustainable ends

**Glover et al 6** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf)

The Sustainable Energy Quest The problems of the conventional energy order have led some to regard reinforcement of the status quo as folly and to instead champion sustainable energy strategies based upon non-conventional sources and a more intelligent ideology of managed relations between energy, environment, and society consonant with environmental integrity. This regime challenger seeks to evolve in the social context that produced the conventional energy regime, yet proposes to fundamentally change its relationship to the environment (at least, this is the hope). Technologies such as wind and photovoltaic electricity are purported to offer building blocks for a transition to a future in which ills plaguing modernity and unsolved by the conventional energy regime can be overcome (Lovins, 1979; Hawken et al., 2000; Scheer, 2002; Rifkin, 2003; World Bank, 2004b). While technical developments always include social, material, ecological, intellectual, and moral infrastructures (Winner, 1977: 54 - 58; Toly, 2005), and may, therefore, be key to promoting fundamentally different development pathways, it is also possible that **technologies, even environmentally** **benign ones, will be appropriated by social forces that predate them and**, **thereby, can be thwarted in the fulfillment of social promises attached to the** **strategy**. Indeed, if unaccompanied by reflection upon the social conditions in which the current energy regime thrives, the transition to a renewable energy regime may usher in very few social benefits and little, if any, political and economic transformation. This is the concern that guides our analysis (below) of the sustainable energy movement. At least since the 1970s when Amory Lovins (1979) famously posed the choice between “hard” and “soft” energy paths, sustainable energy strategies have been offered to challenge the prevailing regime. Sometimes the promise was of no more than “alternative” and “least cost” energy (Energy Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, 1974a, 1974b; O’Toole, 1978; Sant, 1979), but adjectives such as “appropriate,” “natural,” “renewable,” “equitable,” and even “democratic” have also been envisioned (Institute for Local SelfReliance, 2005; Scheer, 2002: 34). 16 The need to depart from the past, especially in light of the oil crises of the 1970s and the energy-rooted threat of climate change that has beset policy debate since the late 1980s, united disparate efforts to recast and reconceive our energy future. Partly, early criticisms of the mainstream were reflective of a broader social agenda that drew upon, among other things, the anti-war and anti-corporate politics of the 1960s. It was easy, for example, to connect the modern energy regime to military conflicts of the period and to superpower politics; and it was even easier to ally the mainstream’s promotion of nuclear power to the objectives of the Nuclear Club. With evidence of profiteering by the oil majors in the wake of the 1973-1974 OPEC embargo, connecting the energy regime with the expanding power of multinational capital was, likewise, not difficult. Early sustainable energy strategies opposed these alliances, offering promises of significant political, as well as technological, change. However, in the thirty years that the sustainable energy movement has aspired to change the conventional regime, its social commitments and politics have become muddled. A telling sign of this circumstance is the shifted focus from energy politics to economics. To illustrate, in the celebrated work of one of the movement’s early architects, subtitles to volumes included “breaking the nuclear link” (Amory Lovins’ Energy/War, 1981) and “toward a durable peace” (Lovins’ Soft Energy Paths, 1979). These publications offered poignant challenges to the modern order and energy’s role in maintaining that order. Today, however, the bestsellers of the movement chart a course toward “natural capitalism” (Hawken et al., 2000), a strategy that anticipates synergies between soft path technologies and market governance of energy-environment-society relations. Indeed, a major sustainable energy think tank has reached the conclusion that “small is profitable” (Lovins et al., 2002) in energy matters and argues that the soft path is consistent with “economic rationalism.” Understandably, a movement that sought basic change for a third of a century has found the need to adapt its arguments and strategies to the realities of political and economic power. Without adaptation, the conventional energy regime could have ignored soft path policy interventions like demand-side management, integrated resource planning, public benefits charges, and renewable energy portfolio standards (see Lovins and Gadgil, 1991; Sawin, 2004), all of which have caused an undeniable degree of decentralization in energy-society relations. In this vein, it is clear that sustainability proponents must find ways to speak the language and communicate in the logic of economic rationalism if they are to avoid being dismissed. We do not fault the sustainable energy camp for being strategic. Rather, the concern is whether victories in the everyday of incremental politics have been balanced by attention to the broader agenda of systemic change and the ideas needed to define new directions. A measure of the sustainable energy initiative’s strategic success is the growing acceptance of its vision by past adversaries. Thus, Small is Profitable was named ‘Book of the Year’ in 2002 by The Economist, an award unlikely to have been bestowed upon any of Lovins’ earlier works. As acceptance has been won, it is clear that sustainable energy advocates remain suspicious of the oil majors, coal interests, and the Nuclear Club. But an earlier grounding of these suspicions in anti-war and anti-corporate politics appears to have been superseded by one that believes the global economy can serve a sustainability interest if the ‘raison de market’ wins the energy policy debate. Thus, it has been suggested that society can turn “more profit with less carbon,” by “harnessing corporate power to heal the planet” (Lovins, 2005; L. H. Lovins and A. B. Lovins, 2000). Similarly, Hermann Scheer (2002: 323) avers: “The fundamental problem with today’s global economy is not globalization per se, but that this globalization is not based on the sun—the only global force that is equally available to all and whose bounty is so great that it need never be fully tapped.” However, it is not obvious that market economics and globalization can be counted upon to deliver the soft path (see e.g. Nakajima and Vandenberg, 2005). More problematic, as discussed below, the emerging soft path may fall well short of a socially or ecologically transforming event if strategic victories and rhetorics that celebrate them **overshadow systemic critiques** of energy-society relations and the corresponding need to align the sustainable energy initiative with social movements to address a comprehensive agenda of change. Catching the Wind To date, the greatest success in ‘real’ green energy development is the spread of wind power. From a miniscule 1,930 MW in 1990 to more than 47,317 MW in 2005, wind power has come of age. Especially noteworthy is the rapid growth of wind power in Denmark (35 percent per year since 1997), Spain (30 percent per year since 1997), and Germany (an astonishing 68 percent per year since 2000), where policies have caused this source to threaten the hegemony of fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Wind now generates more than 20 percent of Denmark’s electricity and the country is the world leader in turbine manufacture. And as the Danes have demonstrated, offshore wind has the potential to skirt some of the land-use conflicts that have sometimes beset renewable energy alternatives. Indeed, some claim that offshore wind alone might produce all of Europe’s residential electricity (Brown, 2004). National energy strategists and environmental movements in and beyond Europe have recognized the achievements of the Danes, Spaniards, and Germans with initiatives designed to imitate their success. What are the characteristics of this success? One envied feature is the remarkable decline in the price of wind-generated electricity, from $0.46 per kWh in 1980 to $0.03 to $0.07 per kWh today (Sawin, 2004), very close to conventionally-fueled utility generating costs in many countries, even before environmental impacts are included. Jubilant over wind’s winning market performance, advocates of sustainable energy foresee a new era that is ecologically much greener and, yet, in which electricity remains (comparatively) cheap. Lester Brown (2003: 159) notes that wind satisfies seemingly equally weighted criteria of environmental benefit, social gain, and economic efficiency: Wind is...clean. Wind energy does not produce sulfur dioxide emissions or nitrous oxides to cause acid rain. Nor are there any emissions of health-threatening mercury that come from coal-fired power plants. No mountains are leveled, no streams are polluted, and there are no deaths from black lung disease. Wind does not disrupt the earth’s climate...[I]t is inexhaustible...[and] cheap. This would certainly satisfy the canon of economic rationalism. It is also consistent with the ideology of modern consumerism. Its politics bestow sovereignty on consumers not unlike the formula of Pareto optimality, a situation in which additional consumption of a good or service is warranted until it cannot improve the circumstance of one person (or group) without decreasing the welfare of another person (or group). 17 How would one know “better off” from “worse off” in the wind-rich sustainable energy era? Interestingly, proponents seem to apply a logic that leaves valuation of “better” and “worse” devoid of explicit content. In a manner reminiscent of modern economic thinking, cheap-and-green enthusiasts appear willing to set wind to the task of making “whatever”—whether that is the manufacture of low-cost teeth whitening toothpaste or lower cost SUVs. In economic accounting, all of these applications potentially make some in society “better off” (if one accepts that economic growth and higher incomes are signs of improvement). Possible detrimental side effects or externalities (an economic term for potential harm) could be rehabilitated by the possession of more purchasing power, which could enable society to invent environmentally friendly toothpaste and make affordable, energy-efficient SUVs. Sustainable energy in this construct cooperates in the abstraction of consumption and production. Consumption-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose, and, relatedly, production-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose are not issues. The construct altogether ignores the possibility that “more-is-better” consumption-production relations may actually reinforce middle class ideology and capitalist political economy, as well as contribute to environmental crises such as climate change. In the celebration of its coming market victory, the cheap-and-green wind version of sustainable energy development may not readily distinguish the economic/class underpinnings of its victory from those of the conventional energy regime. Wind enthusiasts also appear to be largely untroubled by trends toward larger and larger turbines and farms, the necessity of more exotic materials to achieve results, and the advancing complications of catching the wind. There is nothing new about these sorts of trends in the modern period. The trajectory of change in a myriad of human activities follows this pattern. Nor is a critique per se intended in an observation of this trend. Rather, the question we wish to raise is whether another feature in this pattern will likewise be replicated—namely, a “technological mystique” (Bazin, 1986) in which social life finds its inspiration and hope in technical acumen and searches for fulfillment in the ideals of technique (Mumford, 1934; Ellul, 1964; Marcuse, 1964; Winner, 1977, 1986; Vanderburg, 2005). This prospect is not a distant one, as a popular magazine recently illustrated. In a special section devoted to thinking “After Oil,” National Geographic approvingly compared the latest wind technology to a well-known monument, the Statue of Liberty, and noted that the new machines tower more than 400 feet above this symbol (Parfit, 2005: 15 - 16). It was not hard to extrapolate from the story the message of Big Wind’s liberatory potential. Popular Science also commended new wind systems as technological marvels, repeating the theme that, with its elevation in height and complexity lending the technology greater status, wind can now be taken seriously by scientists and engineers (Tompkins, 2005). A recent issue of The Economist (2005) included an article on the wonder of electricity generated by an artificial tornado in which wind is technologically spun to high velocities in a building equipped with a giant turbine to convert the energy into electricity. Indeed, wind is being contemplated as a rival able to serve society by the sheer technical prowess that has often been a defining characteristic of modern energy systems. Obviously, wind energy has a long way to go before it can claim to have dethroned conventional energy’s “technological cathedrals” (Weinberg, 1985). But its mission seems largely to supplant other spectacular methods of generating electricity with its own. The politics supporting its rapid rise express no qualms about endorsing the inevitability of its victories on tech- nical grounds. In fact, Big Wind appears to seek monumental status in the psyche of ecologically modern society. A recent alliance of the American Wind Energy Association and the U.S. electric utility industry to champion national (subsidized) investment in higher voltage transmission lines (to deliver green-and-cheap electricity), illustrates the desire of Big Wind to plug into Giant Power’s hardware and, correspondingly, its ideology (see American Wind Energy Association, 2005, supporting “Transmission Infrastructure Modernization”). The transformative features of such a politics are unclear. Indeed, wind power—if it can continue to be harvested by everlarger machines—may penetrate the conventional energy order so successfully that it will diffuse, without perceptible disruption, to the regime. The air will be cleaner but the source of this achievement will be duly noted: science will have triumphed still again in wresting from stingy nature the resources that a wealthy life has grown to expect. Social transformation to achieve sustainability may actually be unnecessary by this political view of things, as middle-class existence is assured via clean, low-cost and easy-to-plug-in wind power. Small-is-Beautiful Solar18 The second fastest growing renewable energy option—solar electric power—is proving more difficult to plug in. Despite steady declines in the cost per kWh of energy generated by photovoltaic (PV) cells, this alternative remains a pricey solution by conventional standards. Moreover, the technology does not appear to have significant scale economies, partly because the efficiency of PV cannot be improved by increasing the size of the device or its application. That is, unit energy costs of large installations of many PV arrays do not deviate appreciably from those for small installations comprised of fewer arrays. Instead, the technology seems to follow a modular economic logic in which unit costs neither grow nor decline with scale. Some have praised this attribute, suggesting that PV’s modularity means there are no technical or economic reasons for scaling its application to iconic levels that conventional power plants now represent, potentiating a more robust system of distributed generation and delivering clean energy to previously marginalized populations (Martinot and Reiche, 2000; Martinot et al., 2002). Small-Is-Beautiful Solar is attributed with social empowerment potential by Vaitheeswaran (2003: 314) who notes that PV (and other small scale electricity generation technologies) can overcome social barriers through a “collision of clean energy, microfinance, and community empowerment,” three properties that may lift the burden of poverty and promote democratic social relations. “Micropower,” he argues (2003: 314), “is beginning to join forces with village power.” Thus, it would seem that a Solar Society might depend upon a different politics than Big Wind in displacing a fossil and nuclear energy driven world economy. Perhaps because PV has, so far, found wider social usage in rural contexts where poverty (as modernly conceived) persists, discussions, in fact, crop up about solar’s social project. For example, arguments have formed around the gender interests of PV, at least as it has been diffused in rural life to date (see, for example, Allerdice and Rogers, 2000). And criticism has surfaced about PV’s ‘capture’ by the state as a tool to quiet, if not mollify, the rural poor (Okubo, 2005: 49 - 58). There has even been a charge that PV and other renewables are being used by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank to stall Southern development. By imposing a fragmented patchwork of tiny, expensive solar generators on, for example, the African rural landscape, instead of accumulating capital in an industrial energy infrastructure, the World Bank and other actors are accused of being unresponsive to the rapid growth needs of the South (Davidson and Sokona, 2002; Karekezi and Kithyoma, 2002). A related challenge of PV’s class interests has raised questions about the technology’s multinational corporate owners and offered doubts about successful indigenization of solar cell manufacturing (AbleThomas, 1995; Guru, 2002: 27; Bio-Energy Association of Sri Lanka, 2004: 20). Regardless of one’s position on these debates, it is refreshing to at least see solar energy’s possible political and economic interests considered. But PV’s advocates have not embraced the opportunities created by its rural examiners to seriously investigate the political economy of solar energy. The bulk of solar research addresses engineering problems, with a modest social inquiry focused on issues of technological transition in which solar electricity applications are to find their way into use with as little social resistance or challenge as possible. A green politics that is largely unscarred by conflict is, and for a long time has been, anticipated to characterize an emergent Solar Society (Henderson, 1988; Ikeda and Henderson, 2004). Likewise, **solar economics is thought to be consensual** as non-renewable options become too expensive and PV cells, by comparison, too cheap to be refused their logical role (see, for example, Henderson, 1995, 1996; Rifkin, 2003). It seems that a solarized social order is inevitable for its proponents, with technological breakthrough and economic cost the principal determinants of when it will arrive. In this regard, ironically, Small-is-Beautiful Solar shares with Big Wind the aspiration to re-order the energy regime without changing society. Despite modern society’s technological, economic, and political addiction to large-scale, cheap energy systems that solar energy cannot mimic, most PV proponents hope to revolutionize the technological foundation of modernity, without disturbing its social base. A new professional cadre of solar architects and engineers are exhorted to find innovative ways of embedding PV technology in the skin of buildings (Strong, 1999; Benemann, Chehab, and Schaar-Gabriel, 2001), while transportation engineers and urban planners are to coordinate in launching “smart growth” communities where vehicles are powered by hydrogen derived from PV-powered electrolysis to move about in communities optimized for “location efficiency” (Ogden, 1999; Holtzclaw et al., 2002). The wildly oversized ecological footprint of urban societies (Rees and Wackernagel, 1996) is unquestioned as PV **decorates its** **structure**. These tools for erecting a Solar Society intend to halt anthropogenic changes to the chemistry of the atmosphere, rain, and soil mantle while enabling unlimited economic growth. In the Solar Society of tomorrow, we will make what we want, in the amounts we desire, without worry, because all of its energy is derived from the benign, renewable radiation supplied by our galaxy’s sun. Compared to Big Wind, PV may cost more but it promises to deliver an equivalent social result (minus the avian and landscape threats of the former) and, just possibly, with a technical elegance that surpasses the clunky mechanicalness of turbines propelled by wind. In this respect, Solar Society makes its peace with modernity by leaving undisturbed the latter’s cornucopian dreams 19 and, likewise, **poses no serious challenge** to the social and political structures of the modern era. At this precise point, inequality and conflict can only be conceived in Solar Society as the results of willful meanness and greed. While the solar variety of technological politics guiding society may be relatively minimalist—no towering new monuments or spectacular devices are planned—it would be no less committed to the ideals of technique in shaping social experience and its self-assessment. Similarly, its economics would warmly embrace a form of consumptive capitalism, although with cleaner inputs (and possibly throughputs) than before. While the discussion here of sustainable energy advocacy has concentrated on its wind- and solar-animated versions, we believe that strategies anticipating significant roles for geothermal, biomass, micro-hydro, and hydrogen harvested from factories fueled by renewables anticipate variants of the social narratives depicted for the two currently most prominent renewable energy options. The aim of producing more with advancing ecological efficiency in order to consume more with equally advancing consumerist satisfaction underpins the sustainable energy future in a way that would seamlessly tie it to the modernization project. 20

### Risk Calc

#### Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios.

Eliezer **Yudkowsky**, 8/31/**2006**. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, **adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable**. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." **Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security**, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, **people tend to overestimate the probability that**, e.g., **seven events of 90% probability will all occur**. Conversely, **people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur**. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### Worst-case scenario planning causes serial policy failure and disables solvency

**Schneier** 20**10** [Bruce, internationally renowned security technologist and author, MA CS American Univ. 3-13 http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case\_thin.html

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as **if it were a certainty**. **It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason**. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on **the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes.** Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. **Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking**. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." **Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action**. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential **to cause dangerous escalation**. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate **probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued**. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. **It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness.** Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

### AT Framework – Short

#### **-- Counter interpretation – aff must defend their discourse. The judge is a specific intellectual challengning the values and assumptions of the 1AC.**

#### -- Our form of education outweighs – we are educators not policy-makers – we all take government classes to learn about the policy-making process – individuals must be able to point out the weak spot in dominant narratives.

#### -- Cost-benefit analysis – aff gets strategic gains from reading hyperbolic impact scenarios -- cost is that they should have to defend the desirability of how their represent those impacts.

#### -- Coherence – only incorporation of representations can make sense of political reality

Jourde 6 – Cedric Jourde \* Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 2002 \* M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, 1996 \* B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal, Montréal, 1995 Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin p. 182-3 2006

Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are **interpretative prisms** through which decision-makers **make sense of a political reality**, through which they define and assign **a subjective value** to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine **what are significant** international political **issues**.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as 'allies', 'rivals', or simply 'insignificant', thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states' domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as 'unstable\*, 'prosperous', or 'ethnically divided'. It must be clear that representations are **not objective** or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things 'seen' by and significant for an actor while making other things 'unseen' and 'insignificant'.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor's and group of actors' cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations **constrain and enable** the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are **politically thinkable** and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor **helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded**. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of 'freedom fighters', such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a 'terrorist network', such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum. the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the 'other\* delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this 'other'.

#### -- Kritik proper is offense – means their interpretation excludes vital discussions that implicate how the plan is enacted – at worst we turn case

### AT Pre-empts

AT Paterson

Just says death ontologically destroys the subject -- we argue our form of politics allows for more becoming and less war/violence in the first place

AT Sharpe and Goucher

We are not ideologically duped fools staring at wall -- this card is far too general -- begs the q of the productiveness of the alt' and our framework

AT Cummiskey

We agree we should maximize the number of lives -- your worst-case, focus prevents effective engagement to solve conflict

AT O'Calligan

We are not smacks of wishful idealism -- this card is a cap indict -- you don't focus on the underlying causes like power distribution that he references

### AT Extinction Outweighs

#### Evaluate probability first – “any risk” logic makes decisionmaking impossible

Meskill 9 (David, professor at Colorado School of Mines and PhD from Harvard, “The "One Percent Doctrine" and Environmental Faith,” Dec 9, http://davidmeskill.blogspot.com/2009/12/one-percent-doctrine-and-environmental.html)

Tom Friedman's piece today in the Times on the environment (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/opinion/09friedman.html?\_r=1) is one of the flimsiest pieces by a major columnist that I can remember ever reading. He applies Cheney's "one percent doctrine" (which is similar to the environmentalists' "precautionary principle") to the risk of environmental armageddon. But this doctrine is both intellectually incoherent and practically irrelevant. It is intellectually incoherent because it cannot be applied consistently in a world with many potential disaster scenarios. In addition to the global-warming risk, there's also the asteroid-hitting-the-earth risk, the terrorists-with-nuclear-weapons risk (Cheney's original scenario), the super-duper-pandemic risk, etc. Since each of these risks, on the "one percent doctrine," would deserve all of our attention, we cannot address all of them simultaneously. That is, even within the one-percent mentality, we'd have to begin prioritizing, making choices and trade-offs. But why then should we only make these trade-offs between responses to disaster scenarios? Why not also choose between them and other, much more cotidien, things we value? Why treat the unlikely but cataclysmic event as somehow fundamentally different, something that cannot be integrated into all the other calculations we make? And in fact, this is how we behave all the time. We get into our cars in order to buy a cup of coffee, even though there's some chance we will be killed on the way to the coffee shop. We are constantly risking death, if slightly, in order to pursue the things we value. Any creature that adopted the "precautionary principle" would sit at home - no, not even there, since there is some chance the building might collapse. That creature would neither be able to act, nor not act, since it would nowhere discover perfect safety. Friedman's approach reminds me somehow of Pascal's wager - quasi-religious faith masquerading as rational deliberation (as Hans Albert has pointed out, Pascal's wager itself doesn't add up: there may be a God, in fact, but it may turn out that He dislikes, and even damns, people who believe in him because they've calculated it's in their best interest to do so). As my friend James points out, it's striking how descriptions of the environmental risk always describe the situation as if it were five to midnight. It must be near midnight, since otherwise there would be no need to act. But it can never be five \*past\* midnight, since then acting would be pointless and we might as well party like it was 2099. Many religious movements - for example the early Jesus movement - have exhibited precisely this combination of traits: the looming apocalypse, with the time (just barely) to take action.

#### Extinction won’t happen – false narratives of staving off apocalypse have continuously resulted in genocide and oppression.

Quinby 99 (Lee, Distinguished Lecturer at the Macaulay Honors College of the City University of New York City, Millennial Seduction, p. 2-5)

Promoting ways of thinking and living unhampered by fear of earth-shattering catastrophe and extricated from the kindred conviction that a perfect world is on the horizon is admittedly an uphill task. Endism has long run deep in the United States, ranging from a literal acceptance of the divine apocalypse predicted in the Book of Revelation to a more nebulous sense of impending doom, whether from asteroids, viruses, or technology.3 Believing that the end of the world looms means living in the shadow of fear. Some believers report suffering intensely whereas others disclose a more general anxiety or routine agitation. What makes living with apocalyptic belief tolerable for so many is its accompanying millennial dream, the current of hope that promises the fullness of Truth unveiled and visions of perfection for the elect. The elect are the chosen ones, whether they be divinely ordained, technologically proficient, or just plain lucky, the ones tapped to survive destruction and reign supreme in the millennium. Not that such hope is the antidote to fear—at least not the kind that is framed in apocalyptic zeal. Apocalyptic fear and millennialist hope fit hand in glove, with the glove of augmented desire needing the hand of inordinate fear to fill out its shape. I call this sense of millennial hope electism, not only to highlight its relation to endism, but also to make clear the inherent divisiveness of apocalypse. Even when electism takes a benign, generous and nebulous form, division and hierarchy prevail. For example, although the spiritual progress of New Age belief is supposed to envelop the whole world and for some the universe, the concept of the elect remains. It is simply extended to all in a promised transformation toward higher consciousness; the partition between the chosen and the doomed becomes temporal, dividing between the former and new ages.4 More often, however, electism is cast overtly in oppositional terms in keeping with the fierce battle between the forces of good and evil envisioned in Revelation. The rub, of course, is that it is impossible to disprove apocalyptic prophecy once and for all. But it can't be proven either; even the most ardent believers concede that faith is necessary. In the meantime, it should be possible to shift focus to the historical record of apocalyptic and millennialist belief. First, the end of the world has not arrived as predicted. This seems obvious, but given the recurrent insistence that the end is near, it needs to be stated bluntly. The failure rate of this prediction over the course of 2000 years is pretty astounding. If more than two millennia have passed since apocalyptic writings emerged in Jewish and then Christian society, there is no good evidence to accept them as applicable to the present. Even though natural calamities and technological disasters do happen, there is no historical or scientific evidence to link such occurrences to supernatural agency. And although there are well-known stories that tell of world-ending calamities—the biblical flood, for example—such disasters are more likely to be exaggerations of earthquakes, volcanoes, and mudslides that may have destroyed whole societies, but not the earth. Whatever the cause of the flood that Noah survived, it is obviously clear that—despite numerous predictionsworld-destructive disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, asteroids, and so on, have not happened. So my first point is what hasn't happened. My second point is what has happened as a result of the rise and spread of apocalypticism and millennialism as systems of belief. Apocalypticism claims that a supernatural or exceedingly powerful force, like nuclear disaster, for example, will bring world destruction, but that an elect number will be granted a new, transformed earth. This powerful conviction that time and the world as we know it are ending has brought both terror and fervor to multitudes over the centuries. As many scholars have pointed out, such a belief is far more likely to accompany poverty and persecution than privilege. Heartfelt expression for suffering to come to an end has a history of spurring struggle. This struggle includes holy wars against earthly forces believed to be under the sway of Satan as well as personal vendettas against forces of technology, by the unabomber, for example. Like apocalyptic endism, millennialist electism also stems most notably from the Book of Revelation, specifically Chapter 20, Verse 4,\* which proclaims that the martyred faithful will be returned to enjoy a thousand-year reign with the son of God while Satan is bound away in a lake of fire. From the Crusades to the colonization of the Americas to the Cold War, millennialism has spurred desire to be one of the elect, desire bolstered by apocalyptic demands to fight against forces of evil. The sense of being chosen to survive the days of doom easily conflates with believing one has been called to enact them, thereby bringing about the New Era. The twentieth century alone provides ample evidence of this, including one of its most atrocious brands of apocalyptic millennialism, the Third Reich, as well as its current white-supremacist and militia offshoots. Evoking Nazism is not meant to be alarmist. While I do want to insist that millennialist belief has been a powerful moving force for social domination, I also want to acknowledge, as Stephen Jay Gould has put it, that there probably will be more party than terror this time around.5 Nevertheless, it is important not to dismiss the detrimental effects of apocalypticism and millennialism, not only in U.S. culture, which is the focus of this book, but also around the world.° What this book stresses is that apocalyptic and millennialist principles and practices interfere with the goals of democratic societies. My view runs contrary to scholars who regard apocalyptic zeal as necessary to democratic social transformation, as indeed essential to the establishment of the United States as a democracy and to the achievements of the civil rights movement in the sixties and of second-wave feminism.7 This stance emerged out of Norman Cohn's highly influential work The Pursuit of the Millennium, which details a number of links between apocalyptic belief and egalitarian movements.8 But it is a reductive reading of Cohn's complex account, which situates what he calls "revolutionary millenarianism" in relation to other social movements in Europe between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries. He points out that both peasant revolts and urban insurrections were "very common and moreover often successful," contrasting them to apocalyptic groups which came together from an "unorganized, atomized population, rural or urban or both." Banding together around a charismatic prophet, often an intellectual, including former priests, rather than one of the poor, the millenarian groups typically had leaders who were obsessed with the end-time. Unlike the populist social movements, these fringe groups embodied a kind of radical desperation. Stances linking apocalypse to democracy tend to overlook the ways in which strident apocalyptic conviction propels such marginalized groups toward martyrdom or genocidal massacre because of their willingness to defy their enemies.9 When these designated enemies are as powerful as the U.S. government, incidents like Waco can occur. Similarly, many other groups run the danger of confusing unconditional defiance with radical social change in the name of democratic practice.

### 2NC Alt Solvency

#### The alternative reject's the affirmative's security discourse – think of the alternative as a broader process rather thean a finished product – only way to eschew security logic is to stop the reiteration of threats that marginalize political decision-making – fighting for an alternative political language requires tolerating uncertainty -- tha's Neoclous

#### Even if there are obstacles to the alt’, our thought excercise is more productive than their stable production of the present – the alternative enables a different conception of security that can overcome inevitable conflict

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many **appear like enduring political facts**, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they **condition politics** as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very **possibility of the present**. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination **has conceived and thought security**, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

#### Critical intellectualism creates change – answers all of their “alt fails” args

**Jones 99** (Richard Wyn, Professor of International Relations – Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 155-163)

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party – a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination – for example, in the case of gender – to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks” – members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role – a significant one at that – in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing – even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures – can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays – in all senses – to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

### 2NC Energy Security – VtL

#### Energy security enables panoptic politics that pervade all aspects of daily lives

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At first glance, to state that energy ‘pervades every aspect of life’ (Ocheltree, 2008: 1) is commonsensical and seems unproblematic in security terms. On closer investigation, however, this view of energy has significant consequences. In the most immediate sense, energy modulates security by taking it everywhere, simply because energy is everywhere. This assertion alone – ‘security is everywhere’ – will startle students and practitioners of security, because it challenges one of their most fundamental assumptions: that security has precise boundaries that make it a domain reservé of specialist knowledge and practice (Bigo, 1998; Ciuta˘, 2009). But, what precisely does it mean that energy security is everywhere? To quote one proponent of this view, ‘energy security needs to be extended to the safety of the whole infrastructure and supply chain – recognizing the vulnerabilities that come from terrorism, war, brigandage, and natural disasters’ (Yergin, 2006b: 1). In conceptual terms, this statement identifies an ‘infinite number of targets’ (Kain, 2007) that are subject to an infinite number of vulnerabilities. Energy security means the security of everything: resources, production plants, transportation networks, distribution outlets and even consumption patterns; everywhere: oilfields, pipelines, power plants, gas stations, homes; against everything: resource depletion, global warming, terrorism, ‘them’ and ourselves. At its maximum, this logic invests every single object of any kind with and in security. At least potentially, 90 the result is a panoptic view of security that legitimates panoptic security policies (see Bigo, 1998). It is at this point that the totality of energy intersects and reinforces its reflexivity. Former NATO SACEUR General James L. Jones (2007: 2) might have intended to emphasize only the totality of energy when he argued that energy is ‘a national security issue as well as an international and family security issue’, but his statement draws attention to the potential of energy security to percolate down through to the most minute, banal and intimate aspects of our lives. Families are not only affected by energy security, but also produce energy insecurity – through consumption patterns, for example (Campbell, 2005) – and they can be security providers by the same means. The multiplication of actors signalled by the previous logic is thus pushed to the maximum, because all the myriad of actual and potential actors acquire simultaneously all possible security roles: they are at the same time referent objects, subjects, threats, vectors and agents of security. Thus, the call to broaden security becomes realized in paroxysmic manner. To paraphrase Dillon & Reid (2001: 58), energy security becomes ‘omnidirectional, omnisensorial, omniversal’.

#### That outweighs war

**Burke 2007** lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, “What security makes possible,” Working Paper 2007 p.11-12

Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’:

### AT Perm – Do Both

#### 1. Cross-apply framework – the aff must prove there’s value in incorporating their discourse and epistemology. Testing competitiveness with the plan is nonsensical because our kritik is about their scholarship.

#### 2. Theory – permutations must include 1AC representations, they’re the majority of the opening speech. Severance makes the aff a moving target and being neg becomes impossible. The aff isn’t selected in a vacuum, they had infinite prep to select advantages they had defenses of.

#### 3. The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**

**4. Multiple perms are a VI – no risk option for the aff that demands lots of block time and are impossible to generate offense against, sandbags explanation to the 1AR screwing the neg, ci – they get 1 permutation.**

#### 5. Their initial framing precludes change – forgetting the 1AC is necessary

Bleiker 1 (Roland, Senior Lecturer and Co-Director – Rotary Centre of International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution, The Zen of International Relations, Ed. Chan, Mandeville, and Blieker, p. 38-39)

The power to tell stories is the power to define common sense. Prevalent IR stories have been told for so long that they no longer appear as stories. They are accepted as fact for their metaphorical dimensions have vanished from our collective memories. We have become accustomed to our distorting IR metaphors until we come to lie, as Nietzsche would say “herd-like in a style obligatory for all. As a result dominant ir stories have successfully transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the realist one, into reality per se. Realist perceptions of the international have gradually become accepted as common sense, to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and objectified world view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Steve Smith argues, 'is the ultimate act of political power.’8 It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path. The prime objective of this essay is to challenge prevalent IR stories. The most effective way of doing so, the chapter argues, is not to critique but to forget them, to tell new stories that are not constrained by the boundaries of established and objectified IR narratives. Such an approach diverges from many critical engagements with world politics. Most challenges against dominant IR stories have been advanced in the form of critiques. While critiquing orthodox IR stories remains an important task, it is not sufficient. Exploring the origins of problems, in this case discourse of power politics and their positivist framing of the political practice, cannot overcome all the existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR theory, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that have been established through the initial framing of debates. A successful challenge to orthodox IR stories must do more than merely critique their narrow and problematic nature. To be effective, critique must be supplemented with a process of forgetting the object of critique, of theorizing world politics beyond the agendas, issues and terminologies that are prest by orthodox debates. Indeed the most powerful potential of critical scholarship may well lie in the attempt to tell different stories about IR, for once theres stories have become validated , they may well open up spaces for a more inclusive and less violence prone practice of real world politics.

**Embedded in their 1ac discourse –**

### JMU MM Solar

#### Warming apocalypse --

#### Deibel -- IR prof at national war college talking with scientific certainty -- "major existential threat to American security and prosperity"

#### We control uniqueness – apocalyptic warming rhetoric disabling effective approaches to warming now

Barrett & Gilles 12 -- \*nonprofit director and consultant for over a decade, her writing has appeared in newspapers, magazines, and blogs nationwide AND \*\*consulted for numerous political campaigns, advocacy organizations, and global NGOs, and has been profiled in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, and Fast Company (Mel and Metthew Barrett, 4/23/12, "How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action," http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/)

To understand why fewer people believe in climate change even as evidence mounts, we must look beyond the industry-funded movement to deny the reality and effects of climate change. Perhaps equally important -- if not quite equally culpable -- has been the extent to which both the proponents and opponents of human-made climate change have led us down a cul-de-sac of conversation by exploiting the apocalyptic metaphor to make their case. Whether by design or by accident, the initial warnings of environmentalists -- of oceans rising to engulf our most beloved metropolises, of amber waves of grain scorched into a desert landscape -- activated the apocalyptic impulse. The focus on disastrous repercussions for our behavior at some point in the future echoed the warnings of the Israelite priests to wayward Jews in Babylon or, later, to those who submitted too willingly to Alexander's process of Hellenization. It was a familiar story: change, and change radically, or face hell on earth. Perhaps there was no other way to sound the alarm about the devastating threat presented by global climate change, but that echo of apocalyptic warning was quickly seized upon by the naysayers to dismiss the evidence out of hand. We've heard this story before, the deniers insisted, and throughout history those who have declared the end of the world was near have always been proven wrong. As early as 1989, the industry front man Patrick Michaels, a climatologist and global warming skeptic, was warning in the op-ed pages of the Washington Post of this new brand of "apocalyptic environmentalism," which represented "the most popular new religion to come along since Marxism." That the solutions to global warming (a less carbon-intensive economy, a more localized trade system, a greater respect for nature's power) parallel so perfectly the dream of environmentalists, and that the causes of global warming (an unrestrained industrial capitalism reliant on the continued and accelerating consumption of fossil fuels) parallel the economic dream of conservatives, has simply exacerbated the fact that global warming has now become just another front in the culture wars. By seizing upon and mocking the apocalyptic imagery and rhetoric of those sounding the alarm, the industry front groups succeeded in framing the debate about global warming into a question about what one believes. Thus, entangled with the myth of apocalypse -- and its attendant hold on our own sense of belief and self-identity -- the debate about anthropogenic climate change has reached an impasse. You believe in the Rapture; I believe in global warming -- and so the conversation stops. But global climate change is not an apocalyptic event that will take place in the future; it is a human-caused trend that is occurring now. And as we expend more time either fearfully imagining or vehemently denying whether that trend will bring about a future apocalypse, scientists tell us that the trend is accelerating. Talking about climate change or peak oil through the rhetoric of apocalypse may make for good television and attention-grabbing editorials, but such apocalyptic framing hasn't mobilized the world into action. Most of us are familiar with the platitude "When the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, our over-reliance on the apocalyptic storyline stands between us and our ability to properly assess the problems before us. Some see the looming crises of global warming and resource and energy depletion and conclude that inaction will bring about the end of civilization: only through a radical shift toward clean energy and conservation, those on the Left argue, can we continue the way of life that we have known. Those on the Right dismiss the apocalyptic threats altogether, because the proposed solutions to peak oil, global warming, and overpopulation conflict with core conservative beliefs about deregulation and the free-market economy, or with a religious worldview that believes humanity is not powerful enough to alter something as large as our climate. Still others dismiss the catalog of doom and gloom as mere apocalypticism itself. Surely, we convince ourselves, all the dire warnings about the effects of global warming aren't that different from the world-ending expectations of the Rapturists? The result is that the energy we could expend addressing the problems before us is instead consumed by our efforts to either dismiss the threat of apocalypse or to prove it real. Ultimately, the question becomes not what to do about the threats before us but whether you believe in the threats before us. By allowing the challenges of the 21st century to be hijacked by the apocalyptic storyline, we find ourselves awaiting a moment of clarity when the problems we must confront will become apparent to all -- or when those challenges will magically disappear, like other failed prophecies about the end of the world. Yet the real challenges we must face are not future events that we imagine or dismiss through apocalyptic scenarios of collapse -- they are existing trends. The evidence suggests that much of what we fear in the future -- the collapse of the economy, the arrival of peak oil and global warming and resource wars -- has already begun. We can wait forever, while the world unravels before our very eyes, for an apocalypse that won't come. The apocalyptic storyline becomes a form of daydreaming escape: the threat of global warming becomes a fantasy to one day live off the grid, or buy a farm, or grow our own food; economic collapse becomes like a prison break from the drudgery of meaningless and increasingly underpaid work in a soul-crushing cubicle; peak oil promises the chance to finally form a community with the neighbors to whom you've never spoken. Yet despite the fantasia peddled by Hollywood and numerous writers, a world battered by natural disasters and global warming, facing declining natural resources and civic unrest, without adequate water or energy or food, with gross inequalities between the rich and the poor, is not a setting for a picaresque adventure, nor is it the ideal place to start living in accord with your dreams. The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

#### This technological enframing makes warming strategically even more dangerous.

**Crist ‘7** – Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are **even greater dangers** in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the **root cause** of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may **temporarily** avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will **barely address**—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Their framing of climate change causes a distraction for more pressing environmental movements that solve extinction

**Crist ‘7** – Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)

The diminishment of life's richness began with the exodus of hunters and gatherers from Africa thousands of years ago, and deepened with the [end page 36] invention of agriculture and cities, the development of warfare, and the advent of the European voyages.24 But biodepletion accelerated enormously after the emergence of industrial civilization, and particularly since the mid-twentieth century, with billions of people not only doubling every few decades, but inclining—by force, choice, or delusion—toward a consumer culture founded on overproduction and global trade. Overproduction and global trade, in turn, require the ceaseless conversion of living beings and natural systems into dead objects, "resources," and humanized landscapes and seascapes.25 The significance of human-driven extinction can never be overstated, because it means not only the death of species but the end of their evolutionary destinies as well—of the life-forms they would or might have eventually originated. Present-day extinction is not about species blinking out sporadically; it is a global and escalating spasm of en masse losses that, the geological record reveals, is an infrequent event in Earth's natural history. Notwithstanding circulating shallow sophistry that proclaims extinction to be "natural" or "normal," anthropogenic extinction is neither natural (for countless species are disappearing from targeted onslaught or pressures far exceeding their capacity to adapt) nor normal (for this level of losses occurs rarely as a consequence of a catastrophic event). Yet, as tragic as extinction is, species are also being devastated without being annihilated: losses of distinct populations and plunges in population numbers are a blow to the vigor, ecological contributions and connectedness, and evolutionary potential of species. Today, drops of 70, 80, 90 percent, or more, of wild plants and animals, on land and in oceans, are common. Such declines mean that species hang on as relics, with shortened lifespans or committed to extinction, no longer able to play significant ecological and evolutionary roles. The nosedive of wild-animal and plant abundance foregrounds yet [end page 37] another facet of biodepletion: the simplification of ecosystems. From a landscape perspective, the decline of numbers and geographic races of wild organisms signifies constrictions of their former ranges. As populations blink out from diverse places, their place-bound contributions are lost; the losses cascade through the communities of organisms to which the extinguished populations belonged, leaving behind degraded ecosystems. While the simplification of ecosystems is often dramatically visible, it can also unfold as an incremental, barely noticeable process. And it is not that ecosystems, here and there, are occasionally suffering simplification by losing constituent locals. The biosphere is experiencing gross decline or elimination of areas that are, in certain cases, centers of diversification—most notably, tropical forests, wetlands, mangrove forests, and coral reefs everywhere. The whittling down of ecological complexity has been a global trend proceeding from the conversion of ecosystems for intensive human uses, the aforementioned population depletions, and the invasion of nonnative species. Nonnative species are the generalists hitching rides in the bustle of globalization—from the climate-change-favored fungus that is killing frogs, to millions of domestic cats preying on birds, to innumerable more.26 Human-facilitated invasions, coupled with the disappearance of natives, lead to places losing the constellation of life-forms that once uniquely constituted them. The inevitable outcome of extinction, plummeting populations, lost and simplified ecosystems, and a bio-homogenized world is not only the global demolition of wild nature, but also the halting of speciation of much complex life. The conditions for the birth of new species within a wide band of life, especially of large-bodied species that reproduce slowly, are being suspended.27 [end page 38] All these interconnected dimensions constitute what conservation biologists call the biodiversity crisis—a term that to the postmodernist rings of rhetoric, while to the broad public (insofar as it has heard anything about it) involves a largely illiterate and vague understanding of "extinction."28 Academic frivolity and public ignorance aside, the biodiversity crisis heralds a biospheric impoverishment that will be the condition and experience of all future human generations: it requires 5 to 10 million years for biodiversity to recover after a mass extinction of the current scope. In light of this fact, I submit that unless global warming unleashes appalling penalties—in which case, the climate crisis and biodepletion will merge into one devastating event for virtually all life29—the implications of humanity's impact on biodiversity are so far-reaching that they may, in reality, dwarf the repercussions of climate change. And yet, the current framing of climate change as the urgent issue encourages regarding the unwinding of biodiversity as a less critical matter than the forthcoming repercussions of global warming. Attention to the long-standing ruination of biodiversity underway is subverted in two ways in climate-change discourse: either it gets elided through a focus on anthropocentric anxieties about how climate change will specifically affect people and nations; or biodepletion is presented as a corollary of climate change in writings that closely consider how global warming will cause biodiversity losses. Climate change is undoubtedly speeding up the unraveling of life's interconnectedness and variety. But if global warming has such potential to afflict the natural world, it is because the latter's "immunity" has been severely compromised. It is on an already profoundly wounded natural world that global warming is delivering its blow. Focusing on the added blow of climate change is important, but this focus should not come at the expense of erasing from view the prior, ongoing, and climate-change-independent wounding of life on Earth.

#### Climate conflict --

#### Scheffran et al -- increases border tensions, causes resource conflicts, and would cause US military involvement – alt’ rejects impetus for intervention

#### Resource wars are all hype and your discourse causes them and environmental degradation

Kumari 12 -- International Relations Masters graduate @ University of Nottingham (Parmila, 1/29/12, "Securitising The Environment: A Barrier To Combating Environment Degradation Or A Solution In Itself?" <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/29/securitising-the-environment-a-barrier-to-combating-environment-degradation-or-a-solution-in-itself/>)

Secondly, the assertion that environmental degradation is a primary reason of conflict is purely speculative (Barnett 2003:10). Barnett suggests that the ‘evidence’ provided in support is a collection of historical events chosen to support the conflict-scarcity storyline and reify the realist assumption that eventually humans will resort to violence (Barnett 2001:66). This is as opposed to acknowledging that humans are equally capable of adapting. Thirdly, research shows that it is abundance of resources which drives competition, not scarcity (Barnet 2003:11). This makes sense because any territorial conquest to obtain resources will be expensive. A poor country suffering from resource scarcity would not be able to afford an offensive war(Deudney 1990: 309-11). The second and third points mean that environmental-conflict literature counteracts any attempts at solving the problem of environmental degradation. The discourse attributes high intentionality to people-because of scarcity they decide to become violent. This ignores the fact that human actions are not intended to harm the environment. The high intentionality given to people prevents them from being seen as victims who need help. Instead they are pictured as threats to state security. This view can exacerbate ethnic tensions as the state uses minority groups as scapegoats for environmental degradation. It also means that only those involved in conflict are relevant to environmental security, not those who are vulnerable (Detraz and Betsill 2009:307-15). In this way the South is scripted as “primeval Other” (Barnett 2001:65), where order can only be maintained by the intervention of the North, rather than by the provision of aid. The North’s agency in creating the environmental problems is completely erased. Instead environmental degradation is seen from the perspective of the individual state, questioning how it could affect the state, i.e. increased migration (Allenby 2000:18) and this leads to the adoption of narrow policies. Saad has said that securitising the environment in this way allows the North to justify intervening and forcing developing nations to follow policies which encapsulate the North’s norms (Saad 1991:325-7). In this way the powerful become stronger, and the weak weaker. This view may affect the South’s relations with the North. For example, Detraz and Betsill have commented on tensions between the North and South in the 2007 United Nations Security Council debate on climate change. Only 29% of the Southern states compared to 70% of Northern speakers supported the idea of the Security Council being a place to develop a global response to climate change. The reasons for this difference was that shifting decision-making to the Security Council would make Southern states unable to promote efficiently their interests in obtaining resources for climate adaptation and mitigation plans. Furthermore, Egypt and India argued that in suggesting this Northern countries were avoiding their responsibilities for controlling greenhouse gases, by trying to “shift attention to the need to address potential climate-related conflict in the South” (Detraz and Betsill 2009:312). In this way environmental security becomes a barrier because the traditional (realist) concept of security is used to immobilise any action towards dealing with the root causes of environmental degradation.

#### Economic security --

#### Royal -- stat support for our root cause claim -- your discursive claim to national security creates a rally around the flag effect

#### Attempting to save the global economy from disaster is a liberal order-building method of security

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy, Brunel University, 08 (“Critique of Security”, McGill-Queen’s University, pp. 94-97, Published 2008)

But 'social security' was clearly an inadequate term for this, associated as it now was with 'soft' domestic policy issues such as old-age insurance. 'Collective security' would not do, associated as it was with the dull internationalism of Wilson on the one hand and still very much connected to the institutions of social security on the other." Only one term would do: national security. This not to imply that 'national security' was simply adopted and adapted from 'social security'. Rather, what we are dealing with here is another ideological circuit, this time between 'national security' and 'social security', in which the policies 'insuring' the security of the population are a means of securing the body politic, and vice versa;" a circuit in which, to paraphrase David Peace in the epigraph to this chapter, one can have one's teeth kicked out in the name of national security and put back in through social security. Social security and national security were woven together: the social and the national were the warp and the weft of the security fabric. The warp and the welt, that is, of a broader vision of economic security. Robert Pollard has suggested that 'the concept of "economic security'- the idea that American interests would be best sewed by an open and integrated economic system, as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment - was firmly established during the wartime period'. 71 In fact, the concept of 'economic security' became a concept of international politics in this period, but the concept itself had a longer history as the underlying idea behind social security in the 1930s, as we have seen. Economic security, in this sense, provides the important link between social and national security, becoming liberalism's strategic weapon of choice and the main policy instrument from 1945. As one State Department memo of February 1944 put it, 'the development of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security. But it would also continue to be used to think about the political administration of internal order. Hence Roosevelt's comment that 'we must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security [and so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won't come back again'.' On security grounds, inside and outside were constantly folding into one another, the domestic and the foreign never quite On the fabrication of economic order properly distinguishable. The reason why lay in the kind of economic order to be secured: both domestically and internationally, 'economic security' is coda for capitalist order. Giving a lecture at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall recalled the disruption to the European economy during the war and Europe's continuing inability to feed itself, and suggested that if the US did not help there would be serious economic, social and political deterioration which would in turn have a knock-on effect on US capital. The outcome was a joint plan submitted to the US from European states at the end of August, after much wrangling with the Soviet Union, requesting $28 billion over a four-year period (the figure was reduced when finally agreed by Congress). The European Recovery Program (ERE known as the Marshall Plan) which emerged has gone down as an economic panacea, 'saving' Europe from economic disaster. But as the first of many such 'Plans', all the way down to the recent 'reconstruction' of Iraq, it does not take much to read the original Marshall Plan through the lens of security and liberal order-building. Alan Milward has suggested that the conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the picture of post-war Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and economic discontent, such that it needed to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse. There were no bank crashes, very few bankruptcies and the evidence of a slow down in industrial production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general deterioration in the standard of living. By late-1946 production had roughly equalled pre-war levels in all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward argues that the Marshall Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new, expansionary economic and social policies in Western European countries which were in fact already in full-bloom conditions. In other words, the Marshall Plan was predominantly designed for political objectives - hence conceived and rushed through by the Department of State itself." Milward's figures are compelling, and complicate the conventional picture of the Marshall Plan as simply a form of economic aid. But to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which, in terms of security, the economic and the political are entwined. This is why the Marshall Plan is so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine's offer of military aid and intervention beyond us borders, a new global commitment at the heart of which was the possibility of intervention in the affairs of other countries. As Joyce and Gabriel Kolko have argued the important dimension of the Truman Doctrine is revealed in the various drafts of Truman's speech before it was finally delivered on 12 March, and the private memos of the period. Members of the cabinet and other top officials understood very clearly that the united States was now defining a strategy and budget appropriate to its new global commitments, and that a far greater involvement in other countries was now pending especially on the economic level. Hence the plethora of references to 'a world-wide trend away from the system of free enterprise's which the state Department's speech-writers thought a 'grave threat' to American interests. Truman's actual speech to Congress is therefore more interesting for what it implied than what it stated explicitly. And what it implied was the politics behind the Marshall Plan: economic security as a means of maintaining political order against the threat of communism. The point then, is not just that the Marshall Plan was 'political' how could any attempt to reshape global capital be anything but political? It is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional, and to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which the economic, political and military are entwined The point is that it was very much a project driven by the ideology of security. The referent object of 'security here is 'economic order'. The government and the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the communist threat as economic rather than military. As Latham notes, at first glance the idea of military security within a broad context of economic containment merely appears to be one more dimension of strength within the liberal order. But in another respect the project of economic security might itself be viewed as the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the priority given to economic security was the driving force behind the us commitment to underwrite milita ry security for Western Europe." The protection and expansion of capital came to be seen as the path to security, and vice versa. This created the grounds for a re-ordering of global capital involving a constellation of class and corporate forces as well as state power, undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this period, stated that the 'overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish'." In this sense we can also read the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the Brussels Pact of March 1948 and the nascent movement towards 'European Union' as part and parcel of the security project being mapped out." The key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked a particular vision of order with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing 'security' political, social and economic - from the communist threat.

#### Accidents --

#### Latynina -- staff writer saying chemical accidents are worse than any war humans could start

#### “accident” is a political strategy to obscure responsibility for nuclear violence and dehumanization

Hanna M. **Segal**, MB ChB FRC – Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst – British Pyscho-Analytic Society, **88** [*Psychoanalysis and the Nuclear Threat: Clinical and Theoretical Studies*, p. 47]

The growth of technology is also used for a typically schizoid dehumanization and mechanization. There is a kind of pervasive depersonalization and derealization. Pushing a button to annihilate parts of the world we have never seen is a mechanized, split-off activity. Bracken (1984) contends that war is likely to happen as a result of our machines getting Out of control. Everything is so automated that oversensitive machines could start an unstoppable nuclear exchange. The MIT computer expert Joseph Weizen-baum (1976) comes to a similar conclusion: modern big computers are so complicated that no expert can see through and control them. Yet the whole nuclear early warning system is based on these machines. Since one effect of nuclear explosion is a disturbance in communication systems, it might not be within the power of governments to stop a war even if they wished to. But the fact that we can even think that "machines will start the war, not us" shows the extent of denial of our responsibility. We seem to live with a peculiar combination of helplessness and terror and omnipotence-helplessness and omnipotence in a vicious circle; heightening one another. This helplessness, which lies at the root of our apathy, is inevitable. We are faced with a horrifyingly threatening danger. But partly it is induced by us and becomes a self--fulfilling prophesy. Confronted with the terror of the powers of destructiveness we divest ourselves of our responsibilities by denial, projection, and fragmentation. The responsibility is fragmented and projected further and further away-into governments, army, scientists, and, finally, into machines beyond human control. We not only project into our so--called enemies, we also divest ourselves of our responsibilities by projecting them onto governments. They, in turn, can not bear such responsibility, and they project onto us, the people, public opinion, and so on, as well as fragmenting their responsibility as previously described. When we project onto governments, we become truly helpless. We are in their hands.

#### Accident fears are missile hysteria

**Seng 2** [Tan See, Prof of Security Studies @ IDSS Singapore, July 2002, "What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of America, IDSS Commentary No. 28, http://www.sipri.org/contents/library/0210.pdf]

Few, to be sure, would doubt the sincerity of Secretary Rumsfeld when he averred last June: "I don't think vulnerability is a (viable) policy."84 Clearly, Washington's preoccupation with missile defence has much to do with the Bush Administration's concern over what it perceives as the strategic vulnerability of America to potential ballistic missile attack. Nonetheless, as important as debates over whether or not the "missile threat" actually exists are to the study and practice of international relations, what is equally if not more fundamental is the question of how discourses of danger figure in the incessant writing of "America" - a particular and quite problematic identity that owes its materiality to textual inscriptions of difference and Otherness. Missile hysteria in US national security discourse cannot be simplistically reduced to the level of an ideological explanation - certainly not according to the classic formulation of Mannheim's. 85 Rather, what this paper has demonstrated is the centrality of difference and deferral in discourse to the identity of America - a discourse of danger, fear, and vulnerability posed by potential missile attacks against the US from "rogue states" and accidental or unauthorized missile launches from a particular "China" or "Russia." The argument maintained here has been that a particular representation of America does not exist apart from the very differences that allegedly threaten that representation, just as the particular America of recent lore did not exist apart from Cold War-related discourses of danger. If missile defence is (as Bauman, cited earlier, has put it) the "foolproof recipe" for exorcising the ghosts or demons of missile hysteria, then Bush's national security advisors are the exorcists and shamans as well as the constructors of national insecurity via missile hysteria. 86 However, the argument has not been that the Administration, the Rumsfeld Commission, and other missile defence enthusiasts fabricated, ex nihilo, a ballistic missile threat against the US by means of a singular, deliberate "act," which is what some constructivists in international relations, conspiracy theorists, and partisan Democrats - an interesting if not motley collectivity - would have us believe. Nor has it been that language and discourse is "everything" as linguistic idealists would have us imagine. Rather, through reiterative and coordinated practices by which discourse produces the effects that it names, a certain normative representation of America "emerges" - wrought, as it were, by fear and written into being by missile hysteria.

## 1NR – Politics

### JMU MM Solar

#### Warming apocalypse --

#### Deibel -- IR prof at national war college talking with scientific certainty -- "major existential threat to American security and prosperity"

#### We control uniqueness – apocalyptic warming rhetoric disabling effective approaches to warming now

Barrett & Gilles 12 -- \*nonprofit director and consultant for over a decade, her writing has appeared in newspapers, magazines, and blogs nationwide AND \*\*consulted for numerous political campaigns, advocacy organizations, and global NGOs, and has been profiled in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, and Fast Company (Mel and Metthew Barrett, 4/23/12, "How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action," http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/how-apocalyptic-thinking-prevents-us-from-taking-political-action/255758/)

To understand why fewer people believe in climate change even as evidence mounts, we must look beyond the industry-funded movement to deny the reality and effects of climate change. Perhaps equally important -- if not quite equally culpable -- has been the extent to which both the proponents and opponents of human-made climate change have led us down a cul-de-sac of conversation by exploiting the apocalyptic metaphor to make their case. Whether by design or by accident, the initial warnings of environmentalists -- of oceans rising to engulf our most beloved metropolises, of amber waves of grain scorched into a desert landscape -- activated the apocalyptic impulse. The focus on disastrous repercussions for our behavior at some point in the future echoed the warnings of the Israelite priests to wayward Jews in Babylon or, later, to those who submitted too willingly to Alexander's process of Hellenization. It was a familiar story: change, and change radically, or face hell on earth. Perhaps there was no other way to sound the alarm about the devastating threat presented by global climate change, but that echo of apocalyptic warning was quickly seized upon by the naysayers to dismiss the evidence out of hand. We've heard this story before, the deniers insisted, and throughout history those who have declared the end of the world was near have always been proven wrong. As early as 1989, the industry front man Patrick Michaels, a climatologist and global warming skeptic, was warning in the op-ed pages of the Washington Post of this new brand of "apocalyptic environmentalism," which represented "the most popular new religion to come along since Marxism." That the solutions to global warming (a less carbon-intensive economy, a more localized trade system, a greater respect for nature's power) parallel so perfectly the dream of environmentalists, and that the causes of global warming (an unrestrained industrial capitalism reliant on the continued and accelerating consumption of fossil fuels) parallel the economic dream of conservatives, has simply exacerbated the fact that global warming has now become just another front in the culture wars. By seizing upon and mocking the apocalyptic imagery and rhetoric of those sounding the alarm, the industry front groups succeeded in framing the debate about global warming into a question about what one believes. Thus, entangled with the myth of apocalypse -- and its attendant hold on our own sense of belief and self-identity -- the debate about anthropogenic climate change has reached an impasse. You believe in the Rapture; I believe in global warming -- and so the conversation stops. But global climate change is not an apocalyptic event that will take place in the future; it is a human-caused trend that is occurring now. And as we expend more time either fearfully imagining or vehemently denying whether that trend will bring about a future apocalypse, scientists tell us that the trend is accelerating. Talking about climate change or peak oil through the rhetoric of apocalypse may make for good television and attention-grabbing editorials, but such apocalyptic framing hasn't mobilized the world into action. Most of us are familiar with the platitude "When the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." In a similar way, our over-reliance on the apocalyptic storyline stands between us and our ability to properly assess the problems before us. Some see the looming crises of global warming and resource and energy depletion and conclude that inaction will bring about the end of civilization: only through a radical shift toward clean energy and conservation, those on the Left argue, can we continue the way of life that we have known. Those on the Right dismiss the apocalyptic threats altogether, because the proposed solutions to peak oil, global warming, and overpopulation conflict with core conservative beliefs about deregulation and the free-market economy, or with a religious worldview that believes humanity is not powerful enough to alter something as large as our climate. Still others dismiss the catalog of doom and gloom as mere apocalypticism itself. Surely, we convince ourselves, all the dire warnings about the effects of global warming aren't that different from the world-ending expectations of the Rapturists? The result is that the energy we could expend addressing the problems before us is instead consumed by our efforts to either dismiss the threat of apocalypse or to prove it real. Ultimately, the question becomes not what to do about the threats before us but whether you believe in the threats before us. By allowing the challenges of the 21st century to be hijacked by the apocalyptic storyline, we find ourselves awaiting a moment of clarity when the problems we must confront will become apparent to all -- or when those challenges will magically disappear, like other failed prophecies about the end of the world. Yet the real challenges we must face are not future events that we imagine or dismiss through apocalyptic scenarios of collapse -- they are existing trends. The evidence suggests that much of what we fear in the future -- the collapse of the economy, the arrival of peak oil and global warming and resource wars -- has already begun. We can wait forever, while the world unravels before our very eyes, for an apocalypse that won't come. The apocalyptic storyline becomes a form of daydreaming escape: the threat of global warming becomes a fantasy to one day live off the grid, or buy a farm, or grow our own food; economic collapse becomes like a prison break from the drudgery of meaningless and increasingly underpaid work in a soul-crushing cubicle; peak oil promises the chance to finally form a community with the neighbors to whom you've never spoken. Yet despite the fantasia peddled by Hollywood and numerous writers, a world battered by natural disasters and global warming, facing declining natural resources and civic unrest, without adequate water or energy or food, with gross inequalities between the rich and the poor, is not a setting for a picaresque adventure, nor is it the ideal place to start living in accord with your dreams. The deeper we entangle the challenges of the 21st century with apocalyptic fantasy, the more likely we are to paralyze ourselves with inaction -- or with the wrong course of action. We react to the idea of the apocalypse -- rather than to the underlying issues activating the apocalyptic storyline to begin with -- by either denying its reality ("global warming isn't real") or by despairing at its inevitability ("why bother recycling when the whole world is burning up?"). We react to apocalyptic threats by either partying (assuaging our apocalyptic anxiety through increased consumerism, reasoning that if it all may be gone tomorrow, we might as well enjoy it today), praying (in hopes that divine intervention or mere time will allow us to avoid confronting the challenges before us), or preparing (packing "bugout" packs for a quick escape or stocking up on gold, guns, and canned food, as though the transformative moment we anticipate will be but a brief interlude, a bad winter storm that might trap us indoors for a few days or weeks but that will eventually melt away). None of these responses avert, nor even mitigate, the very threats that have elicited our apocalyptic anxiety in the first place. Buying an electric car doesn't solve the problem of a culture dependent on endless growth in a finite world; building a bunker to defend against the zombie hordes doesn't solve the growing inequities between the rich and poor; praying for deliverance from the trials of history doesn't change that we must live in the times in which we were born. Indeed, neither partying, nor preparing, nor praying achieves what should be the natural goal when we perceive a threat on the horizon: we should not seek to ignore it, or simply brace for it, but to avert it.

#### This technological enframing makes warming strategically even more dangerous.

**Crist ‘7** – Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are **even greater dangers** in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the **root cause** of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may **temporarily** avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will **barely address**—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Climate conflict --

#### Scheffran et al -- increases border tensions, causes resource conflicts, and would cause US military involvement – alt’ rejects impetus for intervention

#### Economic security --

#### Royal -- stat support for our root cause claim -- your discursive claim to national security creates a rally around the flag effect

#### Attempting to save the global economy from disaster is a liberal order-building method of security

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy, Brunel University, 08 (“Critique of Security”, McGill-Queen’s University, pp. 94-97, Published 2008)

But 'social security' was clearly an inadequate term for this, associated as it now was with 'soft' domestic policy issues such as old-age insurance. 'Collective security' would not do, associated as it was with the dull internationalism of Wilson on the one hand and still very much connected to the institutions of social security on the other." Only one term would do: national security. This not to imply that 'national security' was simply adopted and adapted from 'social security'. Rather, what we are dealing with here is another ideological circuit, this time between 'national security' and 'social security', in which the policies 'insuring' the security of the population are a means of securing the body politic, and vice versa;" a circuit in which, to paraphrase David Peace in the epigraph to this chapter, one can have one's teeth kicked out in the name of national security and put back in through social security. Social security and national security were woven together: the social and the national were the warp and the weft of the security fabric. The warp and the welt, that is, of a broader vision of economic security. Robert Pollard has suggested that 'the concept of "economic security'- the idea that American interests would be best sewed by an open and integrated economic system, as opposed to a large peacetime military establishment - was firmly established during the wartime period'. 71 In fact, the concept of 'economic security' became a concept of international politics in this period, but the concept itself had a longer history as the underlying idea behind social security in the 1930s, as we have seen. Economic security, in this sense, provides the important link between social and national security, becoming liberalism's strategic weapon of choice and the main policy instrument from 1945. As one State Department memo of February 1944 put it, 'the development of sound international economic relations is closely related to the problem of security. But it would also continue to be used to think about the political administration of internal order. Hence Roosevelt's comment that 'we must plan for, and help to bring about, an expanded economy which will result in more security [and so that the conditions of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 won't come back again'.' On security grounds, inside and outside were constantly folding into one another, the domestic and the foreign never quite On the fabrication of economic order properly distinguishable. The reason why lay in the kind of economic order to be secured: both domestically and internationally, 'economic security' is coda for capitalist order. Giving a lecture at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall recalled the disruption to the European economy during the war and Europe's continuing inability to feed itself, and suggested that if the US did not help there would be serious economic, social and political deterioration which would in turn have a knock-on effect on US capital. The outcome was a joint plan submitted to the US from European states at the end of August, after much wrangling with the Soviet Union, requesting $28 billion over a four-year period (the figure was reduced when finally agreed by Congress). The European Recovery Program (ERE known as the Marshall Plan) which emerged has gone down as an economic panacea, 'saving' Europe from economic disaster. But as the first of many such 'Plans', all the way down to the recent 'reconstruction' of Iraq, it does not take much to read the original Marshall Plan through the lens of security and liberal order-building. Alan Milward has suggested that the conventional reading of the Marshall Plan and US aid tends to accept the picture of post-war Europe on the verge of collapse and with serious social and economic discontent, such that it needed to be rescued by US aid. In fact, excluding Germany, no country was actually on the verge of collapse. There were no bank crashes, very few bankruptcies and the evidence of a slow down in industrial production is unconvincing. There is also little evidence of grave distress or a general deterioration in the standard of living. By late-1946 production had roughly equalled pre-war levels in all countries except Germany. And yet Marshall Aid came about. Milward argues that the Marshall Plan was designed not to increase the rate of recovery in European countries or to prevent European economies from deteriorating, but to sustain ambitious, new, expansionary economic and social policies in Western European countries which were in fact already in full-bloom conditions. In other words, the Marshall Plan was predominantly designed for political objectives - hence conceived and rushed through by the Department of State itself." Milward's figures are compelling, and complicate the conventional picture of the Marshall Plan as simply a form of economic aid. But to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which, in terms of security, the economic and the political are entwined. This is why the Marshall Plan is so inextricably linked to the Truman Doctrine's offer of military aid and intervention beyond us borders, a new global commitment at the heart of which was the possibility of intervention in the affairs of other countries. As Joyce and Gabriel Kolko have argued the important dimension of the Truman Doctrine is revealed in the various drafts of Truman's speech before it was finally delivered on 12 March, and the private memos of the period. Members of the cabinet and other top officials understood very clearly that the united States was now defining a strategy and budget appropriate to its new global commitments, and that a far greater involvement in other countries was now pending especially on the economic level. Hence the plethora of references to 'a world-wide trend away from the system of free enterprise's which the state Department's speech-writers thought a 'grave threat' to American interests. Truman's actual speech to Congress is therefore more interesting for what it implied than what it stated explicitly. And what it implied was the politics behind the Marshall Plan: economic security as a means of maintaining political order against the threat of communism. The point then, is not just that the Marshall Plan was 'political' how could any attempt to reshape global capital be anything but political? It is fairly clear that the Marshall Plan was multidimensional, and to distinguish reasons that are 'economic' reasons from reasons that are 'political' misses the extent to which the economic, political and military are entwined The point is that it was very much a project driven by the ideology of security. The referent object of 'security here is 'economic order'. The government and the emerging national security bureaucracy saw the communist threat as economic rather than military. As Latham notes, at first glance the idea of military security within a broad context of economic containment merely appears to be one more dimension of strength within the liberal order. But in another respect the project of economic security might itself be viewed as the very force that made military security appear to be necessary. In this sense, the priority given to economic security was the driving force behind the us commitment to underwrite milita ry security for Western Europe." The protection and expansion of capital came to be seen as the path to security, and vice versa. This created the grounds for a re-ordering of global capital involving a constellation of class and corporate forces as well as state power, undertaken in the guise of national security. NSC-68, the most significant national security document to emerge in this period, stated that the 'overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish'." In this sense we can also read the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, the Brussels Pact of March 1948 and the nascent movement towards 'European Union' as part and parcel of the security project being mapped out." The key institutions of 'international order' in this period invoked a particular vision of order with a view to reshaping global capital as a means of bringing 'security' political, social and economic - from the communist threat.

### 2NC – Heg Impact Overview

#### Immigration key to heg – key to hard and soft power

#### Hegemonic decline causes multiple hotspots for conflict – Kagan indicates countries like Russia/Georgia, India/Pakistan, the Middle East and Asia would all start fighting to be the hegemon escalating to global nuclear conflict

#### Deterrence – ceiling on conflicts- reason no impacts to econ or resource wars

#### Heg collapse turns warming – fighting =no global emission reduction also says key to soft power which is probably key to emissions reductions- that was the 1NC ev

### Turns Economy 2NC

#### Turns economy --- failure to pass immigration reform results in economic decline --- kills jobs, wages and revenue.

Center for American Progress, 1/14/2010 (How Immigration Reform Would Help the Economy, p. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2010/01/14/7130/how-immigration-reform-would-help-the-economy/)

A new report, “Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” by Dr. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, finds that comprehensive immigration reform that includes a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants and enables a future flow of legal workers would result in a large economic benefit—a cumulative $1.5 trillion in added U.S. gross domestic product over 10 years. In stark contrast, a deportation- only policy would result in a loss of $2.6 trillion in GDP over 10 years. Hinojosa uses a computable general equilibrium model based on the historical experience of the 1986 legalization program, and finds that: Comprehensive immigration reform that includes a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants would stimulate the U.S. economy. Immigration reform would increase U.S. GDP by at least 0.84 percent. This would translate into at least a $1.5 trillion cumulative increase in GDP over 10 years, which includes approximately $1.2 trillion in consumption and $256 billion in investment. The benefits of additional GDP growth would be spread broadly throughout the U.S. economy, but immigrant-heavy sectors such as textiles, electronic equipment, and construction would see particularly large increases. The higher earning power of newly legalized workers would mean increased tax revenues of $4.5 billion to $5.4 billion in the first three years. Higher personal income would also generate increased consumer spending—enough to support 750,000 to 900,000 jobs in the United States. Experience shows that legalized workers open bank accounts, buy homes, and start businesses, further stimulating the U.S. economy. Comprehensive immigration reform increases all workers’ wages. The real wages of less-skilled newly legalized workers would increase by roughly $4,405 per year, while higher-skilled workers would see their income increase $6,185 per year. The wages of native-born high-skill and low-skill U.S. workers also increase modestly under comprehensive immigration reform because the “wage floor” rises for all workers. Legalized workers invest more in their human capital, including education, job training, and English-language skills, making them even more productive workers and higher earners. Mass deportation is costly, lowers wages, and harms the U.S. economy. Mass deportation would reduce U.S. GDP by 1.46 percent, amounting to a cumulative $2.6 trillion loss in GDP over 10 years, not including the actual costs of deportation. The Center for American Progress has estimated that mass deportation would cost $206 billion to $230 billion over five years. Wages would rise for less-skilled native-born workers under a mass deportation scenario, but higher-skilled natives’ wages would decrease, and there would be widespread job loss. Studies from various researchers with divergent political perspectives confirm these findings. A report by the libertarian CATO Institute using a similar CGE model came to startlingly similar conclusions. CATO found that legalization would yield significant income gains for American workers and households. Legalization would boost the incomes of U.S. households by $180 billion in 2019. CATO also concluded that tighter restrictions and a reduction in less-skilled immigration would impose large costs on native-born Americans by shrinking the overall economy and lowering worker productivity.

#### Econ doesn’t turn heg.

**Kagan**, 1/11/**2012** (Robert – senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, Not Fade Away, The New Republic, p. International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI)

SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for America’s relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.

### L.A.

#### Reform key to Latin American relations

**Shifter, Inter-American Dialogue president, 2012**

(Michael, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>, DOA: 2-9-13, ldg)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation. The **inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the U**nited **S**tates **and** nearly **every other country in the Americas**. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Turns warming, solves extinction

**Shifter, Inter-American Dialogue president, 2012**

(Michael, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>, DOA: 2-9-13, ldg)

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties. Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a **vital** market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology **for Latin America**, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance. For its part, **Latin America’s rising economies will** inevitably **become** more and more **crucial to the U**nited **S**tates’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such **global matters as climate change**, nuclear non-proliferation, and **democracy and human rights.** With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

### Solar – 2NC

#### Plan unpopular- Concerns about deficit and solyndra poisoned the well for solar- that’s Cardwell – outweighs public popularity

#### Plan requires lots of capital – Congressional engagement key

Businessweek, 9/6 (“Renewable Energy Is Obama Goal for Next Term, Aide Says”, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-06/renewable-energy-is-obama-goal-for-next-term-aide-says)

President Barack Obama’s effort to develop renewable power sources and persuade Congress to adopt a long-term energy policy will be priorities should he win a second term, his top climate and energy aide said. Clean-energy programs and efficiency initiatives will be a focus for the president if he’s re-elected in November, Heather Zichal, Obama’s deputy assistant for energy and climate change, told reporters today in Washington. “The big issue will remain engagement with Congress,” she said. “The president has talked continuously about the need for a long-term energy policy, and I think that will be something that he will obviously remain focused on in the second term.” As a candidate in 2008, Obama pledged to create 5 million green jobs over 10 years by investing in renewable sources such as solar and wind power. He promoted alternatives to fossil fuels as a way to cut U.S. dependence on imported fuel. The 2009 economic-stimulus plan spent a record $90 billion on clean energy, creating 225,000 green jobs after one year, according to the White House. Republicans have used U.S. support for Solyndra LLC, the solar-panel maker that collapsed two years after getting a $535 million U.S. loan guarantee, to depict Obama’s policies as a failure by meddling in the free market. Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee, said federal regulation of oil and gas limit U.S. energy development.

#### Massive GOP opposition to the plan – just passed “No More Solyndras Act”

Abrams, 9/14 (Jim, “House votes to end energy loan guarantee program”, Associated Press, http://www.boston.com/business/technology/2012/09/14/house-votes-end-energy-loan-guarantee-program/AdM0doMf7MgEIqbjxfTcVI/story.html)

WASHINGTON (AP) — Republicans on Friday pushed a bill through the House shining a campaign-season light on the most conspicuous failure of President Barack Obama’s economic stimulus package. The bill would phase out federal loan guarantees like those that went to the now-bankrupt solar power company Solyndra LLC and left taxpayers on the hook for more than $500 million. The ‘‘No More Solyndras Act,’’ which passed on a mainly party-linevote, has no chance of advancing in the Democratic-led Senate and was assailed by House Democrats as an election-year stunt. The vote was 245-161. The bill would curtail an Energy Department loan guarantee program that was the source of the more than $500 million investment in Solyndra. It was part of the $787 billion stimulus package enacted shortly after Obama took office in 2009. The Fremont, Calif.-based company was the first renewable energy company to receive a federal loan guarantee under the stimulus, and its financial woes in the face of Chinese competition made it a target for Republican scrutiny. The company filed for bankruptcy protection in September 2011, and under its reorganization plan, taxpayers would lose almost all of their investment. The bill would require the Treasury to review any future Energy loan guarantees made before the program expires and reaffirm that it is forbidden to ‘‘subordinate’’ loans so that private investors are repaid before the government is. ‘‘I'm stunned by the cavalier manner in which the administration squandered all of these tax dollars yet says it has no regrets, no apologies, about its handling of the program,’’ said Rep. Fred Upton, R-Mich., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. ‘‘Burning money is one source of energy that the country doesn’t need.’’ The measure was approved by Upton’s committee in early August, along with the results of an 18-month investigation by committee Republicans concluding the administration was determined to make Solyndra a stimulus success story despite evidence that it was headed for failure. The report said the Energy Department knowingly violated the law when it restructured the loan last year so as to subordinate taxpayer interests to those of private investors. One of the private equity funds that takes repayment priority is an investment vehicle for a foundation headed by billionaire George Kaiser, a major Obama campaign contributor. Democrats dismissed the report as partisan and one-sided and said Republicans failed to prove their argument that the loan was made for political reasons. The White House said the president strongly believed it was the right decision to invest in clean energy technologies. ‘‘It’s clear that this legislation is a political exercise,’’ said Rep. Diana DeGette, D-Colo. ‘‘It does nothing but attempt to keep the word ‘Solyndra’ in the news.’’ Republicans pointed out that three of the first five companies that received loan guarantees under the stimulus, among them Solyndra, have gone bankrupt. Democrats said Republicans were ignoring the Energy Department successes, including saving nearly 300 million gallons of gasoline a year by supporting such projects as one of the world’s largest wind farms in Oregon, a large solar generation project in California and a major photovoltaic solar power plant in Arizona. The loan guarantee program falls under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that was passed partly with the intention of promoting a revival of nuclear energy. The George W. Bush administration did not approve any loan guarantees and under Obama it shifted toward boosting development of innovative clean energy technology. The legislation bars the Energy Department from issuing loan guarantees for any application received after Jan. 1 this year, leaving $34 billion in authorized money to provide financial backing to applications made before that date. Democrats said that means the department could provide loan guarantees to older energy industries favored by Republicans, specifically nuclear and coal, while shutting out future applicants with breakthrough clean energy technology.

#### Plan forces Obama to spend capital

Hansen, 10 (Dr. James, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York City and is Adjunct Professor of Earth Sciences at Columbia University’s Earth Institute, “Obama's Second Chance on the Predominant Moral Issue of This Century”, Huffington Post, Apil 5, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-james-hansen/obamas-second-chance-on-c\_b\_525567.html)

But so far Congress has been steamrolled by special interests. Congressional leaders add giveaways in their bills to attract industry support and specific votes. The best of the lot, the Cantwell-Collins bill, returns 75 percent of the revenue to the public. But it is still a cap-and-trade scheme, and its low carbon price and offset-type projects create little incentive for clean energy and would have only small impact on carbon emissions. Can the cacophony of special interests be overcome? There is one way: the president must get involved. He must explain the situation to the public and use his bully pulpit to persuade Congress to do what is right for the nation and future generations. He must explain that a rising carbon price is needed to phase out our fossil fuel addiction. The dividend will provide the public the means to move to a clean energy future, stimulating the economy.

**A2: Popularity**

**-- Public popularity irrelevant**

**Gelman 9** (Andrew, Professor of Statistics and Political Science and Director of the Applied Statistics Center – Columbia University, FiveThirtyEight.com, 11-14, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/11/politicians-have-lot-of-leeway-in-how.html)

Matthew Yglesias remarks that, when staking out positions, congressmembers are not very strongly constrained by the ideologies of their constituents. Wow, that was a lot of big words. What I meant to say was**:** Congressmembers and Senators can pretty much vote how they want on most issues, whatever their constituents happen to believe. Not always, of course, but a representative can take a much more liberal or conservative line than the voters in his or her district or state, and still do fine when election time comes. Yglesias gives some examples from the U.S. Senate, and I just wanted to back him up by citing some research from the House of Representatives. First, here's a graph (from chapter 9 of Red State, Blue State; the numbers are based on research with Jonathan Katz) showing that, when running for reelection, it helps for a congressmember to be a moderate--but not by much: Being a moderate is worth about 2% of the vote in a congressional election: it ain't nuthin, but it certainly is not a paramount concern for most representatives. To look at this another way, here's a graph showing the members of the House of Representatives in 1993-1994: Representatives from more politically extreme districts tended themselves to be further to the right (if Republicans) or to the left (if Democrats), but only slightly so, with a lot of exceptions. There's a lot of leeway on where politicians stand. (And, yes, many of these Democrats did lose in 1994--but, pretty much, the ones that lost were those in marginal districts, not particularly those with extremely liberal ideologies. By this I'm not trying to say the extreme liberals benefited from their ideology--as noted above, I estimate that it hurt them by, on average, a couple percentage points of the vote--but that these couple percentage points didn't really matter much; the partisanship of their districts was much more of the key factor in determining whether they were reelected.) More discussion here, in the context of the notorious "median voter theorem." As I wrote earlier, I am sympathetic to the related point that it can be a mistake to assume that politicians of your political party agree with you, deep down, on the issues, and that they're only voting differently because of expedience, craven political calculation, or whatever. It's worth considering the hypothesis that lots of Democratic politicians do not share the values and policy preferences of lots of Democratic voters, and similarly for the Republicans. Given the diversity of public opinion, this really has to be true on some issues, and it very well might be true all over the place. Another way of saying all this is: Incumbent congressmembers almost always win reelection. And, when they don't, they're often losing as part of a national swing (as in the 1994 Republican sweep or the 2006/2008 Democratic shift). And when an incumbent does lose unexpectedly, it can be for something unrelated to their votes (remember the "check kiting scandal" of 1992?).

### Not Pop W/Public

#### Even if voters support clean energy, they don’t want government spending.

**Freed et. al**, February **2012** (Josh – Third Way and Matt Bennett – Third Way, Al Quinlan – Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, and Andrew Baumann – Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Moving Clean Energy to the Center: Insights from Swing Voters in the Midwest and South, p. http://content.thirdway.org/publications/486/Third\_Way\_Report\_-\_Moving\_Clean\_Energy\_to\_the\_Center\_-\_Insights\_from\_Swing\_Voters\_in\_the\_Midwest\_and\_South.pdf)

While there is a strong desire to get America running on clean energy, there is a gap between what participants want and how they think the country can achieve it. Much of the public focus for clean energy advocates in recent years simply did not resonate with these participants. While voters did believe clean energy will spur economic growth—eventually—they did not see it creating a significant number of jobs today, particularly in manufacturing. In addition, climate change was simply not on voters’ minds—virtually none of the participants connected a focus on clean energy with addressing global warming. Finally, there was no faith that direct government spending would spur innovation or adoption of clean energy.

### U – 2NC

#### Will pass – Merica evidence indicates that Obama feels good about negotiations – he is setting a timetable – 60 days until passage- means that there is only a risk that the plan trades off

#### Will pass – GOP

Smith 3/8

[Larry, Left Foot Forward, The Week in Washington: Obama and GOP talk budget, filibuster fails to block CIA director and more, 3/8/13,

<http://www.leftfootforward.org/2013/03/the-week-in-washington-obama-and-gop-talk-budget-filibuster-fails-to-block-cia-director-and-more/>]

Republican senators involved in talks on immigration reform have said they are still prepared to offer undocumented aliens a pathway to full citizenship, despite unexpected opposition to the idea from Jeb Bush. In press interviews this week, the three most influential GOP senators in favour of an overhaul – John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio - restated their support for a pathway and rejected an alternative plan floated by the former Florida governor which would allow immigrants legal residency but not citizenship. Bush’s intervention – which comes in a new book written last year – took many observers by surprise given his previous support for large-scale reform. Some have wondered whether the ex-governor is positioning himself for a Republican presidential primary, although it seems more likely he formulated the alternative to woo his party away from hardline positions it took during the 2012 election. Bush has already indicated he could change his position on the issue. The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that the cross-party group of senators working on an immigration reform bill would not have a draft ready until April at the earliest. However, there are signs of progress in the House of Representatives. Judiciary Chair Bob Goodlatte has announced he will hold classes for members on immigration to ensure a lack of in-depth knowledge does not hinder legislation, and small **GOP working groups are aiding bipartisan House talks on the issue**. Aides to Speaker Boehner have said his chamber may end up passing ‘**small-bore’ bills that could then be reconciled with a comprehensive Senate blueprint**.

#### Momentum and top of docket – this also answers “poison pill”

Liasson 2-20 (Mara, Anchor – NPR, “Where Does Overhauling Immigration Stand?,” Lexis)

MARA LIASSON: Well, that's a good question. To hear some Republicans explain it, anything with the president's name on it hurts, but that doesn't really make sense because I don't think Republicans are going to vote for or against immigration reform based on whether the president supports it. This is an issue that has momentum because it's in the political interests of both sides to support it. And then there's the notion that some Republicans believe that the president wants and issue not a bill. But I don't see any evidence for that. He has tread very carefully on this issue. He hasn't demonized Republicans on immigration reform as he has been more than willing to do on other issues like sequestration, as we just heard in Scott's piece. I think the president does want to sign a bill, but he also has to prove to his own base that he is willing to move forward with his own plan if Congress is unable to come up with a bipartisan immigration reform proposal. He hasn't put a hard and fast deadline on it, but he has mentioned March as a time when he expects something to happen in the Senate. STEVE INSKEEP: OK. So if he has to prove that to his own base, his fellow Democrats, does the release of this White House plan actually help things a little bit then? MARA LIASSON: Well, it could help push things forward in a perverse way, because it provides some cover for Republicans, particularly Marco Rubio, who's been a leader on this issue. He was very critical of the White House draft. He said it would be dead on arrival if they sent that up in legislative form to the Hill. It allows him to position himself in maybe a more politically comfortable position, opposing the president's plan and saying he supports this bipartisan congressional package instead of the, you know, far left White House proposal on immigration reform. So you could make the argument that this actually could help the process.

#### Bipartisan support BECAUSE Obama is pushing

Samay 2-21 (Samay Live, Obama is hoping to sign immigration reform bill, Lexis)

US President Barack Obama is encouraged by the progress made in the US Congress on comprehensive immigration reform and hoped that a bill in this regard would soon land up on his table for signature. "As the (US) President has made clear, he is encouraged by and hopeful about the process underway in the Senate, the bipartisan process led by the so-called Gang of Eight (a group of eight Senators), towards achieving a comprehensive immigration reform bill that could pass the Senate -- and hopefully pass the House, and land on his desk for his signature," the White House Press Secretary Jay Carney told reporters here yesterday. "He (Obama) prefers that option to any other, and he is very encouraged by the progress that's been made so far. He thought his conversations with Senate Democrats involved in this process last week were very productive, and he felt the same about his conversations with Senate Republicans yesterday," Carney said referring to the telephonic conversations the US President had with top three Republican lawmakers, a day earlier. Responding to questions, Carney said there is not much disagreement among various parties when it comes to the need to pursue enhanced border security as part of comprehensive immigration reform. "That's part of why it's called comprehensive. So we look forward, to continuing to work with Congress, work with the Senate as they pursue bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform legislation," he said. Carney said that the prospects of success in this regard can be easily reflected from the comments of Republican Senator Mario Rubio. "But we encourage the Senate to keep working because this is a significant priority. It's a priority that has in the past enjoyed broad bipartisan support, and that we believe is, once again, enjoying that kind of support," the White House Press Secretary said. He said the legislation that then-Senator Obama supported back in 2006 was co-authored by Senator (John) McCain, which also got the support of President George W. Bush "And that I think represents and reflects what should be the bipartisan consensus behind this very important policy goal," he said. Carney said that comprehensive immigration reform provides a clear path to citizenship that includes getting in the back of the line and paying taxes and the like, a view supported by both the Democratic and Republican parties.

#### Opposition is being resolved BECAUSE of PC

CBS 2-19 (After tiff, Obama calls GOP senators to talk immigration, Lexis)

After a public squabble over whether President Obama was in communication with Congress on immigration reform, Mr. Obama today called three key Republican senators to discuss the matter. Mr. Obama called Sens. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.; John McCain, R-Ariz.; and Marco Rubio, R-Fla., the White House said in a statement, "to discuss their shared commitment to bipartisan, commonsense immigration reform and to commend the Senators for the bipartisan progress that continues to be made by the Gang of 8 on this important issue." Graham, McCain and Rubio are three of the four Republican senators working with four Democratic senators to craft immigration reform legislation. Mr. Obama did not speak to the fourth Republican, Sen. Jeff Flake, R-Ariz., because he is traveling today, but the White House said the president looks forward to speaking with him in the near future. White House: Leaked immigration plan is only partial draft of bill[1] GOP: Leaked WH immigration plan "counterproductive"[2] The White House said the president's phone calls today "build on conversations that have taken place at the staff level." In a White House briefing earlier today, senior administration officials said "Gang of 8" staff had met at least five times in recent weeks with the White House policy and legislative affairs staff. Rubio's office, however, disputed that claim. "We've never discussed immigration policy with anyone from the White House," Rubio's spokesman Alex Conant said. "The Administration has sent some agency officials to brief staff at the bipartisan group meetings, but they've never asked for our input. (And, frankly, we've never asked for theirs.) We've never received a call or email from [Mr. Obama's chief domestic policy adviser] Cecilia Munoz or anyone else at the White House asking for our input as they draft their bill." Republicans contend that if the Obama administration is serious about drafting its own immigration reform proposals, they should be seeking at least some input from the GOP. Today's phone calls may have at least temporarily improved the White House's relationship with Congress. Conant said on Twitter[3] today that "@MarcoRubio appreciated @BarackObama's call to discuss immigration tonight. Rubio said he feels good about ongoing negotiations in Senate."

### A2: Thumpers – Budget

#### Obama’s pivoting to immigration, away from budget

NYT 3-6 (“From One Budget Fight to the Next,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/opinion/from-one-budget-fight-to-the-next.html?\_r=1&)

Unable to stop the sequester’s job-killing spending cuts, President Obama now says he wants to move past the endless wars of budget attrition. Though he still wants a long-term deficit deal, he said last week, it is time to turn to immigration, gun control, universal preschool, a higher minimum wage and voting reform.

### A2: Thumpers – Sequester/Gun Control

#### Sequester and gun control don’t thump

Murray 3/6

[Sara, Wall Street Journal, McCain: Visa Overhaul Key Hurdle in Immigration Talks, 3/6/13, <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/03/06/mccain-visa-overhaul-key-hurdle-in-immigration-talks/>]

Even as others in the GOP remain unsettled about the path to citizenship, Mr. McCain said compromising with unions could be one of the biggest challenges for the Senate group. The group of eight senators is also engaged in a “major debate” over who would be eligible to apply for legal status, depending on when they entered the U.S. Still, he is cautiously optimistic that comprehensive immigration changes could pass and said the plan is unlikely to be sidetracked by the broader argument over the sequester and budget. In a wide-ranging interview with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. McCain said he thinks an upcoming fight this spring to extend the federal government’s borrowing limit could be the most significant budget battle. The constant wrangling over budget issues could spur renewed calls for a grand bargain, he said. “Even we are tired…of lurching from one cliff to another,” Mr. McCain said. “I think that’s lending some pressure towards trying to come up with some kind of a grand bargain.” After recently meeting with President Barack Obama at the White House, Mr. McCain said he believes the president has an appetite to do a big deal. But there are still scars between Mr. Obama and GOP leaders from their series of failed fiscal negotiations. “There’s a huge level of mistrust,” he said. Mr. McCain also said he’s hopeful that background-check legislation proceeds in Congress but disavowed any chance of passing a ban on assault weapons. “I think everybody knows how this is going to turn out,” Mr. McCain said. “There is not going to be a ban on assault weapons. They don’t have the votes for that.” Instead he urged a focus on expanding background checks and prosecuting background-check violations. While some had hoped Mr. McCain might join a Senate group working on the background check issue, he shied away from that possibility Wednesday, in part to keep his focus on immigration. Even as other Republicans express uncertainty, or even outright opposition, to immigration changes, Mr. McCain said it’s one of the few shots the party has to mend ties with Hispanic voters. “Republicans from a pure practical standpoint have to understand that right now many of our Hispanic citizens believe we don’t like them,” Mr. McCain said. “If we did comprehensive immigration reform it would not gain a single vote from the Hispanic community…it would put us in a position to compete for the Hispanic vote.”

### A2: Thumpers – Sequestration 2NC

#### Obama’s changed his strategy – reaching out on immigration, NOT sequester

Carney 2-20 (Jay, White House Press Secretary, “White House News Briefing,” Lexis)

QUESTION: The president reached out to key Republicans who were working on immigration reform yesterday. Does this represent a shifting of strategy? And can we expect him to reach out to Leader McConnell and Speaker Boehner today, or in the coming days? CARNEY: Well, I don't have any calls or meetings to announce or preview for you today. But I think it represents the regular engagement on the top priorities that the president has and the country has with members of Congress. And that will continue. As I think we learned yesterday, the -- yes, the president reached out to some of the Republican leaders, the "gang of eight" on immigration reform. That is in keeping with the regular outreach that has been done at a staff level by the White House. QUESTION: (inaudible) engagement with the president? CARNEY: Well, I think... (CROSSTALK) QUESTION: **They say they haven't heard from him in months on the sequester**.

#### Won’t be a fight

Kaletsky 1-23 [Anatole, journalist, financial economist, “Cooperation isn’t coming to Washington – it’s already arrived,” Reuters -- http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2013/01/23/cooperation-isnt-coming-to-washington-its-already-arrived/]

The House of Representatives decision to suspend the U.S. Treasury debt limit is the most important political event in America since President Barack Obama was first elected in 2008. As anticipated in this column immediately after the 2012 election, Washington seems to have broken its addiction to deadly games of economic chicken. That, in turn, should mean an orderly resolution of all U.S. fiscal problems and perhaps even an outbreak of bipartisan political cooperation, at least on economic issues, of a kind not seen in Washington since the early 1990s.¶ None of these favorable outcomes is yet acknowledged as true in Washington or Wall Street. Political analysts and market pundits have almost unanimously described the House decision as a diversionary tactic, simply designed to shift the high-noon confrontation with Obama to a new battleground more favorable to the Republican side: the March 1 date for automatic spending cuts under the sequestration procedure, or the March 27 expiration date of current government budgets.¶ This cynicism will almost certainly be proved wrong. The obvious reason is that **an army in full retreat,** as the Republicans have been since the election and fiscal cliff fiasco, finds it hard to regroup against an enemy enjoying strong momentum. And when such a battered force does attempt a last stand, this usually results in a rout. In this case, however, there are more specific reasons for the Republicans to seek peaceful coexistence instead of the fight-to-the-death over borrowing and spending that many pundits still predict. To see why House leaders decided to unilaterally disarm their nuclear weapons — first the fiscal cliff and now the debt ceiling — one has to understand the transformation in U.S. political dynamics that occurred the moment the votes were counted on Nov. 6.¶ Before the election, Republicans and their business backers had two overriding reasons to obstruct any deals with Obama on borrowing, spending or taxes. First, most Republicans genuinely expected to win the presidential election and therefore had every incentive to defer important decisions until their man was in power. Secondly, they calculated that any collateral damage inflicted on the economy through fiscal warfare would harm the incumbent president, whose Achilles’ heel was economic policy. Once the election was over, this calculus completely changed.¶ Having failed to unseat Obama, Republicans were suddenly in a situation where sabotaging the economy was no longer in their interests. As I argued immediately after the election, and again during the fiscal cliff negotiations, the GOP had few incentives after Nov. 7 to just thwart Obama. Republicans now had to persuade voters that their policies would promote jobs and growth — and would do so immediately, not in some distant future when budgets would have to balance or else the United States would turn into Greece.¶ The election also changed motivations for the Republicans’ business supporters. Instead of viewing Washington gridlock as a weapon for defeating Obama, American businesses after the election **had to accept the inevitable**. They would have to live with Obama and his policies, however much they disliked them. For most U.S. businesses, the primary political consideration was no longer the ideological debate over taxing and spending, but a purely economic issue: How would the economic policies negotiated between the White House and Congress affect business conditions in the four years leading to 2016?¶ This gestalt shift implies that **Republicans are unlikely to press very hard for large-scale spending cuts, government layoffs or fiscal tightening that could be seen as harming economic** recovery. Instead the focus should move to long-term budget reforms, designed to take effect only after the economy has largely recovered in 2015 or so – conveniently beyond the next congressional elections.¶ The president will have **strong incentives** to cooperate with such gradual fiscal consolidation, with major budget cuts backloaded to the last years of his administration and beyond. He would rather go down in history as the man who delivered universal healthcare, saved the U.S. economy from its worst crisis since the Great Depression, and put U.S. fiscal policy on a sustainable footing than waste his entire second term haggling over budgets – especially since achieving fiscal austerity does not require any major cuts or austerity, except in the very long term. ¶ In fact, the White House has already said it will offer some long-term entitlement reforms as part of the bipartisan budget deal that now looks eminently attainable. This may infuriate left-wing Democrats, but Obama is unlikely to care much, now that he has been reelected. In any case, grassroots Democratic voters will probably care more about presidential efforts on gun control, immigration and climate change than about wonkish arguments over Chained CPI and Medicare spending caps in the next decade.¶ Why then has there been little discussion of this change in political dynamics? Probably because **the media mostly see it as their role to magnify political drama rather than to analyze how they are likely to be resolved. The same applies to many professional politicians. Extreme statements from both parties will always attract the most media attention**. The congressional arithmetic, however, means that the views of radicals, highlighted by the media, are no longer very important.

**A2: Winners Win – 2NC**

#### Obama is walking the balancing now --- their “winners win” arg collapses immigration reform.

New York Times, **2/13**/2013 (On Immigration, Obama Draws Bipartisan Praise, p. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/us/politics/senate-panel-tackles-immigration.html?\_r=0)

President Obama’s nonconfrontational tone on an immigration overhaul in his State of the Union address on Tuesday night probably did more to advance the issue, lawmakers said, than if had he offered a fierce rallying cry, as he did about gun restrictions. As senators gathered Wednesday for the first hearing on the proposed sweeping changes in immigration law, they said the president’s decision to give members of both parties room to maneuver on the delicate politics of immigration was a strategic choice that could pay off as negotiations continued. “He’s walking a tightrope here, trying to allow Congress on a bipartisan basis to come up with a comprehensive immigration reform bill in the Senate,” said Senator Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, the No. 2 Senate Democrat. “He encouraged us, told us he doesn’t want this to drag on forever, and if we can’t get it done he’ll play more forceful role.” Mr. Durbin, a member of a bipartisan group of eight senators working on an immigration bill, added, “The reason he’s on this tightrope is the Republicans don’t want to make it appear that they are bending to the president on this issue.”

**Controversial wins bleed momentum not build it.**

**Politico**, 1/20/**2010** (Obama's first year: What went wrong, p. http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4DF829C9-18FE-70B2-A8381A971FA3FFC9)

Obama believed that early success would be self-reinforcing, building a powerful momentum for bold government action. This belief was the essence of the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a big stimulus package would lead to success in passing health care, which in turn would clear the way for major cap-and-trade environmental legislation and “re-regulation” of the financial services sector — all in the first year. This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power. The massive cost of the stimulus package and industry bailouts — combined with the inconvenient fact that unemployment went up after their passage — meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum rather than steadily increasing public confidence in his larger governing vision. That vision was further obscured for many Americans by the smoke from the bitter and seemingly endless legislative battle on Capitol Hill over health care.

**Obama thinks that pol cap is finite – he’ll back off controversial issues even if he’s winning**

**Kuttner 9** (Robert – , co-editor of The American Prospect and a senior fellow at Demos, author of "Obama's Challenge: America's Economic Crisis and the Power of a Transformative Presidency, 4/28/9, “Obama Has Amassed Enormous Political Capital, But He Doesn't Know What to Do with It,” <http://www.alternet.org/economy/138641/obama_has_amassed_enormous_political_capital,_but_he_doesn%27t_know_what_to_do_with_it/?page=entire>)

**We got a small taste of what a more radical break might feel like** when Obama briefly signaled with the release of Bush's torture memos that he might be open to further investigation of the Bush's torture policy, but then **backtracked** and quickly asked the Democratic leadership to shut the idea down. Evidently, Obama's political self wrestled with his constitutional conscience, and won. Civil libertarians felt a huge letdown, but protest was surprisingly muted.

Thus **the most important obstacle for seizing the moment to achieve enduring change:** Barack **Obama's conception of what it means to promote national unity.** Obama repeatedly declared during the campaign that he would govern as a consensus builder. He wasn't lying. However, there are two ways of achieving consensus. **One is to split the difference** with your political enemies and the forces obstructing reform. The other is to use presidential **leadership** to transform the political center and alter the political dynamics. In his first hundred days, **Obama** has done a little of both, but he **defaults to the politics of accommodation.**

**Winners lose – any major win is the quickest way to kill future proposals. The GOP will backlash**

**The Economist**, 2/16/**2011** (What’s the equilibrium here?, p. lexis)

The Obama administration's theory of policymaking amid divided government is a frustrating one. What most people want from the president is to lead. And leading, in this case, means giving a speech, getting behind some unpopular ideas, trying to change public opinion... But the White House has come to the conclusion that that type of leadership doesn't work. It believes that the **quickest way to kill a controversial proposal** in a polarized political system is to have the president endorse it. Once a high-profile proposal is associated with the White House, Republicans (correctly) view its passage as a **threat to their political fortunes**. That's why the Obama administration didn't endorse a payroll tax holiday until after the election, when it emerged as part of the tax deal. Endorsing it before the election would've "**poisoned the well**," one administration official told me after. Republicans would have had to attack it, and that would have made it impossible for them to endorse it later. The Obama administration may have a point here. Consider one item that the president has repeatedly, openly pushedinvestment in America's long-neglected intercity rail system. Republican governors are cancelling rail plans as fast as they can. Florida Governor Rick Scott just scrapped a Florida plan, despite the fact that the federal government was going to cover most of the capital costs, while private companies were offering to cover the rest in exchange for the right to operate the line. On the other hand, Mr Obama responded to Republican budget proposals that avoided addressing entitlements by...releasing a budget that avoided addressing entitlements. And lo and behold, Republican congressional leaders are now scrambling to include entitlement reforms in new budget plans. Maybe the president has this whole reverse psychology thing figured out. But I doubt this is a stable equilibrium. The GOP's reflexive **anti-Obama streak** is motivated, one presumes, by a desire to win elections. One supposes that they feel they must **deny him legislative victories** in order to be successful at the ballot box. So for a while, presidential abdication of leadership may create political space for something like honest legislative negotiations over policy. But a grand bargain that takes place under Mr Obama's watch is a **political victory** for Mr Obama, whether or not he led the charge. And the GOP is **unlikely to let the president have such a win**.

**Wins don’t spill over – empirically proven**

**Hertzberg**, 2/7/**2011** (Hendrik – senior editor and political essayist at the New Yorker, The New Yorker, p. http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/02/07/110207taco\_talk\_hertzberg?printable=true)

Strong words. But now they are not even whispered. The climate bill, like hundreds of others less consequential, met its fate on the legislative terminal ward that is the United States Senate, where bleeding is still the treatment of choice. The bill died of complete organ failure, you might say. The contributing causes included the economic crisis, which made it easy to stoke fear; the power, money, and regional clout of sectors that benefit from the greenhouse-gas-producing status quo, especially the coal and oil industries; the Republican congressional leadership’s determination to forgo compromise in favor of a disciplined drive to block anything that might resemble a victory for Obama; the rise of the Tea Party right and the baleful influence of talk radio and Fox News; and, as always, the filibuster. But Obama and the White House cannot escape blame. They botched delicate negotiations in the Senate, were neglectful at key moments, and expended little of the courage, imagination, and resources they brought to health-care reform. Perhaps they calculated that winning health care would strengthen them for climate change, like Popeye after a helping of spinach. But the political effect, at least in its immediate manifestations, was more like Kryptonite.

**Winners win not true for Obama – must be large, popular and on economic issue**

**Kuttner 11** (Robert, co-founder and co-editor of The American Prospect, as well as a distinguished senior fellow of the think tank Demos, 5/16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack\_obamas\_theory\_of\_power)

Obama won more legislative trophies during his first two years than Clinton did, but in many respects, they were poisoned chalices. Health reform proved broadly unpopular because of political missteps—a net negative for Democrats in the 2010 midterm. The stimulus, though valuable, was too small to be a major political plus. Obama hailed it as a great victory rather than pledging to come back for more until recovery was assured. He prematurely abandoned the fight for jobs as his administration’s central theme, though the recession still wracked the nation. And because of the administration’s alliance with Wall Street, Obama suffered both the appearance and reality of being too close to the bankers, despite a partial success on financial reform. Obama’s mortgage-rescue program was the worst of both worlds—it failed to deliver enough relief to make an economic difference yet still signaled politically disabling sympathy for both “deadbeat” homeowners and for bankers. (See this month’s special report on page A1.)

**Wins only build long-term capital – link outweighs**

**Purdum 10,** Columnist for Vanity Fair, (Todd, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” 12-20 [www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html](http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html))

With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. **With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves** and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often **messy and confusing**. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too.

**A2: DA Not Intrinsic**

**-- Our disad is intrinsic – the link proves that the plan results in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_.**

**-- Destroys all ground –**

**A) No disad is intrinsic – “make-up calls” can be crafted to solve any link or impact – even purely reaction-based DAs like Relations can be avoided by having the government cut the offended nation a big check**

**B) Fairness outweighs – logical debate is worthless if the Neg always loses. Fairness protects the forum that makes debate educational**

**-- Moving target – intrinsicness makes the plan conditional – destroys fairness because it's the locus of debate**

**-- Not logical: no single actor can do the plan and other actions. Even Congress is made up of many individual legislators.**

**-- Empirical intrinsicness checks – the Aff can read evidence that Congress will react to the plan by taking action – but not fiat that it occurs**

**A2: Fiat Solves / Magic Wand**

**-- Voting issue –**

**Uneducational – details of enactment are important**

**Not real world – there’s no magic wand, nothing passes instantly**

**Crushes ground – politics DAs are core offense on a broad topic**

**-- Our interpretation: plan passes immediately via normal political processes**

**-- Links worse: rushed enactment amplifies opposition, backlash is greater because there’s no time for debate**

**A2: Vote No**

**-- Illogical – the status quo should always be an option – they create bad policy-making – destroying real-world education – voting issue**

**-- Not real world – we aren’t Congress – just citizen-advocates debating ideas – they confuse roles**

**-- Politics DAs are good – encourage timely research key to education and its core ground on a huge topic**